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ABSTRACT
This study attempts to overcome past failings in the analysis of post-apartheid
South Africa's foreign policy. In contrast to "explanations" offered by most
previous analyses, this work demonstrates that the behaviour exhibited by
Pretoria is not immutable or simply subject to the global "realities", but is
derivative of the specific historic conjuncture of forces that joined together
during the transition from apartheid, and which remain open-ended. The
changes in the African National Congress' economic and political policies during
the transition period are seen as the key to any attempt to understand Pretoria's
post-1994 foreign policy behaviour. This is intimately connected to the
structural changes in the international political economy and the change in the
balance of international class forces brought about by the neo-liberal counter
revolution.
Deploying a theoretical framework derivative of the work of the Italian
Marxist, Antonio Gramsci, this study situates South Africa's foreign policy in a
world where the ideology of neo-liberalism has achieved hegemonic status
amongst the transnational elite class - fractions of national elites, representing
and reflecting the interests of money capital. Such a hegemonic project informs
the beliefs of the Government of National Unity and the subsequent foreign
policy activities postured by Pretoria. This study attempts to understand how
and why the ANCacceded to the dominant discourse of neo-liberalism and why
this must be contextualised within the structural constraints brought to bear
upon the GNUin an increasingly globalised world.
This accession to neo-liberal beliefs has gIVen nse to contradictions
within the domestic polity between contending class fractions and within the
ANC'sown ranks. This has provoked a fundamental tension in Pretoria's overall
foreign policy, where on the one hand South Africa accepts the fundamental
normative world order, whilst on the other pushes various reformist initiatives
which seek to re-negotiate Pretoria's standing within this framework.
Specifically, South Africa's behaviour in multilateral organisations has been
marked by a tactical middlepowermanship role, essentially problem-solving,
11l
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which seeks to smooth out the international system so that the ongoing world
order may function as "efficiently" as possible. Such behaviour has been
qualitatively different from the activist role that was expected from an ANC-led
administration.
Indeed, the activism exhibited by South Africa has been largely centred
around the promotion of the liberalisation of markets and free trade, albeit
tempered by an awareness of the need to reconcile its acceptance of the
hegemonic order, with that of the appeals of a historically important fraction of
its support constituency: the Left and labour. Attempts to reconcile these two
positions, of promoting "free" trade whilst at the same time demanding "fair"
trade for example, mirror the broader contradictions that have been evident in
South African foreign policy. They reflect the historic compromise that saw the
ANCcome to administrative power, and also the desire by the government to
balance its neo-liberal credentials with certain reformist convictions. This has
been most evident in Pretoria's behaviour in multilateral organisations.
SLXmultilateral initiatives, and Pretoria's role within each, are examined:
the World Trade Organisation, the Cairns Group, the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Commonwealth,
and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Implications for future South African
foreign policy are drawn out, and a critical eye cast on whether such roles
played out by Pretoria are immutable, or subject to change.
IV
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OPSOMMING
Hierdie studie poog om vorige tekortkominge in die analise van post-apartheid
Suid-Afrika se buitelandse beleid te oorkom. In teenstelling met die
"verduidelikings" wat deur meeste vorige analises gebied word, illustreer die
werk dat Pretoria se buitelandse gedragspatroon nie onveranderlik is en bloot
onderhewig is aan die globale "realiteite" nie, maar voortvloei uit die besondere
historiese tydsgewrig van magte wat saamgevoeg is gedurende die oorgang van
apartheid na 'n onvoorspelbare era. Die veranderinge binne die African National
Congress se ekonomiese en politieke beleid gedurende die oorgang periode word
voorgehou as die sleutel tot enige poging om Pretoria se post-1994 buitelandse
gedrag te verklaar. Strukturele veranderinge in die internasionale politieke
ekonomie en die veranderinge in die magsbalans tussen internasionale klasse
as gevolg van neo-liberalisme, het 'n fundamentele impak op die aard van
hierdie buitelandse gedrag.
Met behulp van 'n teoretiese raamwerk gedistilleer uit die werk van die
Italiaanse Marxis, Antonio Gramsci plaas die studie Suid-Afrika se buitelandse
beleid in 'n wêreld waarin die neo-liberale ideologie hoogty vier veral onder die
transnasionale elite klas - fraksies van nasionale elites verteenwoordigend van
die belange van finansiële kapitaal. Sodanige hegemoniese projek onderlê die
oortuiging van die Regering van Nasionale Eenheid (RNE) en voortvloeiende
buitelandse beleidsaksies. Die studie probeer vasstel hoe en waarom die ANC
toenemend gehoor gegee het aan die oorheersende neo-liberale diskoers en
waarom hierdie toetreding gekontekstualiseer moet word lil terme van die
strukturele beperkinge waaronder die RNE onderhewig IS in 'n immer-
globaliserende wêreld.
Hierdie toetrede tot neo-liberale oortuiginge het aanleiding gegee tot
teenstrydighede intern, tussen strydende klasfraksies asook binne die ANC se
eie geledere. Hierdie teenstrydighede word ook weerspieël in Pretoria se
buitelandsebeleids aksies in die algemeen. Aan die een kant aanvaar Suid-
Afrika fundamenteel die normatiewe basis van wêreldorde, terwyl daar ook aan
die ander kant gepoog word om Pretoria se posisie binne hierdie wêreldorde te
bowe te kom.
Suid-Afrika se gedrag in multilaterale organisasies in die besonder word
gekenmerk deur 'n taktiese intermediêre rol ("middlepower role") hoofsaaklik
van 'n probleem-oplossende aard, wat daarop gemik is om die internasionale
v
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sisteem so glad moontlik te funksioneer en teenstrydighede binne die
wêreldorde te oorkom. Hierdie rol konstitueer 'n fundamentele wysiging van die
aktivistiese rol wat van 'n ANC-regeerde Suid-Afrika verwag is.
Die aktiwiteite wat wel deur Suid-Afrika geopenbaar IS, sent,reer
hoofsaaklik om die bevordering van vrye en regverdige handel, alhoewel
gerigsnoer deur 'n bewustheid van die behoefte om sodanige posisie te versoen
met die aanvaarding van die bestaande hegemoniese orde aan die een kant en
die eise van arbeid en politieke steun aan die Linkerkant van die politieke
spektrum. Pogings om hierdie twee posisies te versoen - om "vrye" sowel as
"regverdige" handel te versoen byvoorbeeld, weerkaats die algemene
teenstrydighede waardeur Suid-Afrikaanse buitelandse beleid gekenmerk word.
Die paradokse is tekenend van die historiese kompromie wat tot die ANC se
bewindsoorname aanleiding gegee het asook die regering se behoefte om sy neo-
liberale orientasie te balanseer met bepaalde hevormingsoortuiginge. Hierdie
patroon is besonder merkbaar in die geval van multilaterale organisasies.
Ses multilaterale inisiatiewe en Pretoria se verhoudinge met elk van die
volgende internasionale organisasies word van naderby bekyk, veral ten opsigte
van die Wêreldhandelsorganisasie, die Cairns Groep, die Verenigde Nasies
Konferensie oor Handel en Ontwikkeling, die Onverbonde Beweging, die
Statebond en die Kernspêrverdrag. Daar word gewys op die implikasies vir Suid-
Afrika se buitelandse beleid, terwyl daar krities gevra word of sodanige rolle wat
deur Pretoria gespeel word, 'n bepaalde onveranderlikheid geniet of ook
onderhewig is aan veranderinge.
VI
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In memory of my father, Edwin Raymond Taylor (1943-1994)
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INTRODUCTION
The Republic of South Africa has 'moved from being a pariah state and outlaw
nation', ostracised by the world community, 'to a respected world citizen';' This
return to normalcy has meant that some analyses now see South Africa having
become just another country' and that 'the business of debating and defining
priorities in foreign policy will have to come to a swift conclusion'< On the other
hand, Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad has asserted that 'our assessment
has ...changed quite fundamentally ...[T]here has been a paradigm shift' in South
Africa's foreign policy. 3
Debate amongst analysts of Pretoria's post-apartheid foreign policy has been
heated and controversial, though in general few assert that South Africa's foreign
policy has changed to any great extent since the demise of apartheid. Whilst David
Dunn early on claimed that it was 'overwhelmingly probable' that there would be a
radical change in the direction of Pretoria's foreign policy, this has in the main not
materialised." Even earlier, Peter Vale had made an assessment that South Africa's
foreign policy reflected 'continuity rather than change'.» Such divergent reflections
on South African foreign policy mirror the different analyses that have emerged vis-
a-vis in the post-apartheid era. They can be summed up within six broad groups:
i. the "internationalists";
ii. the "pragmatists";
iii. the "national interest realists";
iv. the "anti-populists" (an effective sub-section of the realists);
! Foreign Affairs Minister Alfred Nzo, quoted in 'South Africa No Longer a Pariah State:
Foreign Minister Nzo', South African Press Association, December 1, 1997.
2 Jack Spence 'On Becoming "Just Another Country"', World Today, vol. 53, no. 3, March
1997, p. 69.
3 See interview with Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Aziz Pahad by Marlene Kromberg
'SA's Niche in the Global Village', SA Now, vol. 1, no. 6, July 1996, p. 3.
4 David Dunn 'International Relations and the New South Africa', South African Journal of
International AjJairs, vol. 3, no. 1, Summer 1995, p. 37.
5 See Peter Vale 'Continuity Rather Than Change: South Africa's 'New' Foreign Policy',
Indicator SA, vol. 12, no. 3, Winter 1994.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
v. the "critical theorists";
vi. and "sympathetic critics" (with a certain cross-over with the critical theorists).
Those who argue that there has been a palpable change in Pretoria's foreign policy
vary in their analysis, and are divided into two camps: the "internationalists" and
the "pragmatists". For example, though Chris Landsberg is dismissive of the Non-
Aligned Movement's relevance in the post-Cold War era, he does assert that non-
racism, anti-colonialism and a pro-South position has been incorporated into
South Africa's new foreign policy.s Indeed, Landsberg argues that
"internationalism" has become the guiding light of Pretoria's post-apartheid foreign
policy. This analysis however seems to take at face value the internationalist
prospectus of the GNUwithout interrogating its concrete manifestations, nor being
aware of the tensions within the ruling party that act as impulses driving much of
these policies.
From a "pragmatic" approach, Gerrit Olivier and Deon Geldenhuys have
argued that South Africa has changed its foreign policy in a 'pragmatic and
reasoned manner', and by doing so has supposedly disappointed the (unidentified)
'ideologues' who previously argued for a total break from the past.? This ostensible
pragmatism however is unreflective of the choices available to the GNU and also
accepts at face value a standpoint, in this case the "realities" of the global order in
which South Africa is presumed to have minimal agency. Furthermore, such
"pragmatists" - and Jack Spence may be included within this camp (see below) -
attempts to de-legitimise other opinions whilst claiming for themselves an
"objective" (and authoritative) voice that is supposedly above and beyond the noise
of the ideologically-driven - a specious assertion that will be dealt with below.ë
Those arguing from a "national interest realist" framework, agree that South
Africa's foreign policy has changed to a limited degree. Their analysis however is
6 Chris Landsberg 'Selling South Africa: New Foreign Policy', Indicator SA, vol. 12, no. 2,
Autumn 1995.
7 See Gerrit Olivier and Dean Geldenhuys 'South Africa's Foreign Policy: From Idealism to
Pragmatism', Business and the Contemporary World, vol. IX, no. 2, 1997.
8 Although this will be dealt with in detail below, Spence was perhaps the first to start
dividing commentators on South African foreign policy into "radicals" and "pragmatists". The
radicals were pictured as being unrealistic and naïve - see Jack Spence 'The Debate Over
South Africa's Foreign Policy', South African Journal of International Affairs, vol. 4, no. 1,
2
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against specific directions which this foreign policy has taken, namely a more
sympathetic position vis-a-vis the developing world, for "national interest" is
defined in very specific terms. For example, Greg Mills is generally sceptical of the
initiatives by the new administration to forge linkages with supposed "pariahs"
such as Cuba and Libya, and questions the ostensible commitment to greater
interaction with Africa.? Expressions of friendship by the ANC with so-called
"pariahs" of the international community before the 1994 election provoked such
like-minded scholars to assert that this was 'not exactly calculated to win
respectable friends and ...influence important people abroad' and was put down to
'merely repaying old debts."?
This realism is typical of much of the type of scholarship that promotes the
neo-liberal "consensus" and which defines who and what is acceptable, and what is
and what is not "in the national interest". Thus it is asserted that 'a cogent
economic policy is critical for an overall successful foreign policy' and that there
must be 'improved dialogue and confidence between Government and business'.ll
In short, 'the business of foreign policy is finding business'.l2 As Mills wrote in
"welcoming" the new Foreign Minister:
[CJarousing with Muammar Gaddafi, the Libyan leader, and others will not
find favour with the international community .
...Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the new foreign minister, will have to carefully
balance assertive polemic with the need for close interaction with our key
(Western) trade and investment partners .
... [S]he will need to assiduously build a foreign policy alongside with a
domestic business constituency.P
In this light, allying with states perceived as unfriendly by Washington somehow
risks "business" and is 'strange from the perspective of the pursuit of South Africa's
Summer 1996.
9 Greg Mills 'Pretoria Discovers that with Greater Diplomatic Authority Comes the Duty of
Engaging the Continent's Problems', Sunday Independent (Johannesburg) May 11, 1997.
10 Dean Geldenhuys Towards a New South Africa: The Foreign Policy Dimension',
International Affairs Bulletin, vol. 15, no. 3, 1991, p. 19.
li Greg Mills 'Leaning All Over the Place? The Not-So-New South Africa's Foreign Policy' in
Hussein Solomon (ed.) Fairy Godmother, Hegemon or Partner? In Search of a South African
Foreign Policy, Institute of Security Studies Monograph Series no. 3, Halfway House:
Institute of Security Studies, 1997, p. 32.
12 Peter Vale, 1994, p. 82.
13 Greg Mills 'Growth and Stability Top Foreign Agenda', Sunday Independent
(Johannesburg) June 27, 1999.
3
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national interest+'"
Critically cast, this line of analysis is largely "policy-relevant", and fits with
the advice given to the GNU by bureaucrats within the DFA who served under the
previous regime and who, for example, argued that a shift in favour of
Washington's policy towards Cuba was a "necessity". IS It also purports to "explain"
South African foreign policy from a supposedly objective and "scientific" standpoint
[see belowj.tv Du Plessis' claim to 'revisit' Pretoria's national interest is a good
example of this approach.!? Yet, such analyses embrace 'without criticism, some
will say, the ideas around globalisation and the parallel influence within the world
of market forces U" Thus cautioning against the development of linkages with
"pariah" states that may antagonise the dominant capitalist powers, and the
rigorous defining and re-defining of what is "realistic" or "unrealistic" is standard
fare of such analysts.tv
Demands that 'first and foremost, South Africa ...must present itself as a
stable and reliable partner in diplomacy and business' and that its 'foreign policy
should in most circumstances be non-confrontational and non-ideological' reflects
not good analysis, but the demands of international capital.w In this light, it is
possible to concur with Andrew Linklater that such analyses are really problem-
solving activities 'committed to promoting the smooth functioning of the inter-state
system [and] has the effect of assisting the reproduction of the very structures
which many political actors regard as unjustA'
14 Adrian Guelke South Africa in Transition: The Misunderstood Miracle London: LB. Tauris,
1999, p. 154.
15 Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), September 16, 1994.
16 See Martin Hollis and Steve Smith Explaining and Understanding International Relations
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.
17 Anton du Plessis 'Revisiting South Africa's National Interest in an Era of Change and
Transition: Theoretical Considerations and Practical Manifestations', Strategic Review for
SouthemAfrica, vol. XIX, no. 2, November, 1997.
18 Peter Vale 'Random Speaking Notes on South Africa's Foreign Policy', paper prepared for
submission to ANCStudy-Group on Foreign Policy, Cape Town, March 14, 1997.
19 But as one analysis asked, 'whose "real world" are we purporting to discuss?' - Ken Booth
and Peter Vale 'Security in Southern Africa: After Apartheid, Beyond Realism', Iniernational
Affairs, vol. 71, no. 2, 1995, p. 291.
20 Greg Mills 'South Africa's Foreign Policy Priorities: A 1996 Update', CSIS Africa Notes, no.
180, January 1996, p. 5.
21 Andrew Linklater The Transformation of Political Community Cambridge: Polity Press,
1998, p. 21.
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These type of analyses are nominally anti-ideological. However, calls for a
rejection of "ideology" from such quarters is never aimed at neo-liberalism (an
ideology par excellence - see below), but is rather directed against Pretoria having
linkages that are not approved of by the dominant global powers. Such false
"objective"analysis of the challenges facing South Africa's foreign relations must be
recognised when locating such critiques within the debate. Fortunately, this task is
comparatively easy when the same analysts argue that 'the United States has a
special meaning to South Africans and the rest of the world as a symbol of freedom,
civil and human rights and democracy'<t
This being so, it is important to point out that this realist analysis (and it is
currently dominant within South African International Relations) often serves as
the legitimisation of orthodox norms and practices, and take on the role served by
what Gramsci called "organic intellectuals", who act as "deputies" in organising
and promoting the hegemony of the prevailing economic "consensus".23 Whilst all
intellectuals have a subjective agenda behind their work, it is important to identify
the bases from which this is derivative and reject the objectivist epistemological
assumptions that characterises most past works on South Africa's international
relations (see below).
Operating from a similar ostensibly "objective" framework, "anti-populists"
such as Sombra Saraiva have asserted that 'South Africa is ...an exemplary case of
continuity in foreign policy on the African continent> Writing from a wholly
uncritical appraisal of Pretoria's foreign policy and 'the continuity of a standard of
behaviour' [sic] Saraiva is quite explicit in suggesting that 'the foreign policy of the
South African govemment...does not contain radically new elements in relation to
the traditional standards of South African insertion on the international level">
Like the national interest realists, Saraiva stresses the need for caution and the
necessity to adhere to 'common assumptions' of the international community.
Where Saraiva however surpasses the realists is in his explicit warning against
22 Greg Mills, 1996, p. 5.
23 Antonio Gramsci Selections From the Prison Notebooks London: Lawrence and Wishart,
1971, p. 60.
24 José Flávio Sombra Sara iva 'AComparative Analysis of the Foreign Policies of South Africa
and Brazil', Unisa Latin Amencan Report, vol. 13, no. 2, July-December 1997, p. 30.
25 Ibid., p. 30.
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what would happen if 'the views of the Black majority ...get top billing'v= Shorn of
its racial caricaturing, this analysis sits largely within the realist discourse
dominant in South African International Relations in assessing (and in the main
defending) a scenario where there has been no radical change in South Africa's
foreign policy, due to a "realistic" explanation of the appropriate behaviour that
Pretoria should pursue. In such analyses, the 'continuity of South African foreign
policy at present should cause no surprise'<?
The "critical theorist" approach has been largely pioneered in South Africa
by one individual, namely Peter Vale. Vale has attempted to counter the 'slash and
burn realism' prevalent in much of the South African acaderny.ê" Perhaps one of
the major accomplishments of Vale is to acknowledge the flaws in posing an
objectivist epistemology - as he asserts, 'any analysis begins from the place where
the analysts find themselvea'<? He has also challenged the ontological privileging of
states so characteristic of past studies in South African International Relations,
whilst critiquing the ongoing world order - something which virtually no other
analyses do.3o As Vale asserts when commenting on such past analyses:
[T]here is no effort to problematise the world, and certainly no intention to
challenge the cultism which holds that states are always the central player in
international politics. Such perspectives turn on received notions of control:
they re-circulate words, rather than seeking out new explanations or offering
alternative understandings of the world. By using them pundits can certainly
provide easy answers, but because punditry is rooted in problem-solving
theory, its pronouncements are invariably mundane - concerned only with the
maintenance of the status quO.31
. By doing so, Vale has avoided the criticism levelled at problem-solving analyses by
people such as Cox and Linklater, and has opened up space via critical theory to
illustrate how the present has been arrived at and how knowledge about this serves
2j) Harvey Tyson 'Straddling the World', South Africa's New World: Leadership SA, 1991, p.
13.
2! Ibid.
28 Peter Vale 'South Africa's Prospects From a Global Perspective - A View From the South' in
.• Hennie Kotzé (ed.) A Future South Africa: Prospects for 1999 and Beyond Stellenbosch:
Centre for International and Comparative Politics, 1997, p. 22.
29 Ibid.
30 For an example of Vale's work where the people - not states - of southern Africa are
privileged, see Peter Vale 'Regional Security in Southern Africa', Alternatives, vol. 21, no. 3,
1996.
31 Peter Vale in Hennie Kotzé (ed.), 1997, p. 23.
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the powerful. This helps those studies which wish to move beyond past
examinations whose 'economics begin with Margaret Thatcher and [whose]
understanding of South Africa's history [begins] with FW de Klerk's famous
February 2, 1990 speech'.32As such, this study is sympathetic to Vale's research
agenda.
However, this of course is not to say that Vale's work is problem-free.
Though he raises a number of valid theoretical points, Vale has largely failed in
applying such insights to empirical studies - raising questions rather than
answering them. Concomitant with this, he has also neglected the rich vein of
multilateralism in Pretoria's foreign policy - a failing that this study aims in part to
rectify. Also, although Valemakes it clear that any attempt to understand Pretoria's
foreign policy must be historically situated, he has neglected to concretely link -
other than by allusion - current foreign policy with the contradictions and
concessions that sprang from the historic compromise. Only by doing so, it is
suggested, can a coherent analysis of contemporary South African foreign policy be
arrived at and its international relations understood.
For their part, the "sympathetic critics" approach the debate largely from the
position that there has been no discernible foreign policy change post-1994.
Writing just over a year after the transition, Graham Evans asserted that 'there has
been no radical or even distinct ANC input into foreign affairs<» The reasoning
behind this is the 'inescapable priority ...for domestic reconstruction and economic
growth'i>' This directed Pretoria's post-apartheid foreign policy into a realist
direction that understood that interests not sentiments form the foundations for
policy formulation. Indeed, Evans goes to some trouble in outlining the type of
world that the GNU found itself operating in as it assumed power. Of particular
importance is Evans' appreciation of the change in the structure of the world which
at the ideological level reinforced the hegemony of the West's 'universal norms of
behaviour' which in practical terms acted as a constraint on any major policy
32 Ibid., p. 25.
33 Graham Evans 'South Africa in Remission: The Foreign Policy of an Altered State', Journal
of Modem African Studies, vol. 34, no. 2, 1996, p. 266.
34 Ibid. p. 269.
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departure by the ANC-led government.w
This study agrees with the importance of situationing South Africa and its
foreign policy within the wider global structure. However, where this study departs
from Evans is in that it firstly asserts the importance of critically examining the
historic experience of the ANC and the existence within it of an important fraction
who have retained an essentially accomodatory posture towards internal and
external capital. This history explains the eventual accession of leading elements
within the GNU elite to the hegemonic norms and "realities" of the international
community, to the point where critics can assert that South Africa's 'newly defined
national interest [is] the search for markets'i> Secondly, it is necessary to situate
post-apartheid South Africa in the web of contradictions derivative of the politico-
economic constraints that the ANC stood to encounter as it emerged from the
transition process and acceded to power, as well as the ongoing incorporation of
the state, at a critical juncture in the state's history, into the globalised
international political economy.ê" Such analyses help in part understand the lack
of fundamental change in post-apartheid foreign policy.
Other dissatisfied critics have complained of the failure 'to generate ideas
which might have served as the founding principles of a coherent foreign policy',
which have resulted in 'a hopeless mix of so-called "pragmatism", so-called
"realism" and general ad hocery [sic] that prevents us from making our own
initiatives and leaves us little choice but to take Uncle Sam's advice'<" Such a
scenario is seen as a result of complex factors, though the fact that 'soon after
taking power the ANC's foreign policy makers seemingly disengaged from their
academic support base' is seen by one account as crucially important.ê? This is
particularly so when this disengagement has meant that criticism has become the
35 Ibid., p. 255.
36 Peter Vale 'Foreign Policy in the New South Africa', Labour Left Briefing, June 1996 -
http:j jwww.labournet.org.ukjllbj1996jjunejint3.html
37 It hence shares some features of Southall's earlier notion of the "double whammy" - see
Roger Southall 'The New South Africa in the New World Order: Beyond the Double
Whammy', Third World Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 1, 1994.
38 Anthony Holiday 'Foreign Policy? What Foreign Policy?', Mail and Guardian
(Johannesburg), September 4-10, 1998.
39 Anthoni van Nieuwkerk 'Foreign Policy for the New Millennium: Nice Vehicle - But Who's
the Driver?', paper presented at IDASAjFGD Foreign Affairs Forum, Cape Town, March 25,
1999, p. 3.
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c:
preserve of conservative commentators who largely fit with the "national interest
realist" approach. One consequence of this is seen as leading to Pretoria's foreign
policy being led and informed by the 'so-called "new realism'v.t? a scenario that has
already been criticised as problematic for South Africa's overall international
relations.
Failures in past analyses
Having sketched the broad terms of the debate on post-apartheid foreign policy
thus far, problems with these analyses need to be addressed. These can be
summarised as follows (obviously the applicability of such criticism is variable
according to the analysis under question). In short, past examinations of South
African foreign policy have been:
• largely positivist - "objective" - in their epistemology;
• have made spurious claims to non-ideological analysis;
• have neglected the changed international political economy;
• have failed to problematise the ongoing world order;
• have invariably resorted to "problem-solving" approaches;
• have been ignorant of the internal dynamics within the GNU;
• have failed to examine the role of multilateralism in Pretoria's foreign policy;
• have ontologically privileged the state, ignoring other units;
• and have lacked attention to the role and power of ideologies.
Developing this critique, perhaps one of the main flaws is that in the main past
analyses have approached the topic from a positivist epistemology, posturing an
"objectivity" which is palpably specious. This is especially, though not exclusively,
true of the type of analyses which poses as "realistic" prescriptions on the limits of
South Africa's manoeuvrability. Such analyses frequently attempt to claim
supposedly "non-ideological" neutrality - Mills' assertion that 'ideology...has all but
40 Ibid., p. 4.
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disappeared as the key determinant of international relations' is a case in point.f
This ostensible objectivity then leads to a-theoretical and highly descriptive
accounts of South African foreign policy which, empirical information
notwithstanding, contribute very little to the analysis of Pretoria's international
relations.e?
Furthermore, past analyses of post-apartheid foreign policy, even when they
have noted the changed global environment in which Pretoria's elites must re-
negotiate their positions, have largely failed to take into account the changes in the
international political economy in an era of globalisation. This neglect to engage
with the reconfigured global order is then exacerbated by the failure to
problematise the ongoing world order within which Pretoria must operate. As a
result, past analyses of South Africa's international relations fall back upon
"problem-solving" activities concerned with fine-tuning current policies (a
deficiency that is developed below).
These flaws in analysing South African foreign policy have been compounded
by the ignorance shown by most past analyses vis-a.-vis the internal dynamics of
the ANC, both during the liberation struggle and in particular, during the
transition period. Hence when the GNU elite do seem to be acceding to the
hegemonic norms, this is pictured as somehow "normal", whilst pro-South
impulses, however weak, are seen as aberrations - a reflection of the failure to
reflect on the contradictions that are derivative of the historic compromise post-
1994.43 The usefulness of multilateral activity to attempt to ostensibly overcome
such contradictions (through a reformist agenda) are subsequently ignored -
indeed, Pretoria's activity within multilateral bodies has been greatly overlooked in
past analyses. Concomitant with this, previous accounts of South Africa's
multilateralist engagement fail to take into account the major contradictions within
41 GregMills 'Waiting for the Fig Leaf to Drop' in Greg Mills,Alan Beggs and Anthoni van
NieuwkerkSouth Africa in the Global Economy Johannesburg: South African Institute of
InternationalAffairs, 1995,p. 2.
42 See for example the chapter 'South Africa's Foreign Policyand International Practice' in
the annual South African Yearbook of International Law Pretoria: Verloren van Themaat
Centrefor International Law,various years.
43 Seefor example GregMills'criticismof South Africa'srelations with Libya,phrased as not
beingin line with 'SA's foreignpolicy imperatives' - Business Day (Johannesburg), October
22,1997.
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the tripartite alliance and the desire by the elite to accommodate Leftist pressures
whilst being cognisant of the constraints of a globalised world. Such a failure to
situate the specificities of South Africa's position is a fundamental flaw in most
past analyses of Pretoria's foreign policy, particularly when 'any plausible
explanation of foreign...policies in the 1990s has to begin by recognising and
evaluating transformations in the global political economy, especially in the
South'i =
In addition, past explanations of South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy
have been largely dependent on a state-as-agent-based explanation of foreign
policy that ontologically privileges either the South African state or the individual
predilections of the elites. Ontologically, they have failed to address the particular
structural constraints surrounding the transnationalisation of capital and the
ideological hegemony of neo-liberalism. By posturing a "non-ideological" posture,
past analyses have neglected to grapple with the intensely ideological questions
surrounding the hegemony of neo-liberalism, instead seeming to accept the
immutability of the ongoing world order. Furthermore, they have also failed to
engage in any meaningful account of the liberation struggle or the compromise that
emerged out of the transition. They have, in short, failed to address what has been
termed the "double whammy" of the insertion of South Africa into a globalised
international political economy and the historic trajectory of the transition from
apartheid.i>
These failings mirror that of realism's deficiency in addressing the "new
ontologies" in the current epoch, tending to 'ignore or to obscure the importance of
class forces at the transnational level; to undervalue the role of ideas, ideologies
and the role of strategic (or organic) intellectuals; and to a lesser extent, to
depreciate the importance of transnational networks of interest in the constitution
of order and hegemony'r'é
44 Timothy Shaw 'The South in the 'New World (Dis)Order': Towards a Political Economy of
Third World Foreign Policy in the 1990s', Third World Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 1, 1994, pp. 18-
19.
45 See Roger Southall, 1994.
46 Stephen Gill 'The Emerging Hegemony of Transnational Capital: Trilateralism and Global
Order' in David Rapkin (ed.) World Leadership and Hegemony Boulder: Westview Press,
1990,pp.120-121.
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A more nuanced understanding of South African foreign policy is hence
clearly needed, for only by acknowledging the presence of powerful constraints on
the autonomous construction of a nation's external relations can a true
understanding of Pretoria's attempts at formalising a "new" foreign policy role be
properly contextualised and understood. This is not to say that states have no
autonomy per se in the making of their foreign policy. Such a reductionism is
.rejected in this study, echoing the assertion that:
[E]ach state is constrained by its position and its relative power in the world
order ...States [however] undoubtedly act with a certain autonomy. This
autonomy however, is conditioned by both internal and external constraints.
State autonomy, in other words, is exercised within a structure created by
the state's own history.f?
Such a conception of agency is qualitatively different from the structural neo-
realism of Kenneth Waltz, primarily because a neo-Gramscian approach allows for
agents to transform the system within which they find themselves. This allows for a
change in world orders which is lacking in the neo-realist account of an immutable
and anarchic international system.
Problem statement
The central focus of this study is accounting for the contradictions and ambiguities
in post-apartheid South African policy. In doing so, such contradictions are traced
to the nature and historical situationing of the transition from apartheid and the
historic compromise that sprang from this. The accession by leading fractions of
the ANCto the ongoing discourse of neo-liberalism has, it is suggested, lead to the
scenario whereby the policy-making elite must play to two separate audiences: its
Leftist-inclined constituency and elements within the GNU who are linked to
._organised labour and/or the Communist Party; and externally oriented domestic
and international capital. This second "audience" is increasingly integrating the
GNUelite into a nascent historic bloc, which more and more reflects the concerns,
aspirations and demands of a transnational class elite. Such a process mirrors the
ongoing incorporation of the South African state into a globalising international
47 Robert Cox Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History New
York: Columbia University Press, 1987, pp. 399-400.
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political economy and the movement towards the formation of a transnational class
elite who share and propagate the normative principles of what has become the
hegemonic ideology in the current epoch viz. neo-liberalism.
Only by appreciating the changed global environment in which the GNU elite
finds itself (and importantly, has corne to perceive itself) operating within, can an
accurate account of why Pretoria's international relations seems so paradoxical: on
the one hand acceding to the liberalisation narrative favoured by the disciplinary
discourse; and on the other performing a reformist multilateral posture which
seeks to ameliorate the more deleterious aspects of globalisation and the
concomitant loss of sovereignty which goes with the constraints of transnational
capital mobility. By doing so, the fundamental structures that form the global order
are addressed, taking such architecture not as a given cl la objectivist
epistemological narratives, but as something that needs to be rigorously examined
and problematised to gain a more sophisticated account of post-apartheid's
insertion into the contemporary world order. This will be an advance on most
previous studies of South African foreign policy which have in the main been
"objective" in their epistemology, problem-solving in their methodology, and have
ontologically privileged the state at the expense of more nuanced, historically-
derived explanatory frameworks.
In addition, the theoretical rigour needed in analysing South Africa's change
in foreign policy behaviour has yet to be satisfied.të The generally underdeveloped
nature of International Relations in South Africa was recently remarked upon by
Walter Carlsnaes and Marie Muller, yet little to date has been produced that has
broken this pattern in scholarship.s? Indeed, such a pattern follows the trajectory
crafted long ago by scholars such as James Barber and John Barratt who dealt
with the apartheid state's foreign policies in a highly descriptive manner that was
"objective" and rather ahistorical in its understanding. so
48 SeeWalterCarlsnaes and MarieMuller (eds.)Change and South African External Relations
HalfwayHouse: International ThompsonPublishing, 1997.
49 DavidDunn, 1995.
50 James Barber and John Barratt South Africa's Foreign Policy: The Search for Status and
Security, 1945-1988Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1990.
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Conceptual framework
This study is more reflective on the constraints and dilemmas that the new state
elite faces in the light of both globalisation (in its various guises), and the
contradictions that spring from the historic compromise surrounding the
transition. It is also more cognisant of the hegemony of the neo-liberal agenda that
permeates the work of Mills, Olivier and Geldenhuys et al and which has been
taken up by the GNUelites. Whilst a certain solidarity with the South does inform
South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy, so too does an active promotion of the
neo-liberal norms surrounding liberalisation, polyarchy and strict monetary and
fiscal discipline. This inherently contradictory position reflects the strains and
ambiguities found in the rationalisations of the policy-making elite within the GNU
uis-á-uis globalisation and the strategic responses that a state in the developing
world must make.
As one analysis framed these essential pressures and contradictions in
Pretoria's foreign policy, the South African leadership recognises 'that there are
beneficiaries of globalisation, and that they are structuring the process to further
their interests', but the GNUcouples this with 'concerns about the negative effects
of globalisation and the resolve to participate in global attempts to reform
international institutions and regimes'. By doing so, 'the GNU becomes able to
convince its domestic allies to the Left that it has not caved in to the pressures of
the global neo-liberal agenda', even if this is, at the final analysis, what has
actually occurred.s '
Such an essentially contradictory position reflects the 'strategies of both
accommodation and challenge', and resonates from the space afforded to state
elites in the international political economy by the varied effects and consequences
of deepening integration and the restructuring of global production. 52 This mixture
of constraint and opportunity which the GNU elite faces is summed up in one
analysis:
While strategies for disengagement and autarkic national development are
51 Philip Nel 'Conceptions of Globalisation Among the South African Elite', Global Dialogue,
vol. 4, no. 1, April 1999a, p. 23.
52 Xavier Carim 'International Relations Theory, Global Change and a Post-Apartheid Foreign
Policy', Acta Academica, vol. 26, nos. 2 and 3, 1994, p. 49.
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virtually impossible today, the integration of the capitalist economy across
national boundaries has not entirely rendered impossible the pursuance
of...strategies [...] Nation-states can to some extent "mould and change"
events and the recent changes in the world...have opened up opportunities,
as well as set limits or constraints. 53
These opportunities provide the elite of the ANCwith highly useful space by which
they can placate a domestic constituency that stands at variance with its
acceptance of the neo-liberalist discourse, but also with the manoeuvrability to
negotiate with the centres of structural power within the global order in order to
maximise benefits for its outwardly-oriented elites and ameliorate the more
negative outcomes of the globalisation thrusts upon its domestic political economy.
Whether such a policy is ultimately able to satisfy all parties remains an open-
ended question, though the ongoing controversy within the tripartite alliance and
the hostility from working class organisations surrounding the macro-economic
policies pursued by the GNU suggest what Gramsci referred to as 'a rift between
popular masses and ruling ideologies'rs-
However, in the contemporary order 'the dominant forces of contemporary
globalisation are constituted by a neo-liberal historical bloc', and within this
transnational elite class the normative principles of neo-liberalism have achieved
hegemonic status as "common sense" prescriptions on how best to configure -
indeed restructure - political and economic life.55 This hegemony is not territorially-
based in the epoch of globalisation - though it remains, due to the structural power
ofAmerican-based elites, a 'US-centred transnational hegemony'. 56 Indeed:
Global hegemony is not a matter of single states taking turns as the
"hegemon", but of transnational coalitions of social forces committed to a
particular concept of control. Such a concept expresses the power of a
concrete configuration of economic and political forces, while leading other
forces in the absence of a viable alternative. One of several states will
perform certain key functions in the military or monetary fields, but the
primary source of the hegemony resides in a "recipe" for handling challenges
53 Vishnu Padayachee Implications for South Africa of Using IMF and World Bank Loans and
Resources: Some General Observations, paper presented at 'South Africa's International
Economic Relations in the 1990s' conference, Mabula Game Lodge, Transvaal, 1993, p. 16.
54 Antonio Gramsci, 1971, p. 276.
55 Stephen Gill 'Globalisation, Market Civilisation and Disciplinary Neo-liberalism',
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol. 24, no. 3, 1995, p. 402.
56 Stephen Gill 'Neo-Liberalism and the Shift Towards a US-Centred Transnational
Hegemony' in Henk Overbeek (ed.) Restructuring Hegemony in the Global Political Economy
London: Routledge, 1993.
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in national and international arenas that emanates from a specific class
configuration interacting with, but not expressing state power.s?
This 'moment of hegemony occurs if and when there is a widespread acceptance of
the key principles and political ideas of a leading class fraction or constellation of
interests'<" This has occurred, we suggest, amongst the transnational elite whose
structural power in a globalised world has increased in epoch-making bounds.
Indeed, 'the global synthesis of ideas, institutions, and material capabilities
represented in its membership and networks reflects the emergence of what can be
termed a transnational historic bloc of social forces'<"
In short, this hegemony is expressed as an ideological construct, materially-
based, and organised around a global set of institutions which include the
transnational corporations who own and manage the world's resources and
appropriate its riches; the international fmancial institutions that impose
restructuring along neo-liberalist lines to constitute the environment necessary for
global capital accumulation to occur; the states of the North and their secondary
counterparts in the South, that craft the global and the local political,
administrative and legal environment that allows the hegemonic system to
function; and the formal and informal transnational elite forums such as the G-8,
the Trilateral Commission, and the World Economic Forum, which evolve tactics for
the maintenance and reproduction of the global normative order.sv
Though formal states remain important, in the epoch of globalisation, their
discrete political economies (or what is left of them) are more and more perforated
at multiple levels by global and transnational dynamics. As such, questions
regarding hegemony and political accountability - indeed agency - need to be re-
theorised to take into account the monumental structural changes that have
.taken/ are taking place. State-centric analyses a la realism simply can no longer
accommodate the complexities that are at play in the contemporary era. Although
57 Keesvan der Pijl 'Atlantic Rivalriesand the Collapse of the USSR' in Stephen Gill (ed.)
Globalisation, Democratisation and Multilateralism Basingtsoke: Macmillan, 1997, pp. 196-
197.
58 Stephen Gill American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission Cambridge: Cambridge
UniversityPress, 1990,p. 118.
59 Stephen Gill in DavidRapkin (ed.),1990,p. 144.
60 RogerBurbach and WilliamRobinson, 'TheFin DeSiecleDebate: Globalisationas Epochal
Shift',Science and Society, vol.63, no. 1, Spring, 1999,pp. 36-37.
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we shall develop the argument m greater detail below, a critical theory/neo-
Gramscian framework is more satisfying in helping to theorise on international
relations in the period of globalisation. This is particularly so as such analyses
allows us the framework within which it is possible to theorise on questions
relating to the ideological dominance of neo-liberalism - an absolute key to
understanding why the ANC-led government follows the macro-economic policies
that it does, and how this plays out in its overall foreign policy.
It is a central contention of this work that the GNU policy elite have entered
the ranks of what is termed the "transnational elite", whose ongoing formation can
be portrayed as a nascent historic bloc. Although this clique does not admit itself
as a class per se, it has 'attained a clearly distinctive class consciousness' with an
'awareness of a common concern to maintain the system that enables the class to
remain dominantA' How this relates to the global power structures and the
essentially concomitant dogmatic ascendancy of neo-liberalism (to the point where
this has reached hegemonic status amongst the transnational elite) is captured by
Robert Cox:
There is something that could be called a nascent historic bloc consisting of
the most powerful corporate economic forces, their allies in government, and
the variety of networks that evolve policy guidelines and propagate the
ideology of globalisation. States now by and large play the role of agencies of
the global political economy, with the task of adjusting national economic
policies and practices to the perceived exigencies of global economic
liberalism. This structure of power is sustained from outside the state
through a global policy consensus and the influence of global finance over
state policy, and from inside the state from those social forces that benefit
from globalisation (the segment of society that is integrated into the world
economy) ...Neo-liberalism is hegemonic ideologically and in terms of policy.s-
This scenario follows on from what may be referred to as the "transnationalisation
of the state" whereby under the conditions of globalisation, discrete states are
having to transform and restructure themselves, becoming more and more
externally-integrated into the international political economy. As such national
states are not external to the ongoing process of the transnationalisation of the
state system, but are becoming incorporated into it as component parts.v- This has,
61 Robert Cox, 1987, pp. 358-359.
62 Robert Cox 'Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium: Prospects for an Alternative',
Review of International Studies, vol. 25, no. 1, January 1999, p. 12.
63 William Robinson 'Capitalist Globalisation and the Transnationalisation of the State',
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and is having, a profound constraining effect on the policy options that are
available to state administrations and, at the same time, continues to tilt the
balance of power in favour of the transnational elite and the concomitant policies
that serve and are inextricably bound up with, the ongoing hegemonic order.
Transformative ambitions that the ANCmay have had during the liberation
struggle have been tempered by not only an acceptance (via a contested
educational and socialisation process) of the ongoing ideology of neo-liberalism, but
also the structural constraints inherent in a globalising world. This ideological
"conversion" of the GNU elite sets the "limits of the possible" and, in combination
with the objective constraints of a restructured and globalised international
political economy, informs the policy options that the post-apartheid administration
regards as potentially pursuable.
Of profound importance m this movement is the process of international
consensus-building amongst the transnational elite, dialectically m turn
responding to fundamental changes in global production and the concomitant class
interests that this spawns. In effect, this plays out at the national state level
whereby the internal structures of the states are seen to require adjustment so that
the global hegemonic "consensus" can be brought to bear onto national policy and
practice.s+
Although this will be developed below, post-apartheid South Africa is
undergoing the formation of a historie bloc composed of elite fractions of the ANC;a
nascent Black bourgeoisie; and "traditional" White business elites whose
accumulation patterns are primarily export-oriented and whose gaze is externally-
oriented, essentially to the capitalist core. This last fraction is intricately connected
to international capital and it is this fraction which has succeeded (in tandem with
external actors, for sure) in propagating the ideology of neo-liberalism and
"realistic" macro-economic policies to the point where such ideological principles
have become internalised by the ANC elite. As the head of the South African
. Chamber of Business remarked, 'consensus has been reached regarding the overall
paper presented at workshop 'Historical Materialism and Globalisation', University of
Warwick, April 15-17, 1998.
64 Robert Cox, 1987, p. 254.
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economic framework'<- This is part of a wider, global, process whereby the 'Third
World bourgeoisies ...are becoming significant players on the international scene.
What is happening ...is a process of transnational class formation, including the
emergence of a transnational bourgeoisie out of national bourgeoisies as national
circuits of accumulation become integrated at the globallevel'.66
This in turn has resulted in the GNUelite seeing as one of its primary goals
the task to make South Africa more and more attractive, essentially
accommodatory, to a de-territorialised - if not fetishised - nebula known as "the
market". In short, 'in order to serve their own economic interests, the political-
economic elites in the semi-periphery [sees as its primary duty to) try to "lock in"
the semi-peripheral economy with that of the core'.67Springing from this is a desire
by the GNU to 'reshap[e) its foreign policy to give greater importance to its
economic interests'.68 Specifically, the GNU has acceded to the hegemonic
discourse that privileges growth as the engine for development, and this is reflected
in its foreign policy where growth is seen as occurring only through 'more equitable
trade relations, better market access, better import and export opportunities and
more foreign direct investment'.69
This shift in thinking by the ANC elite has occurred in an era of deepening
inter-penetration of political economies and the ongoing restructuring of global
production, which has meant that any counter-hegemonic impulses have been
swiftly marginalised by a battery of organic intellectuals and the active constraints
at force in the contemporary international political economy. This of course is not
to say that the South African government is 'undertaking restructuring and
serv[ing) the needs of transnational capital simply because they are "powerless" in
the face of globalisation'. No, 'a particular historical constellation of social forces
65 Interview with Kevin Wakeford, head of the South African Chamber of Commerce, SABC 3
news broadcast, 8.00 p.m., June 2, 1999.
66 Roger Burbach and William Robinson, 1999, p. 20.
67 Wil Hout 'Theories of International Relations and the New Regionalism' in Jean Grugel
and Wil Hout (eds.) Regionalism Across the North-South Divide: State Strategies and
Globalisation London: Routledge, 1999, p. 24.
68 'Economy to Loom Larger in S. African Foreign Policy', Reuters Information Service
(Pretoria) August 25, 1997.
69 Interview with Aziz Pahad, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, in Global Dialogue, vol. 3,
no. 1, March 1998, p. 21.
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now exists that presents an organic social base for neo-liberal restructuring?c The
grounding for this is in the historic bloc that is forming out of the compromise
crafted in 1994.
Yet at the same time, by acceding to the ongoing discourse of neo-Iiberalism
the GNU elite is in danger of alienating its domestic base and its tripartite allies,
who may be seen as gathering and "delivering" a large element of the ANC's mass
constituency. It is in this contradiction that the stimulus for pursuing - if not
maintaining the remnants of a commitment to - the alleviation of the more negative
aspects of globalisation can be sourced. For sure, the state elite has expressed a
clear perception of the constraints globalisation has wrought on its
manoeuvrability regarding autonomous policy-making: President Mandela has
spoken of how in the current epoch it is 'impossible for countries ... to decide
national economic policy without regard to the likely responses of [international]
markets', combining this with a need 'to ensure that our country integrates itself
within a world community that is evolving under the impact of a process of
globalisation '."!
This acceding to the demands of international capital however is tempered
with an ostensible reformist position regarding key international organisations. In
the analysis, which will be developed below, this has assumed the form of a
"middlepowerrnanship" role for South Africa which has taken on 'a commitment to
orderliness and security on inter-state relations and to facilitating ... orderly change
in the world system U? Not only can this be seen as attempt to compensate for the
perceived (if not objective) loss of "sovereignty", it also affords the GNU elite the
opportunity to be seen by its Leftist constituency to be not wholly submissive
before the diktats of globalisation. A key way in which this is operationalised is
Within multilateral organisations, where the GNU postures the need to work in
alliance with "the South" to ameliorate the more deleterious effects of the ongoing
order: 'the bargaining power which the developing countries need will be greatly
enhanced if they are able to present a united front as they seek to make an impact
70 Roger Burbach and William Robinson, 1999, p. 31,
71 Nelson Mandela 'Political Report of the President, Nelson Mandela', Mmabatho, issued by
African National Congress, December 16, 1997.
72 Robert Cox 'Middlepowermanship, Japan and Future World Order', International Journal,
vol.44, no. 4, Autumn 1989, p. 825.
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on the process of globalisation'_73
This in part helps in understanding why the GNU has adopted such an
activist role in bodies such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)and the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).In essence, the reformist
multilateralism that lies at the heart of South Africa's multilateralism, springs from
a desire to satisfy its Left critics that it has not "sold out" and a struggle for a better
global environment in which the GNU elite and its allies within the nascent
historical bloc can operate.
Indeed, the ANC-led administration is determined to resist those efforts by
governments and corporations located in the developed world who try and take
advantage of the hegemonic thrust vis-a-vis liberalisation and deregulation to
benefit themselves, particularly when this is hypocritically accompanied by
protectionism for the North's own nationally-based industries and fractions. The
best way for this to be pursued is through engagement with multilateral
organisations, thus explaining in part Pretoria's activism in bodies such as the
World Trade Organisation and the Cairns Group, where the rhetoric of "free trade"
is turned around and firmly connected to "fair trade". Even though much of this
may be to the essential benefit of externally-oriented fractions within South Africa,
it does indicate a sensitivity to the uneven process of globalisation by the GNUand
casts the administration as a defender of "South African interests" - an important
consideration in the light of ongoing criticism from its Left constituency.
Yet, such reformist policies occur within the overarching framework as
articulated by the GNU that is well within the ambit of the hegemonic discourse.
Indeed, though this will be discussed in depth later, the GNU approaches
multilateralism from a technical perspective (or "problem-solving" approach) which
fails to address the structural inequalities in the international political economy
and rather sees the need 'to approach many international questions from a
common perspective'i?- By doing so, the GNU elite 'assumes that the major
component of the system ...are not subject to fundamental change ...It is the action,
not the limits of the system, that is the analytical focus of problem solving', a
73 Nelson Mandela, 1997.
74 African National Congress Foreign Policy Perspectives in a Democratic South Africa
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position that South Africa's foreign policy in the main adopts.t> Hence though
Pretoria's multilateralist activity is in parts reformist, it is reformist within the
hegemonic discourse. This suggests a feature of what Antonio Gramsci recognised
in his thinking about hegemony:
The fact of hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the interest and
tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised, and that a
certain compromise equilibrium should be formed - in other words, that the
leading group should make sacrifices of an economic-corporate kind. But
there is no doubt that such sacrifices and such compromises cannot touch
the essential; for though hegemony is ethical-political, it must also be based
on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive
nucleus of economic activity.?>
It is suggested that the GNU elite has noticed this and that they have pursued a
reformist stance, acting through multilateral institutions, in an attempt to posture
a "new" foreign policy whilst not touching 'the essential' core of the global order. By
doing so and within the perceived constraints operating at the structural level,
Pretoria exploits the space afforded for a technical role in smoothing out the global
order - thus placating Leftist critics - whilst retaining the confidence of the
dominant economic and political powers and "the market". This has been primarily
operationalised within multilateral fora.
Multilateralism
This concentration on studying Pretoria's multilateral activity is justified as
'multilateral coalition building among state and non-state actors is becoming
increasingly important in a world groping for the re-establishment of order'."?
Before developing this, a brief discussion of what is meant by multilateralism is
embarked upon.
Multilateralism can be viewed either instrumentally or normatively. The
differences between the two are important. Robert Keohane for instance. defines
multilateralism as simply the 'practice of co-ordinating national policies in groups
Johannesburg: African National Congress, December 1994, p. Il.
7S Timothy Sinclair 'Beyond International Relations Theory: Robert W. Cox and Approaches
to World Order' in Robert Cox with Timothy Sinclair Approaches to World Order Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 5.
76 Antonio Gramsci, 1971, p. 161.
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of three or more states'i " According to John Ruggie however, multilateralism is 'an
institutional form that co-ordinates relations among three or more states on the
basis of generalised principles of conduct'itv Keohane's definition emphasises only
the activity of co-ordinating the behaviour of states interacting with one another.
Ruggie's however suggests a more normative perspective, where a set of "rules" are
put to use without discrimination and within a multi-faceted regime. Such a meta-
norm of non-discrimination applies when there is an:
[I]nstitutionalisation of the recognition that because actors in the world are
not only interconnected, but also interdependent ...the best way to achieve
a ...stable order is via:
a) generalised principles of conduct applicable in a non-discriminatory way
to all states that want to co-operate, without negating the individuality and
autonomy of each actor;
b) distributing the costs and benefits of interaction across the system
(indivisibility);
c) and developing incentives for actors to suspend the urge for instant
gratification on every single issue, and to recognise and pursue joint
satisfaction on many issues (diffuse reciprocityl.ë?
Ruggie's definition is more rigorous than Keohane's. However, although it
acknowledges that multilateralism advances a set of norms, it fails to engage with
any critical understanding of what these norms are, and how they may relate to the
world order and global power. Cox's work on multilateralism, where he argues that
the essential function of international institutions is the justification and defence of
the hegemon's politico-economic project is more satisfying. Yet, as Will be
discussed below, multilateralism not only serves to legitimise particular normative
regimes, but can in fact act to de-legitimise the hegemon's position at certain
temporal moments.
77 Paul-Henri Bischoff and Roger Southall in Stephen Wright (ed.), 1999, p. 166.
78 Robert Keohane 'Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research', International Journal, vol. 45,
no.4, 1990.
79 John Ruggie 'Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution', in John Ruggie (ed.)
Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form, New York: Columbia
University Press, 1993, p.ll.
80 Philip Nel 'In Defence of Multilateralism: The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries in the
Current Global Order', paper delivered at a DFA/FGD workshop on "South Africa and the
Non-Aligned Movement in an Era of Globalisation', Pretoria, April 29-30, 1998, p. 3. Nel's
thoughts are influenced by Ruggie's conceptualisation of multilateralism.
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However, as long as such counter-hegemonic "moments" remain within the
overall world order, and fail to address structural problems - indulging in problem-
solving activity - multilateralism serves to propagate an elaborate set of structures
which serve to limit the boundaries around which "realistic" policies may be
formulated. This has important implications for the usefulness of multilateral
bodies as agents of change.
Indeed, in an increasingly globalised world and lil a post-bi-polar
international order, multilateralism has seen a palpable resurgence, particularly
from "above" in the sense that the disciplinary institutions and core states see
multilateralism as a crucial tool in reformulating global governance; and from
"below"where elites in the South see multilateralism 'as the only place where we
can challenge the North's might', and attempt to 'try and do away with the negative
consequences of globalisation', even if such elites concur with the broader neo-
liberal project.s! As one analysis put it when discussing such problems and how
they relate to multilateral bodies:
In terms of material interests, the accelerated globalisation of the world
economy has undermined the capacity of peripheral groups to pursue
alternative development strategies. This has been accompanied by the
consolidation of neo-liberal ideas and policies, notably the way in which
problems of peripheral groups and the appropriate role of [international
organisations] in addressing them are defined.ës
In short, in terms of engaging with the international community in order to extract
maximum benefits, albeit within the remit of the hegemonic project, Southern-
based elites have increasingly turned to multilateral institutions. At the same time,
the South African elite is highly conscious of the constraints that the external
environment places on its agency - in part reflected by the adherence to the
hegemonic proscription that there is "no alternative" to neo-liberalism. In an order
where states in the periphery are having to cast themselves in competition with
others to attract international investors, a "responsible" policy of engagement
within multilateral organisations, demonstrating adherence to policies in favour
81 Jackie Selebi, in response to questions during presentation to Department of Political
Science, University of Stellenbosch, February 26, 1999.
82 Kelley Lee 'A Neo-Gramscian Approach to International Organizations: An Expanded
Analysis of Current Reforms to UN Development Activities' in Andrew Linklater and J.
Macmillan (eds.) Boundaries in Question: New Directions in International Relations
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995, p. 154.
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with transnational capital, affords South Africa space to maximise its material
conditions.
This has been referred to by one analyst as "instrumental" or "tactical"
multilateralism. Such an approach 'starts from the conclusion that contemporary
multilateral institutions reflect the values of globalised American liberalism'.
Accepting this framework however, the "tactical" approach 'is intent on modifying
the worst aspects of it, without getting rid of it altogether'Aê In short, a problem-
solving approach (see below) working for reformist outcomes from within the
ongoing structures.
Connected with reformist postures to satisfy the Left (and practically, to
materially benefit domestic fractions), a "tactical" multilateralism makes sense
within what is perceived as a global order where manoeuvrability is deemed bound.
As one analyst put it:
South Africa's reputation in the global arena [can] be enhanced ...if the
government favours a strategy of external extraction which embraces the
principles and norms of the liberal economic order. Such an approach would
mean adherence to multilateralism and the rules of the game promoted by
the World Trade Organisation ...and other pillars of the intemational
economic architecture. 84
Furthermore, officials from South Africa's Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
repeatedly assert that multilateralism is the comerstone of Pretoria's "new" foreign
policy. Abdul Minty (the Deputy Director-General of the Multilateral Branch at the
Department of Foreign Affairs) claimed that 'one of the most dramatic aspects
of...changes (post-1994) has been the retum of South Africa to the world of
multilateral diplomacyw In a later speech on the same topic, the Director-General
of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Jackie Selebi, asserted that:
[M]ultilateralism is the corner-stone of this country's foreign policy. It is our
firm conviction that a true reform and renewal ...of how our world conducts
its business, of how international relations are conducted and intemational
institutions operate and fulfil their mandate.
83 Philip Nel 'Approaches to Multilateralism', paper presented at biennial conference of the
South African Political Science Association, Saldanha, June 29-July 2, 1999b, p. 6.
84 Andrew Cooper The Multiple Faces of South African Foreign Policy', International Journal,
vol. 53, no. 4, Autumn 1998, p. 708.
85 Abdul Minty in Department of Foreign Affairs Multilateral Branch Annual Report, 1995,
Pretoria: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1996, p. i.
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[M]ultilateralism has enormously increased our ...capacity to understand and
engage creatively and constructively with the world community .
... [F]or...our government, the strengthening of multilateralism, its rights,
obligations, rules and procedures ...is not only perhaps the most important
distinguishing feature between this Government's foreign policy and the
practices of the previous government, but it is at the very heart of new and
democratic South Africa's foreign policy.s''
In short, the policy-makers themselves see multilateralism as fundamental to post-
apartheid South Africa's foreign policy, 'based on a renewed appreciation for the
tactical advantages that multilateralism offers'.87
Case study selection
The selection of case studies attempts to provide a broad overview of Pretoria's
multilateral behaviour and how these relate to the world order. Selection has been
taken from a variety of institutions that South Africa belongs to. It is from these
diverse multilateral bodies that this study's selections have been made. In order to
make a representative selection of such organisations, a mind-map has been
constructed by which multilateral initiatives can be placed vis-á-vis the hegemonic'
world order. This mind-map is replicated below:
86 Jackie Selebi 'Multilateralism and South Africa's Foreign Policy', paper presented to
Department of Political Science, University of Stellenbosch, February 26, 1999. Selebi went
on to link South Africa's multilateral behaviour with the promotion of Pretoria's "national
interest". Obviously, who or what defines this national interest is of profound importance in
discussing South Africa's involvement in such institutions and the policies it promotes when
engaging with these organisations.
87Philip Nel, 1999b, p. 6.
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An explanation of the above diagram is as follows. The inner ring depicts those
bodies that are active promoters of the hegemonic political and economic order
favoured by the transnational elite, and which reflect the hegemony of neo-
liberalism as an organising project. The closer an organisation is to the central
88 lOR-ARC: Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation, ECOSOC: United
Nations Economic and Social Council, UNECA: United Nations Economic Commission for
Africa, UNGA: United Nations General Assembly; UNSC: United Nations Security Council;
WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organisation ..
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axes, the closer the multilateral body is perceived as fitting with the hegemonic
order - hence the WTOand IMFare seen as being integral to the neo-liberal project
on the Northern-dominated economic side, whilst the Cairns Group is seen as close
to the hegemonic project, but from a South-oriented perspective. Naturally, the
division between "economic" and "political" is artificial - they are ideal types purely
for the purpose of this diagram. Certain organisations saddle the divide between
hegemonie and non-hegemonie - NAM, SADC and UNCTAD,whilst the United
Nations General Assembly lies close to the dividing line (though still within the
hegemonic category). This is because multilateral organisations, as will be detailed
below, are not simply reifying agents of the dominant order, but can be used to de-
legitimise and challenge the extant order (albeit temporarily). Their stance (and
position within the diagram) are dependent upon the balance of forces at specific
historical junctures, are not immutable, and are subject to change.
Furthermore, these organisations do - although ultimately fitting within the
hegemonic project in the contemporary order - reflect tensions within their
membership that means that they cannot simply be categorised as organisations
promoting neo-liberal prescriptions. But, within the era of globalisation and the
dominance of neo-liberalism as the "only" economic and political programme
available, the fact that most organisations, even within the South, lie within or
close to the hegemonic order, reflects the triumph of the counter-revolution. Even
those bodies ostensibly pro-South (and often, formerly counter-hegemonic) lie near
to the dominant project in contemporary times. Finally, although not specifically
related to neo-liberalism's hegemony, the NPT and the land mines ban
agree/ disagree with the favoured order of the dominant global powers and are
included.
This study attempts to understand Pretoria's engagement with a variety of
multilateral organisations that represent both economic and political agendas
(frequently in reality, both); that can be seen as hegemonic or "non-hegemonic"
(though as has been suggested, this division is somewhat problematic in the
contemporary era); as well as organisations/initiatives that can be regarded as
North- and South-dominated. In doing so, the selection of case studies has been
undertaken with an eye for broad representivity.
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It is started by chapter 4, an examination of two organisations specifically
concerned with global trade and which spring from - and indeed represent - the
very essence of the hegemony of neo-liberalism and the discourse of market
liberalisation, "good governance", "sound economic principles" etc. Although
finance is currently dominant, and the transnational elite reflect the interests of
money capital, it is trade which has pushed back many frontiers in global
commerce. The reconfiguration of global trade - and the active involvement of state
elites in this process - reflect the extent to which neo-liberal precepts have attained
hegemony among nationalleaderships.
Demonstrating this, and the role Pretoria has played/is playing in this
process, two organisations are examined. These are the World Trade Organisation
and the Cairns Group. As two bodies that emerged out of, and represent the
institutionalisation and regularisation of, the neo-liberal counter-revolution,
Pretoria's reaction to and intercourse with such organisations provide powerful
examples of the GNU's essential acceptance of the hegemonic project - as does
Pretoria's attempts to work within such a framework to exact benefits and bring the
Northern-based elites into line with their own free trade rhetoric. The Cairns Group
of agricultural nations, though largely Southern-dominated/oriented, provides an
example of the GNU leadership's policy of fostering a rules-based trading regime
within a trade-related body.
The next three case studies (chapter 5) analyse the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, the Non-Align~d Movement, and the
Commonwealth. These provide examples of Pretoria's involvement with
development-oriented organisations. UNCTADand the NAMare ostensible counter-
hegemonic groupings which in fact have largely acceded to the dominant discourse.
Indeed, the change in developmental ideology and the retreat from open
confrontation with the developed world over the structural inequalities that
characterise the global order shadows to a large part the change in ideology that
the ANCunderwent before and during its accession to power.
As such, the GNU's positions within these two organisations provides
compelling evidence as to the shift in thinking regarding macro-economic policies
that virtually all elites within the South have experienced as they not only take on
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board the hegemonic principles shared by the transnational elite, but come to
terms with the perceived constraints that globalisation is seen as creating. At the
same time, the rhetorical calls for an amelioration of the more negative aspects of
globalisation and an attempt to appeal to the "fairer" side of the "free" trade
discourse, reflects the need to satisfy its Left constituency, fearful as they are that
the GNU leadership has become too overtly enthusiastic about the benefits
supposedly offered by liberalisation and the privatisation of the economy.
The Commonwealth is a "traditional" organisation that has developmental
concerns within its mandate but legitimises a certain way of behaviour which over
time has mirrored that of a core state in the intemational political economy viz.
Great Britain. Though of course the Commonwealth is no longer a British
organisation, its normative principles are essentially that of the metropole and
indeed, the developmental agenda of the organisation has increasingly taken on
board the neo-liberalist project so favoured by London. Whilst during the apartheid
era the Commonwealth was an important de-legitimising body against British
policy towards South Africa, in the post-1994 period membership of this body has
flagged a return to respectability and normality for Pretoria - with' all the
implications that this has for the country's foreign policy.
Chapter 6 is an examination of South Africa's role during the negotiations of
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's Review and Extension and indicates the
general line that Pretoria has taken since 1994 as a "bridge-builder" and middle
power vis-a-vis the dominant powers and the developing world. Whilst it has been
argued that hegemonic power in the era of globalisation is not necessarily
concomitant with a spatial entity and indeed rests with a transnational historic
bloc, the preponderant material and military power of the United States means that
an examination of South Africa's policy with relation to this preponderant power is
of profound interest. The Treaty Review has been chosen as it was one of the first
major initiatives of the post-apartheid government within a multilateral context,
and the disappointment voiced by many critics of the new administration's foreign
policy indicates the disquiet shown by a certain quarter regarding Pretoria's
intemational stance. The middlepowermanship role that South Africa has adopted
was also very clearly evidenced during the negotiation process and as such is
informative of a general trend that Pretoria has followed under the GNU.
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Study plan
This study is divided into three parts: theoretical reflections; the transition from
apartheid; and South African foreign policy post-1994. All three parts are intimately
linked together and should be conceived as forming one whole body of work.
Meta-theory in the discipline of International Relations, and in particular the
questioning of the objectivist epistemology that underpins most work on South
African foreign policy has been largely absent in previous studies. It is a purpose of
Part 1 to move beyond the "explanation", problem-solving approach of past studies,
whilst attempting to provide a greater understanding of examining South Africa's
contemporary foreign policy. In doing so, the chapter is divided into three sections.
Section 1 is an examination of the epistemological and ontological issues raised by
non-positivist approaches (and particularly by the neo-Gramscian "school" of
critical International Relations theory). Such meta-theoretical reflections are vital
in order to avoid what has been sardonically referred to as the 'evasion of
philosophy' - an all too often feature of International Relations scholarship.e? Mark
Neufeld's comments on meta-theoretical reflection is informative and worthy of
quotation:
Meta-theory is not an unproductive distraction from the 'real substance' of
the discipline - i.e. theoretically informed analysis of empirical evidence.
Rather, meta-theory is the indispensable foundation of competent scholarly
activity, and vital for ensuring the adequacy of the explanatory accounts
which are developed. Indeed, the relative neglect of meta-theoretical
questions may go some way in accounting for some of the serious limitations
to which the discipline of International Relations has been subject.v?
Hence exploring the meta-theoretical issues raised by non-positivism and how this
relates to International Relations is not a tedious diversion, but an integral and
important element of all competent studies in international politics. Having
discussed such important meta-theoretical issues, Section 2 will then proceed to
examine the notion of hegemony and its applicability in International Relations
theory, as well as other Gramscian terms that are deployed in this study, including
89 Cornel West The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism Madison,
Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989.
90 Mark Neufeld 'Reflexivity and International Relations Theory', Millennium: Journal of
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a discussion of what Cox has termed "middlepowermanship". The third and last
section of this chapter will then discuss how neo-liberalism has achieved hegemony
as the organising project currently reconfiguring the international political
economy.
Part 2 will then look at the historical circumstances surrounding the
transition and the conglomeration of forces, working externally and internally, that
impacted upon the trajectory from apartheid. In particular, the diffuse pressures
that came to bear on the liberation movements and which ultimately saw the elite
of the ANC come to accept the orthodox "rules of the game" regarding macro-
economic principles Vla a highly contested and controversial transition from
apartheid. These factors have had, it is suggested, a profound effect on post-
apartheid South Africa and its foreign policy, and no credible study can afford to
ignore such a historical exposition if one wishes to understand the essential
contradictions in Pretoria's foreign policy and the tactical reformism within
multilateral organisations that Pretoria postures.
Part 3 (prefaced by an overview of South Africa's overall foreign policy) will
then examine the involvement of Pretoria in selected multilateral bodies in an
attempt to draw out the hypotheses that we have crafted regarding post-apartheid
foreign policy. The rationale for selecting the six case studies has been discussed
above. The manner in which Pretoria's contradictory behaviour vis-á-vis
multilateral organisations and how this relates to the global order and normative
hegemonic framework will be illuminated in these chapters, illustrating how the
study addresses the main problem posed in this work. By doing so, South Africa's
pursuance of a middlepowermanship role and the attempt to play to two different
constituencies at once will be highlighted, as will the ambiguities surrounding the
essential problem-solving and technical interventions that has been characteristic
of post-apartheid foreign policy.
The study ends with the conclusion to this work, and will gather together
the evidence presented in the preceding parts and sum up and evaluate the extent
to which South Africa's foreign policy is reflective of the contradictions and
ambiguities emanating from the 1994 historic compromise; the broad acceptance
International Studies, vol. 22, no. 1, 1993, p. 54.
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by the GNU elite of the neo-liberal hegemonic order; and the reformist impulses
that Pretoria has tactically pursued lil multilateral bodies and the
middlepowermanship role that this exemplifies.
Throughout, it will attempt not to "explain" post-apartheid foreign policy, but
rather, "understand" it, with an appreciation of the rules and meanings within
which Pretoria's elites must operate. Hence in many respects it is an "insiders"
account, seeking to understand how and why South Africa's foreign policy operates
as it does. This is in contrast to an "outsiders" analysis which postures a
"scientific" viewpoint whereby events are supposedly governed by immutable laws
of nature, replicable in similar conditions and explicable via appeals to scientific
casual explanations.v' Taken to its logical conclusion, what the actors in any
particular situation have in their minds - their understanding of the world - IS
irrelevant: 'behaviour is generated by a system of forces or a structure, external not
only to the minds of each actor but also external even to the minds of all actors'v?
Obviously, in such a scenario choices and alternatives are limited, and
agency can only operate according to a law-like process which can be replicated
elsewhere. On the other hand, understanding 'regard[s] foreign policy decision as
the actor's solutions to problems. These solutions apply policies, for which we can
also ask the reasons, to situations as the actors themselves understand them'.93By
attempting to understand South African foreign policy, the process by which the
national elite acceded to the hegemonic project may be analysed and, crucially,
space for other options and outcomes is present. The adoption of neo-liberalism by
the ANC in this account then is not the result of, or "natural" progression from, a
fixed set of structures - explicable by reference to such "facts" - but instead spring
from choices made at specific historical junctures and from a particular
understanding of the scenario - and alternatives available - at the time.
91 Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, 1990, p. 3 and 6.
92 Ibid., p. 3.
93 tua., p. 204.
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PART ONE
THEORY, HEGEMONY AND NEO-LIBERALISM
This Part attempts to situate the thesis within the wider meta-theoretical debate
and within the discipline of International Relations/Political Economy. By doing
so, a discussion of the neo-Gramscian underpinnings of this study in relation to
the broader field of enquiry viz. foreign policy can then be embarked upon. The
Part is divided into three sections. Section I discusses meta-theoretical
deliberations ins-a-vis International Relations and the state of the discipline.
This is important in the context of a study conducted in and on South Africa,
due to the relatively underdeveloped state of International Relations theorisation
in the country (see below). The nature of theory and its uses are then discussed,
followed by an appraisal of the neo-Gramscian contribution to the discipline.
Throughout, an analysis of the weaknesses of positivism as an approach to
social inquiry is conducted.
Section II discusses what is meant by "hegemony" in the Gramscian
sense and how this relates to International Relations/international relations;'
This is important with regard to particular notions of world order and is then
developed by an explanation of Robert Cox's concept of "middlepowermanship"
and how it relates to the propagation of a particular hegemonic project/world
order. A suggestion is put forward as to why middlepowermanship leads to a
heightened interest in multilateral organisations and more specifically, a
particular tactical role in such institutions.
Section III builds upon the theoretical understandings discussed in
Section II and explores the status of neo-liberalism as the hegemonic politico-
economic project in the contemporary international political economy. It is
within this hegemonic order that all entities (be they states, firms, transnational
classes etc.) must operate. By doing so, a firm base is constructed from which to
understand South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy behaviour - the central
task of this study.
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CHAPTER 1
SECTION I
META-THEORY AND ITS RELATION TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Reflections on the role and status of theory lie at the heart of International
Relations as a credible discipline. All serious scholars within the field believe
this to be so, with Robert Cox asserting that 'we cannot define a problem in
global politics without presupposing a certain basic structure consisting of the
significant kinds of entities involved and the form of significant relationships
among them' i.e. theory-building." Yet the discipline of International Relations
has been described as 'the last vestige of meta-theoretical ignorance'< whilst
'theoretical invisibility' and a 'general lack of knowledge regarding the theoretical
groundings' within the academy has been deplored.t This failing is particularly
acute within the academy in South Africa where meta-theoretical reflection has
been absent from much of the work in the field. This absence of reflexivity has
resulted in an under-developed approach to the study of International Relations
in the country, particularly vis-a-vis methodology-
At the level of theory-building, there has been little progress within the
South African academy. What studies that do work within: a critical perspective
(be they Frankfurt School-inspired Critical Theory, neo-Gramsciarr/Coxian or
feminist) largely remain at an embryonic stage of development thus far. This
being so, before this work embarks on a detailed analysis of South Africa's
foreign policy behaviour in the contemporary period (i.e. post- apartheid), a
1 Following the conventional distinction between International Relations as an academic
discipline, and international relations as the practice of politics across borders.
2 Robert Cox "Towards a Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization of World Order: Reflections
on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun' in James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds.)
Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992.
3 Philip Nel 'Political Relations and the Analogy of Language', Theoria. nos. 81/82,
October 1993, p. 56.
4 Fred Halliday 'International Relations: Is There a New Agenda?', Millennium: Journal of
International Studies, vol. 20, no. 1, 1991, 66.
5 See Mervyn Frost, Peter Vale and David Weiner (eds.) International Relations: A Debate
on Methodology Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1989.
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necessary detour or diversion into questions pertaining to meta-theory is
deemed essential - and needed - as a contribution to the further development of
International Relations in South Africa.
Positivism and International Relations
It is important to acknowledge that positivism has long dominated the academic
discipline of Intemational Relations.s Although there has been a growth in non-
positivist activity within the academy, it is still the predominant approach and
Intemational Relations remains essentially dominated by 'well-funded scholars
interested in dismissing post-positivist critiques, avoiding discussions of
philosophical issues and getting on with their research'." Such a situation
echoes that found in Economics and the distinction made between "positive
economics" and "normative economics", where:
Positive economics pertains to objective value-free enquiry [and] is a
statement of what is, not you or anyone else's values or subjective
feelings ...Normative economics is economic analysis that contains value
judgements, either implicitly or explicitly.ê
Such a claim to value-free "explanations" expresses itself most forcefully in a
position of supposed epistemological certainty, yet 'the point is that empirical
observations confirmed as facts are necessarily distorted by the particularity of
the observer"." This being so, what are the fundamental assumptions and
weaknesses behind positivist theorisations and how do these relate to
Intemational Relations?
Perhaps the main flaw in such theorisations is the absence of reflexivity.
Within this objectivist epistemology no attention is paid to the unstated
presuppositions upon which all scientific inquiries are based.!v Indeed, such
objectivism claims to separate object from observer:
6 See William Olson and Nicholas Onuf 'The Growth of a Discipline Reviewed', in Steve
Smith (ed.) International Relations: British and American Perspectives Oxford: Blackwell,
1985, pp. 1-28.
7 Thomas Biersteker 'Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations',
International Studies Quarterly, vol. 33, no. 3, September 1989, p. 265.
8 G. Walton Understanding Economics Today Homewood, Illinois: Irwin Publishers, 1991,
pp. 16-17.
9 L. Keita 'Neoclassical Economics and the Last Dogma of Positivism: Is the Normative-
Positive Distinction Justified?', Metaphilosophy, vol. 28, nos. 1 and 2, January/April
1997, p. 84.
10 Mark Neufeld, 1993, p. 55.
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Scientists often have a naïve faith that if only they could discover enough
facts about a problem, these facts would somehow arrange themselves in
a compelling and true solution. [However] the problems scientists take
up, the way they go about solving them, and even the solutions they are
inclined to accept, are conditioned by the intellectual, social, and
economic environments in which they live and work.!'
The assumption that problems arise only with respect to social enquiry and that
science and scientific methodology when applied to natural science is non-
problematic, is doubtful:
Research methods, testing techniques and procedures for verifying
results are ...guided by...interpretative paradigms, [thus] the natural
sciences ...rests on the same logic of scientific inquiry as the human
sciences.r-
Knowledge therefore is not neutral, as positivists both in the natural and social
sciences presume, but represent interests manifested through particular
interpretative methodologies and ontological assumptions. In short, science is a
social activity conducted by communities of researchers: it is socially
constructed and not "objective", though positivist scientists invariably seek to
conceal the social interests at work behind their initial problematique by appeals
to "objectivity", "neutrality" and "explanation". This is of profound importance as
within positivist frameworks of enquiry lie the kernel of control and
domination.t- This is true of the disciplines of International Relations and
International Political Economy where those scholars who support the basic
structures of the status quo:
[R]esistthreats to conventional versions by claiming that the constitutive
[i.e. alternative] version is "biased" and "non-scientific" and that it does
not understand the reality of political economy. [Furthermore] they
continually and instrumentally use this reality to achieve and maintain
control.i-
How this affects the academy as a whole and how this is linked to the promotion
of a particular politico-economic model is discussed below. At this point it is
sufficient to suggest that by appealing to "reality" and querying and/ or rejecting
II Theodosius Dobzhansky Mankind Evolving: The Evolution of the Human Species, New
York: 1962, p. 138.
12 Marvin Stauch 'Natural Science, Social Science, and Democratic Practice: Some
Practical Implications of the Distinction Between the Natural and the Human Science',
Philosophy of the Social Sciences, vol. 22, no. 3, September 1992, p. 338.
13 Mark Neufeld, The Restructuring of International Relations Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995(a), p. 103.
14 Roger Tooze 'Constructive Criticism: Threats, Imperatives and Opportunities of a
Constitutive IPE' in Kurt Burch and Robert Denemark (eds.) Constituting International
Political Economy Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997, p. 209.
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alternative projects, a particular discourse is promoted and embedded, making
criticism of the "accepted" project appear as an illegitimate activity in itself.
Indeed, 'once established as common sense, theories become incredibly
powerful since they delineate not simply what can be known but also what it is
sensible to talk about or suggest...Defining common sense is therefore the
ultimate act of political power'. IS
Theoretical constructions hence should be understood in the light of their
specific historical context, the ideology that underpins these theories, and the
forms of society that such theories promote, sustain or challenge.tv Indeed,
'theory is always for someone and for some purpose. All theories have a
perspective. Perspectives derive from a position in time and space, specifically
social and political time and space'."? This is not to say that such a position
leads ultimately to relativism. Jurgen Habermas argues that though knowledge
is historically founded and interest bound, knowledge can emerge out of an
inter-subjective consensus theory of truth: truth claims are resolved through
reasoned discussion culminating in consensus.is In his theory of discourse
ethics, Habermas avoids the problem of relativism (inherent in post-modernism)
and provides a base by which a point of viewmay be situated.
Habermas examines the relationship between processes of constitution
and justification via communicative competence, maintaining that all speech is
directed towards the notion of a genuine discursively achieved consensus
(which is rarely achieved). In short, communicative action outlines a rationality
allowing universal norms. The analysis of consensus shows this notion to
involve a normative dimension, which is formalised in the concept of what
Habermas calls 'an ideal speech situation', which he regards as implicit in the
communicative act and includes ethical and normative commitments.t? A
15 Steve Smith 'Positivism and Beyond' In Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski
(eds.) International Theory: Positivism and Beyond Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996, p. 13.
16 Yosef Lapid 'The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-
Positivist Era', International Studies Quarterly, vol. 33, 1989, p. 250.
17 Robert Cox 'Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations
Theory' in Robert Keohane (ed.) Neo-Realism and its Critics New York: Columbia
University Press, 1986, p. 208.
18 See 'What is Universal Pragmatics?' in Jurgen Habennas Communication and the
Evolution of Society Boston: Beacon Press, 1979, pp. 1-68.
19 See Jurgen Habermas 'On Systematically Distorted Communication' in Eric Bredo and
Walter Feinberg (Eds.) Knowledge and Values in Social and Educational Research
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1970, pp. 370-390.
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20 MichaelPusey Jurgen Habennas London:Routledge,London, 1987,p. 89.
21 WilliamOuthwaite Habennas: A Critical Introduction Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994,
chapter 3.
22 Jurgen Habermas Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action Cambridge: Polity
Press, 1990, pp. 66,89.
23 WilliamOuthwaite, 1994,p. 40.
24 SteveSmith in SteveSmith, KenBoothand MarysiaZalewski(eds.), 1996,p. 28.
consensus attained in this situation - a 'rational consensus' - is, according to
Habermas, the decisive measure of whether a statement is true or not, or of the
correctness of such norms.sv This allows an emancipatory dimension closed by
relativism's extremes.
Indeed, Habermas' critical theory makes emancipatory goals its starting
point. It is grounded in a normative base that is not arbitrary, but intrinsic in
the structures of social activity and language. This can be used as a normative
standard for a critique of distorted communication, whose discourse contributes
to and formulates contemporary ideology. Such ideologies maintain their
"legitimacy" only through coercion and would be invalidated if subjected to
rational discourse - to ideal speech. This rational discourse presupposes that
statements can be comprehensible, true, right and sincere.ê!
One important process of any emancipatory project therefore entails the
transcendence of existing systems of distorted communication so that the force
of the better argument prevails.v- Hence, consensus on whether a statement is
true and right can be achieved in an environment shorn of power and
distortion.v> This process requires engaging in critical reflection and criticism
and it is only through such reflection that domination, in its many forms, can be
unmasked. This reflexivity avoids relativism. By doing so, such 'foundations for
making judgements between knowledge claims places [such analyses] as ...direct
descendant[s] of the Kantian enlightenment project ...a great source of strength
to those who want to link foundational knowledge to emancipation'Pt It
overcomes the relativism of post-modernism which, as Habermas points out, is
unable or unwilling to account for its normative foundations.s-
This is not, of course, to infer that Habermas is a positivist - he does not
think that bringing these realities into rational correspondence will demand that
we use "scientific" methodologies and seek "objective" knowledge. An "objective"
method would claim to get to the truth while disregarding inter-subjectivity as
wholly unreliable - as "unscientific"; for Habermas, the inner reality of the actor
39
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should not be discounted or overlooked. This is where a Habermasian-
influenced approach to International Relations overcomes relativism whilst
remaining non-positivist.
As suggested, positivism (and "traditional" theory lil general) is
characterised by its attempt to privilege natural science and mathematics as its
foundational model.w There are of course precedents to such claims: after all,
Spinoza appealed to geometry to prove his ethical claims and much of positivism
can be seen in a similar light. This is particularly so when such appeals to
"scientific explanations" in International Relations are utilised to produce a
particular discourse that claims to be "realistic" and "factual", when in fact such
statements are the product of distorted communication. It is the task of a more
reflective theorisation to strip away such claims and expose the particular
normative project that is behind the veneer of value-free "objectivity". In short,
to understand the 'active and vital role played by the community of researchers
in the production and validation of knowledge'<?
This is significant not least because it has important politico-normative
implications for the direction of study, taking 'the world as it finds it, with the
prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they
are organised, as the given framework for action'.28This enables the acceptance
and rejection of "appropriate" research agendas at the expense of excluded
alternative modes and subjects of research.
'[T]he vast majority of scholarship in International Relations ...proceeds
without conscious reflection on its philosophical bases or premises'P? having
important ramifications for the pursuit of knowledge and acting as a powerful
tool (inadvertently or otherwise) in preserving existing power relations at
parochial and global levels. In other words, empiricist epistemology 'reflect[s]
more the concerns of hegemons' within and without the academy.ê? Hence,
'prevailing philosophical and theoretical consensus legitimates some forms of
2S Jurgen Habermas The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity Cambridge: Polity Press,
1987, p. 276.
26 Max Horkheimer Critical Theory NewYork: Herder and Herder, 1972, p. 190.
27 Mark Neufeld, 1993, p. 56.
28 Robert Cox in Robert Keohane (ed.), 1986, p. 208.
29 Thomas Biersteker, 1989, p. 265.
30 Roger Tooze 'The Emergence of a New International Political Economy: A Realist View',
Millennium: Journal of International Studies: Journal of International Studies, vol. 16, no.
3, 1987, p. 524.
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"theoretical" inquiry and de-legitimates others'.» Naam Chomsky illustrates this
point when discussing the state of Economics in the United States:
When [a] Nobel Prize winner in Economics considered the range of
possible economic systems, he saw a spectrum with complete laissez-faire
at one extreme and "totalitarian dictatorship of production" at the other.
Assuming this framework, "the relevant choice for policy today" is to
determine where along this spectrum our economy should lie....There are
other dimensions, however, along which [his] polar opposites fall at the
same extreme: for example, the spectrum that places direct democratic
control of production at one pole, and autocratic control, whether by state
or private capital, at the other. In this case, as so often, the formulation of
the range of alternatives narrowly constrains "the relevant choice for
policy.V
A similar dichotomy of policy choices attempts to create "realistic" options for
South African foreign policy, where the NAMand the OAU are dismissed as
'not ...worth the expenditure of the resources involved', and the debate is
caricatured as between 'realists, who are concerned with getting investment,
and radicals, who want us to take the moral high ground'<> Notice how the
"realists" are paired with "common sense" (see below). After all, who can argue
with bringing in finances to a country as poor as South Africa? The "radicals"
meanwhile seemingly promote, by implication, an utopian and moral foreign
policy that, we are encouraged to assume, will get the country nowhere. Though
these "radicals" 'deserve a hearing', it is 'only to assert the importance of moral
considerations' and has little chance of influencing real policy. Thus the illusion
of inclusivity is encouraged in order to promote a semblance of legitimacy, but
real substantive policy is to be trusted only with those who are "realistic".
As discussed in the Introduction, those who premise the usefulness of
International Relations on its policy relevance invariably privilege their position
on a positivist "explanation", yet this cannot be done justifiably as various
fundamental values underpin the different explanations, not the alleged tests
through empiricism. Not only this, but claims to "relevancy" and "realism" are
dishonest as 'in practice the problem of competing perspectives is resolved by
forces and sentiments not considered part of "scientific" academic knowledge at
31 [Italics in the original], Roger Tooze 'Understanding the Global Political Economy:
Applying Gramsci', Millennium: Journal of International Studies: Journal of International
Studies, vol. 19, no. 2, 1990, p. 273.
32 Noam Chomsky Problems of Knowledge and Freedom London: Barrie and Jenkins,
1972, p. 53.
33 Jack Spence 'Realists Wrestle with Radicals', Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg)
August 25, 1995.
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all. That is, it is resolved and choices made on the basis of the values (social,
political, moral) that positivist knowledge claims to banish'i> Such a process
serves the interests of the powerful, predicates "relevance" on its relation to
what the dominant interests demand, and reduces inequities in the system to
technical questions best served by problem-solving theory.
Those who question such a situation are frequently met within the
International Relations academy with the invariably rhetorical retort of "what's
the alternative?". In other words, to (temporarily) co-opt Thatcherism, a research
agenda is created where "there is no alternative" (TINA) to a particular set of
norms. This not only acts as closure on debate, but also as a restriction on the
parameters of inquiry by delineating what is "worthy" of investigation and more
importantly, what is not.
Parameter-setting forces within International Relations
Within the academy, two forces that set the field of inquiry may be identified.
The first is the hegemony of the United States which provides the agenda
through a definition of the issues to be discussed and 'in a process of
intellectual hegemony within the academic study of International Relations, the
methodology and core concepts for "solving" the problems so defined'A"
Secondly, the academic hegemony of Economics 'furnishes the appropriate
epistemology and legitimate[s] the form and content of research'<é In a survey of
the teaching of International Political Economy at universities in the United
Kingdom and United States, it was found that non-traditional texts were
virtually absent from American courses. Accordingly, 'the US texts hard] a
specifically managerial flavour. Not only [were] traditional issues stressed but
the emphasis [was] on the United States' management of the international
economy. The maintenance of hegemony ... rest[ed] at the core of the top US
readings'is?
34 Roger Tooze 'International Political Economy and the National Policy-Maker' in
Christopher Hill and Pamela Beshoff (eds.) Two World of International Relations:
Academics, Practitioners and the Trade in Ideas London: Routledge, 1994, p. 59.
35 Roger Tooze 'International Political Economy and International Relations: From
"Enfant Terrible" to Child Prodigy, or Just a Cuckoo in the Nest?', Millennium: Journal of
International Studies, vol. 16, no. 2, 1987, p. 349.
36 Ibid.
37 Robert Denemark and Robert OBrien 'Contesting the Canon: International Political
Economy at UKand US Universities', Review of International Political Economy, vol. 4, no.
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As American publishers and American academics dominate what has
been dubbed 'an American social science', they tend to set the parameters of
discourse.ê" Not only does this have serious implications for the smaller
academies (e.g. in Canadal.ê? but also has resulted in - as the British
International Studies Association asserts - 'that some of the most highly
rated ...journals are simply unavailable to critics of orthodoxy'r'v This is
particularly problematic when 'U.S. dominance In the social sciences
resulted ...because of their association with American power' and that this
hegemony 'is that of one with the authority, one in charge who speaks but does
not Iisten '.»!
Such a feature of the wider academy leads to scholars such as Cox being
marginalised as 'his work does not sit well vis-a-ins the prevailing discourse of
the powerful and numerous North American academic community'r'ê The
American academy, promoting a particular discourse, becomes the academy to
be measured against.sê Such dominance, it is suggested, also leads to the type
of arrogance exemplified by a leading "name" in the field - Steven Krasner - who
opined that 'sure people in Luxemburg have good ideas ...but who gives a damn?
Luxemburg ain't hegernonic'r= This Americo-centric posturing reaches its zenith
1, Spring 1997, p. 229. See also Kim Richard Nossal 'Tales That Textbooks Tell:
Ethnocentricity and Diversity in American Introductions to International Relations',
paper presented at biennial meeting of the Association for Canadian Studies in Australia
and New Zealand, Macqaurie University, North Ryde, New South Wales, Australia, July
9-11,1998.
38 Stanley Hoffmann 'An American Social Science: International Relations', Deedalus, vol.
1, Summer 1977.
39 See Teresa Healey and Mark Neufeld 'Critical Reflections on a Discipline: A View from
North of the 49th Parallel' in Robert Crawford and Darryl Jarvis (eds.) International
Relations: Still an American Social Science?' Toward Diversity in International Thought New
York: State University of NewYork Press, 1998.
40 British International Studies Association Response of BISA to Research Assessment:
Consultation RAE 2/97 http://snipe.ukc.ac.uk/international/bisa.dir /raesponse.html
41 Frederick Gareau 'The Political Economy of Social Science: Where the Trail Leads',
International Journal of Comparative Sociology, vol. 31, nos. 1-2, January-April, 1990, p.
62 and p. 61. See also Frederick Gareau 'A Gramscian Analysis of Social Science
Disciplines', International Social Science Journal, no. 136, May 1993; and Frederick
Gareau 'The Increasing Ethnocentrism of American Social Science: An Empirical Study of
Social Science Encyclopedias', International Journal of Comparative Sociology, vol. 24,
nos. 3-4, 1983.
42 Stephen Gill 'Two Concepts of International Political Economy', Review of International
Studies, vol. 16, 1991, p. 379.
43 Nicholas Onuf 'Hegemony's Hegemony in IPE', in Kurt Burch and Robert Denemark
(eds.), 1997.
44 Quoted in Richard Higgott 'Toward a Non-hegemonic IPE: An Antipodean Perspective',
in Craig Murphy and Roger Tooze (eds.) The New International Political Economy Boulder:
Lynne Rienner, 1991, p. 99.
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in people such as Robert Kagan who, in an attack against 'sophisticated whining
about U.S. hegemony', asserts that
[T]he truth about America's dominant role in the world is known to most
clear-eyed international observers. And the truth is that the benevolent
hegemony exercised by the United States is good for a vast portion of the
world's population.e-
Such attitudes not only explicitly benefit a particular set of interests, but also
act to establish parameters that invariably serve a particular discourse (in this
case American power). After all, how can one's research be taken seriously if one
is not from the ranks of the 'clear-eyed'?
Agendas that are outside these parameters, set by hegemonic forces at a
variety of levels, are reduced to the fringes of academic discourse. They become
"loners", to use Cox's borrowing of Susan Strange's phrase, set against the
"groupies" of the established acaderny.w The whole process, far from being
"objective" and "scientific" is unavoidably ideological and tends to serve
'particular national, sectional or class interests, which are comfortable within
the given order"."? 'The respectable intellectuals, those who will be recognised as
serious intellectuals, will overwhelmingly tend to be those who are subordinated
to power'r'"
This scenario leads to theorising being limited to what Cox terms
"problem solving". This approach accepts the dominant social and power
relationships and the organisations by which they are arranged as the given
framework for investigation. The essential aim of any problem-solving approach
is to make these relationships and institutions operate as smoothly and
efficiently as possible by dealing with particular sources of difficulty that
threaten the stability of the given order. As the model of institutions and
relationships - the overarching normative order - is not disputed, issues can be
investigated with regard to the specialised sections of activity in which they are
situated. Problem-solving theories are thus segmented along a plurality of
spheres and aspects. Statements and regulations can be attained that seem to
have universal pertinence, yet such laws involve the institutional and relational
4S Robert Kagan 'The Benevolent Empire', Foreign Policy, no. Ill, Summer 1998, p. 26.
46 Robert Cox '"Take Six Eggs": Theory, Finance, and the Real Economy in the Work of
Susan Strange', in Robert Cox with Timothy Sinclair, 1996, pp. 177-178.
47 Robert Cox in Robert Keohane (ed.), 1986, p. 208.
48 Noam Chomsky 'The Cold War and the University' in Noam Chomsky et al., The Cold
War and the University: Toward an Intellectual History of the Post-war Years, New York:
New Press, 1997, p. 189.
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parameters taken for granted from the beginning in any problem-solving
research agenda."?
Such problem-solving methodologies tend to the reification of existing
ontologies: within International Relations, the privileging of state behaviour over
all other research agendas. To date, this has been the primary ontology in
analysing foreign policy, though the usefulness of this in understanding foreign
policy is profoundly unsatisfactory. This is parf rlarly so when 'it is generally
accepted that the internal construction of the state is an important aspect of
explaining its behaviour internationally'. 50 Whilst this is held to be true,
Gramsci's qualifying remarks on the linkages between social relations and
international politics are important. Reductionist analysis that ties in
international relations to basic class considerations is rejected as economically
deterministic. Posing the question whether international relations and foreign
policies precede or followsocial relations, Gramsci gave a qualified answer:
There can be no doubt that they follow. Any organic innovation in the
social structure, through its technical-military expressions, modifies
organically absolute and relative relations in the international relations
field...However, international relations react both passively and actively
on political relations ...The more the immediate economic life of a nation is
subordinated to international relations, the more a particular party [in
power] will come to represent...that country's subordination and
economic enslavement to the hegemonic nations or to a certain number
[of themj.ê!
Whilst past literature on foreign policy has in the main ignored the social
relations behind state behaviour, it has also passed over Gramsci's concept of
the relational aspects of the state to the international hegemonic structure (see
below). Studies which assume isolated entities - such as the state as actors - as
ontological tools, whilst ignoring structuralist explanations and the specific
societal and historical contexts that such actors (states) spring from, are
abstractions and unsatisfactory. Unless the historic nature of a given state is
established and analysed, the derivative nature of such a focus of analysis and
the level of abstraction becomes too speculative. 52 The same applies to "foreign
policy" if it ignores the specific socio-economic context (at both national and
49 Robert Cox in Robert Keohane (ed.), 1986, p. 208.
50 John Maclean 'Marxist Epistemology, Explanations of 'Change' and the Study of
International Relations', in Barry Buzan and R.J. Barry Jones Change and the Study of
International Relations: The Evaded Dimension, London: Frances Pinter, 1981, p. 62.
51 Antonio Gramsci, 1971, pp. 176-177.
52 Vendulka Kubalkova and Albert Cruickshank Marxism and International Relations
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 12.
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international levels) from which it is inevitably derivative but at the same time
helps to create: 'anarchy is what states make of it'.s3 Addressing such issues is
what this work now turns to.
The agent-structure debate in International Relations
Both neo-realist and liberal accounts approach the political and economic
spheres as autonomous, and states as particular and unified entities with the
endowment to seek particular objectives. This is problematic, for it does not just
present a doubtful view of the world but also its helps, through "problem-
solving" positivism, to maintain a world which is both elitist and undemocratic:
the 'conservative ideology of the exercise of state power'. 54
The main alternative to such actor-centred explanations was initially the
structuralist perspective of dependency theory which argued that the economic
structures of the global capitalist economy were decisive in affecting outcomes
in the global economy rather than the intentions of states.P> However, the
critical approach of Cox et al. rejects not only the "billiard ball" model presented
by realists but also the rather rigid, structuralist accounts of dependencia.
Instead it tries to give equal weight to both structure and agency, depending on
the given temporal and spatial context. The conception of states as unified
actors has been replaced with the conception of a rapidly changing global
economic order which shapes economies and livelihoods in all areas of the
world. By bridging the gap between agent and structure, such analyses shares
with Alexander Wendt the concern to conceptualise 'agents and structures as
mutually constitutive yet ontologically distinct units. Each is in some sense an
effect of the other'. 56
However, such a notion of structure is faced with the critique of the
empiricists and their assertion based on phenomenonalist nominalism that only
what is observable is a defensible object to study. With no direct causality
53 AlexanderWendt 'Anarchyis What States Makeof It: The SocialConstruction of Power
Politics',International Organization, vol.46, no. 2, 1992.
54 Justin Rosenberg The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of
International Relations London:Verso, 1994,p. 30.
ss For the classic dependencia approach, see André Gunder Frank Latin America:
Underdevelopment or Revolution? NewYork:MonthlyReviewPress, 1969.
56 AlexanderWendt 'TheAgent-StructureProblem',International Organization, vol.41, no.
3, Summer 1987,p. 360.
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between structure and agent, how can structures be scientifically studied? Any
reply hinges on the ontological positions a theorist adopts i.e. what is taken to
exist. Apart from the fact that social structures require humankind to form and
re-form them, basic ontological distinctions between molecular structures lil
physics and generative structures in international politics can be claimed as
real as their outcomes can be viewed.s?
Precisely the same can be said for the critique of a lack of causality in
structural analyses. This criticism adopts a Humean position that rejects the
existence of causes and instead asserts that science can only provide empirical
generalisations by which events may be related in temporal successions. Thus
whilst "law-like" regularities may be discussed, Hume discounts the notion of
"cause".58 However, as Wendt demonstrates, the natural sciences would never
have advanced if they had not undertook to comprehend the underlying causal
mechanisms that produce the phenomena which make up the natural realm.ë?
Thus the position that demands observable causality fails to address how
structural power may impinge on states or other bodies.
To summarise, since the effects of structural power can be perceived, it is
appropriate to assume that structural power is real - causality or no causality.
In an era of globalisation and the spread of structural hegemonic power,
rejecting this thesis is somewhat eccentric.
Cox's neo-Gramscian perspective seeks to define historically the
structures which are expressed through political agency, rather than assuming
that structures are fixed, and stresses the importance of the role of ideas in
creating a transnational ideological hegemony of neo-liberalism (see below). This
approach 'stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that
order came about ... [It]does not take institutions and power relations for granted
but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and
whether they might be in the process of changing'<v Only then can a structure
be adequately analysed: a temporal 'snapshot' (typical of problem-solving) is
rejected as ahistorical and negatively parsimonious. Indeed, critical perspectives
stress 'the need to ground all knowledge of social life in human history, culture
57 Ibid., p. 353.
58David Hume A Treatise of Human Nature Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969, pp. 121-142.
59 Alexander Wendt, 1987, p. 353.
60 Robert Cox in Robert Keohane (ed.), p. 208.
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and power relations', and not take "reality" at face value.e! As such, an essential
reappraisal of 'images and assumptions about man and society' and about the
institutions and structures that man interacts with is carried out.62
By advancing the analysis of South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy
beyond purely examining actor-behaviour, and by examining the constraints
that remain invisible in actor-orientated explanatory frameworks, this study
aims to advance a more sophisticated understanding of Pretoria's foreign policy
post-apartheid, whilst avoiding the structural determinism of Wallerstein and
Gunder Frank. Indeed, as will become clear, there is room for agency and
choices and alternatives do exist - as the deployment of a Gramscian perspective
to the study of international politics demonstrates. It is this Gramscian
conceptualisation and its relations to the fundamental hypotheses of this work
that we now turn to.
61 Jim George and David Campbell 'Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of Difference:
Critical Social Theory and International Relations', International Studies Quarterly, vol.
34, no. 3, September 1990, p. 270.
62 R. Walker Political Theory and the Transformation of World Politics World Order Studies
Program, Occasional Paper No.8, Princeton, New Jersey: Center for International
Studies, 1980, p. 2.
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SECTION II
HEGEMONY, MIDDLEPOWERMANSHIP AND MULTILA TERALISM
It is a central premise of this work that any redirection of South African post-
apartheid foreign policy that has occurred has been in a direction that fits
Coxian notions of middlepowermanship. This has largely played itself out in a
particular enthusiasm for multilateral activity. 'By itself a middle power IS
unlikely to have overwhelming influence on the intemational stage', and as a
result, 'middle power leadership is, in essence, multilateralist in approach'<o
This being so, the purpose of this section is to outline our understanding of
middlepowermanship following a reading of Cox, and also how this analysis
throws light on multilateralism and multilateral activity. By doing so, we provide
a framework through which an analysis of post-apartheid South African foreign
policy may be conducted.
The Section is composed of three parts. Firstly, what IS meant by
"hegemony" in the Gramscian sense and how this relates to International
Relations and in particular notions of world order is explored. What this
hegemonic world order is in the contemporary period will be elucidated in the
following chapter. Secondly, an explanation of Coxian "middlepowermanship"
and how this is relates to the propagation of a particular hegemonic
project/world order will be sketched. Why Cox's notion of middle powers is seen
as the preferable definition will also be briefly discussed. Thirdly, a suggestion is
put forward as to why middlepowermanship leads to a heightened interest in
multilateral organisations and more specifically, a particular tactical role in
such institutions.
Gramsci's understanding of hegemony
According to Robert Cox, the essential function of most intemational
institutions is the justification and defence of the hegemon's politico-economic
63 Hussein Solomon 'South African Foreign Policy and Middle Power Leadership', in
Hussein Solomon Fairy Godmother, Hegemon or Partner? In Search of a South African
Foreign Policy HalfwayHouse: Institute of Strategic Studies Monograph Series no. 13,
1997, p. 54.
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project. In short, 'the institutionalisation and regulation of established order'.64
How a particular order becomes 'established' and is maintained is central to the
Gramscian notion of hegemony:
By hegemony, Gramsci seems to mean a socio-political situation, in his
terminology a "moment", in which the philosophy and practice of a
society fuse or are in equilibrium; an order in which a certain way of life
and thought is dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused
throughout society in all its institutional and private manifestations,
informing with its spirit all taste, morality, customs, religious and
political principles, all social relations, particularly in their intellectual
and moral connotations. An element of direction and control, not
necessarily coercion, is implied.v>
The hegemonic class leads society through its leadership of a complex alliance
of social forces and leadership in the sphere of production - a "historic bloc".
This is 'the particular configuration of social forces and ideology that gives
content to a historical state'.66 In this theorisation classes and fractions of
classes form alliances in order to construct a specific mode of social relations of
production and build a state formation (and world order at the intemational
level) that is favoured by them. This bloc becomes hegemonic if/when it is based
on a coherent conjunction or fit between a configuration of material power, the
prevalent collective image of world order. ..and a set of institutions which
administer the order with a certain semblance of universality'A?
In the Gramscian sense, this hegemonic power is of a different type than
that usually associated with pure material dominance, and is intimately linked
to 'intellectual and moral leadership' via ideology. Indeed, the importance of
ideas in Gramscian theorising is explicit, with Gramsci himself asserting that
ideologies have the 'same energy as a material force'.68Once these ideas have
become hegemonic (see below) in combination with control over the material
spheres of production, a historic bloc may be said to have been constructed.
Prior to this it is conceivable that a situation may arise where hegemony is
absent, hence postponing the creation of an historic bloc:
64 Robert Cox 'Multilateralism and World Order', Review of International Studies, vol. 18,
no. 2, April, 1992, p. 163.
65 Gwn Williams 'Hegemony, War of Position and Political Intervention' in Anne
Showstock Sassoon (ed.) Approaches to Gramsci London: Writers and Readers, 1982, p.
94.
66 Robert Cox, 1987, p. 409.
67 Robert Cox, 1986, p. 223.
68Antonio Gramsci, 1971, p 377.
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A class can in fact organise itself in a State which only barely goes beyond
the bounds of an economic-corporative development, but it is only when
this state has developed the area of hegemony that it is an extended or
integral State, and only then can it represent a fully developed and
maximally extended historical bloc.v?
Hence the notion of ideology is inextricably bound up in Gramscian theory vis-a-
vis the nature of the state. In the writings of Marx and Engels, we can see a
foreshadowing of Gramsci's notions surrounding ideological control:
Insofar ...as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of
an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence
among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and
regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus
their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch.t?
Gramsci's concept can be seen as an extension of the Marxist theories around
leadership of society. By bringing into focus an analysis of Machiavelli's
Centaur,"! viz. the levels of coercion and consent, force and culture, government
and hegemony etc., Gramsci 'posed the question of consent in a way new to
Marxism '."? By doing so, Gramsci provides scholars of International Relations
with a conceptualisation that also extends traditional theorisations and makes it
possible to take a more nuanced understanding of dominance and power in
politics.
Following Gramsci, whilst it is true that the dominant economic class can
(and does) exercise sheer coercive force via state apparatuses, this factor does
not solely account for its control over society for alliances are required with
other fractions if this is to be achieved on a stable and lasting basis. The ability
to exercise this control is made possible by the elite classes establishing
hegemony in social, cultural and moral spheres, for a hegemonic class is 'a class
which has been able to articulate the interests of other social groups to its own
by means of ideological struggle'Yê This has been extended to define a
hegemonic system as identifying 'the apparent interests of a subaltern class
with those of a fundamental class which is able to exercise political
69 Anne Showstock Sassoon Gramsci's Politics Minneapolis: University of Minnesota,
1980,p. 123.
70 KarlMarxand Friedrich Engels The German Ideology London:Lawrenceand Wishart,
1970,pp. 64-65.
71 AntonioGramsci, 1971,pp. 169-170.
72 Christine Buci-Glucksmann 'Hegemonyand Consent: A Political Strategy' in Anne
ShowstockSassoon (ed.)Approaches to Gramsci London:Writers and Readers, 1982, p.
117.
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leadership'<" This is done through a combination of both coercion and
persuasion, producing 'the possibility of ruling with the consent of the
oppressed classes, the iron fist of the state being kept in reserve and rarely in
evidencet " Gramsci himself uses the word direzione (leadership)
interchangeably with egemonia (hegemony) and in contrast with deminazione
(dominationl.ts Maintaining hegemony in the Gramscian sense is thus
dependent not only upon exercising power through coercion, but also by
attaining consent by acting as the "moral" leaders of society:
The supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as
"domination" and as "intellectual and moral leadership". A social group
dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to "liquidate" or to
subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it leads kindred or allied groups.
A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise "leadership" before
winning governmental power...[I]t subsequently becomes dominant when
it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must
continue to "lead" as well."?
Hence, 'hegemony is the ability of a social group to exercise a function of
'political and moral direction' in society'i?e
A hegemonic class then is one which achieves the consent of other
classes by manufacturing and fostering a network of alliances by way of both
political and ideological encounters. This is derivative of the notion that the
dominant class understands that the acquiescence of the subordinate classes in
the existing power relations is but conditional. The hegemonic class(es) thus
need to broaden and generalise the basis of class power by inducting various
interests groups into the states concerns. By constructing what is essentially a
superficial coalition via a mixture of coercion and consent, the hegemonic class
produces (temporary) stability and diverts the subordinated elements within
society from realising their own real needs or interests, thus serving to defend
the ascendant position of the dominant class elite. At the same time, hegemony
is not purely an ideological phenomenon: hegemony cannot be created without
73 Chantal Mouffe 'Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci' in Chantal Mouffe (ed.) Gramsci
and Marxist Theory London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979, p. 181.
74 James Mittelman 'World Order Studies and International Political Economy',
Alternatives, vol. 9, no. 3, Winter 1983-84, p. 331.
7S Vendulka Kubálková and Albert Cruickshank, 1989, p. 199
76 Roger Simon Gramsci's Political Thought London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1991, p. 23.
77 Antonio Gramsci, 1971, pp. 57-68.
78 Enrico Augelli and Craig Murphy 'Gram sci and International Relations: A General
Perspective and Example from Recent US Policy Towards the Third World' in Stephen Gill
(ed.) Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993, p. 130.
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the 'decisive nucleus of the economic'. Yet, Gramsci also avoids the economistic
trap of mechanically connecting control over the productive forces to that of
societal domination, for in addition to the economic realm 'the nature of power
in the modern world is that it is also constructed in relation to political, moral,
intellectual, cultural, ideological, and sexual questions'_79
An advantage of Gramsci's analysis then is that it allows us to escape
from pure economic determinism and to develop the notion of the state as being
integral i.e. "dictatorship + hegemony". Gramsci portrayed the nature and role of
the state in a famous paragraph worthy of reproduction:
[T[heState is seen as the organ of one particular group, destined to create
favourable conditions for the latter's expansion. But the development and
expansion of the particular group are conceived of, and presented, as
being the motor force of a universal expansion, of a development of all the
'national' energies. In other words the dominant group is co-ordinated
concretely with the general interests of the subordinate groups, and the
life of the State is conceived as a continuous process of formation and
superseding of unstable equilibrium (on the juridical plane) between the
interests of the fundamental group and those of the subordinate groups.ë?
If we take the "State" as the world order and the "dominant group" as the
dominant hegemonic classes, it is possible to extrapolate this analysis of local
society to the international level. Gramsci himself asserted that 'the
international situation should be considered in its national aspect'A' and others
have argued that we 'can use Gramsci's concepts to ask to what degree there is
a "state" in the wider sense which characterises world society'.S2 COX has
pioneered this international aspect of Gramsci's conceptualisation of hegemony
and is worth quoting at length:
"Hegemony" is used ...in the Gramscian meaning of a structure of values
and understandings about the nature of order that permeates a whole
society, in this case a world society composed of states and non-state
corporate entities. In a hegemonic order these values and understandings
are relatively stable and unquestioned. They appear to most actors as the
natural order of things. They are the inter-subjective meanings that
constitute the order itself. Such a structure of meanings is underpinned
by a structure of power, in which most probably one state is dominant
but that state's dominance is not sufficient by itself to create hegemony.
Hegemony derives from the ways of doing and thinking of the dominant
social strata of the dominant state or states insofar as these ways of
79 Stuart Hall Thatcherism and the Crisis of the Left: The Hard Road to Renewal London:
Verso Press, p. 170.
80 Antonio Gramsci, 1971, p. 182.
81 Ibid., p. 40.
82 Enrico Augelli and Craig Murphy in Stephen Gill (ed.), 1993, p. 129.
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doing and thinking have inspired emulation or acquired the acquiescence
of the dominant social strata of other states. These social practices and
the ideologies that explain and legitimise them constitute the foundation
of the hegemonic order. Hegemony frames thought and thereby
circumscribes action. 83
Following on from this, dominance is, as we have mentioned, different to that
usually associated with the word and which is utilised within the Intemational
Relations discipline by among others, neo-realists. There, dominance and
hegemony are inter-linked with the power projections of states within an
anarchic world order and characterise various power relations where coercion is
overt. Within this anarchical intemational order, a major theoretical assumption
about states is that their prime motivation is to survive as independent,
sovereign units.ë- Within this framework, hegemony is understood to be the
ability of one preponderant state to project its power through superior material
power resources "over" other states within a Hobbesian conceptualisation of the
world. James Mittelman usefully contrasts neo-realist understandings of
hegemony with that of the Gramscian approach when he points out that:
What distinguishes the United States as a hegemon from Japan as a
contender may be discemed in the realm of ideology. Whereas the United
States diffusers] liberal values as universal norms, Japanese culture has
not yet generated values for export.e>
Within the broad neo-realist school, this powerjhegemon equation
understanding has led to "hegemonic stability theory" which suggests that
domination by a single country is the most conducive to the promotion of a
strong international regime where "rules" within the system regulating order are
obeyed under threat from the dominant hegemon.w Co-operation between states
is then founded on temporary alliances constructed to maintain global stability.
This position adopts a structuralist view of the intemational system and
privileges states as the prime ontological unit of analysis. Within this
framework, hegemons construct regimes that perpetuate their intemational
advantage by furnishing global public goods. These public goods profit not only
83 Robert Cox, 1992, p. 178-179.
84 Kenneth Waltz Theory of International Politics NewYork: Random House, 1979.
85 James Mittelman 'The End of a Millennium: Changing Structures of World Order and
the Post-Cold War Division of Labour' in Larry Swatuk and Timothy Shaw (ed.) The South
at the End of the Twentieth Century: Rethinking the Political Economy of Foreign Policy in
Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and Latin America NewYork: St. Martin's Press, 1994, p. 26.
86 Robert Keohane 'The Theory of Hegemonic Stability Theory and Changes in
International Economics Regimes, 1967-77', in Ole Holsti, Randolph Siverson, and
Alexander George (eds.) Change in the International System Boulder: Westview Press,
1981.
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the hegemon but also the wider international system.s" Such a functionalist
view of regimes defines the phenomena of international co-operation.
Whilst it is true that this international regime may possess "rules" that tie
in with the Gramscian notion of hegemony, the fundamental difference is that
hegemonic orders within the neo-realist lens are seen as a product of one state's
preponderance of military and economic power and that this is a prerequisite for
a liberal international economy. Viewed via Gramsci however, the liberal
economic order and hegemony are organically linked and hegemony is a device
by which the norms of the economic order are further propagated.ê" Dominance
by a state is not particularly central to this notion of hegemony: it is the
promotion of a particular dominant ideology and the construction of an
international institutionalisation that underpins the system that is important:
Hegemony is understood to involve not dominance of one state by
another, but rather the institution and maintenance of a world order
which serves the interests of the dominant class of the dominant state
while at the same time it serves the interests of the dominant classes of
other states as well.ë?
That is not to say that a dominant power does not exist. Yet the crucial
difference from accepted (i.e. neo-realist) notions of hegemony is that projecting
raw military and economic power is not central to the creation of a hegemonic
order - it is the ability to project a particular order as the "common interest" via
a combination of coercion and consent that is central to Gramscian notions of
hegemony. Such hegemony is centred around an ideology which 'wins the
consent of very substantial sections of the subordinate and dominated classes
[and] which can inscribe ...a vast range of different positions and interests in it
[making it] seem...to represent a little bit of everybcdy'iw
These shared common interests and 'the coaxing of public consent' are
achieved 'through the media (schools, churches, and intellectuals working hand
87 Robert Keohane After Hegemony: Co-operation and Discord in the World Political
Economy Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, pp. 31-46. See also Robert Gilpin
The Political Economy of International Relations Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1987.
88For similarities between the "traditional" understanding of international regime theory
and Critical Theory understandings, see Fred Gale 'Cave 'Cave! Hic Draqones': A Neo-
Gramscian Deconstruction and Reconstruction of International Regime Theory', Review
of International Political Economy, vol. 5, no. 2 Summer 1998.
89Mark Neufeld 'Hegemony and Foreign Policy Analysis: The Case of Canada as a Middle
Power', Studies in Political Economy, no. 48, Autumn 1995(b), p. 13.
90 Stuart Hall, 1988, p. 165.
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In glove with the ruling class), agencies, in other words, that customarily form
part of the political socialisation process 'vi This socialisation process acts to
enforce certain dominant ideas that 'exert a pervasive, yet subtle, influence in
the making of policy, serving to define the parameters of acceptable policy
options'w Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman's work on "manufacturing
consent" through the media in the service of a particular worldview and set of
dominant ideas is of profound interest in this respect.w
Furthermore, we have already noted the presence of such socialising
agents as the organic intellectuals debating and promoting a particular
hegemonic project and who help define what is and what is not "realistic". The
importance of such intellectuals in promoting a certain order should not be
underestimated:
Central to the promotion of the hegemony of trans-national capital is the
development and articulation of theories and ideologies by its 'organic
intellectuals'. [This is achieved via] a large number of policy-oriented
academics and theoreticians drawn from a range of fields. 94
Such a process acts to facilitate and further deepen the ability of a particular
hegemonic norm to be generally accepted as the "correct" order of things and
which obtains consent. "Experts in legitimation" act 'in mediating the ideological
and political unity of the existing hegemonic structure, rendering it acceptable
to allied and subordinate groups, universalising its dominance'v>
These intellectuals 'are not merely regarded as cliques pursuing
individual interests, but as ...representatives of a particular social group or
historic bloc generated by the sphere of production vë As such, they are
intimately linked to a clear economic base and promote the interests of the
historic bloc - 'exercis[ing] an organisational function in the wide sense' - whilst
at the same time transcending this so as to open up space for other social forces
91 Vendulka Kubálková and Albert Cruickshank, 1989, p. 199.
92 Kim Richard Nossal The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy 3rd ed. Scarborough:
Prentice Hall, 1997, p.165.
93 Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of
the Mass Media New York: Pantheon Books, 1988.
94 Stephen Gill 'Hegemony, Consensus and Trilateralism' Review of International Studies,
no. 12 July 1986, p. 215.
95 John Merrington 'Theory and Practice of Gramsci's Marxism' in New Left Review
Western Marxism: A Critical Reader London: New Left Review, 1977, p. 153.
96 Andreas Bieler 'Neo-Gramscian Approaches to IR Theory and the Role of Ideas: A
Response to Open Marxism', paper presented at British International Studies Association
annual conference, December 16-18, 1996, p. 4.
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to give their consent - an integral component of notions regarding hegemony.v?
'The intellectuals organically tied to the hegemonic class ... demonstrate in every
field of knowledge that the aspirations of the group they serve coincide with the
interests of society as a whole'.98
In the realm of world orders this "rationality" becomes so accepted as the
"norm" that a 'nation's conception of the world becomes universalised to the
point where its own leaders stand by the universal principles when they conflict
with particularistic domestic interestsPs In other words, a particular hegemonic
project becomes so embedded as the normative order that the national elites
view it as essentially inviolable and resist even influential segments of its
constituency in seeking to maintain such a programme.
Such a hegemonic order is diffused throughout international society at
multiple levels and comes to define what may be "legitimately" expected or
demanded. This elaborate set of structures acts to limit the boundaries around
which "legitimate" and "realistic" policies may be formulated. In the current
world order, where there has been a shift from "embedded liberalism" á la
Ruggie to hyper-liberalism, this involves:
A transnational process of consensus formation among the official
caretakers of the global economy. This process generates consensus
guidelines, underpinned by an ideology of globalisation, that are
transmitted into the policy-making channels of national governments and
big corporations.rw
This has particular implications for the developing world's response to negative
outcomes within the global order.tv! Though space does exist for agency, it has
been particularly constrained to a large degree by the massive shift in political
and economic relations in the post-Cold War era and can perhaps be seen
'convert(ing] the state into an agency for adjusting national economic practices
and policies to the perceived exigencies of the global eccnomy'i 'v? This creates in
the most perilous states the situation where agency 'represents not so much the
vital forces of [their] own country, as [those countries] subordination and
economic enslavement to the hegemonic nations or to a certain of their
97 Antonio Gramsci, 1971, p. 97.
98 Enrico Augelli and Craig Murphy in Stephen Gill (ed.), 1993, p. 131.
99 Robert Cox, 1989, p. 829.
100 Robert Cox 'Global Perestroika' in Robert Coxwith Timothy Sinclair, 1996, p. 301.
101 Enrico Augelli and Craig Murphy America's Quest for Supremacy and the Third World:
A Gramsciart Analysis London: Pinter Publishers, 1988.
102 Robert Cox 'Global Perestroika' in Robert Cox with Timothy Sinclair, 1996, p. 302.
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number'103 Though we can perhaps avoid the extreme pessimistic notions of a
Foucaltian parr-opticon as pictured by Stephen Gill,lo4(though the disciplinary
elements of the WTOmay prove Gill correct), it is pertinent to echo warnings of
a "new imperialism" where:
[N]ational sovereignty is ...readi1y overridden by a hegemonic power
pursuing its own self-defined national interest; and [where] the neo-
liberal policy prescription of the 1980s [is] even more single-handedly
imposed ...with potentially serious consequences for large parts of the
developing world.
... A more monolithic world is spinning an even tighter web of constraints
through the creation of an increasingly integrated, institutionalised and
liberalised global economy...In this new world people have greater
political freedom, but their range of choices has narrowed. ios
In other words, in the post-Cold War era where a particular hegemonic project is
dominant and where one order defines the choices available, the South is
disadvantaged to a large degree by its weakened state capacity and economic
vulnerability. This is not to say that this is fixed, and competent investigations
require an integrated approach 'by combining parsimonious theories which
analyse agency in terms of a conception of rationality with contextual theories
which analyse structures institutionally and historically'rtw 'Making allowance
for agency, there is nothing inevitable or pre-determined about outcomes, only
opportunities defining the limits of the possible+tv? Yet constrained by a
particular vision of world order that has achieved hegemony, 'states can no
longer determine; they can only bargain',108 and this bargaining takes place
within certain constraints. These can take on the form of 'structural constraints
which are often taken as the limits of the possible'.109However, this is not to say
that structure is fixed nor that space does not open up at certain junctures to
allow agency: 'agency matters much more than structural realists such as Waltz
103Antonio Gramsci, 1971, p. 177.
104 Stephen Gill 'The Global Panopticon? The Neoliberal State, Economic Life and
Democratic Surveillance', Alternatives, vol. 20, no. 1, 1995.
105Manfred Bienefeld 'The New World Order: Echoes of a New Imperialism', Third World
Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 1, 1994, pp. 31 and 43.
106Andrew Gamble, Anthony Payne, Ankie Hoogvelt, Michael Kenny, and Michael
Dietrich 'Editorial: New Political Economy', New Political Economy, vol. 1, no. 1, 1996, pp.
5-6.
107James Mittelman 'Coxian Historicism as an Alternative Perspective in International
Studies', Alternatives, vol. 23, no. 1, January-March, 1998, p. 82.
108Richard Higgott 'Issues, Institutions and Middle-Power Diplomacy: Action and
Agendas in the Post-Cold War Era' in Andrew Cooper (ed.) Niche Diplomacy: Middle
Powers After the Cold War Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997, p. 27.
109Stephen Gill 'Epistemology, Ontology and the 'Italian School" in Stephen Gill (ed.),
1993, p. 36.
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are yet prepared to concedetuv Indeed, 'the notion of structural context .. .is not
to be understood as a cage. It is properly conceived as the source of both
opportunities and constraints, as being both enabling and binding'. 'Care [must]
be taken to make sure that a sufficiently political (or agency-oriented) dimension
is introduced into [any] framework'i u!
This study accepts such warnings against a structurally-determinist
analysis and, following Gramsci, allows space for agency whilst being aware of
structural constraints. It is asserted that 'no countries ... are completely
autonomous and self-reliant [whilst] no countries ... develop (or under-develop)
merely as a reflection of what goes on beyond their national borderst u? Yet in
the contemporary period agency must operate within a particular milieu that
militates against strong opposition to a specific global order which is the
hegemony of neo-liberalism and which has led to a 'demise of sovereignty in the
South'.113 Following this, the inherent politico-ideological aspects of such a
world order (and the legitimisation process which in tum accompanies such a
schema) are central to Gramscian analyses and possess in themselves an
ontological commodity. In the contemporary period, this hegemonic concept can
be understood whereby 'capitalist norms and practices pervade ...everyday life in
a more systematic way than in the era of welfare-nationalisms and state
capitalism ... so that it may be apposite to speak of the emergence of. ..a "market
civilisatiori'vn+
This being so, the usage of neo-Gramscian analysis (and specifically the
notion of hegemony) in International Relations has not proceeded unchallenged
and indeed has provoked some criticism - mainly due to the supposed problems
arising from attempting to "intemationalise" Gramsci's work, and the alleged
concentration on ideology.
110 Richard Higgott in Andrew Cooper, (ed.), 1997, p. 30.
III Anthony Payne 'The New Political Economy of Area Studies', Millennium: Journal of
International Studies, vol. 27, no. 2,1998, p. 266.
112 Bjorn Hettne Development Theory and the Three Worlds: Towards an International
Political Economy of Development Harlow: Longman, 1995, p. 262.
113 Timothy Shaw 'Conditionalities Without End: Hegemony, Neo-Liberalism and the
Demise of Sovereignty in the South', in Mark Denham and Mark Owen Lombardi (eds.)
Perspectives on Third World Sovereignty: The Postmodern Paradox Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1996.
ll4 Stephen Gill 'Globalisation, Market Civilization, and Disciplinary Neo-liberalism',
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol. 24, no. 3, 1995, p. 399.
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According to Randall Germain and Michael Kenny, Gramsci's notion of
hegemony was specific to the national social context within which it was
developed and it IS problematic to transpose this willy-nilly to the
international.t '> It is certainly true that Gramsci concentrated his analysis on
the local. This however was not a spatial boundary mark, but simply a starting
point, providing a foundation from which to understand the relationship
between national and international. The historically particular constellations of
social forces at the parochial or national level are the beginning of any analysis,
not the end. Naturally, such local configurations do not simply emerge as an
abstraction from the international, but are themselves moulded via the
global/national dialectic, for as Gramsci wrote, 'it is ...necessary to take into
account that international relations intertwine with these internal relations of
nation-states, creating new, unique and historically concrete combinationstus
In defence of the Gramscian approach, Mark Rupert argues that Gramsci
suggested 'a dialectical understanding of world politics which cannot proceed in
abstraction from the specific constellations of factors - global and local - which
have shaped the historical production of particular states [and] the emergence of
international and transnational relations'. 117 This local analysis is fundamental
to any neo-Gramscian account (including this study), so it is hard to
understand the charge by Germain and Kenny that neo-Oramscian analyses
ignore the local and concentrate on the international.
Furthermore, Germain and Kenny's critique misinterprets the neo-
Gramscian understanding of a transnational hegemony. Contrary to their
assertion that the neo-Gramscian turn in International Relations suggests a
one-directional power relationship where hegemony is simply fashioned by an
elite transnational class and then imposed upon subaltern classes.ue hegemony
is understood to be 'the unstable product of a continuous process of struggle, a
"war of position", a "reciprocal siege", hardly a foreclosure of the horizons of
115 Randall Germain and Michael Kenny 'Engaging Gramsci: International Relations
Theory and the New Gramscians', Review of International Studies, vol. 24, no. 1, 1998, p.
17.
116 Antonio Gramsci, 1971, p. 182.
117 Mark Rupert '(Re-)Engaging Gramsci: A Response to Germain and Kenny', Review of
International Studies, vol. 24, no. 3, 1998, pp. 432-433.
118 Randall Germain and Michael Kenny, 1998, p. 18.
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meaningful political contestation t u? In other words, the neo-Gramscian
approach within International Relations is not as reductionist as Germain and
Kenny suggest, but rather is fully aware that any hegemonic project is
constructed on contested terrain where it is fought within the realm of ideas
(though obviously connected to material bases).
This notion of the importance of ideas leads to another critique of the
neo-Gramscian approach, namely that the role of ideology is given too much
emphasis, particularly vis-a-vis changes in economic policies.P? According to
one account, this gives the impression that changes in strategies are simply the
result of fractional struggles within elite circles.tv! Obviously, when a particular
accumulation regime demonstrates that it is inefficient in serving the interests
of the bourgeoisie, it is reconfigured and inefficient capitals are sacrificed. Yet,
the end of one accumulation regime does not result in an automatic (almost
teleological) leap to another, supposedly driven by the vagaries of the demands
of "the market". 'On the contrary, there are always various possible courses of
action in times of structural change. Which course of action is chosen is not
determined by the market, but depends on the outcome of class struggle'.122
The notion of a historic bloc, discussed previously, is vitally important in
the selection of a particular strategy to overcome turning points in any
accumulation regime. This historic bloc attempts to gain hegemony through a
combination of coercion and consent. It is in the realm of the consensual aspect
of a reconfigured historic bloc that the role of ideas and organic intellectuals is
crucial in striving for the success of a hegemonic project. Despite the criticism of
Burnham, a Gramscian understanding of such a project is based on and springs
from - the economic sphere: ideas have a material base. However, any
hegemonic project also goes 'beyond economic, the structure, into the political
and social sphere, the superstructure, incorporating issues such as social
reform or moral regeneration, to result in a stable hegemonic political system'.123
To quote Gramsci:
119 MarkRupert, 1998, p. 428. For another defence of the neo-Grarnscian approach, see
Craig Murphy 'Understanding IR: Understanding Gramsci', Review of International
Studies, vol.24, no. 3,1998.
120 See Peter Burnham 'Neo-GramscianHegemonyand the International Order', Capital
and Class, vol.45, 1991, especiallyp. 83.
121 Ibid., p. 88.
122 AndreasBieler, 1996, p. 3.
123 Ibid.
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Politics becomes permanent action and gives birth to permanent
organisations precisely in so far as it identifies itself with the economic.
But it is also distinct from it, which is why one may speak separately of
economics and politics, and speak of "political passion" as of an
immediate impulse to action which is bom on the "permanent and
organic" terrain of economic life, but which transcends it'.124
Ideology therefore is pertinent in the struggle to organise a reconfigured historic
bloc. In contrast to what critics have claimed, ideas are not simply imparted top-
down but are engaged at a variety of levels and agency is present throughout.
Furthermore, such ideas are not independent of the economic sphere but have a
material base - something which neo-Gramscian analyses make clear. In doing
so, the approach is a valuable theoretical framework by which the intemational
political economy can be examined - as Mark Neufeld forcefully points out:
Gramscian theorising - and in particular the notion of hegemony - is a
valuable adjunct to the dominant class approach to foreign policy
analysis ...Additionally it provides a means of relating the global context to
foreign policy-making, as well as space for agency ...As such, the
Gramscian approach is a viable altemative to realist-theorising, and
deserves serious consideration in the search for analytical frameworks
adequate to the contemporary world order.V>
Accepting this, an examination of the world order from the above framework will
now be undertaken.
Constitutions of world orders
If the usefulness of Gramscian analysis in Intemational Relations and the
concomitant definition of hegemony is embraced, how is this applied to the
analysis of world orders? By order it is meant 'the [common] sense of the way
things usually happen' - not "orderliness" or the lack of upheaval in global
affairs.t= Furthermore, a world order differs from an intemational order, for a
world order is essentially normative, whilst an intemational order indicates the
interactions between states and across borders, that is inter-nations. The
various organisations that govern this intemational order do not, in themselves
"make" the world order (though as Cox argues, they help legitimise and
construct it). According to Cox, three components make up the structure of a
hegemonic world order. These are: material capabilities, ideas and institutions.
The material capabilities of a world order are composed of:
124Antonio Gramsci, 1971, pp. 139-140.
125Mark Neufeld,1995 (b), pp. 24-25.
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Productive and destructive potentials within a world order that exists as
technological and organisational capabilities, and in their accumulated
forms as natural resources which technology can transform, stocks of
equipment (for example, industries and armaments), and the wealth
which can command these.rs?
In Cox's definition, there is no specific location of such material capabilities.
Such a theorisation differs from traditional state-centric analyses which seeks to
locate such capabilities within specific states and under the control of the elites
within such spatially defined entities. Cox's historical sensitivity and the
knowledge that the post-Westphalian state system belongs merely to the current
modern epoch, shies away from such assertions and avoids any pre-
specification of the location of capabilities. Such loci are historically determined
and are not temporally omnipresent. However, the interrelated elements of such
power capabilities as identified by Susan Strange (security, production, finance
and knowledge) within the global political economy, go some way to address
those critics who claim that Cox's conceptualisation of hegemony fails to fully
separate out all the diverse elements that make up hegemony across divergent
structures of power.128
Derivative of his Gramscian inspiration, Cox's conceptualisation of world
orders privileges the ascendant ideas of a particular era. By doing so, two forms
of ideas are distinguished: inter-subjective meanings and collective images.
Inter-subjective meanings are made up of shared ideas regarding the nature of
social relations and tend to continue behavioural habits and expectations. Cox
is again historically sensitive when he asserts that an example of such inter-
subjective meanings is the notion 'that people are organised and commanded by
states which have defined territories; that states relate to one another through
diplomatic agents'.129 It is clear that states are not seen as fixed ontological
units, but as historically determined, mutable creations conceptualised via
inter-subjective experience. As another account points out, 'the historical
structures of the feudal manor and the fief that confronted serfs and lords in
mediaeval times appeared as real and as enduring as do our modem historical
structures of the nation-state and the interstate system'.130
126Robert Cox in Robert Keohane (ed.), 1986, footnote 2, p. 249.
127 Ibid., p. 218.
128 Susan Strange in Craig Murphy and Roger Tooze (eds.), 1991, pp. 33-49.
129 Robert Cox in Robert Keohane (ed.), 1986, p. 218.
130 Fred Gale, 1998, p. 271.
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The second form of ideas are the collective images of social order held by
various popular groupings. These differ from inter-subjective meanings in that
collective images are widely debated over and unlike inter-subjective meanings
are not commonly indisputable or survive comparatively unquestioned. For
example, within "wider society" the state and state system as inter-subjective
meanings pass essentially unscathed as ontological "facts" - with the exception
of course of anarchist critics. Yet the actual organisation of the state and the
inter-state system (and related questions vis-á-cis alternative structures or
developmental paths) is the battlefield of a variety of ideological positions that
calls into question the very legitimacy of power relations within the existing
state and inter-state structure.t-"
The third and last constitutive element of Cox's conceptualisation of a
world order are its institutions. This is at both parochial and international levels
and act largely in propagating the hegemonic order:
Institutionalisation is a means of stabilising and perpetuating a particular
order. Institutions reflect the power relations prevailing at the point of
origin and tend, at least initially, to encourage collective images
consistent with these power relations. Eventually, institutions take on
their own life; they can become a battleground of opposing tendencies, or
rival institutions may reflect different tendencies. Institutions are
particular amalgams of ideas and material power which in turn influence
the development of ideas and material capabilitiea.t-?
At the intemational level, multilateral institutions play a vital role in
consolidating hegemony and propagate and ensure the continuance of a
particular hegemonic project by the mediating and legitimising function that
they perform. It is via interventions, negotiations, the making of concessions
and the arrival at "consensus" that paramount sectional interests are able to be
displayed as the common interest. This role of multilateral institutions and the
particular relevance of middlepowermanship in this process will be retumed to
below.
The three elements outlined above then constitute Cox's notion of world
order. It is when these three components conglomerate in a particular
arrangement that it is possible to speak of a hegemonic world order in the
Gramscian sense. Broadly speaking, 'the stronger the position of the ruling
131 Robert Cox in Robert Keohane (ed.), 1986, p. 219.
132 Ibid.
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group or state, the less the need for the use of force'.l33 In short, coercion
becomes less and less visible and consent appears paramount. So much so that
the very power relations on which such an order depend recede into the
background. In its most extreme and perhaps rarest form, it becomes
'impossible to distinguish the "dominant" class from "subordinate" allies to
whom concessions have to be rnade.'>' The implications for the salience of
agency, particularly in the periphery, are obvious.
This is not to say that agency is wholly absent from such a world order,
as has been mentioned previously. Within a Gramscian framework an
ideological battleground upon which hegemony is built is apparent and agency
is patently also present. As Gramsci himself writes:
A study of how...forces developed, from subaltern groups to hegemonic
and dominant groups, must ...seek out and identify the phases through
which they acquired: i. autonomy uis-a-uis the enemies they had to defeat,
and ii. support from the groups which actively or passively assisted them
...It is precisely by these two yardsticks that the level of historical and
political consciousness which the innovatory forces progressively attained
in the various phases can be measured.t "
In seeking agency, Gramsci's work can be seen to therefore avoid the
reductionist tendency of outright structuralism á la world-systems theory. The
struggle for hegemony is seen as a "war of position" where competing ideological
positions contest and where, 'through lived experience and shared cultural
codes [people may] learn what constitutes the "possible"'.136The same may be
said of states where hegemony has not been achieved domestically or, where the
dominant classes within the state reject the normative project of the global
hegemonic project. Agency is present within a Gramscian perspective of
international politics and this is one of the attractions of such an approach: it
was 'as a consequence of the "structuralist" failings of world-systems theory that
IR Gramscians were initially attracted to interpretations that stressed the
historicist and agency-oriented aspects of Gramsci's political sociology'.137This
being so, it is the varying degree to which agency is present and the strategic
133Anthony Payne and Andrew Gamble 'The Political Economy of Regionalism and World
Order' in Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne (eds.) Regionalism and World Order,
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996, p. 9.
134Craig Murphy International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance
since 1850 Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994, p. 45
135Antonio Gramsci, 1971, p. 53.
136Mark Rupert, 1998, p. 429.
137Craig Murphy, 1998, p. 418.
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choices that are made by policy-making elites that decides the extent to which a
state resists or acquiesces to an ongoing project:
Larger states and macro-regional political associations (like Japan and
the EC) generally have greater room for manoeuvre than small states.
Thus some are more sovereign than others in the emerging world order.Pë
Middlepowermanship
Of interest to the agent-structure debate is the role of middle powers. Whilst
this concept will be developed below, it is pertinent here to examine how middle
powers relate to such deliberations. Middle powers occupy an intermediary
position in the overall power structure of the international system and their
behaviour reflects a "meeting point" between the two:
The middle power seems to be the archetypal place for thinking and
experimenting with human and state agency in the international system.
Unlike the weakest states in the hierarchy of power, the middle power can
more clearly manifest a certain form of autonomy relative to the major
powers. In addition, the middle power's freedom of action cannot be
confused with the manifestation of structural leadership expected from the
major powera.P?
In other words, the middle power possesses more agency than a small and
invariably vulnerable state in the pursuance of its foreign policy, yet lacks the
structural position to dominate. Such thinking leads Timothy Shaw to assert
that in the African context, it will be those states that may be viewed as middle
powers who will have the capacity 'to maintain continental stability and
international viaibility'it+? Obviously, by either choosing not to struggle against
or not being in a position to, a nation's foreign policy coincides more with that of
the hegemonic interests than that of a state where the dominant elites actively
chose otherwise. This is at the centre of South Africa's post-apartheid foreign
policy and its emergence as a middle power and active multilateralist.
In discussing middle powers and the notion of middlepowermanship,
stylised ideal types as explanatory models must be resorted to. This being
acknowledged, what is a middle power and what is middlepowermanship?
Within International Relations, the concept is highly debatable. As Andrew
138 Stephen Gill 'Gramsci and Global Politics: Towards a Post-Hegemonic Research
Agenda'in Stephen Gill (ed.), 1993, p. Il.
139 Louis Bélanger and Gordon Mace 'Middle Powers and Regionalism: The Cases of
Argentina and Mexico' in Andrew Cooper (ed.), p. 165.
140 Timothy Shaw in Mark Denham and Mark Owen Lombardi (eds.), 1996, p. 110.
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Cooper points out, the notion of middle powers 'presents an ambiguous
conceptual category in international politics'i t+' Though middle powers are
generally accepted as possessing a range of capabilities within the middle range
of states, how this is measured and crucially, how important this is, is
problematic. Indeed, two broad divisions can be made in the approach to middle
powers in the literature: one based on the capabilities of the state(s) in question;
and another on their position - and crucially - their behaviour, in the
international political economy.
Those basing their definition of middle powers on the material capabilities
of the state are largely realist in their theoretical approach. In an extensive
discussion of what "power" is and how to measure it, Bernard Wood suggested
that the Gross National Product of a state is the determining criteria in any
attempt to 'measure tangible capabilities'.142 Using this method, Wood created a
list of countries deemed to be of middling GNP and ergo "middle powers". Yet
such a taxonomy is (obviously) profoundly flawed, for a listing of middle powers
based on their GNPrankings includes generally accepted middle powers such as
Canada and Sweden, but so too are states such as Austria, Belgium, Romania
and Venezuela - none of whom are usually defined as "middle powers". Carsten
Holbraad's definition of middle powers also related strongly to the material
capabilities of a state. Holbraad modified this however by reference to
geopolitical criteria i.e. by qualifying middle power candidates by their position
within their respective regions. This gave (in 1975) South Africa and Nigeria in
Africa; China, India, Iran and Japan for Asia; France, Italy, Poland, Spain, the
United Kingdom, and West Germany for Europe; Canada and Mexico for North
America; Argentina and Brazil for South America; and Australia and Indonesia
for "Oceania and Indonesia". By doing so, Holbraad's definition "lost" virtually
all those states in Europe usually considered middle powers e.g. Norway and
Sweden. His division into "upper" and "lower" middle powers was also
problematic.143
141Andrew Cooper 'Like-Minded Nations and Contrasting Diplomatic Styles: Australian
and Canadian Approaches to Agricultural Trade', Canadian Journal of Political Science,
vol. 25, no. 2, June 1992, p. 350.
142 Bernard Wood The Middle Powers and the General Interest' Middle Powers and the
International System Ottawa: North South Institute, 1988, p. 17.
143See Carsten Holbraad Middle Powers in International Politics New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1984.
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Perhaps the fundamental problem with both Holbraad and Wood's efforts
to define middle powers is the paucity that such capability-oriented approaches
give in predicting or at least rationalising the international behaviour of such
states. Reliance on the GNP of a state, although not entirely irrelevant in
providing the material ability to enact out a role, is devoid of any real
explanatory power. In addition, trying to "define" middle powers is highly
problematic, not least because there is no readily accepted definition. However,
a combination of capabilities and the behavioural activities of a state provides a
more useful definition of middle powers, particularly as this allows a greater
understanding of their role vis-a-vis the international political economy, where
much of their activities are aimed at helping 'shape and condition the transition
of the international system'i t+' Furthermore, a more nuanced approach
overcomes realism's state-centric ontology and accommodates state-society
complexes and transnational developments. After briefly discussing Pretoria's
"candidacy", a discussion of what this more nuanced - and critical - approach is
will be embarked upon (see below).
In the South African case, all indicators demonstrate that the country is
the preponderant power on a regional basis: its economy is four times bigger
than the other eleven members of SADe combined, and nearly twenty times that
of the next largest economy (Angola) .145 Indeed, the question arises whether
Pretoria is, within the region at least, 'partner or hegemon?'.146 This pre-
eminence within a semi-peripheral region of the global economy, combined with
South Africa's increased tendency to act out its foreign policy as a conciliator
and "bridge-builder" - particularly within multilateral forums - as well as
Pretoria's enthusiasm for promoting a particular politico-economic model on a
pan-continental basis and in line with the hegemonic project, supports the
thesis that South Africa has emerged post-1994 as a middle power. This
emergent role in Pretoria's foreign policy has emerged from the kind of economic
and political choices made by the African National Congress and by the changes
in the international system at the time of the transition from apartheid to a form
of liberal democracy in South Africa. In short, the 'transformation in the nature
144Andrew Cooper 'In Search of Niches: Saying "Yes" and Saying "No" in Canada's
International Relatiosn', Canadian Foreign Policy, vol. 3, no. 3 Winter 1995, pp. 12-13.
145Figures taken from South Africa in Figures, 1996 Pretoria: Standard Bank, 1996.
146 See Fred Ahwireng-Obeng and Patrick McGowan 'Partner or Hegemon? South Africa
in Africa', Part One, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, vol. 16, no. 1, January
1998.
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of world order, as well as the asymmetric diffusion of power among domestic
political stakeholders ...fundamentally influenced South Africa's emergence as a
middle powerv!"? This, as will be shown, has been generally supportive of the
ongoing politico-economic hegemonic project and will be discussed later.
Yet it IS important to note at this stage that the role of
middlepowermanship has been stimulated by an array of forces playing
themselves out at both domestic and international levels:
As a regulative ideal, "middle power" must be understood in terms of both
levels of the global order. In terms of the international level,
middlepowermanship direct[s] the ...state to play a prominent role in
multilateral fora...In this way, the notion of "middle power" orient[ates]
the ...state to a role supportive of the hegemonic global order ...[and]...by
fulfilling an important role of facilitator and mediator, [the middle power]
help[s] defuse potential conflicts which, if not addressed, might...
undermine ...the stability of the global order.t+ë
This is also revealed at the domestic level where the adoption of a middle-power
role also serves highly important legitimising functions that should not be
ignored:
In terms of the construction of hegemony at the domestic level the notion
of "middle power" play[s] an important function as well. First, in the
stability-reinforcing role of facilitator at the international level. .. the
[middle-power] help[s] to create an environment conducive to economic
growth...upon which the compromise of the liberal ...state [is founded].
Secondly, the image of the "middle power", with its attendant emphasis
on [the state] as a responsible member of the international community,
[is] crucial in creating a domestic consensus in support of extensive
involvement in the support of the international order. Finally, in
representing [the state's] selfless activism in the international realm as
the natural expression of...society as a whole, middlepowermanship
reinforcers] the notion that the social order within [the state's] borders [is]
essentially a just one, and deserving ofwidespread public support.t+?
Whilst accepting the capability-dependent taxonomic definition of middle
powers, Cox goes further and links the role to the support of a particular
hegemonic world order. As such, he is worthy of quoting at some length:
In the middle rank of material capabilities, but...also stand[ing] in the
middle of situations of conflict [the middle power] seeks to expand the
area of common ground which will make it possible to curtail risk in the
management of conflict. Possessing middle range capability (military and
economic) is a necessary condition of the ability to play this role, but it is
147 Janis van der Westhuizen 'South Africa's Emergence as a Middle Power', Third World
Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 3, 1998, p. 429.
148 Mark Neufeld, 1995(b), pp. 16-17.
149 Mark Neufeld 'Democratization in/of Foreign Policy: Critical Reflections on the
Canadian Case', unpublished paper, 1998.
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not an adequate predictor of a disposition to play it. An ability to stand a
certain distance from direct involvement in major conflicts, a commitment
to orderliness and security in interstate relations and to the facilitation of
orderly change in the world system are the critical elements of the middle
power role. ISO
Following the Gramscian analysis discussed above, the type of "orderliness" that
a middle power promotes is intimately tied up with the ongoing project. Cox is
quite explicit in this understanding of the middle power's role when he asserts
that though the hegemonic order 'does not usually need to be enforced by direct
violence...[m]iddle powers may playa supporting role in such a hegemonic
order'. lSIIn short, the middle power in general acts as a facilitating agent of the
ongoing project in helping to manage the global order on behalf of a specific
politic-economic model (in this study, nee-liberalism]. This model is buttressed
and consolidated by particular behavioural norms and rules that support the
hegemonic order. The role of middle powers is 'to affirm the principle of
adherence to acceptable rules of conduct by all powers, great or small'.IS2This
has important implications for such middle power states, as such a role directs
the particular country to serve the interests in a broad sense of the ongoing
hegemonic order: 'middle powers' ...concern with stability and order in the
international system often results in their being supportive of the hegemonic
status quO'.IS3This role (as is the world order) is in continual movement and 'is
not a fixed universal but something that has to be rethought continually in the
context of the changing state or the international system'. Hence, 'the middle
power's [role] is to support this process ...in the context of a hegemonic world
order'.IS4
Middlepowermanship therefore denotes a style of foreign policy behaviour.
This is typically practised by states that are neither great powers nor small
powers. Yet middle powers are not simply middle powers because of their
tendency to involve themselves in mediatory diplomacy, or because of their
propensity to multilateral activity, or their ability to develop techno-functionalist
roles within the international system. Rather, 'some middle-sized states have
engaged in these forms of international behaviour, or "roles", because it has
suited their long-term interests uis-a-uis world order, the world economy and the
ISO Robert Cox, 1989, p. 827.
151 Ibid., p. 826.
152 Ibid., p. 834.
153 Hussein Solomon in Hussein Solomon (ed.), 1997, p. 57.
154 Robert Cox, 1989, pp. 825 and 826.
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dominant societal values and interests'. ISS Though multilateral fora are the
natural arena of operations for middle powers (see below), simply predicating
middlepowermanship around an expanded interest in multilateralism can lead
to confusion. Hence whilst Willie Breytenbach points out that South Africa's
'greatest disqualification' as a middle power has been its at times willingness to
act without multilateral backing, the point is, is that Pretoria's behaviour served
the ongoing project's wider interests - the lack of multilateral activity
notwithstanding.r=
Accepting this, Kim Nossal and Richard Stubbs' conceptualisation of five
essential characteristics of middlepowermanship's diplomatic profile is valuable.
These are: scope, style, focus, form, and forum. IS? A discussion of these five
characteristics will be conducted before concentrating on the notion of forum i.e.
multilateralism, and how this relates to hegemony. This being so, what
characteristics of a middle power's behavioural activities can be identified?
i. Scope
States that practice a middlepowermanship role tend to be characterised by the
extended scope of the diplomatic concerns of such nations. Great powers have
interests that are global in scope and that the great power has an active role in;
whereas small states generally confine their interests (and hence their
diplomatic energy) to their own particular geographical regional entity. Middle
powers however tend to be actively involved in a diffuse variety of diplomatic
undertakings, invariably projecting beyond their immediate regional location.
Such behaviour is driven by a conviction that 'diplomatic activities which
are directed towards the interests of the international community as a whole
should not be the exclusive preserve of the great powers alone'.158 According to
this philosophy of praxis, it is desirable that the lesser states within the
international system actively involve themselves in the global community's
affairs. Stemming from such a normative position, notions such as acting in the
"common interest of humanity" or playing the "good global citizen" follow.
155 David Black 'Addressing Apartheid: Lessons from Australian, Canadian and Swedish
Policies in Southem Africa' in Andrew Cooper (ed.), 1997, p. 103.
156 Willie Breytenbach 'South Africa and Egypt: The Foreign Policies of Regional Powers in
Search of African Security', Africa Insight, vol. 27, no. 4, 1997, p. 277.
157 The following discussion is adapted from Kim Richard Nossal and Richard Stubbs
'Mahathir's Malaysia: An Emerging Middle Power?' in Andrew Cooper (ed.), 1997, pp.
149-15l.
158 Kim Richard Nossal and Richard Stubbs in Andrew Cooper (ed.), 1997, p. 149.
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ii. Style
'The style of middle-power diplomacy is a necessary concomitant to the global
interests of middle powers'.159This is played out in an activist demeanour that a
middlepowermanship role demands. Such a state involves itself in issues where
its interests are not directly effected. More importantly, the activist approach
drives the middle power to make usage of the diplomatic initiative as a typical
mark of its diplomacy. Such initiatives involve the middle power in
concentrating on ways to solve international problems; formulating a plan of
action (often based on expert advice); garnering support for the middle power's
ideas from as many like-minded states as possible; and then presenting the
international community (lead by the great powers) with a workable compromise
that may result in an acceptable solution.tv?
The middle power's tendency to involve itself in the construction of
consensus is highlighted by the diplomatic activity of middle powers who fix on
mediatory and consensus-building activities, especially such activities as
building reformist coalitions'.161 An example of such a process uis-a-uis South
Africa's own middlepowermanship role is Pretoria's "facilitating" part played at
the 1995 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Review (see below).
iii. Focus
Middlepowermanship also lends itself to the state concemed focusing on conflict
resolution as a primary goal of its foreign policy. By doing so the stability of the
ongoing intemational order is protected, thus satisfying both the ambitions of
the hegemonic project and the aspirations of the middle power to be seen as a
"good" intemational citizen. South Africa's role in trying to solve the Lesotho
crisis in August 1998 as well as tentative involvement in attempts at resolving
the crisis in the Great Lakes region in the same month, all point to Pretoria
playing such a middlepowermanship role. However, this activity 'goes well
beyond attempting to defuse and settle local wars. It extends to developing
confidence-building measures between adversaries so that conflicts of interests
do not develop into "hot" conflicts'.162That is, the active insertion of the middle
159 Ibid., p. 150.
160 Ibid.
161 Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal Relocating Middle Powers:
Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order Vancouver: University of British
Columbia, 1993, p. 174.
162 Kim Richard Nossal and Richard Stubbs in Andrew Cooper (ed.), 1997, pp. 150-151.
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power in a peace-keeping initiative á la South Africa and the Eritrean-Ethiopian
border dispute. The mediation of disputes between mutual friends is also
practised by the middle power. South Africa attempting to resolve the East
Timor conflict is a case in point, as is Pretoria's on-off involvement with the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
iv. Farms and forums
It has already been noted that middlepowermanship leads a state to have a
particular preference for engaging in multilateral activity. This is a function of
their size and capacity:
Middle powers, almost by definition, probably lack sufficient resources -
relative to the resources of great powers - to be able to count on 'buying'
an agreement between disputants ...The side payments of middle-power
diplomacy simply might not be enough to accomplish the psychological
and physical results desired, or, even if they do seem initially to be
effective, to remain so, should a great power decide to make another,
'better' offer.
For this reason ...middle powers often rely for influence on their roles in
intemational institutions. Membership, participation and leadership
within international organisations can provide the bargaining power
which they themselves may lack. 163
Furthermore, the diplomatic endeavours of middle power states are informed by
a conviction that in the contemporary era where interdependence and political
economies have become increasingly internationalised, bilateralism has lost its
effectiveness in solving global controversies. In addition, multilateral institutions
provide the smaller states (and middle powers are to be counted in this) with a
platform where their voices can be heard. In summary:
[Middle powers have an abiding attachment to intemational institutions
as the most appropriate forum for multilateral negotiations, and an
equally abiding attachment to the creation of intemational institutions to
'house' new negotiations, and the maintenance of old institutions to
encourage the continuation of dialogue.t=
If this is accepted, then it is pertinent to examine just what is meant by
references to multilateralism and its attraction to middle power activity.
163 AlanHenrikson 'MiddlePowersas Managers: International MediationWithin,Across
and OutsideInstitutions', in ibid., p. 47.
164 KimRichardNossaland RichardStubbs in ibid., p. 151.
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Multilateralism as the natural forum of middlepowermanship
Cox took a Gramscian understanding of hegemony as the starting point for his
analysis of multilateral organisations. In his view, international institutions are
an important instrument through which the values of a global hegemony are
stated. According to this position, the main function of these associations is to
articulate the hegemonic ideology.165Within this framework, such institutions
are legitimising agents of the hegemonic order from which they are born out of
and act as the embodiment (indeed codification) of the central norms around
which the hegemonic order is constructed. These multilateral organisations are
in themselves sustained by 'universal norms, institutions, and mechanisms
which lay down general rules of behaviour for states'.166 The spread and
enlargement of this hegemonic ideology is facilitated by these multilateral
organisations, which whilst co-opting national elites in the periphery also
possess the strength to assimilate opposing (counter-hegemonic) positions.
Followingthis, 'the precondition for the achievement of a hegemonic world order
is the construction of strong international regimes', which is facilitated by the
regulative effect of international organisations.re?
Such a notion of multilateral organisations can however be problematic to
a degree. By restricting international institutions' role as merely serving as
agents of the hegemonic project, a fixed conceptual framework is applied that
allows no movement nor any active dialectical inter-relationship between the
hegemonic order, multilateral organisations, or their constituent members. It is
asserted that there is more to international institutions than simply a
legitimisation function. Yet by admitting this, we need not embark on an
abandonment of Cox's Gramscian analysis. It is here that we turn to Frederick
Gareau's work and his efforts in rescuing the valid aspects of Cox's
understanding of multilateral organisations. By doing so, a coherent framework
through which to examine South Africa's role in multilateralist organisations as
a middle power is provided.
Gareau's position is that despite what Cox asserts, anti-hegemonic
elements, invariably anchored in the South, have (at times) taken control of
leading multilateral fora, including the United Nations General Assembly. This
165Robert Cox, 1983, p. 172.
l~RobertCox, 1987, p. 172.
167Fred Gale, 1998, p. 274.
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was then used to promote a particularistic anti-hegemonic vision (e.g. the New
International Economic Order) .168 By temporarily "capturing" the United
Nations, the South was able to agitate and build pressure up leading to the
founding of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD)which has at times postured an alternative vision at variance to the
hegemonic order (though as will be seen this has largely faded in the
contemporary period). Multilateral organisations can also be founded to
explicitly challenge (or at least posture a challenge) to the hegemonic order.
Hence multilateral organisations are seen not simply as agents of the hegemon
or mere legitimisers of the accepted "standard of behaviour" but can, at specific
junctures in history, attempt to challenge the hegemonic discourse.
That this project invariably fails can be traced 'to the weakness and
derivative nature of IGOs' and not simply the legitimisation function of these
institutions as proffered by Cox.169 Such an understanding serves to qualify
Cox's statement that anti-hegemonic forces do not control international
institutions and 'even if they did, they could achieve nothing by it'.170It is
certainly true that multilateral organisations in their historically current form do
not have an adequate connection with any popular political base within civil
society (see below). This is the root cause of the dismissal of such institutions as
"talking shops" based on rhetoric and nothing else. Yet, multilateral
organisations can have a certain potential in de-legitimising to a degree the
ongoing world order. The active re-assertion of the hegemonic discourse over
institutions deemed to have strayed from "acceptable" behaviour (e.g. the
General Assembly, UNESCO, etc.) serves as a reminder that the hegemon can
feel threatened if it is perceived that a nascent anti-hegemonic project is
developing.r"!
However, such an attempt at de-Iegitimising the orthodox hegemonic
norms are embarked upon at specific periods and act to challenge the
established ethos. Furthermore, the actions of the institutions themselves, far
168 Frederick Gareau 'International Institutions and the Gramscian Legacy: Its
Modification, Expansion, and Reaffirmation', Social Science Journal, vol. 33, no. 2, 1996,
p.227.
169 Ibid.
170Robert Cox, 1983, p. 174.
171 See Frederick Gareau 'The Reassertion of United States Hegemony: Evidence From the
United Nations General Assembly', International Journal of Comparative Sociology, vol. 35,
nos. 1-2, January-April, 1994.
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from legitimising the hegemon's project may serve to de-legitimise the
organisation itself. This is an important addition to the Coxian understanding of
multilateral organisations. As Gareau points out, the UN General Assembly's
expressed position over continued systematic oppression against Palestinians
has served to de-legitimise the body in the eyes of many Israelis. A large amount
ofWhite South Africans also saw the UN as a de-legitimised organisation taken
over by "Third World radicals" and hence viewed with hostility pronouncements
coming out of the Assembly.tv? From another angle, the legitimacy of the
Organisation of American States (OAS)was seriously undermined by the usage
made of it by the hegemon in occupying the Dominican Republic in 1965, and
legitimisation of the hegemon's behaviour could not be counted on from the OAS
when Washington decided to remove its 'long-time US ally and CIAinformant' in
Panama in 1989.173Furthermore, British reluctance to implement sanctions
against Pretoria in the 1980s led to massive frustration amongst many members
of the Commonwealth and at one point even led to talk of Britain being expelled
from the organisation. As one Commonwealth writer noted 'Britain [lost] her
moral authority to lead the organisation, because on several issues, she [sic]
stood on the wrong side of the majority position t '?" Such an outcome is a
serious reversal of the legitimising notion regarding international organisations.
This being so, it is important not to see legitimisation as a static concept
uis-a-uis multilateral organisations. The concept 'should be viewed dynamically,
dialectically, as a relationship between organisation and audience, and [as] a
relationship which varies over time'.175Hence multilateral organisations have
the capacity of not only legitimising the hegemonic norms established at historic
junctures but also of de-Iegitimising these same values - however temporarily.
The temporary nature of this process is important and lies closer to Cox's
understanding of multilateralism. We have already noted that Cox asserts that
international institutions as they are currently formed have no chance of
overturning the existing hegemon because of their fragile (non-existent?)
foundations in any social space. Invariably, problems affecting the elites are
tabled for discussion and the concerns of the ordinary citizen are rarely put
172 FrederickGareau 1996, p. 231.
173Carter Findley and John Rothney Twentieth Century World, 3rd. ed. (Boston:
HoughtonMifflin,1994), p. 282.
174Prakash Chandra International Relations: Foreign Policies of Major Powers and Regional
Systems, 2nd. ed. NewDelhi:VikasPublishing, 1994, p. 110.
175FrederickGareau, 1996, p. 231.
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forward. Hence whilst it is true that de-legitimisation of the ongoing hegemon
may occur within multilateral organisations, this process will be temporary and
fleeting as long as international organisations remain divorced from social
bases. Nonetheless, multilateral organisations are more than just agents of the
hegemon serving to legitimise the existing world order: 'non-hegemonic
economic diplomacy' is possible and that we 'should take more seriously the
prospects of...more innovative processes of coalition building than we may have
been used to under hegemony'T"
It is this legitimisation of an ongoing hegemon's values that is central to
Cox's adaptation of a Gramscian understanding of multilateral organisations.
According to this understanding, 'values and understandings are relatively
stable and unquestioned. They are apparent to most actors as the natural order
of things ...Hegemony derives from the ways of doing and thinking ...insofar as
these ways of doing and thinking [inspire] emulation "!"? The middle power's role
as has been sketched is to facilitate the systematic management of this
hegemonic order whilst at the same time performing the (de-legitimising] role of
a "loyal opposition".l78Disputes and disagreements with the ongoing hegemonic
project are integral to this middlepowermanship role within multilateral
organisations. Indeed, such disputes serve the interests of the ongoing world
order in that it is seen as not simply the preserve of a narrow nationalistic
interest, but instead represents the "common interest" of international society.
Following on from this, there has been an increasing 'importance of
issue-specific, mission-orientated diplomacy' being tactically played out in the
contemporary period.r"? The de-Iegitimising aspects of this and the activities of
various members in diverse multilateral institutions in occasionally seeming to
challenge the hegemonic order, serve to project the illusory image that the world
order is under serious attack. As Cox asserts, 'the rules and practices and
ideologies of a hegemonic order conform to the interests of the dominant power
while having the appearance [italics added] of a universal natural order of things
which give at least a certain measure of satisfaction and security to lesser
176 Richard Higgott in Craig Murphy and Roger Tooze (eds.), 1991, p. 122
177 Robert Cox, 1992, p. 179.
178 Mark Neufeld, 1995 (b), p. 19.
179 Richard Higgott 'Issues, Institutions and Middle-Power Diplomacy: Action and
Agendas in the Post-Cold War Era' in Andrew Cooper (ed.), 1997, p. 37.
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powers'.180 It is the role of the middle powers to regulate this activity and
facilitate the continued promotion of a particular world order.
In looking toward the future of the middlepowermanship concept, David
Black predicted that 'new, emerging centres of power in world affairs [may]
increasingly adopt internationalist, order building roles of the middle power
type ...These are likely to emerge out of Asia, possibly Latin America and perhaps
even Africa (from the "new" South Africa)'.181It is suggested that this has indeed
begun to emerge within the South African context and informs post-apartheid
foreign policy. Why the elites of South Africa should have chosen this role for its
post-apartheid foreign policy is contingent on the convergence of extemal and
internal factors - that has directed Pretoria's socio-economic policies. This has
necessarily influenced the type of international role and attitudinal position of
the goveming elite. Before discussing how and why the ANCcame to accept the
precepts of neo-liberalism, the next section will attempt to understand how neo-
liberalism has become the contemporary hegemonic ideology.
180 Robert Cox, 1989, p. 825.
181 David Black in Andrew Cooper (ed.), 1997, p. 122.
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SECTION ill
NEO-LIBERALISM AS A HEGEMONIC PROJECT
Neo-liberalism has been described as 'an owner's revolt against the class and
international compromises of corporate liberalism'. 182By doing so, 'neo-
liberalism [has] lent a politically reactionary quality to the technologically highly
innovative round of capital accumulation [via globalisation] which made the re-
imposition of capitalist discipline possible in the first place'.183In short, 'neo-
liberalism has become the predominant ideology legitimating the privatisation of
the state-controlled economy and the substitution of the market for the social
provision of basic welfare'.184
The construction of this hegemonic order has had profound implications
for South African foreign policy as will be illustrated in the remaining chapters
of this work. Yet to contextualise this phenomena a brief overview of the
contemporary international political economy must be undertaken. Three
questions will be focussed upon:
i Howdid nee-liberalism come to represent the ongoing hegemonic discourse?
ii. Whose interest does this project serve?
iii. How can an understanding of this process shed light upon the question:
"who benefits from South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy"?
The crisis of the "Golden Age"
By the late 1970s, the capitalist order under the leadership of Washington was
in a state of evolution. Whilst the global economy expanded and the portability
of international capital was restricted, the ideological underpinnings within the
capitalist world order were essentially hegemonic. A post-war "Golden Age"
compromise between capital and labour via various Keynesian welfare
182 Kees van der Pijl Transnational Classes and International Relations London: Routledge,
1998, p. 130
183 Ibid.
184 Henk Overbeek and Kees van der Pijl 'Restructuring Capital and Restructuring
Hegemony: Neo-Liberalism and the Unmaking of the Post-War Order' in Henk Overbeek
(ed.), 1993, p. 1.
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nationalist schemes (originally associated with the New Deal) had established a
tacit consensus by which the capitalist system was managed.18S"Extremists" on
either the Left or Right were marginalised and centrist impulses (always
favourable to capitalism for sure) were dominant. At the same time, labour was
granted a junior role via trade union representation in a hegemonic global vision
aimed at securing a liberal capitalist world order. This had been facilitated by
the way mass production was institutionalised (initially in the United States)
under a Fordist mechanisation of the labour process. 186
Under the aegis of the Bretton Woods institutions, "mixed economies"
and a liberalising international economy became central to this arrangement.
The value of co-operating currencies was secured to the dollar whilst the
American bank of issue promised to exchange dollars for gold. Concurrently,
dealing in currencies was regulated by official exchange controls, thus fostering
currency stability and allowing states to effectively plan their economies in the
furtherance of the post-war capital-labour compromises. Keynes was quite
explicit in this regard, saying that 'the whole management of the domestic
economy depends upon being free to have the appropriate rate of interest
without reference to the rates prevailing elsewhere in the world. Capital control
is a collorary to this'.187Keynes and the other founders of Bretton Woods were
more than aware that speculative capital flows had led to the instability that
had marked the inter-war years. Thus Bretton Woods 'was seen as an answer to
the chaotic developments of the 1920s and 1930s which had led to wild national
defensive reactions, protectionism and finally war'. 188
During a period of unprecedented stability and growth, the ideas and
institutions that fostered this order remained essentially harmonious and in the
ongoing conditions of the Cold War acted to bind together a strong working
alliance between the elites in Washington, the NATO states, and Tokyo - a
trilateral co-operation. This alliance emanated from the core state, the United
States, and can in Gramscian terms be seen as an international historic bloc
185See Stephen Marglinand J. Schor The Golden Age of Capitalism: Reinterpreting the
Post-war Experience Oxford:Clarendon, 1990.
186Mark Rupert Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American
Global Power Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1995.
187John MaynardKeynesin DonaldMoggridge(ed.)Collected Writings of John Maynard
Keynes, vol. 25: Activities 1940-44: Shaping the Post-war World, The Clearing Union
London:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1980, p. 149.
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which in turn cemented the post-war international economic order that became
known as Pax Americana. 189
However, dependent as it was on American largesse, this hegemonic
order began to unravel once Washington sought to stem the growing negative
effects on its economy brought about by a decline in productivity growth and its
competitiveness on the global economic stage. Furthermore, an increasingly
transnationalised capital began to see such restrictions as a dampening device
on their profitability and "freedom" (in contrast to the domestic-oriented
fraction) and began pushing for a re-negotiation of the post-war consensus.
Richard Nixon's suspension of the convertibility of the dollar into gold and the
setting of exchange rates based on market valuations under the Smithsonian
Agreement of 1971, plus the imposition of import surcharges by Washington,
rapidly forced an adaptation by the rest of the capitalist trading states. As a
result, with fixed exchange rates no longer providing a marker for currencies,
the world monetary system relied on a dollar (not gold) standard. At the same
time, there was an appreciable growth in offshore Eurodollar markets that
remained outside of any formal political management, but which acted to offset
(and internationalise) the costs of Washington's policies at home and abroad.
This was further helped by an inflationary macro-economic policy that served to
share the costs of America's disastrous (and massively expensive) adventurism
in Vietnam as well as financing the Johnsonian-inspired "Great Society"
through a devaluation of the dollar and hence a depreciation of external dollar-
denominated holdings.rsv
These policies brought on a profound recessionary wave throughout the
capitalist world that lasted into the 1980s and a crisis in the consensus that
had characterised the global order. All previous assumptions about the
organising precepts of society were questioned and 'the post-war compromise
[was attacked] in both senses of the term: the domestic compromise which tied
in labour and welfare interests; and the intemational compromise of mediating
between national interests and the global order';!» Such a scenario resulted in
an ongoing attempt to reconstruct hegemony. These efforts were formative and
188 Hans-Peter Martin and Harald Schumann The Global Trap: Globalization and the
Assault on Democracy and Prosperity London: Zed Books, 1997, p. 47.
189 Stephen Gill, 1991, p. 97.
190 Stephen Gill in Henk Overbeek (ed.), 1993, p. 250.
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aimed at 'a new balance of forces, the emergence of new elements, the attempt
to put together a new 'historic bloc', new political configurations and
"philosophies" [and] a new profound restructuring of the state and the
ideological discourses' which underpin it.192This remains an ongoing process:
There is something that could be called a nascent global historic bloc
consisting of the most powerful corporate economic forces, their allies in
government, and the variety of networks that evolve policy guidelines and
propagate the ideology of globalisation. States now by and large play the
role of agencies of the global economy, with the task of adjusting national
economic policies and practices to the perceived exigencies of global
economic liberalisation. This structure of power is sustained from outside
the state through a global policy consensus and the influence of global
finance over state policy, and from inside the state from those social
forces that benefit from globalisation (the segment of society that is
integrated into the world economy). Competitiveness in the world market
has become the ultimate criterion of state policy which justifies the
gradual removal of the measures of social protection built up in the era of
the welfare state. Neo-liberalism is hegemonic ideologically and in terms
of policy. 193
This scenario has been formulated by increasingly transnationalised ruling
elites as an intense reappraisal 'of the role of the public sector and the
appropriate "mix" of intervention and market in a capitalist economy'ct?+ Under
such conditions, the power of labour has been severely compromised as capital
has gone on the offensive in a neo-liberal reconstructing of domestic social
structures of accumulation designed to protect its own interests whilst
appealing to populist concerns ó. la Reagan and Thatcher over tax cuts,
deregulation and privatisation.rw
'Led by Thatcher and Reagan [neo-liberalism] aimed at breaking the
power of organised labour, expanding the scope for capital accumulation
through privatisation, and replacing collective welfare by entrepreneurship and
individualism as the legitimating values of liberal democracy'.196 Indeed, neo-
liberalism was/is 'a project to engage, to contest [the Keynesian] project and,
191 Leo Panitch 'Globalisation and the State', in Ralph Miliband and Leo Panitch (eds.)
The Socialist Register, 1994 London: Merlin Press, 1994, p. 74.
192 Stuart Hall The Great Moving Right Show' in Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques (eds.)
The Politics of Thatcheristri London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1983, p. 23.
193 Robert Cox 'Civil Society at the Turn of the Millenium: Prospects for an Alternative
World Order', Review of International Studies, vol. 25, no. 1, January 1999, p. 12.
194 Stephen Gill in Henk Overbeek (ed.), 1993, p. 251.
195 See Edward Herman Triumph of the Market: Essays on Economics, Politics and the
Media Boston: South End Press, 1995.
196 Colin Leys and Leo Panitch The Political Legacy of the Manifesto' in Colin Leys and
Leo Panitch (eds.}, The Socialist Register, 1998 London: Merlin Press, 1998, p. 20.
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wherever possible, to dismantle it and put something new in place. It entered
the political field in a historic contest, not just for power, but for popular
authority, for hegernony'i!"? Such 'changes voiced in the 1980s [represented] the
victory of new hegemonies' and a new era that is still unfolding.t'"
In popular folklore and in an inversion of reality, trade unions came to
been seen as the villains who had precipitated the ongoing crisis through their
"unreasonable" behaviour:
Governments were made to understand that a revival of economic growth
depended on business confidence to invest and that this confidence
depended on "discipline" directed at trade unions and govemment fiscal
management. The investment strike and capital flight [were] too powerful
weapons that no government [could] ignore with impunity.tv?
A 'transnational process of consensus formation among the official caretakers of
the global economy ...generat[ing] guidelines that are transmitted into the policy-
making channels of national govemments and big corporations' thus began to
reformulate a hegemonic global order.ê?? This not only stemmed from the
ongoing crisis that had originally sparked a re-evaluation of the consensus of
the Golden Age, but was also sparked by the rapidly globalising world economy:
Since capitalism encompasses the entire globe, its architects require a
universal vision, a picture of a globally conceived society, to join classes in
different countries ... [in order] to institutionalise global capital
accumulation by setting general rules of behaviour and disseminating a
developmentalist ideology to facilitate the process.201
This 'vision' can be formulated as a comprehensive concept of control which
Henk Overbeek defines as transcending 'narrowly defined fractional interests
and which combine mutually compatible strategies in the field of labour
relations, socio-economic policy and foreign policy on the basis of a class
compromise'.202 It was nee-liberalism that emerged as the new hegemonic
concept of control and that led it to becoming 'the dominant perspective and
197 Stuart Hall, 1990, p. 165.
198 Pablo González Casanova 'Globalism, Neo-Liberalism and Democracy', Social Justice,
vol. 23, nos. 1-2, 1996, p. 39.
199 Robert Cox 'Global Restructuring: Making Sense of the Changing International
Political Economy', in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey Underhill (eds.) Political Economy and
the Changing Global Order Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994, p. 46.
200 Ibid., p. 49.
201James Mittelman and Mustapha Kamal Pasha Out From Underdevelopment Revisited:
Changing Global Structures and the Remaking of World Order Basingstoke: Macmillan,
1997, p. 51.
202Henk Overbeek Global Capitalism and National Decline: The Thatcher Decade in
Perspective London: Unwin Hyman, 1990, p. 26.
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ideology of the contemporary period'.203 This was essentially centred on an
idealised notion of the market 'in which progress is defined in terms of the
subordination of labour to capital [whilst] the state role is limited to a Lockean
night watch'.204Far from being a vulgar "end of history", this phenomena is not
an event but an ongoing and open-ended process both spatially and temporally.
Thus it can be asserted that:
A relatively cohesive transnational hyper-liberal power bloc is in formation
within [the] interacting ideological and material developments [of
globalisation and neo-liberalism]. Its cohesion is articulated through
private-informal, as well as public-formal fora ...This formation has been
instrumental in efforts to create a mode of international economic policy
co-ordination which is intended to ensure the coherence and stability of a
new transnational accumulation regime'.20s
Neo-liberalism defined
Nee-liberalism represents an ostensible return to the classical economics of
Adam Smith - though this project has 'gone much further than ...Adam Smith, or
one of the main early exponents of the neo-classical school'.206However, it is an
order adapted to an age of increased globalisation and first rose to prominence
with the "Chicago School" and the theories of Milton Friedman.ë''? Based on the
quantity theory of money, which balanced the economy and secured the
durability of prices, stability was seen as only being realised if the market was
allowed to function freely and without the monetary interventions of the state,
tempted by populist pressures. In essence, the welfare-nationalist architecture
of the post-war era had to be demolished if capitalism was to recover from the
recessionary crises of post-1971 and regain its growth track. The main points of
the neo-liberalist project can be summarised as including:
l. The rule of the market" and the liberalisation and de-regulation of the
economy so as to facilitate unfettered private enterprises to develop and - in
203 Stephen Gill 'Knowledge, Politics, and Neo-Liberal Political Economy' in Richard
Stubbs and Geoffrey Underhill (eds.), 1994, p. 85.
204 Kees van der Pijl 'Ruling Classes, Hegemony and the State System: Theoretical and
Historical Considerations', International Journal of Political Economy, vol. 19, no. 3, Fall,
1989, p. 30.
205 Magnus Ryner 'Nordic Welfare Capitalism in the Emerging Global Political Economy'
in Stephen Gill (ed.), 1997, pp. 22-23.
206 Gerd Nonneman 'Economic Liberalization: The Debate' in Gerd Nonneman (ed.)
Political and Economic Liberalization: Dynamics and Linkages in Comparative Perspective
Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996, p. 4.
207 See the "manifesto" of neo-liberalism - Milton Friedman's Capitalism and Freedom
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.
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theory - grow, thus allowing a "trickle down" effect to the less advantaged. In
order to do so, a reduction in labour costs is envisioned whilst greater
openness to international trade and investment is privileged.
Il. Swinging cuts in social welfare services e.g. health and education, and the
"roll-back" of the state in order to cut government expenditure and further
take the state out of interfering with the "natural" mechanisms of "the
market" - the state being the "enemy of freedom".
iii. Privatisation of state-owned enterprises, good and services to private
investors, thus freeing government from having to expend on services that
can - in theory - be better managed by private concerns whilst at the same
time justifying a reduction in taxation that had formerly been collected to
operate such enterprises.208
Initially revolutionary and beyond the pale of the Keynesian consensus, neo-
liberalist thinking came to be seen as the way out of the ongoing crisis of the
1970s and as a device which could reconstruct an order that defended the
position of an increasingly transnational capital in an era of restructured
capitalism. In short, neo-liberalism emerged 'as a hegemonic ideology that
under[lay] the emergence of a new mode of regulation'.209 Such a process was
not teleological but was conducted by a 'powerful phalanx of social
forces...arrayed ...behind the agenda of intensified market-led globalisation' who
sought to actively promote the post-Keynesian counter-revolution.a'v This
complex and ongoing procedure sought to form a consensus around the norms
of neo-liberalism:
Part of [the] consensus-formation process [took] place through unofficial
forums like the Trilateral Commission, the Bilderberg conference, or the
more esoteric Mont Pelerin Society. Part of it [went] through official bodies
like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
the Bank for International Settlements, the IMF, and the G-7. These shape
the discourse within which policies are defmed, the terms and concepts
208 Adapted from Elizabeth Martinez and Arnoldo Garcia What is "Nee-Liberalism?": A
Brief Guide for Activists' http:j j aidc.org.zaj archivesjwhat_is_neo-lib.html. See also
Colin Crouch The Terms of the Neo-Liberal Consensus', Political Quarterly, vol. 68, no. 4,
October-December 1997.
209 Thomas Brown 'Ideological Hegemony and Global Governance', Journal of World-
Systems Research, vol. 3, no. 2, Spring 1997, p. 251.
210 Mark Rupert 'Contesting Hegemony: Americanism and Far-Right Ideologies of
Globalization' in Kurt Burch and Robert Denemark (eds.) Constituting International
Political Economy Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997, p. 117.
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that circumscribe what can be thought and done [and] also tighten the
transnational networks that link policy-making from country to country.211
This occurred in the context of an epoch where it is possible to talk of the
transnationalisation of capital, where markets are increasingly global and
organically integrated, allowing an internationalised ownership of capital and
the transit of capital in and out of any number of corporations and territories.v'?
This has been massively facilitated by profound technological change which not
only has driven change in the structure of power but has 'changed the
productive structure by shifting power over trade and production from
governments to firms'.213Such a scenario a.k.a. "globalisation", has led to states
effectively losing most of their the ability to plan and regulate their national
social and economic policies. In a decentralised global system of finance and
production, with US$ 1 trillion circulating at light speed every day on the foreign
exchange markets, even short-term planning is nigh-on impossible. This in itself
confirms Marx's assertion that 'the necessary tendency of capital is ...circulation
without circulation time'.214
Nee-liberalism as the hegemonic order is not simply a political project, it
IS at the same time economic. Indeed, this 'new normalcy which a newly
hegemonic concept of control expresses is not a political ploy, but the objective
"general interest" as delineated by the current parameters of the prevailing
mode of production and its class order'.21SThis being so, it is fundamentally
correct to assert that 'any plausible explanation of foreign and
strategic ...policies in the 1990s has to begin by recognising and evaluating
transformations in the global political economy, especially in the South'.216
This is particularly so when, in an era of 'disciplinary nee-liberalism',
those that err from the hegemonic project and its prescriptions face capital
flight, disinvestment and economic ruin as "mad money" flits from one territory
to another whilst states are compelled to follow highly prescriptive agendas
211 Robert Cox in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey Underhill (eds.), 1994, p. 49.
212 For one account of this, see Ali El-Agraa (ed.) Economic Integration World-wide
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997.
213 Susan Strange What Theory? The Theory in Mad Money', Centre for the Study of
Globalisation and Regionalisation Working Paper, University of Warwick, no. 18/98,
December 1998, p. 14.
214Karl Marx The Grundrisse Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973, p. 359.
215Henk Overbeek and Kees van der Pijl in Henk Overbeek (ed.], 1993, p. 5.
216Timothy Shaw, 1994, p. 18.
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within the hegemonic project.v!? Such a process entails 'subordination of
domestic economies to the perceived exigencies of a global economy. States willy
nilly become more effectively accountable to a nebeleuse personified as the
global economy',218reflecting a fractionalisation of capital and its elite classes
into domestic and international fractions. The former favours long-term political
stability in order to facilitate accumulation strategies based on long-term
planning; whilst the latter favours a more short-term speculative strategy based
on (and dependent upon) "open markets" in order to facilitate lightning-quick
profiteering. It is this latter fraction that is currently dominant and assumed a
transnational class identity. It is this fraction that are the active agents of the
globalisation thrust. It is also this immensely powerful fraction which demands
the adoption of neo-liberal projects throughout the globe.v!?
As Marx and Engels foretold, capital now 'compels all nations, on pain of
extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode a production; it compels them to
introduce what it calls civilisation into their midst'.22oAs will be shown below,
the ideological discourse of neo-liberalism does indeed assign to itself the
common sense of a "realistic" civilisation in its organising principles. Such a
scenario puts govemments at the mercy of capital and accountable not to their
electorate but to faceless speculators in NewYork, London, Frankfurt etc. This
has profound implications for state governments when:
The more dependent countries become on the goodwill of investors, the
more ruthless must governments be in favouring the already privileged
minority who have sizeable assets. Their interests are always the same: low
inflation, stable external value of their currency, and minimum taxation of
their investment income ...
[Yetthe] financial short-circuit between different countries forces them into
a competition to lower taxes, to reduce public expenditure, and to
renounce the aim of social equality'.221
In short, spatial territories have had to (re-)structure themselves as "competition
states", attracting capital whilst competing with rival territories for
investment.222 To do so requires an almost complete break from any
217 Susan Strange Mad Money Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998.
218 Robert Cox 'Global Perestroika' in Robert Cox with Timothy Sinclair, 1996, p. 298.
219 See Kees van der Pijl 'The International Level' in Tom Bottomore and Robert Bryan
(eds.) The Capitalist Class: An International Study Hemel Hempstead: Wheat sheaf, 1989.
220 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels The Communist Manifesto' in A Handbook of Marxism
London: Victor Gollancz, 1935 [1888], p. 27.
221 Hans-Peter Martin and Harald Schumann, 1997, p. 61.
222 See Philip Cerny 'Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of Political
Globalisation', Government and Opposition, vol. 32, no. 2, Spring 1997.
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redistributive aspirations regarding social equity, which is subordinated to the
imperatives of monetary stability, even though neo-liberalism by its very nature
contributes to monetary instability e.g. extreme exchange rate fluctuations,
through its demand for freedom of movement of speculative capital. This has
obviously intense implications for nations such as South Africa with deep
structural inequalities.
At this point it can be asserted that a project based on liberalisation,
privatisation and representing the dislocating effects of globalisation has little
chance of becoming hegemonic, particularly as the effects on the disadvantaged
have been so crippling - as a recent UNCTADreport readily admits.223For sure,
a hegemonic project in the Gramscian sense needs a "politics of support" as well
as a "politics of power", however mighty transnational capital and its state allies
may be.224This consensual element in the neo-liberalist project is "polyarchy",
which shall be turned to below. At this juncture, it is sufficient to say that 'the
transnational agenda of neo-liberalism and polyarchy take hold as the
hegemonic project under the guidance of transnationalised fractions of local
elites'.225Polyarchy aims to soothe the social and political pressures that are
created by the transnational elite-based neo-liberal order and creates a state of
'low intensity democracy'.226 Such an analysis echoes the assertion that 'the
construction of a corporate-dominant order would ...require the neutralisation of
social forces precipitating persistent and effective questioning of the established
order'.227 By its very nature, polyarchy dissipates the energies of those
marginalised by the ongoing order into parliamentary procedures that in
themselves are acted out by political fractions whose power and prestige are
dependant on the polyarchical model.
223 See UNCTAD Trade and Development Report, 1997 New York and Geneva: United
Nations Press, 1997.
224Andrew Gamble The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics of Thatcherism
London: Macmillan, 1988, pp. 208-41.
225 William Robinson 'Neo-liberalism, the Global Elite and the Guatemalan Transition: A
Critical Macrostructural Analysis', prepared for seminar on 'Guatemalan Development
and Democratisation: Proactive Responses to Globalisation', Universidad del Valle de
Guatemala, March 26-28, 1998, p. 3.
226 Barry Gills, Joel Rocamora and Richard Wilson Low Intensity Democracy: Political
Power in the New World Order London: Pluto Press, 1993.
227Jeffrey Harrod 'Social Forces and International Political Economy: Joining the Two
IRs' in Stephen Gill and James Mittelman (eds.) Innovation and Transformation In
International Studies Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 108.
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Furthermore, polyarchy is based on a conscious divorce of "economics"
from "politics" (at a time when neo-liberalist impulses push for a greater inter-
penetration of the two, if not a domination of the former over the latter). By
doing so, the polyarchical process limits itself to the "purely political" except on
assenting or dissenting over trivial modifications to macro-economic policy. This
movement however serves to socialise the wider population into a consensual
organisation of society that contributes to the construction of hegemony. Such a
process has itself played out in South Africa and has subsequently strongly
influenced Pretoria's foreign policy - to the extent that South Africa is itself now
an enforcer of the discipline of neo-liberalism and "democracy" (polyarchy)
within Africa.
Neo-liberalism as an ideology
In discussing neo-liberalism, it is useful to look at it as an evolving ideology. In
doing so, Gramsci's notions of ideology and what he refers to as "common sense"
are particularly insightful casting greater clarity on the thesis put forward here.
Gramsci's ideas regarding ideology differ from the somewhat crude notions of
"false consciousness" that can be found in some readings of Marx and Engels.
According to Gramsci, ideologies are not illusions but are "real" in the sense
that when they obtain the status of widely-held beliefs they playa distinct
component in social history: 'popular beliefs...are themselves material forces'.228
They do not exist in some sort of space above the political, but have material
existence m the practical activities surrounding this arena. Their material
existence is manifested in the social practices of individuals and in the
institutions within which social practices play out.
Furthermore, ideologies possess their own agents i.e. intellectuals who
specialise in the development of organic ideologies and in the duty of moral and
intellectual movement. The promotion of a particular ideology hence is not a
teleological process but is based in material activities and processes. Indeed,
following Gramsci, hegemony is not simply an ideological phenomenon: 'there
can be no hegemony without "the decisive nucleus of the economic"'.229
228 Antonio Gramsci, 1971, p. 165.
229 Stuart Hall, 1990, p. 170.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
90
Having accepted that ideology does have a material basis, a brief
discussion of what is meant by "ideology" and "common sense" IS now
conducted, as this is pertinent to our discussion of how neo-liberalism became
the "accepted wisdom" of the ANC and its implication for South Africa's foreign
policy. In brief, ideology refers to the 'mental frameworks - the languages, the
concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and the systems of representation -
which different classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense of,
define, figure out and render intelligible the way society works'.230According to
Gramsci, ideology can either appear as seemingly abstract theorisations derived
from individualist activities - "philosophy" - or it can appear in its most basest
and popular form as "folklore". Common sense is a mediating position, taking on
attributes of both. As such it is fragmentary, often logically inconsistent, and is
the conception of the world which has been uncritically adopted by the
masses.v'! It is not the obtuse theorisations of philosophers (which indeed may
be more coherent and satisfactory), but is the philosophy of 'real men, formed in
specific historical relations, with specific feelings, outlooks [and] fragmentary
conceptions of the world'.232This common sense is the result of a specific
historical scenario uis-a-uis material production combined with the
'agglomeration within it of disparate social elements'.233
Though this common sense may be contradictory, it nonetheless is a
conception of the world and has a material basis in presenting the world as
"natural" and "the way of doing things" to those who share in this common
sense. Common sense facilitates a situation where 'we rarely question why we
think and act in a certain way, but rather, regard our ways of thinking and
acting as absolutely objective and eternal and, as such, as needing no deep
study into their origins or consequence'is> To wit, 'common sense shapes our
ordinary, practical, everyday calculation and appears as natural as the air we
breathe. It is simply "taken for granted" in practice and thought, and forms the
starting-point (never examined or questioned) from which every conversation
begins'.235
230Stuart Hall 'The Problem of Ideology - Marxism Without Guarantees', in Betty
MatthewsMarx: A Hundred Years On London:Lawrenceand Wishart, 1983, p. 59.
231AntonioGramsci, 1971, p. 419.
232 Ibid.
233Ibid., p. 198.
234EnricoAugelliand CraigMurphy, 1988, p. 18.
235Stuart Hall, 1990, p. 9.
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So how does this relate to the notion of hegemony as previously
discussed? It is surely not argued that the elite class gains hegemony by
spreading its ideology throughout society until all succumb to it. Such a
totalitarian project can never fully succeed, even in an Orwellian nightmare. For
Gramsci, the degree of hegemony is not simply equivalent to the ability of its
philosophy to displace common sense (actually transform as common sense is
made up of a synthesis of previous generations' historical relationships that
continue to perpetually form and reformulate a society's common sense). No, the
ideology promoted by the elites and its intellectuals operate in a manner to
thwart the development of common sense into "good sense" (the positive
empirical nuclei of common sense). Hegemony 'implies the struggle to contest
and disorganise an existing political formation'.236 It is this disorganising of
alternatives that lies at the core of common sense and the ongoing construction
of hegemony.
In short, that the potential for critical reason against the elite ideology is
cut off and a scenario of Thatcherite "TINA"is realised. This has been asserted
in a discussion of how this has affected Africa, claiming that 'liberalism ...is not
an ideology; it is the ideology'.237Such a process does not and cannot shape
common sense. This is not the aim. Rather as Gramsci points out, a limitation
of 'the original thought of the masses in a negative direction (is attempted],
without having the positive effect of a vital ferment of interior transformation of
what the masses think. ..about the world and life', i.e. common sense.238 In
short, things appear as self-evident:
Untrammelled international competition, the celebration of the market, of
wealth and self, anti-communism and anti-unionism; all these are no
longer propagated as "revolutionary" in the sense of challenging a
prevailing consensus of a different content, but they are now part of
normal every day discourse; self-evident, near impossible to contradict or
even doubt.239
Yet, in the early days of the neo-liberal renaissance, the monetarist ideology was
perceived as beyond the pale of the welfare nationalist consensus that had been
constructed post-1945. For sure, "capitalism does not just happen", and the
assertion of neo-liberalism as the hegemonic discourse similarly did not simply
236 Ibid., p. 7.
237 Tom Young 'A Project to be Realised': Global Liberalism and Contemporary Africa',
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol. 24, no. 3,1995, p. 529.
238 Antonio Gramsci, 1971, p. 420.
239 Henk Overbeek and Kees van der Pijl in Henk Overbeek (ed.), 1993, p. 2.
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"occur". 'It IS a social system that has to struggle to create and reproduce its
hegemonic order globally, and to do this large numbers of local, national,
international and global organisations [were] established' to promote the new
organising norms,240 imposing 'a uniform conception of the world on an
increasingly transnational society'.241 The power of nee-liberalism was that its
proponents recognised the ideological as well as material effort that was needed
to establish its hegemony and 'understood that to transform the economic,
political and social landscape they first had to change the intellectual and
psychological one'.242 As one account of the neo-liberalist counter-revolution
frames it:
Margaret Thatcher, reflecting on the magnitude of changes brought about
by the "Thatcher revolution": "It started with Sir Keith [Joseph] and me,
with the Centre for Policy Studies, and Lord Harris at the Institute for
Economic Affairs. Yes, it started with ideas, with beliefs ...That's it. You
must start with beliefs. Yes, always with beliefs".243
The ultimate result of this process (which remains ongoing) was 'a sea change in
the intellectual zeitgeist: the almost universal acceptance by governments and
markets alike, of a new view about what it takes to develop'i-+' This development
has
[Slet free-market ideas up as the only sensible response which political
leaders and policy-makers [can] possibly make to a wide range of
economic problems. [It is implied] that the rise of Keynesianism (and
nationalist-populism in Latin America and elsewhere) was the result of a
particular historical conjuncture, but the rise of neo-liberalism was akin
to the discovery of a universal truth.v-"
This was accomplished by a strategy aimed at constructing a new common
sense based on neo-liberal norms. These agents included the IMF, the World
Bank, WTO, OECD and regional development banks; transnational
organisations such as the Bilderberg Group and Trilateral Commission; and a
240Leslie Sklair 'Social Movements for Global Capitalism: The Transnational Capitalist
Class in Action', Review of International Political Economy, vol. 4, no. 3, Autumn 1997,
pp. 514-515.
241Otto Holman Transnational Class Strategy and the NewEurope', International Journal
of Political Economy, vol. 22, no. 1, Spring 1992, p. 13.
242Susan George 'How to Win the War of Ideas: Lessons from the Gramscian Right',
Dissent, vol.44, no. 3, Summer 1997.
243Margaret Thatcher quoted in Daniel Yergin and J. Stanislaw The Commanding
Heights: The Battle Between Government and the Marketplace That is Remaking the
Modem World NewYork:Simon and Schuster, 1998, p. 124.
244Paul Krugman 'Dutch Tulips and Emerging Markets', Foreign Affairs, July-August
1994, p. 28.
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number of highly influential think-tanks and foundations (an arena examined
below in the context of South Africa). Among perhaps the most important of
these are the American Enterprise Institute, the Ford, Heritage and Rockefeller
Foundations and the Cato Institute (all based in the United States); the Adam
Smith Institute, Institute of Economic Affairs, and Centre for Policy Studies
(based in the United Kingdom); and the Mont Pelerin Society, founded in 1947
by Friedrich Hayek as an "International Academy of Political Philosophy" to
promote neo-liberalism.s-e
These lavishly funded think tanks and their associated coterie of organic
intellectuals, crafted, over a period of time, the terms of debate that promoted
the neo-liberal discourse until it became the hegemonic ideology within a
transnationalised elite class.v+? The dissemination of this ideology occurred
through a variety of funding mechanisms such as foundations, endowments and
granting agencies, wealthy "philanthropic" individuals, university centres,
think-tanks etc.248 The ideological ingredient of this process was carried out by a
relatively small number of organic intellectuals (based in think-tanks) in a
concerted 'economic counter-revolution' against the welfare nationalism
consensus and in favour of the neo-liberalist discour se.ê"? These policy-
formulating bodies act as the 'central co-ordinating points in the entire elite
policy-making process '.250
This is not to say that such a process was simply "top-down" imparting of
the received wisdom. The process was dialectical where certain groups of
intellectuals 'inspired by the promise or actual achievements of global
capitalism, articulate[d] what they perceive[d] to be its essential purposes and
strategies' as the material conditions of globalised capitalism underwent a
245 Mark Berger 'Up From Neo-Liberalism: Free Market Mythologies and the Coming
Crisis of Global Capitalism', Third World Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 2, 1999, p. 454.
246 Friedrich Hayek Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1967,p. 149.
247 For an account of how this process was underwent, albeit not in Gramscian terms,
see John Kelley Bringing the Market Back In: The Political Resuscitation of Market
Liberalism Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997.
248 See Kees van der Pijl 'The Cadre Class and Public Multilateralism', in Yoshikazu
Sakamoto (ed.) Global Transformation: Challenge to the State System Tokyo: United
Nations University Press, 1994.
249 Richard Cockett Thinking the Unthinkable: Think-Tanks and the Economic Counter
Revolution, 1931-1983 London: Harper Collins, 1995.
250 Thomas Dye Who's Running America? The Conservative Years, 4th ed., Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1986,p. 246.
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transformation.."" For sure, they were supported with moral and financial
largesse from the already established transnationalised hegemonic elite and this
was frequently manifested via the agents of the corporate foundations and
think-tanks. These were particularly active in the South and East where the
state and non-state elites were 'lectured and advised .. .insistently ... on the
virtues of the free market, privatisation, and foreign investment'.252 Any
remaining dirigiste impulses and their institutional apparatus became passé
and gradually projected as the loci of all that was wrong with the developing
world.
This (ongoing) re-educative project has been remarkably successful. By
doing so, Gramsci's and Marx's assertion that ideology is materially grounded is
vindicated, for these think tanks were all financed by big capital's
"philanthropic" institutions such as the Ford Foundation, Coors, Mellon and the
John M. Olin Foundation. These like-minded and similarly endowed think-tanks
and foundations invariably promote a particular ideology. In the current ongoing
order, this ideology is within the remits of nee-liberalism and has inextricably
defined the terms and terrain of the debate. Susan George gives an example of
this process that is most worthy of citation:
In 1988, Allan Bloom, director of the University of Chicago's Olin Center for
Inquiry into the Theory and Practice of Democracy ($ 3.6 million grant from
Olin) invite[d) a State Department official to give a paper. The speaker
proclaim[ed] total victory for the West and for neo-liberal values in the Cold
War. His paper [was] immediately published in the National Interest ($ 1
million Olin subsidy) edited by Irving Kristal ($ 376,000 grant as Olin
Distinguished Professor at New York Graduate School of Business).
Kristal simultaneously publishe[d] "responses" to the paper: one by
himself, one by Bloom, one by Samuel Huntingdon ($ 1.4 million for the
Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard). This completely artificial,
engineered "debate" [was] then picked up by the New York Times, the
Washington Post and Time magazine. Today everyone has heard of Francis
Fukuyama and The End of History and the Last Man, a best-seller in
severallanguages.253
As this account suggests, much of the "debate" around which neo-liberal norms
are promoted is in fact constructed and propagated by those with a distinct
material interest in pursuing this agenda. By doing so, the "natural" and
"superior" explanations that neo-liberalism provides are advanced. After all, the
251 Leslie Sklair, 1997, p. 515.
252 Albert Hirschmann 'The Political Economy of Latin American Development: Seven
Exercises in Retrospect', Latin American Research Review, March 22, 1987, pp. 30-31.
253 Susan George, 1997.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
95
superiority of the neo-liberalist ideology and its evident common sense has
emerged from an ostensibly free debate, where alternative viewpoints must
surely have been proffered and shown to be lacking upon inspection. This
process in fact has seen the elevation of neo-liberalism as la pensee unique and
the market as the ultimate arbiter of what is or what is not acceptable, both
economically, politically, and increasingly, socially.
In this context Kees van der Pijl's discussion of fetishism and neo-
liberalism may be usefully deployed. Fetishism is the ascription of vital spirit
and mysterious powers to dead objects - the animation of the inanimate.
According to this view, neo-liberalism and "the market" has increasingly become
fetishised, creating a scenario whereby:
Professional economists serve to keep alive the idea that the workings of
the market economy are only interfered with at one's peril. Even obviously
inhuman conditions of production, such as child labour, are declared
beyond regulation in the name of the free market.v='
This fetishisation of "the market" is invariably externalised, hanging like the
sword of Damocles over any administration that, in Margaret Thatcher's phrase,
dare 'buck the markets'. This can act as a useful alibi to be deployed in defence
of administrations that intend to embark on neo-liberal restructuring and can
serve to bolster the consensual element of hegemony. As a Bank for
International Settlements report put it, 'in many countries, explaining monetary
policy decisions in terms of external constraints has been helpful in securing
public acceptance'.2SSThis fetishisation has not yet reached the level of common
sense, but the incantations sounded by the organic intellectuals tied to this
project whenever criticism is raised make its almost hallowed status quite
clear.v= The rise of religious motivational speakers who explicitly link religion
with "entrepeneurship" (increasingly a feature of popular South African life) or
the characterisation of neo-liberalist populisers such as Clem Sunter as
preaching the 'hottest gospel' serve as a testament to this actuality.ê="
254 Kees van der Pijl, 1998, p. 13.
255 Bank for International Settlements Annual Report, 1992 Basle: Bank for International
Settlements, 1992, p. 124.
256 Thus provoking John Miheve to refer to 'The Fundamentalist Ideology of Neo-
liberalism', http://www.alternatives.ea/ does/ colloque zanglais /neolio.html
257 See Josey Ballenger 'Divining the Righteous Path to Eternal Worth', Sunday
Independent (Johannesburg), November 1, 1998 and the profile on Clem Sunter in 'The
Hottest Gospel', Leadership, vol. 6, no. 3, 1987.
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At the same time, this fetishisation of the market acts, as Gramsci
suggests, to stifle debate. Thus in spite of the hardships that neo-liberalism has
created in the developing world, no coherent alternative counter-hegemonic
project has yet emerged for the ideology of nee-liberalism at least at the elite
level appears as "natural". For sure, neo-liberal 'beliefs and the policy agenda
that they yield, embody deep ideological premises. Most important, they take the
existing economic and political structures as given and defining a "natural
order" to which policy must adapt'. This is so because the transnational elites
'are able to fix the political boundaries by their economic and political power, an
economics that limits itself to considering options within this system of
domination'.258
Essentially, discussion has been limited a la Gramsci's notion into
discussions as to how best to ameliorate such outcomes or "ride through" the
crises i.e. the discussion becomes exclusively preoccupied with "problem
solving". But the fundamentals of "the market" dare not be tampered with, lest
"the market" punish such transgressors - a neat tautology that heads off
counter-hegemonic impulses at birth. In the South African context there has
been an extensive rubbishing of any alternatives to nee-liberalism. For example,
in a recent seminar Rudolph Gouws, chief economist of the Rand Merchant
Bank, characterised those who oppose neo-liberalism as "extremists" who
advocate "bad policies" in the face of "reality" where there is "no option".259Such
language is reminiscent of how business interests characterised Ben Turok
when he was appointed to implement the RDP, describing him as "controversial"
and holding "extreme views",26owhilst neo-liberalism is posited as self-evident
'to reasonable men who understand the workings of an economy'.261
Opposition to this ideology implies that one is an "extremist" who is
economically illiterate. In the South African context, the business press now
promotes the idea that adhering to neo-liberalist policies makes one belong to
'the middle of the political continuum', with 'all [who] subscribe to capitalism'
258 Herman also comments on the fetishisation of neo-liberalism when he comments on
the 'faith in markets' that has developed and the almost religious belief that 'government
actions not serving the profit motive are unnatural' and hence heretical - Edward S.
Herman The Economics of the Rich', Z Magazine, July 1997.
259 Rudolph Gouws, chief economist of Rand Merchant Bank, at the seminar
'Globalisation and the South African Economy: A Medium-term Perspective', Bellville,
November 13, 1998.
260 Sunday Times (Johannesburg), March 13, 1994.
261 NigelBruce 'No Easy Road', Leadership, vol. 11, no. 3, 1992, p. 18.
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being in 'the centre', whilst all who dispute the tenets of the counter-revolution
being labelled as 'radicalsFv? Yet as has been pointed out previously, the type of
policies that neo-liberalism espouses were originally way beyond the pale of
"normal" economic thinking, be it Keynesianism or socialist - indeed, Hayek's
theories were seen as 'stupid' and leading down the 'road to reaction' when they
were first publicised.ê= It is a reflection of the immense success that this
ideology has had in achieving hegemony that it is now put forward as the
common sense "centre", from which all other policy prescriptions must be
judged accordingly and in the light of their compatibility with its prescriptions.
Indeed, the fixed certainties that surround nee-liberalism have achieved
the status of an ideology against which only economic illiterates may venture.
This dogmatism and presentation of subjective opinion as objective truth
permeated the South African business press during the transition (and
continues today). A typical example was the Financial Mail glibly asserting that
'private property and freedom of contract ...are values that are absolutely
necessary to peace, prosperity and liberty. That is not a theory. It is a matter of
observable fact'.264This type of rhetoric has continued after 1994, with one
commentator complaining that:
[It] has become quite common in South Africa today [to be] asked to
accept certain economic realities, and so on. The word "reality" seems to
stop any further argument. In fact, if you insist otherwise, you are made
to feel guilty of either ignorance or stupidity ...
It...makes me sad that when people fail to transform the economy of the
country, they blame it on reality and it is often made to look even more
formidable or fierce when it is qualified as "harsh economic reality".265
As has been suggested, cutting the ground from under the terrain of debate and
denigrating altemative viewpoints whilst promoting opinions as "facts" is
integral to promoting a particular ideology, as Gramsci correctly theorises.
In short, it is the emasculation of altematives alongside the promotion of
a particular discourse that is at the core of a dominant ideology and which helps
construct a negotiated hegemony. This is particularly so when such
emasculation (among other factors) conditions those intellectuals who would
normally side with an altemative project to join with the ongoing ideology or at
262 Financial Mail, June 11, 1999.
263 Herman Finer Road to Reaction Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1963, p. 67.
264 Financial Mail, December 14, 1990.
265 The Sowetan (Johannesburg), April 20, 1999.
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least abandon their activities lil the face of such seemingly compelling forces.
Whilst opposition to the dominant ideology will of course remain in a culturally
autonomous space, the neutering of the potency of such niches via assimilation
is fundamental to the construction of a hegemonic project. The marginalisation
of South African intellectuals on the Left as being "irrelevant" and "unrealistic"
in the face of the logic of neo-liberalism is one such occurrence:
[TJhe consciousness of the oppressed can be thwarted when the
intellectuals who would normally be allied with them are wooed away by
the intellectuals of the dominant classes. This, and not the production of
some unlikely society-wide consensus, is the essence of Gramsci's notion
of domination through ideology.266
It is suggested that such a scenario helps us analyse the situation that
developed in South Africa around the time of the transition and that facilitated,
among other important factors, the acceding of an ANC-led government to the
ongoing project of neo-liberalism. It is this story that Part Two focuses upon.
266 Enrico Augelli and Craig Murphy, 1988, p. 23.
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PART TWO
NEO-LIBERALISM, HEGEMONY AND POST-APARTHEID
SOUTH AFRICA
When Nelson Mandela was released from prison in 1990, he declared that 'the
nationalisation of the mines, banks and monopoly industry is the policy of the
ANCand a change or modification of our views in this regard is inconceivable'i!
However, four years later and two days after the elections in which the ANChad
swept to power, Nelson Mandela was to declare that 'in our economic policies .,.
there is not a single reference to things like nationalisation, and this is not
accidental. There is not a single slogan that will connect us with any Marxist
ideology'< Four years after that, with the ANC pursuing an aggressively neo-
liberalist economic model, Mandela was urging the South African people to
'respect the business sector' and adamant that 'he wanted to dispel the notion
that the African National Congress government wanted to introduce socialism to
South Africa">Big business celebrated this volte-face, enthusiastically asserting
that 'far from the dreaded threat of nationalsiation, the present government is
playing a real free market hand.'."
The next two chapters aim to demonstrate how the ANC moved its
politico-economic policies from a populist and vaguely socialist platform that
held out a tacit promise for nationalising the means of production and which
would have helped to facilitate the construction of a historic bloc that at least
held out the potential for redressing the inequalities of the past, to that of a
fiercely pro-capitalist framework (via a modest and short-lived reformist
programme) that sits well within the remit of the ongoing hegemonic order. This
evolution of the ANC's economic policies culminated in the government's macro-
economic plan, the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy,
which was released in June 1996.
By broadly aligning itself politically and economically with the hegemonic
order, the ANC's post-apartheid foreign policy has been inextricably drawn into
1 The Sowetan (Johannesburg), March 5, 1990.
2 Sunday Times (Johannesburg), May 1, 1994.
3 Business Day (Johannesburg) October 14, 1998.
4 J. Drake, chairman of Shell S.A., London, December 10, 1996, cited on SA Foundation
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support for the current discourse, though the contradictions that this engenders
and how the GNU attempts to navigate these tends to obscure this premise
somewhat. In short, the decisions taken by the ANCelite during the transition
and then within the GNU once in power over broad politico-economic policies
have led to South Africa pursuing an essentially supportive role to the ongoing
world order, what is essentially a US-centred transnational hegemony based
around the organising principles of nee-liberalism.
This actuality has spurred Pretoria into playing the character of facilitator
and consensus-builder - a "middle power" - for the GNUsees itself as located in
between North and South and recognises that it has to balance an intricate
aggregate of forces. In the final analysis however, the playing of such a role
serves to legitimise the broad normative order that is current in the
international political economy, wrapped up as it is within the hegemonic
discourse. In examples of where Pretoria postures a reformist platform at
multilateral fora - by emphasising fair as well as free trade; or even positing an
ostensibly "anti-hegemonic" position at odds with the North's established
position e.g. relations with Cuba, Iran or Libya, these are manifestations of the
contradictions that the ANCelite has had to deal with in its negotiated position
cis-a-vis the hegemonic discourse and a recognition of the contradictions that
this has engendered within the tripaprtite alliance, and do not threaten the "real
business" of its support for the tenets of neo-liberalism and its accession to the
broader global order.
web page - http) jwww.safoundation.org.zajpsglobal.html
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CHAPTER 2
THE TRANSITION PROCESS: EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES,
POLYARCHY AND HEGEMONY
The specifics of the negotiation process have been dealt with in detail elsewhere
and need not be covered in depth here.> The reasons why the process was
entered into by the elites of both the National Party and the ANChowever, help
explain the outcome whereby the post-apartheid government so seemingly
identified with the ongoing global order. Indeed the further involved in the
negotiations the elites of the ANC became, the greater they began to identify
with the hegemonic project that was being pushed by a multiplicity of actors. In
short, the transition process lead to a historic compromise whereby the African
National Congress and its alliance partners essentially abandoned much of their
radical pretensions in exchange for accession to political power and access to
the nascent historic bloc that is still in formation and remains an ongoing
project.
Crucial to this scenario were the forces at both the national and
international level that propelled the two broad parties into the negotiation
process and which came into play during and after. Moving beyond the agent-
structure dichotomy and avoiding reductionist tendencies inherent in focusing
on one constituent, this study moves beyond the debate as to which factor was
the most important in leading to the negotiation process.é FW de Klerk himself
asserted that the decision to un-ban the liberation movements stemmed from a
combination of national and extra-national conditions."
As will be seen, the two elements are inter-linked and support the notion
of an ensemble of forces at the domestic and international levels that serve to
5 See for example Steven Friedman (ed.) The Long Journey: South Africa's Quest for a
Negotiated Settlement Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1993; Allister Sparks Tomorrow is
Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa's Negotiated Settlement Johannesburg:
Struik, 1994; and Patti Waldmeir Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid and the
Birth of the New South Africa Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1997.
6 For the "external" thesis, see for example Hermann Gilliomee 'Democratisation in South
Africa', Political Science Quarterly, vol. 110, no. 1, Spring 1995. For a rather
unconvincing refutation of this, see Adrian Guelke The Impact of the End of the Cold
War on the South African Transition', Journal of Contemporary African Studies, vol. 14,
no. 1, 1996.
7 FW de Klerk in 'Proceedings of Joint Sitting, 2 February 1990', Debates of Parliament,
Second Session - Ninth Parliament Pretoria: Government Printer, 1990.
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reconcile the agent-structure problem. How these coalesced to craft a scenario
where the pro-capitalist fraction within the ANC was bolstered and the counter-
hegemonic impulses within the main liberation movement were neutered is
what this study turns to first. To organise our thoughts on this a "mind map" is
provided, indicating the main elements regarded as crucial in propelling the
transitional moment and in influencing the ANC's stance:
Figure 2: Selected structural factors propelling negotiations and some of
their effects on the main protagonists
I§ovemment I ENC alliance I
Increased
transnationalisation
of ruling classes
Hegemony of neo-
liberalism: "There
are no alternatives"
Pressure from global
capital to dismantle
apartheid
Ideological confusion on
the Left e.g. within the
SACP - Has Socialism
Failed?Pretoria no longer
"strategic asset" to the
West
End of Cold War and
collapse of Soviet-
style economies
MK myth of
"military
solution"Removal of rooi
gevaar rationale
End of logistical and
ideological support from
the socialist statesNamibianindependence - closure
of MK bases in Angola
As observed, at the global level a variety of factors coalesced to propel the move
towards negotiations forward. Whilst it is difficult to provide a ranking of
importance vis-á-vis these factors, of perhaps profound - even fundamental -
importance was the ending of the formal Cold War between the capitalist West
and "really existing socialism". Warnings against the rooi gevaar had long been a
staple ingredient of the apartheid regime's ideological underpinnings and served
to justify the banning of the SACP (and by extension the ANC) but also Pretoria's
adventurist policies throughout the region and particularly in Angola and
Namibia. That this anti-communist fixation was an exaggerated threat is not as
important as the perceptive power it had in socialising generations of South
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Africans into a collective common sense demonisation of the "communist" ANC
as a threat to their religious (and this was heavily accentuated), economic and
political freedom.s
The changes in Eastern Europe were hence viewed by the apartheid
regime as having profound implications for South Africa and the region as a
whole and 'eased Pretoria's phobia that the Black struggle against apartheid was
a conspiracy directed from Moscow"? The rooi gevaar evaporated as the Soviet
Union's political economy went into terminal crisis thereby necessitating a
massive reduction in commitments overseas. Thus 'because of the economic and
political crises in the USSR and Eastern Europe, abundant and cheap socialist
support for progressive governments [and movements] overseas no longer
existjed]'.'? At the same time, the relevance of Pretoria as a strategic Western
bastion against the "Soviet threat" also disappeared, undercutting Western
interest in propping up an increasingly unpopular regime (expressed in the
transnational anti-apartheid movement and the concomitant sanctions against
Pretoria).Il
The South African elite were very quick to realise this - FW de Klerk later
commented that 'within the scope of a few months, one of our main strategic
concerns for decades - the Soviet Union's role in southern Africa and its strong
influence on the ANC and the SACP - had all but disappeared. A window had
suddenly opened which created an opportunity for a much more adventurous
approach' regarding negotiations over a future South Africa.i- More critical
commentaries have also argued that 'the "end of the Cold War"...suggest[ed] the
existence of a new window of opportunity', but this was 'for a successful liberal
reformism, one crafted, precisely, to pre-empt revolution U? In either case, a
scenario rapidly led to conditions acceptable to Pretoria for a settlement of the
Namibian issue (culminating in independence for Windhoek in March 1990).
8 For examples of this point of view/propaganda, see D.J. Kotzé Communism and South
Africa Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1979; and Henry Pike A History of Communism in South
Africa 2nd. ed., Germiston: Christian Mission International of South Africa, 1988.
9 Allister Sparks, 1994, p. 98.
10 Carlos Vilas 'Is Socialism Still an Alternative for the Third World?', Monthly Review,
vol. 42, no. 3, July-August 1990, p. 99.
11 See Audie Klotz Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1992.
12 FW de Klerk The Autobiography: The Last Trek - A New Beginning Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1998, p. 161.
13 John Saul Recolonization and Resistance in Southern Africa in the 1990s Trenton: Africa
World Press, 1993, 49.
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Concomitant with this, the ANClost its base camps in Angola. Combined
with the playing out of the (however flawed) Nkomati Accord with Mozambique
and the "positive neutrality" of Botswana and Zimbabwe, the ANC had no
location where its military camps could be re-established anywhere near South
Africa. The realisation that any military solution to the South African situation
by the ANC's armed wing Umkhonto we Sizwe was not possible (if it had ever
been) therefore had to be faced. This realisation was further conditioned by the
cessation of military aid from the Warsaw Pact. It can be briefly said then that
the ending of the Cold War in short 'allowed the security establishment to
recalculate the strategic balance in South Africa'i+' From the point of view of the
apartheid government:
In the last months of 1989, the external environment improved
dramatically from the govemment's point of view. For the first time it
considered negotiations a viable option. The crucial development was the
severe internal troubles experienced by the Soviet Union. Moscow told the
ANC that it was up to South Africans themselves to reach a political
accommodation. At the same time Pretoria believed that without Soviet
backing it had a much better chance to contain a legalised ANC.ls
The collapse of the socialist economies deprived 'progressive forces throughout
the world of an important pillar of support', in terms not only of material aid but
also in terms of solidarity and ideological support.t> Such an actuality bolstered
the position of transnational capital and its allies and in the context of South
Africa was of profound importance:
We should not underestimate the extent to which the South African
transition was shaped ...by the fact that it gathered momentum just when
alternative visions ...were becoming utterly tarnished by experiences in
the Eastern bloc. Nothing could have played more into the hands of those
Westem powers anxious to shape the outcome of the transition in [South
Africa], than the ability to pass off Stalinist-style "democracy" as the only
alternative to the version they wanted on the agenda.!"
How this played out vis-a-vis the particular democratic arrangements that were
constructed for the post-apartheid society will be detailed below. What can be
said at this juncture is that the end of the state socialist regimes also unleashed
forces within the ANC that propelled a move away from socialism and the
politics of confrontation to the apartheid elite, and towards a negotiated
14 RobertLeeand LawrenceSelemmer Transition to Democracy: Policy Perspectives 1991
CapeTown:OxfordUniversityPress, 1991, pp. 15-16.
15 HermanGiliomee,1995, p. 91.
16 Rob Davies 'The International Context', African Communist, no. 139/140, First
Quarter, 1995, p. 58.
17 David Ginsburg 'The Democratisation of South Africa: Transition Theory Tested',
Transformation, no. 29, 1996, pp. 96-97.
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compromise:
The late 1980s represented a watershed. [The ANC]had long favoured the
nationalisation of large sectors of the economy, but it was now confronted
with mounting evidence of the malperformance of economies under
central control in Eastern Europe and Africa...[T]he leadership saw a need
for negotiating functional political and economic structures that could
deliver.
Extending from this, the collapse of the state socialist nations bolstered the
non-socialist elements within the liberation movement. Space does not permit a
detailed examination of this, suffice to say that the ANC has always been a
broad church. Mandela himself admitted that the ANCwas 'united solely by [its]
determination to oppose racial oppression' and that it was 'the only thing that
unites us ...there is no question of ideology as far as the odysseys of the ANC is
concerned, because any question approaching ideology would split the
organisation from top to bottom UëThis was reflected within the organisation by
two broad fractions - socialist and Africanist - who have historically struggled
for supremacy, though the long years of exile tended to camouflage the degree to
which this was the case.
In the modern era, this Africanist element originally centred around the
original ANCYouth League (formed 1943-44) and the figures of Nelson Mandela,
Walter Sisulu and Oliver Tambo, and were joined by later generations of ANC
leaders, such as Thabo Mbeki, Donald Mkhwanazi, Peter Mokaba and Joel
Netshitzenze. These figures and the fraction they come from have always been
somewhat uneasy with the ANC-SACP nexus. This has been based on an
aversion to the socialist implications that such an alliance had - Mandela
himself has repeatedly claimed that the Freedom Charter was simply a blueprint
for 'African-style capitalism'ct? At the extremist level, it has as well resonated
from a deep-seated racial prejudice against the "disproportionate" number of
Indians and Whites involved from the SACP side, threatening to snap the
'unbreakable thread' of non-racialism that the liberation movement was based
around.vv
This antipathy to the role of non-Blacks in the struggle against apartheid
has long represented a strong strand in the liberation forces, though the
18 Quoted in Allister Sparks The ANCPulls Together', Africa South, no. 13, 1991.
19 Nelson Mandela Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela London:
Little, Brown and Company, 1994, p. 527.
20 For an excellent account of the role of non-Africans in the liberation struggle, see Julie
Frederikse The Unbreakable Thread: Non-Racialism in South Africa London: Zed Books,
1990.
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attitude towards the position (and acceptability) of Indians and Coloureds in the
struggle has been ambivalent. It was these impulses that led to the formation of
the Pan-Africanist Congress (as well as defections to the tribalist Inkatha
Freedom Party by such ANC luminaries as Sipho Mzimela]."! Though the PAC
was to collapse into chaotic mismanagement and corruption, the stimulus
behind its formation represented a trend that has been omnipresent. From a
class analysis, the Africanist element within the liberation forces represented a
nascent congregation of Africans who saw themselves as the heir-apparerits to a
new post-apartheid Black bourgeoisie. Even the Black Consciousness movement
of Steve Biko et al was grounded in the Black middle class and had its support
base in the Black intelligentsia and university students (and hence never
developed a mass basel.F As Blade Nzimande and Jeremy Cronin correctly
summarise, 'the cause of an aspirant Black elite, and a discomfort with
socialism and the "undue left-wing influence" of non-Africans are the hallmarks
of this tendency' within the ANC.23
Typically, prominent Africanist - Minister of Public Services and
Administration, Zola Skweyiya - asserted that 'the ANC shouldn't shy away from
Blacks becoming capitalist. The only question is - how do we achieve it?',24
whilst Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry Phumzile Mlambo-Nguka stated
that Black businessmen should not be shy to say that they wanted to become
'filthy rich'.2s This fraction within the ANC was greatly strengthened by the
conditions i.e. the demise of "really existing socialism", that developed around
the time of the beginning of the end of apartheid and reasserted itself in the
transition process.
In short, the structural conditions surrounding the lead-up to the
immediate transition process (and the process itself) suited the strategic choices
and predilections of a particular fraction within the ANC elite (as well as the
existing elite within the National Party and large-scale capital). This elite within
the ANC was wary of any radical restructuring of South African society, and
21 For his account and the blatantly racist reasons behind it (including an appendix
listing the supposed cabal of Whites and Indians who would 'control the country' if the
ANCtook over),see SipoMzimelaMarching to Slavery Atlanta: Soundview,1993.
22 TomLodgeBlack Politics in South Africa Since 1945 Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983,
pp.322-324.
23 Blade Nzimande and Jeremy Cronin 'ANCThatcherites Want Black Bosses', Weekly
Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), October 10, 1997.
24Weekly Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg) December 15, 1995.
2SQuoted in Heribert Adam, FrederikVan Zyl Slabbert and KogilaMoodleyComrades in
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instead pinned its aspirations to that of developing an indigenous bourgeoisie
alongside and in partnership with the existing patterns of societal structures
that have developed within the country, whilst at the same time capturing
nominal political power. A bigger slice of the cake and not a new cake altogether
is the main goal of this fraction, dressed up as it is in rhetorical calls to arms
centring on "empowerment" and the promotion of Africanism. Whilst unsettling
to those classes/ethnic groups that feel threatened by such rhetoric, the project
that this elite fraction advances is explicitly tied to the promotion of capitalism
and is well within the ongoing order. Indeed, such a scenario suits admirably
the local managerial classes, giving the current economic dispensation a
legitimacy (through the admission into its managerial ranks of Blacks) that
could not be sustained under apartheid.
At the extra-national level, the same process of legitimisation is apparent
and the incorporation of an additional Black South African fraction into the
wider transnational class alliance in support of the hegemonic project gives the
ongoing global order greater legitimacy. As one analysis asserts, 'the private
sector has [tried] to create a few extremely wealthy and powerful Black
individuals who would provide a bulwark against accusations that South
Africa's most powerful companies are all-White. So White business is financing
and advising a line-up of instant millionaires'<s This, in combination with a
socialised political elite who accept the basic tenets of nee-liberalism, is the
perfect scenario for the continuation of the status quo in South Africa. To wit:
From the point of view of sophisticated business, what better government
could be in power to deal with militant unions and the impossible tasks
of satisfying an impoverished half of the population than a liberation
movement under a moderate charismatic leader with universal
legitimacy, yet also bound to work within the parameters of the
economically feasible P.v?
The impulses behind this process are particularly strong given that this
emergent newly-recruited fraction comes as it does from such a high-profile
nation state as South Africa which still possesses widespread international
goodwill. Yet this fraction and the contradictions that this engendered within
the ANCwas long masked by the alliance between that organisation and the
SACP. It is to this that this study now turns to in helping to explain the demise
of any coherent socialist counter-hegemonic impulses in the transition process.
Business: Post-Liberation Politics in South Africa Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1997, p. 201.
26 Weekly Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg) Apri121, 1995.
27 Heribert Adam, Frederik van Zyl Slabbert and KogiIaMoodley, 1997, p.173.
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The cross-over in ANC-SACPmembership was a result of a specific
historical juncture, and did not necessarily represent a convergence of ideology,
despite the assertions of crude anti-ANC "academic" work.28 In essence, the
alliance was a strategic decision by the ANC in the anti-apartheid struggle,
allowing it to access the patronage (be it financial, organisational or military)
linkages that the SACP had access to.29 Indeed, membership of the SACP was
often seen as a tactical exercise for advancement within the ANC, particularly
for those Black nationalists who wished to demonstrate their non-racial
credentials.
Yet the ready way in which many ostensible "communists" in the ANC
leadership (such as Thabo Mbeki) shed their SACP membership after 1990 is
ready testament to the fact that much of their commitment to the ideals of the
SACPwas perfunctory. Indeed, the expedient usage of socialist slogans by this
nationalist elite was openly admitted by Mbeki in an interview when he
remarked that it was 'very easy to say the people will share the wealth of the
country. That is sufficient for the purposes of mobilisation and getting them
engaged'<'? Mbeki of course was also the main opponent against, in 1979,
having the ANCdeclared a "Marxist-Leninist movement" á la FRELIMO,arguing
that it 'was wrong, the notion, that the ANCwas a party of socialism' - a strange
position to take for an ostensible communist.u
It can be said that the alliance between the ANC and the SACP was
largely an uneasy one, sitting as it did within a movement consisting of an elite
whose aspirations centred around nationalism and not socialism. Yet at the
same time, this linkage did have a radicalising effect on the support base of the
ANC, raising their expectations vis-a-vis a socialist reorganisation of society.
One cannot simply dismiss the fact that surveys in 1985 found that between 74
and 77 per cent of Blacks favoured socialism as the organising principle in a
post-apartheid South Africa.ê? or that in 1991 67 per cent of COSATU shop
stewards wanted the nationalisation of key industries whilst only 17 per cent
28 See for example Michael Radu 'African National Congress: Cadres and Credo', Problems
of Communism, July-August 1987.
29 See Philip Nel 'The ANC and "Communism'", in Willie Esterhuyse and Philip Nel (eds.)
The ANC and its Leaders Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1990; and Vladimir Shubin ANC: A View
From Moscow Bellville: Mayibuye Books, 1999 ..
30 Thabo Mbeki, interviewed by Hugh Murray 'The Long Journey of Thabo Mbeki',
Leadership, vol. 12, no. 4, 1993, p. 32.
31 Quoted in Sunday Times (Johannesburg) June 6, 1999.
32 Survey information cited in Fatima Meer 'South Africa's Tomorrow', Third World
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favoured privatisation.P Yet the leadership of the ANC was extremely wary of
such impulses - Oliver Tambo, against all received opinion, went so far as to
claim that 'our people will decide [on a post-apartheid dispensation] and they're
not very interested in a socialist state"> The ANC-SACPlinkage thus had a set
of dialectical contradictions inherent in it and that was reflected in the different
agendas of the elites (itself subject to intra-elite disputes vis-a-ins policies) and
their mass support base.
The constraints of globalisation and the collapse of communism in the
Eastern bloc however resolved much of the potential for a split within the
liberation forces, particularly after the SACP found itself affected by the global
uncertainties that affected all socialists at the time which, seemed to suggest
that were no apparent alternatives to capitalist dernocracy.ê> This served the
interests of those fractions advocating the neo-liberalist project. As one analysis
asserted:
[T]he principal ideological resource available to actors' advocating a neo-
liberal economic programme was the rise to hegemony of market ideology.
This resulted from the collapse of the communist bloc in eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union. This collapse of communism ensured that there
was no alternative economic discourse to that of the market [and the]
market was celebrated as the only rational mechanism for the efficient
production and allocation of goods within and among societies. The
legitimisation of market discourse [was] clearly evident in South Africa.w
Such a playing out of the collapse of communism and the ensuing compromise
by ostensible socialist forces with the hegemonic discourse was reflected by the
intervention of Joe Slovo in 1990 in his paper entitled Has Socialism FailedrJ!
Though this rightly critiqued the tendency to bureaucratism and the lack of
tangible democracy in the Soviet-style centrally planned economies, the
practical effects were to undermine confidence in the socialist movement and
promote a rightward shift of the SACP towards Eurocommunism and even social
democracy (thus leading David Kitson to question whether the SACP was any
Quarterly, April vol. 9, no. 2, 1987, p. 399.
33 Sipho Pityana and Mark Orkin Beyond the Factory Floor: A Survey of Cosatu Shop-
Stewards Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1992, p. 67.
34 Oliver Tambo in conversation with Anthony Sampson, January 21, 1987 quoted in
Anthony Sampson Nelson Mandela: The Authorised Biography Johannesburg: Jonathan
BaH, 1999, p. 362.
35 See Kathryn Manzo (ed.) Domination, Resistance, and Social Change in South Africa: The
Local Effects of Global Power Westport: Praeger, 1992.
36 Adam Habib Structural Constraints, Resources, and Decision-Making: A Study of South
Africa's Transition to Democracy unpublished PhD thesis, City University of New York,
1998, p. 225.
37 Joe Slovo 'Has Socialism Failed?', African Communist, Second Quarter, 1990.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
110
longer 'really communist').38 Though Slovo's thesis was heavily critiqued by
Leftist elements within and without the SACP, the support it elucidated from
leading lights such as Jeremy Cronin tends to suggest that it was the accepted
"line" within the SACP hierarchy.ê? Whether Slovo's thesis was correct or not is
irrelevant for this discussion though. What is important is that it demonstrated
the disorientation that the Leftist project in South Africa faced in the aftermath
of the collapse of the Soviet bloc.
This of course occurred within the global structural context of the
hegemony of nee-liberalism, As one journalist for the London Financial Times
put it, the disorientation of the Left 'took shape in a world where there was
suddenly overwhelming consensus on what constituted sensible economic
policiesr'v As has been suggested, this ideological dominance had profound
implications for any future working out of a coherent alternative politico-
economic project. Perhaps demoralised by the ongoing crises in the former
socialist states, many ANC leaders such as Thabo Mbeki, Mac Maharaj, Gill
Marcus, Joel Netshitenze, Aziz Pahad etc. resigned from the SACP - though in
Mbeki's case doubts have been raised regarding his commitment to
communism.s! At the same time, even leading luminaries who remained loyal to
the Party such as Joe Slovo underwent a metamorphosis until, as one colleague
put it, 'the only things that were red about Joe were his socks'rv
That Joe Slovo rapidly emerged as one of the chief accomodatory forces to
capital and the interests of the privileged minority within South Africa,
culminating in the "sunset clauses" (though this strategy was originally Thabo
Mbeki's) should not be overlooked. The de-demonisation of the former "KGB
colonel" to being the toast of local capital (and it should be remembered that the
government initially wanted to exclude Slovo from the ANCnegotiating team on
38 David Kitson 'Is the SACP Really Communist?', Work in Progress, no. 73, March-April
1991.
39 See Jeremy Cronin 'Is the SACPTravelling in the Right Direction?', Work in Progress,
no. 74, May 1991; and 'Lenin is not a Statue', African Communist, no. 127, Fourth
Quarter, 1991.
40 Patti Waldmeir, 1997, p. 255.
41 Mbeki's close friend Willie Esterhuyse has asserted that Mbeki 'was [Oliver] Tambo's
ears and eyes on the central committee [of the SACP]'and left the Party 'when there was
no threat [from communism within the liberation movement] any more' - Weekly Mail
and Guardian (Johannesburg), June 18-24, 1999. A CIA report in 1988 supports this
thesis, arguing that Tambo had 'long been subtly curbing and channelling SACP
influence' - cited in Anthony Sampson, 1999, p. 388.
42 Cited in John Matissonn 'How the ANC Battled to Balance the Ideological Books',
Weekly Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), November 6-12, 1998.
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account of his communism) was a graphic reflection of the forces that played
out in the transition process. Mass media that was supportive of the interests of
big business gradually sought out Slovo for reassurances and were rarely
disappointed. For instance, the Financial Times reported to its readers that
'building socialism ...is not the immediate goal of the ANC,Mr. Slovo [said)' and
that Slovo went on to assert that 'the economy of South Africa the day after the
ANCflag flies over the Union Buildings in Pretoria will be exactly the same as
the day before'i+ê Such utterances served to soothe nervousness on the part of
capital and the entrenched elite who, at the beginning of the transition process
were somewhat apprehensive of the playing out of any negotiations with the
ANC and its allies. This of course was at a time when the organisation was
publicly committed (at least) to a far less conservative economic programme.
Why the National Party and the ANCinitially began this process is to what this
work now addresses.
Strategic stalemate, globalisation, and the push for negotiations
The reasons why this occurred stemmed from the realisation by both the
National Party and the liberation movements that the balance of forces in South
Africa in the late 1980s meant that neither side could defeat the other. As has
been suggested above, the withdrawal of Soviet aid to the ANC profoundly
affected this equation. As a result, the liberation forces came to realise that an
effective stalemate had ensued and that a negotiated compromise was thus the
only route to pursue. It was realised by many township and unionist leaders
that the essential defeat of the mid-l980s insurrection by the state forces (with
great violence) and the collapse of armed support from the socialist community
meant that a popular revolution was certainly no longer possible (if it had ever
been). Alternatives to ending apartheid had to be thus sought elsewhere. To put
it in Gramscian terms, the 'war of movement' was ruled out by the liberation
movement. Instead, a favourable disposition towards negotiations emerged and
an alternative reorganisation of the economy was no longer on the agenda:
The Black working class and its allies could not defeat a regime
possessing not only the allegiance of the bourgeoisie, but also the
political resources of an effective security apparatus and a functioning
.bureaucracy. Thus the ANC and the SACP [were] condemned by the
balance of political forces to conduct institutional (not revolutionary)
politics with (as well as against) political (not explicitly class) actors in
43 Financial Times (London)February27, 1990.
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enduring state institutions, which ruin[ed] the prospects for socialism,
[and] distort[ed] the democratic demand.v'
Furthermore, this scenario proved to be deeply problematic for it reified the two-
stage theory of the ANC-SACPwhich had long underpinned the ideological
strategy of the main liberation movement. This was dependent on a theoretical
separation of the struggle against apartheid (characterised as "colonialism of a
special type") and that of capitalism and propelled the initial goal of the
liberation movement to be restricted to the winning of "national liberation" via a
broad class alliance of the oppressed (i.e. non-White) population, plus those
Whites committed to the overthrow of the regime.v- The struggle hence had two
stages: firstly, for a national democratic state, and secondly for socialism. This
second stage was, it is to be assumed, to take on the form of a Gramscian 'war
of position' whereby the working class were to continue the battle for the
hegemony of socialism in a post-national liberation South Africa.w In the local
South African context, such a theory aimed for a broad class coalition which
obviously (and as subsequently occurred) opened the process up to the
influence of forces within the liberation struggle and the wider population at
large that were not at all in favour of a socialist reorganisation of South African
society.
Such an outcome vindicates Gramsci's warning that any war of position
'is concentrated, difficult, and requires exceptional qualities of patience and
inventiveness'<? Yet these qualities were consistently undermined by the ANC's
desire for "inclusiveness" within the movement, a predilection in itself stemming
from:
An ageless tradition within the ANC alliance and particularly its
leadership [of] holding the firm belief that accommodating the widest
possible spectrum of ideological and class interests, and attempting to
suppress difference between such interests [would] present the surest
and shortest route to national Iiberation.se
As a result the ANC elite sought to partake in the negotiation process from a
premise where a wholesale reorganisation of the state was simply not on the
agenda of the negotiating briefs of the ANC and its partners, (even if this had
44 Michael Macdonald and Wilmot James 'The Hand on the Tiller: The Politics of State
and Class in South Africa', Journal of Modem African Studies, vol. 31, no. 3, September
1993, p. 394.
45 See South African Communists Speak London: Inkululeko Publications, 1981, pp. 284-
320.
46 Antonio Gramsci, 1971, p. 239.
47 Ibid.
48 Dale McKinley The ANC and the Liberation Struggle: A Critical Political Biography
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been possible within the constraints of the globalised economy) and where the
search for "consensus" was paramount. At the same time, the two-stage theory
necessarily pre-empted and hence abandoned even the attempt (however
feasible) to strive for the 'war of movement' in South Africa. Its effect was to
'divide artificially the democratic and socialist aspects of the struggle into two
separate compartmenta'r'?
This deliberate detachment of the liberation struggle from that of the
accompanying struggle for social and material liberation lead to the isolation
and denigration of those who opposed such a divorcing of the two goals. Joe
Slovo's attempt to paint revolutionary socialists as potential mass-murderers,
saying that 'it can only be an indigenous representative of the disastrous Pol Pot
philosophy who can project a pole-vault into socialism and communism the day
after the overthrow of White rule', is characteristic of such a position.w If this
was the attitude of the leadership of the SACP, it can be of no surprise therefore
that socialism was largely absent from the negotiations process and this
disorientation suggests why counter-hegemonic impulses were largely lacking
from the ANC's side in the transition process. Indeed, 'the closer the end of
apartheid approached, the further the objective of socialism receded in the
minds of the leaders of the ...ANC,SACPand COSATU'.51
On the other side, the mass uprisings in 1984-86 and the growth of an
organised Black resistance centred around the UDF (particularly the trade
unions and civic organisations) during the State of Emergency, combined with a
deepening financial crisis in the "racial Fordist" accumulation regime, finally
convinced crucial figures within the National Party that negotiations with the
ANCwere inevitable. Pressure from intemal and extemal capital to move the
National Party in this direction had been long-standing and 'a good proportion of
change in state rhetoric [was] linked to the coincidence between massive
international economic and political pressure'. 52This pressure in itself was an
outcome of the conjuncture of forces of increased globalisation and the
London: Pluto Press, 1997, p. Il.
49 Robert Fine and Dennis Davis Beyond Apartheid: Labour and Liberation in South Africa
Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1990, p. 113.
50 Joe Slovo Speech by Joe Slovo at the 65th Anniversary Meeting of the South African
Communist Party in London on 30 July, 1986 London: Inkululeko Publications, 1986.
51 Alex Callinicos 'South Africa After Apartheid', International Socialism, no. 70, Spring
1996, p. Il.
52 Philip Frankel 'Beyond Apartheid: Pathways for Transition' in Philip Frankel, Noam
Pines and Mark Swilling (eds.) State, Resistance and Change in South Africa
Johannesburg: Southern Books, 1988, p. 278.
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processes that had been stimulated by the forty years of National Party rule.
The National Party had originally found its support base rooted in the
Afrikaner working class. The nationalisation project which it had embarked
upon post-1948 had cemented this linkage, providing employment for a massive
amount of previously impoverished Afrikaners. At the same time, National Party
rule facilitated the entry of Afrikaners into the ranks of corporate South Africa -
an area previously totally dominated by English-speaking Whites. As a result of
this process, South African capitalism became more Afrikanerised and the
Afrikaner became more urbanised and prosperous. In short, the class basis of
the National Party began to change until the National Party became 'the
organising and structuring political mechanism for capital'. 53
At the elite level this progressively came to reflect the views of an
increasingly internationalised Afrikaner bourgeoisie. This class rapidly came to
identify itself and its material interests not with its ethnic brethren on the
platteland but with the already existing transnationalised class elite within
South Africa. As such, they came to share the neo-liberalist convictions of
transnational capital. Such an identification for sure militated against the
nationalist and statist tradition of the Party and in part accounts for the painful
splits rightwards that the National Party endured throughout the 1980s, as the
Afrikaans elite sought to ditch narrow ethnic self-interest predicated on a form
of national socialism for that of a broader class-based perspective based on neo-
liberalism. In short:
The NP's economic vision ...underwent a dramatic transformation in the
late 1970s. Afrikaner firms, benefiting from three decades of government
contracts and contacts, developed into large conglomerates with a
significant stake in all sectors of the country's economy ....Afrikaner
businessmen, like their English counterparts, felt confident enough to
advocate both political and economic liberalisation and socio-economic
reform. They also pushed for the gradual liberalisation of the South
African financial system and (eyeing future markets abroad) for the
country's further integration into the world economy.54
As a result, 'the National Party ...jettisoned almost every last element of its own,
decades-old ethnic programme and world view. Yet it fought tooth and nail for
the retention of a "colour-blind" free market economy and the class privileges of
53 Mike Morris 'State, Capital and Growth: The Political Economy of the National
Question', in Stephen Gelb (ed.) South Africa's Economic Crisis Cape Town: Philip, 1991,
pp.54-55.
54 Adam Habib and Vishnu Padayachee 'Economic Policy and Power Relations in South
Africa's Transition to Democracy', unpublished paper, 1999, p. 6.
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its Ieadership'<s
In short, the pull of greater capital accumulation that active intercourse
with globalising impulses and the concomitant transnational linkages so visibly
witnessed in the Anglophone companies of South Africa was too much to resist
for aspiring Afrikaner elites. Centred around De Beers Consolidated, Anglo-
American Corporation, Gencor and Barlow Rand, the Anglophone corporations
typified the transnationalisation par excellence of South African capital. The
elites within these conglomerates represented a transnational class that
established South Africa as the entree for the rest of the region and were of
immense importance to the global capitalist system.
It was to this fraction that the emergent and highly influential Afrikaner
capitalists aspired to. In alliance with their English-speaking counterparts, it
was this group in particular that came to push the National Party towards
negotiations. This process was spurred on by the deepening contradictions that
apartheid dialectically spawned and the resistance that this engendered in the
Black working class, first in 1976 and then in the resurgent township revolts of
the early 1980s. Such crises convinced the South African capitalist elite, with
the urging of their class allies based in the core, that a political solution that
involved the preservation of the vital interests of capitalism within the
framework of a non-racial democracy was of great urgency:
The White minority capitalist elite was forced to consider political change
because it was dependent on Black labour, in conditions where apartheid
oppression made Black unrest inevitable. All of the reform strategies
since the Seventies have been designed to stabilise South African society
in order to contain this threat.ë>
This realisation was compounded by intemational pressure. To wit, capital's
'resolve...was brought into even clearer focus by intemational reaction to South
Africa's crisis: both politically-willed sanctions and those market "sanctions"
that sprang from global business misgivings about South Africa's investment
climateev Furthermore, 'capitalism and apartheid were seen [by many Blacks]
as two sides of the same coin [encouraging] a hostility to economic ideologies
which assumed the necessity of "free" markets'. 58 In short, apartheid became
ssDanO'MearaForty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National Party,
1948-1994Randburg:RavanPress, 1996, p. 42l.
56 Charles Longford'Does the Vote Mean Freedom?',Living Marxism, issue 68, June
1994.
57 John Saul, 1993, p. 94.
58 David Lazar 'Competing Economic Ideologiesin South Africa's Economic Debate',
British Joumal of Sociology, vol.47, no. 1, December1996, p. 613.
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bad for business and the elites at both the national and international level
realised this.
Pressure was thus intensified on the National Party to open up the
political process. This pressure had been long-standing (as far back as John
Vorster's rule) and had gathered impetus under the tenure of P.W. Botha as the
structural crises in South Africa became apparent to all. Certainly, by 1984 the
Afrikaner establishment had accepted that change was inevitable.s? However,
Botha's tentative approach and his reluctance to go beyond merely cosmetic
changes (the Tricameral Parliament, abolition of the Mixed Marriages Act etc.)
made his removal from office imperative. This was particularly so after the
disastrous internal and external reaction to his "Rubicon speech" of August
1985.
This realisation was centred around an "elite cartel", which in itself was
made up of five smaller power blocs. These were namely, the Afrikaner-
dominated state bureaucracy; the English-dominated capitalist class (with a
strong Afrikaner presence); the powerful media (closely tied to corporate capital);
well-organised professional groups within civil society; and the National Party
establishment.v? As forces coalesced that required such dramatic changes
gathered impetus, a reforming verligte fraction within the ruling party centred
around F.W. de Klerk (despite his earlier verkrampte pedigree) who replaced
Botha in 1989, was identified by the various power blocs within the White elite
as being able to perform the task that was set before it. This task was to oversee
changes to the political structure of South Africa without endangering the
economic base of the entrenched elites - 'to make South Africa safe for
capitalism'<! As one analysis asserts:
The aim of large-scale corporate interests was to define South Africa's
prevailing inequalities as welfare problems that could be addressed
through redistribution of social surplus rather than as a problem linked
with the logic of capitalist production itse1f.62
Concomitant with this task was to bring on board elements within the liberation
movement and the wider Black population. Not in the sense of co-option into
59 Allister Sparks, 1994, p. 74.
60 Sampie Terreblanche 'The Political Economy and Democratisation During the Period of
Transition' in Ursula van Beek (ed.) South Africa and Poland in Transition: A Comparative
Perspective Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1995, p. 352.
61 Moeletsi Mbeki 'FW: The Choirmaster of Capitalism', Weekly Mail (Johannesburg)
March 8-14, 1991.
62 Martin Murray, Revolution Deferred: The Painful Birth of Post-Apartheid South Africa
London: Verso, 1994, p. 16.
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Right [during the transition period] South Africanising
the National Party (of course), but in performing the negotiating role in a two-
pronged strategy of promoting a particular understanding of democracy and in
promoting the neo-liberalist economic project. This strategy was driven by
hegemonic interests, that aimed to secure the class privileges and well-being of
the local White elite and crucially international capital within South Africa,
whilst also appealing to the class aspirations of the fractions within the ANC
that had always aspired to join the ranks of the bourgeoisie. As one Black
businessman put it, 'the survival of the free enterprise system will only be
ensured by the extent to which Blacks perceive themselves to be beneficiaries of
the systernvê This tactic has essentially succeeded, with a 'new multi-racial
the ...conservatism ...preached by the Major government, the Bush
administration, and the World Bank.e-
Secret contact between the ANCelites in exile and big capital had started
ill 1985 with Anglo-American's tentative discussions (though the ANC had long
used Anglo's headquarters in Lusaka as a post box) and was followed up by
others from the business and Afrikaner establishments. The purpose of these
talks was to break down mistrust of the ANCby the Afrikaans elite and business
(and vice versa) and to persuade the ANCof the need to share power: in essence,
to lay the groundwork for a future historic compromise.es Such talks aimed to
facilitate a working partnership. As one business representative commented on
such ad hoc dialogues, 'there is no doubt in my mind that we made an
important contribution in narrowing the gap between their [ANC]position and
people in business and administration back home'.66
Initially outside the programme of the National Party government, under
Botha business and the state gradually came to share a closer fitting agenda
based around the premises of nee-liberalism. Gradually, South Africa's
economic crisis was seen as a result of market imperfections introduced by
external actors, most notably the national socialist - "uolkskapitalisme' - polices
of the National Party.s" An abandonment of such distorting impulses and the
call for a move towards "the market" as the regulator of the economy had been
63 SamMotsuenyane, NAFCOCpresident, Financial Mail February 3, 1989.
64 CraigCharney 'Convergence',Leadership, vol. 10, no. 4, 1991, p. 26.
65 Patti Waldmeir, 1997, p. 79.
66 Ronnie Bethlehem, chief economics consultant with Johannesburg Consolidated
Investments, Financial Mail July 7, 1989.
67 On this, see Dan O'Meara Volkskapitalisme: Class, Capital and Ideology in the
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articulated since the mid-1970s e.g. the "O'DowdThesis", but an acceptance of
this at the elite levels only really began to be articulated in the 1980s.68 This in
itself reflected the change in the balance of power in South Africa at the elite
level - an echoing of an actuality that had occurred throughout the world - from
domestic-oriented economic nationalists (upon which apartheid was predicated)
to an increasingly transnationalised globally-oriented neo-liberalist fraction. A
key point in the evolution of this trend was the publication of the White Paper on
Priuatisatiori and Deregulation in the Republic of South Africa, in 1987.69
The document committed the government to a series of 'radical measures,
including systematic privatisation and deregulation' and to a process of opening
up the economy more fully to 'market forces'."? Although this process was
stalled somewhat first by the deepening crises of the mid-1980s and then by the
negotiating process surrounding the transition, such commitments represented
a fundamental shift in the economic ideas underpinning the formerly statist
National Party and a broad fit between capital and government over economic
policy. Indeed, 'by the time the govemment's Normative Economic Model was on
the table, govemment and (most factions of)big business were at one in respect
of policy issues relayed to liberalising external economic relations', and shared
an agenda for the future."!
The essential result of this agenda, once dialogue with the opposition
forces was conceded, was to forge a working compromise that would preserve
the process of accumulation and production within South Africa whilst de-
racialising and deconstructing the more odious aspects of apartheid. Conscious
of the hegemony of neo-liberalism on a world order scale, the National Party
attempted to "lock-in" any new ANC administration into the norms of world
capitalism, thus enabling 'one hand on the tiller' of economic policy 'for a very
long time'.72As previously mentioned, the National Party in the late 1980s had
already begun to implement economic policies in line with the neo-liberalist
Development of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1934-1948 Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983.
68 See Michael O'Dowd 'South Africa in the Light of the Stages of Economic Growth' in
Adrian Leftwich (ed.) South Africa: Economic Growth and Political Change with
Comparative Studies of Chile, Sri Lanka and Malaysia NewYork: St. Martin's Press, 1974.
69 Republic of South Africa White Paper on Priuatisatiori and Deregulation in the Republic
of South Africa Pretoria: Government Printer, 1987.
70 David Lazar, 1996, p. 618.
71 Vishnu Padayachee 'The Evolution of South Africa's International Financial Relations
and Policy: 1985-1995' in Jonathan Michie and Vishnu Padayachee (eds.) The Political
Economy of South Africa's Transition London: Dryden Press, 1997, p. 4l.
72 FWde Klerk cited in Financial Times (London), May 7, 1991.
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project. The rand was devalued, public expenditure and the budget cut, and
privatisation of publicly-owned assets was embarked upon. As such
corporations were the cornerstone of apartheid and the provider of employment
for thousands of White working-class South Africans, the fact that De Klerk was
willing to envisage such a move is a testament to the changing class interests
that acted to influence National Party policies (see below). Furthermore, in line
with GATTprescriptions tariffs were slashed. These have been characterised as
'pre-emptive actions of the De Klerk government to keep the economy in the
hands ofWhites before an ANCdominated government took power'i"
It can be further added that such policies served to strengthen the hand
of those elements within the elite classes, particularly those with linkages to
transnational capital, for the cost of de-linking from an insertion into the norms
of the world economy would be severe for any incoming administration. For
sure, the National Party and its allies in capital worked hard to circumscribe
efforts by the ANCto forge a different path:
After 1990 the De Klerk government, private local capital and the
international financial institutions came to form an informal "triple
alliance", and ...honed in whenever the occasion presented itself to attack
and disparage any "business unfriendly" ANC economic ideas and
proposals (which they portrayed as naïve and indicative of a dangerous
commitment to socialism, nationalisation, state intervention and other
similar outdated pathologies.t-
By doing so, the hands of the ANCwere tied as the reforms had 'created a new
largely irreversible reality that [the National Party's] successors dared not touch,
out of fear of alienating "the market",75 Hence emboldened by their informal
alliance with domestic and international capital, the transition was embarked
upon by the National Party with considerable confidence:
The strategic calculation was ...to manage the transition in such a way as
to de-radicalise the ANC and to moderate it to such an extent that it
could be accommodated in the newly restructured and de-racialised
state, which in turn was to be firmly re-embedded in the international
system of states. This system of states ...had become so strongly geared to
the rules of a capitalist, private enterprises political economy that the NP
felt secure about the inability of the ANCto realign a future South African
state away from this systemic momentum.?é
Whilst this is certainly accurate, such a position does emasculate the ANCand
73 Fantu Cheru 'Civil Society and Political Economy in South and Southern Africa' in
Stephen Gill (ed.), 1997, p. 224.
74 Vishnu Padayachee in Jonathan Michie and Vishnu Padayachee (eds.), 1997, p. 41.
75 D. Rodrik 'Understanding Economic Policy Reform', Journal of Economic Literature, vol.
34, no. 1, March 1996, p. 37.
76 Pierre du Toit State-Building and Democracy in Southern Africa: A Comparative Study of
Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe Pretoria: HSRC, 1995, p. 386.
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its allies of any agency during the transition process and posits a rather passive
role for the opposition. Yet the process of courting the ANC leadership - first
initially at locations such as at Mells Park in England, and then later during the
negotiations phase - held within it major difficulties for the government and its
capitalist allies and which went beyond simple structural constraints.
Firstly, the National Party was for a variety of reasons not lil complete
control over the negotiating process, particularly towards the end of the
process."? Such a scenario had the potential of allowing the ANC to increasingly
dictate terms - with the concomitant danger that their economic agenda - under
pressure from their mass base - might be out of synch with common sense
"realities" .
Secondly, because the mass base of the ANC within the country favoured
a project that was qualitatively different from that of the leadership in exile. This
always held within it the inherent danger that the ANC elite could be drawn
downwards into the possibility of articulating the voices of the marginalised -
promoting the interests of 'Black families whose expectations have perhaps been
allowed to run far too high', as the director-general of the South African
Chamber of Business Raymond Parsons famously put it, going on to add that
'because business stands to gain or lose so much in this process, it simply has
to become involved and make its interests known', for 'as businessmen we are
concerned ... that models of a broad type necessary to safeguard certain
principles are promoted'i " The connection of such certain principles to class
relations and power is clear. As Marx wrote, 'the same men who establish their
social relations in conformity with their material productivity, produce also
principles, ideas and categories, in conformity with their social relations'."?
It was the purpose of the organic intellectuals within the "change
industry" therefore to attempt to reconcile the contradiction of an elite ANC
leadership with an expectant mass base by drawing in further and further the
moderate elites within the ANC into the hegemonic project of liberal democracy
and neo-liberal macro-economic thinking, and by convincing them (or
confirming already held beliefs) that the masses were being "unrealistic" and
"impatient". Thus:
77 Philip Nel 'Transition Through Erosion: Comparing South Africa's Democratisation',
Aussenpolitik, vol. 46, no. 1, 1995.
78 The Star (Johannesburg), November 12, 1990.
79 Karl Marx 'The Poverty of Philosophy' Handbook of Marxism London: Victor Gollancz,
1935, p. 355.
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Ingratiating themselves with the potential new rulers, strengthening their
"sensible" forces against radical elements and engineering a smooth
transition from embarrassing racial capitalism to non-racial stability,
guided the policy of all Western governments [who] channelled their
funds to ANC-supporting NGOs. [Such policies] constituted relatively
risk-free investment [and] paid offhandsomely.ev
By doing so, the socialising of this fraction within a Braudelian "limits of the
possible" was conducted - a 'battle for the heart and soul of the ANC'.81By
making such elites "see sense" and converting or consolidating their positions to
"realistic" policies, the hegemony of the ongoing order was realised. As this has
had profound implications for South Africa's foreign policy, an analysis of how
this developed, within the overarching Gramscian perspective that underpins
this work will now be embarked upon, before analysing in depth the process by
which neo-liberalism was adopted as the ANC's (and hence the post-1994
GNU's)macro-economic framework.
The "change industry", the socialisation of hegemonic norms and
polyarchy
The structural and behavioural factors that have been outlined above coalesced
to create an environment that was conducive to negotiations. As suggested, the
ensemble of internal and external forces was also antithetical to the promotion
of socialism and/or a radical restructuring of South Africa and this has
continued to play itself out in the policies - including foreign - that the post-
apartheid government has pursued post-1994. However, if this proposition is
accepted, it is imperative that a teleological leap that jumps from the structural
actualities around the transition to the inculcation of the norms surrounding
this hegemony is avoided. In a Gramscian analysis agency is present alongside
structural conditionalities and the terrain leading to the establishment of
hegemony is a site upon which an ideological battle is fought. This being so, an
analysis of what Mark Swilling called the "change industry" and how it helped
shape the discourse around which the ANC's policies were formulated is turned
to.82 This change industry can be said to have taken on the form (if not
80 Heribert Adam, Frederik van Zyl Slabbert and Kogila Moodley, 1997, p. 162.
81Quoted in 'Socialists in SA Struggle to Rev it Up', Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), May
14-20, ·1993.
82 'The Dynamics of Reform: Mark Swilling', interview with Mark Swilling by Alex
Callinicos in Alex Callinicos Between Apartheid and Capitalism London: Bookmarks,
1992. For a coverage of how capital organised itself into influential pressure groups
during the transition, see Loet Douwes Dekker 'Business Interest Groups', Industrial
Democracy Review, vol. 5, no. 2, 1996.
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appearance) of an episternic community - 'a network of professionals with
recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-
area'.83
The importance of such a community lS 'that the consensus forged by
these experts over the identification [and solution] of problems shapes the way
that interests of states are defined'i= By acting thus, and in the absence of any
strong alternative socialist episternic community, the business-aligned "change
industry" - along with its international cohorts - helped bolster and reinforce the
conservative fraction within the ANC that has already been highlighted and so
contributed to the further marginalisation of any counter-hegemonic impulses
within the liberation movement.
In investigating this further and in avoiding simply the coverage of
economic debates in the transition, the work of William Robinson is deployed to
give the analysis theoretical coherence. In his work Promoting Polyarchy:
Globalisation, US Intervention and Hegemony, Robinson crafts a convincing
thesis surrounding the promotion of liberal democracy in the developing world
by Washington and its various agencies.ë> In providing his work with empirical
support, Robinson examines the promotion of a particular form of "democracy"
in the Philippines, Chile, Nicaragua and Haiti. This political project, which is
within the ongoing hegemonic order, has profound socio-economic implication
for the host country and has resonance in this study. Indeed, Robinson does
touch on the "change industry" in South Africa but does not develop this as a
case study. By doing so therefore, this work can valuably build on Robinson's
work within the remit of its own project. Whilst the bulk of the rest of this
chapter will deal with the economic terrain of the "change industry" and how
nee-liberalism achieved Gramscian hegemony through a mixture of coercion
and consent, this study will briefly tum to the other element of the two-pronged
strategy mentioned above and that was instrumental in shaping post-apartheid
South Africa: the promotion of polyarchy.
Robinson is fundamentally correct in asserting that 'struggles for popular
83Peter Haas 'Introduction: Episternic Communities and Internal Policy Co-ordination',
lniemational Orqanization, vol. 46, no. 1, Winter 1992, p. 3.
84 James Mittelman 'Rethinking Innovation in International Studies: Global
Transformation at the Turn of the Millennium' in Stephen Gill and James Mittelman
(eds.), 1997, p. 255.
85 William Robinson Promoting Polyarchy: Globalisation, US Intervention and Hegemony
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democracy around the world are profound threats to the privileges of US-led
Northern elites and their junior counterparts in the South'.86 The mass
uprisings against the apartheid state during the 1980s was predicated at the
grassroots level around a form of democracy that was such a threat to the
ongoing capitalist dispensation. As a United Democratic Front statement made
clear:
Not only are we opposed to the present parliament because we are
excluded, but because parliamentary type of representation in itself
represents a limited and narrow idea of democracy. The rudimentary
organs of people's power that have begun to emerge in South
Africa...represent in many ways the beginnings of the kind of democracy
we are striving for.87
As a result of such aspirations, a means by which such struggles can be
undermined and privileged interests defended is imperative for the global elite.
Under the current epochal conditions, where globalisation continues its push
for greater integration and inter-penetration of economies across formal state
boundaries, the promotion of polyarchy in the South has developed as a
structural feature of the "new world order".88 The 1970s-1980s had seen a
ground-swell of popular movements mobilising against repressive governments
and exploitative socio-economic orders. Very often, as in the case of South
Africa, the opposition was at the same time attempting to construct alternative
grass-roots forms of popular democracy. Whilst dictatorships began to crumble
and 'a general crisis of elite rule began to develop in the South ...the "elective
affinity" between authoritarianism and [capitalist] domination unravelled [and]
"democracy promotion" substituted "national security'" in the language of the
West and its relations with the South.ë? This process was exacerbated by the
decline of the state-socialist economies which meant that direct coercive
intervention to stem the "communist threat" of popular action could no longer
be mobilised by the West as legitimising motives to restore or maintain the
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
86William Robinson 'Pushing Polyarchy: The US-Cuba Case and the Third World', Third
World Quarterly, vol. 16, no. 4, 1995, p. 649. Robinson goes on to say, and we share this
view, that 'the USA, in the age of globalisation, [is] not acting on behalf of a US elite,
but ... [plays] a leadership role on behalf of a transnational hegemonic configuration
representing transnational capital'.
87 United Democratic Front, quoted in Tom Lodge 'South Africa: Democracy and
Development in a Post-Apartheid Society, unpublished manuscript, Department of
Political Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, , 1994, p. 24 cited in David Ginsburg,
1996, p. 79 ..
88 For how it particularly affected Africa, see Todd Moss 'US Policy and Democratisation
in Africa: The Limits of Liberal Universalism', Journal of Modem African Studies, vol. 33,
no. 2, June 1995.
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status quo. Central America was (perhaps) the last example of such justificatory
rhetoric.
With the decline in utility of sheer coercion (though as Gramsci asserts,
the "armour of coercion" is always held in reserve as the ultimate guarantor of
the status quo), authoritarian regimes are no longer "acceptable" to international
society and nor can they be openly propped up ct la a Mobutu or Somoza as in
the past. In the context of neo-liberalism whereby the state is "rolled back",
traditional forms of social control need to be re-invented and consent secured
alongside coercion. This consensual mechanism of social control is part and
parcel of the neo-liberal economic project, adding crucial legitimacy uw
polyarchie political systems to a specific economic model that cannot be
achieved under authoritarian regimes. Hence:
Formal democratic structures are ...seen as more disposed to diffusing the
sharpest social tensions and to incorporating sufficient social bases with
which to sustain more stable environments under the conflict-ridden and
fluid conditions of emergent global society.v?
American elite representatives have been quite explicit in this. Paul Dobriansky,
who served under Reagan in the State Department, asserted that 'democracy
engenders an international environment most conducive to US political,
economic and cultural interests 'iv! whilst another ex-government employee
stated that 'consolidation of democracy abroad [is] a means to secure stable
governments friendly to the United States in a manner that would directly
mcrease American national security'v- As one analysis suggests,
'democratisation nowadays has become...a hegemonic discourse allowing the
North to define the South in its own imagevê This is supported by the argument
that 'support for [democratisation] efforts in Africa is part of a global strategy to
promote "Western" values and institutionalise political regimes that are likely to
be non-belligerent and generally positive towards the realisation of the [neo-]
liberal paradigm'v+
Yet the reductionist tendency to see this simply as a manufactured
89 William Robinson, 1996, p. 16.
90 William Robinson, 1995, p. 652.
91 Paul Dobriansky 'Human Rights and US Foreign Policy', Washington Quarterly, vol. 12,
no. 2, Spring 1989, p. 166.
92 Tony Smith 'Making the World Safe for Democracy', Washington Quarterly, Autumn,
vol. 16, no. 4, 1993, p. 203.
93 William Graf 'Democratisation "For" the Third World: Critique of a Hegemonic Project',
Canadian Journal of Development Studies, Special Issue, 1996, p. 41.
94 Goran Hyden 'Foreign Aid and Democratisation in Africa', Africa Insight, vol. 27, no. 4,
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conspiracy emanating from the North must be avoided: 'by a project [we] don't
mean (as Gramsci warned) a conspiracy. [We]mean the construction of a new
agenda, the constitution of a new force'.95Indeed, the process is more accurately
a 'complex convergence of interests among an increasingly cohesive
transnational elite headed by a US-led Northern bloc' but also 'incorporating
elite constituencies in the South'_96This process explicitly aims to thwart the
demands and aspirations of the popular classes but within a historical juncture
where mere coercion is unacceptable and uneconomical. In the context of South
Africa, the existence of the 'nationalist element within the ANC, arguably
dominant, who increasingly found common cause with those proponents of
Western-type democracy' can be pointed to."?
By pushing polyarchy, the energies of the marginalised are 'diverted into
the plural channels of liberal democracy and hence diffused',98 not by direct
repression but through ideological mechanisms that co-opt and serve to limit
the terrain of struggle in a negative sense - as suggested above. These
institutions 'insulates the government from the broad mass of people, thereby
allowing existing power-holders to retain much of their control over the levers of
power in society'iv? Indeed, 'the framing and circumscribing of democratic
thought and discourse in terms of the precepts of polyarchy can be understood
as an effort by core-state elites to solidify and stabilise the hegemony which
safeguards their positions of power and privilege'<w
This occurs within a Gramscian ideological hegemony that IS In itself
within the parameters of a particular order. In short, democratic
"participation" ...is the velvet glove shrouding the iron fiSt'.lOl By doing so the
current politico-economic arrangements are legitimised - after all, suffrage has
been universalised and hence grievances are remedied via the ballot box not
mass action, whilst capitalism is seen as the "common sense" outcome of
democracy:
[T]he combination of economic and political liberalism [in polyarchy]
95 Stuart Hall, 1990, p. 163.
96William Robinson, 1995, p. 653.
97 David Ginsburg, 1996, p. 96.
98William Graf, 1996, p. 49.
99 David Ginsburg, 1996, p. 76.
100 Mark Neufeld 'Globalization: Five Theses', paper presented at the conference
'Globalization and Problems of Development', Havana, Cuba, January 18-22, 1999.
101 David Moore 'Reading Americans on Democracy in Africa: From the CIA to "Good
Governance"', European Journal of Development Research, vol. 8, no. 1, June 1996, p.
140.
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is ...not democracy per se ...but that is not the point; the point is that the
dominant discourse has determined that it is. And of course economic
liberalism is but another term for capitalism, so that capitalism appears
as the economic face of democracy, thus downplaying the negative
associations, in the South, between capitalism and imperialism and
collapsing the elite ideological construct into [an] amorphous but
demagogically effective concept of democracy'.102
This process acts to bolster the structural position of those political elites that
enjoy the status and trappings of power through involvement in this
arrangement. Their activities are shifted away from active democratic
intercourse with their constituencies and further and further towards
identification and solidarity with the ongoing order, as embraced by the elites of
the party. Such a scenario is particularly evidenced in South Africa where
proportional representation has removed the possible mediating effect of
constituencies. The members of South Africa's parliament represent no
constituencies and are selected along party lines. Not only does this divorce the
parliamentarians from the grass-roots, it also gives massive leverage to the elites
within the party to select, deploy and/ or re-deploy the politicians who ostensibly
represent the South African people. The constitutional ban on crossing the floor
of the House further acts to "lock-in" the parliamentarians, enforces party
discipline and prevents any maverick displays of independent thinking from the
party line. This process acts in a similar fashion to the co-option of intellectuals
and the concomitant effective emasculation of altematives to the dominant
ideology. Such a process of course also serves to strengthen the position of
those political elites who aspired to such a societal status all along and this
energy develops a dynamism of its own. In the South African context as John
Saul argued:
The pressures upon the ANC to identify "upwards" within the world-wide
and local class systems are strong ...That there should be those within the
movement who will be inclined to so identify should not surprise us. After
all, it [was] well-known that some within the ANC-in-exile had all along
harboured aspirations that were quite petty-bourgeois ... in
character ... [T]hey have been joined by others of similar stripe ... [in ] an
accelerating band-wagon effect.wê
Within South Africa, the promotion of polyarchy (very often alongside economic
nee-liberalism] was underwent by a bewildering variety of actors loosely termed
the "change industry" and who, despite various differences amongst themselves,
formed an identifiable epistemie community. These agents were identified by
126
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Swilling as, among others, the 'Van Zyl Slabberts, the IDASAs, the Five
Freedoms Forum etc.' As he goes on to say, 'there [was] a phenomenal number
of workshops, seminars, discussions, conferences, talks rights across the
country in boardrooms, in industrial relations seminars, in local-level
negotiations, in universities, allover the place. Basically, it [was] a winning
hearts-and-minds campaign'. This campaign was funded by local capitalist
interest, with 'a massive amount of American money being pumped into IDASA
and other organisations'. Swilling correctly summarised this process as
'critically important for creating and socialising people Uv+ Such an analysis
echoes the view that 'various think-tanks, intellectual groupings, as well as
other organised interest blocs attempted to influence official ANC economic
policy' during the transition. lOS
This analysis of the South African situation correlates with Robinson's
own assertions when he summarised that 'specialists, operating out of policy
groups, foundations, think-tanks, university research institutes, and
government agencies, bring long-range political considerations and issues
concerning social stability to the attention of the dominant classes and their
inner core m the corporate community'.106 By doing so, such activities
constitute 'the crucial mediating link between agency and structure in the
development of policy and the construction of hegemony'. 107By acting within the
realm of civil society, these activities are engaging the territory where hegemony
is contested and (eventually) achieved: 'in times of crisis the institutions of civil
society remain as the primary site of the cohesion of new political forces that
may create a new order'. 108
The role of this "change industry" or epistemie community then is 'not to
suppress but to penetrate and conquer civil society' i.e. various political
groupings, the mass media, civic organisations etc. and so forth, and from
therein, harmonise secondary classes and national groups into a hegemonic
social order.l09 Not that civil society becomes a monolithic entity pursuing one
104 Mark Swilling in Alex Callinicos, 1992, pp. 43-44.
105 Barry Munslow and Patrick FitzGerald 'Search for Development Strategy: The RDP
and Beyond', in Patrick FitzGerald, Anne McLennan and Barry Munslow (eds.) Managing
Sustainable Development in South Africa, 2nd ed., Cape Town: Oxford University Press,
1997,4l.
106William Robinson, 1996, p. 27.
!O7 Ibid.
!O8 Craig Murphy International Organization and Industrial Change Cambridge: Polity
Press, 1994, p. 31.
109 William Robinson, 1996, p. 29.
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common goal but, by promoting a strong civil society amenable to polyarchy,
local actors and representatives of the productive sector, such as business
associations will be strengthened. This understanding tends to undermine the
naïve belief that civil society is in itself a "good thing" which mechanically
enhances democracy. Instead, such a scenario can actually strengthen the
position of the economic/political elites whilst providing a useful facade of
legitimacy in the form of "civil society". As one analysis comments on the tactic
by the West of strengthening civil society in Africa:
Assisting [elements within civil society] will lead to better economic
decisions as well as strengthen governance: letting a hundred flowers
bloom on the capitalist side of the civil society will help establish the rule
and norms enabling societies to run themselves along the lines required by
capital.Uv
By doing so, the "limits of the possible" are defined in a negative fashion. Such a
task in the South African context, where the mass media was overwhelmingly
sympathetic to the hegemonic project and where many political groupings were
as well (including significant fractions within the ANC) was conducted by a
range of actors as suggested. 'This task [was], of course, not taken on directly by
the regime itself. It [was] left to a range of commentators and political actors,
some of whom cynically or sincerely present themselves as "friends of the
ANC".111
These 'commentators and political actors' were essentially organic
intellectuals and were active throughout the world in facilitating hegemony
among the increasingly transnationalised elite classes. Such personalities and
groups are not simply cliques pursuing individual concerns but are
representatives of a particular group or historic bloc generated by the sphere of
production.t t- In the context of South Africa, these organic intellectuals
ultimately sprung from or were sponsored by corporate capital and its
transnational class allies. As Gramsci points out, such intellectuals are:
Naturally "condensed" by the organic nature of their relation to the social
groups whose expression they [are)'. [In short, they are] a real, organic
vanguard of the upper classes, to which economically they belong ...They
[are] intellectuals and political organisers, and at the same time company
bosses, rich farmers or estate managers, commercial and industrial
110 David Moore,1996, p. 141.
111 Ben Molapo'Manufacturing a ReformistANC',African Communist, no. 125, Second
Quarter, 1991, p. 15.
112Andreas Bieler 'Neo-Grarnscian Approaches to IR Theory and the Role of Ideas: A
Responseto Open Marxism', paper presented at the Twenty-firstConferenceof British
InternationalStudies Association,Durham, December16-18,1996, p. 4.
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entrepreneurs, etc.113
To achieve hegemony, a class must obtain intellectual and moral leadership by
fashioning the ideological conditions for its construction. This role is fulfilled by
a technical intervention within civil society by such intellectuals, invariably
working within the remit of advocacy-type "think tanks". Such think tanks have
seen a massive growth in their activity in recent years. A recent interview with
Philip Truluck, executive vice-president of the Heritage Foundation, on think
tanks as 'advocates of change' is worth quoting to get some flavour of how these
think tanks perceive themselves:
...Think tanks have become much more important to policy-making in the
last two or three decades ...
...Today a whole world of ideas is coming from the think tank community.
Two years ago The Economist noted the growth of think tanks and their
increasing influence ...Today its difficult to think of an issue ...that hasn't
in some way been formed or shaped or developed in the think tank
community ...
...We... spend as much money on marketing our ideas as we do on
research ...As far as we are concerned, finishing a research project just
kicks off a whole new level of activity. Our aim is to change public policy -
not merely comment on it ... [emphasis added]
...When we publish a paper...we identify movers and shakers on that
issue. If you're one of them, our papers ...will be hand-delivered to you -
and someone will try and arrange a meeting with you to talk about the
issue and present our arguments ...
...We never produce a paper that doesn't have recommendations in it.II4
These think tanks and other actors theorise on the optimal environment for any
future social order and propose policies as to how this may be achieved. In
South Africa, as Murray comments, 'futuristic forecasts about where the "new"
South Africa might be heading' sprung up from this cadre of intellectuals and
'scenario planning became a veritable cottage industry'. lISThis activity sought
to negotiate between the material conditions of South Africa within the global
economy and the aspirations of particular target actors. As Robinson asserts,
'the activity of organic intellectuals constitutes a key element of mediation
between the structural and behavioural levels of analysis'.I16 These organic
intellectuals therefore operate to facilitate "consensus" on the fundamentals
surrounding the organisational principles of a given society and serve to guide
perceptions on "reality".
In the context of South Africa, as Lawrence Harris asserted 'big
113 AntonioGramsci, 1971, p. 60.
114 ThinkTanks as AdvocatesofChange:An Interviewwith PhilipTruluck by the Center
forInternationalPrivateEnterprise', http://www.cipe.orgje21jtruE21.html
115 MartinMurray, 1994, p. 21.
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business .. .launched an exemplary campaign of persuasion and education to
hoist its conceptions of reality and change to pre-eminence;t!? Members of the
business community were quite conscious of this and promoted their
'willingness to become agents of change', us as large-scale capital 'became
increasingly aware that if a market-orientated democracy was not established
soon in SA [their] future ...was inescapably bleak"!'? Perhaps a catalyst for this
was Mandela's reaffirmation of the ANC's commitment to nationalisation upon
release from prison. As one analysis put it:
The speech brought an immediate intensification of pressure on the ANC
from an alarmed South African business community and from Western
governments who, both publicly and privately, urged the movement to
eschew a "statist" economic approach. This can only be described as a
propaganda blitz and it gradually found its target.t-?
As will be shown below, by doing so the ideological conditions and fit between
power, ideas and institutions for the construction of hegemony were
established.t-!
Such activities need not stem from a restricted intellectual base - indeed
diversity is important as a self-legitimising device, for 'narrow orthodoxy or
exclusiveness would be a self-defeating criterion'. Thus the ideas within the
ranks of the organic intellectuals activators 'reach the outer boundaries of what
might be ultimately acceptable'i Pê In many respects, it is the quantity of advice
and the message that is given within a particular remit from a particular
episternic community that counts, as well as the negative shaping of what is not
possible. This was understood during the South African transition, where
representatives of the ANC lamented that the 'liberation movement...receiv[ed] a
barrage of patronising and unsolicited advice'.123
Yet if the above is accepted, it is important to avoid the conclusion that
such activity amounts to a grand conspiracy by a cabal of organic intellectuals
in the service of "the hegemonic project". To be sure, a good number of South
116 William Robinson, 1996, p. 42.
117 Laurence Harris 'One Step Forward', Work in Progress, no. 89, June 1992, p. 22.
118 Murray Hofmeyr, South African Breweries and Johannesburg Consolidated
Investments chairperson, The Star (Johannesburg) June 30, 1990.
119 Financial Mail, April 29, 1994.
120 James Hamill The ANC Perspective: Meeting Expectations?', in Francis Toase and
Edmund Yorke (eds.) The New South Africa: Prospects for Domestic and International
Security Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998, p. 64.
121 Stephen Gill and David Law 'Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital',
International Studies Quarterly, 33, 1989, p. 488.
122 Robert Cox, 'Ideologies and the New International Economic Order: Reflections on
Some Recent Literature', International Organization, vol. 33, no. 2, 1979, p. 260.
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African intellectuals were quite conscious of their activities and whose interests
it was aimed to serve. However, 'what is pertinent is not the subjective status or
conscious intent of intellectuals but the objective significance of the scholarship
in question+r> Space preclude an exhaustive account of this in the South
African context, but the example of IDASAis sufficient to give us a broad picture
of the activities and persuasions of one prominent component of the "change
industry".
IDASA
One of the most active groups within the change industry and one that
struggled at a diverse array of levels in pushing certain views in South Africa
(which coincided with the global "common sense"), was the Institute for a
Democratic Alternative South Africa (later Institute for Democracy in South Africa),
commonly known as "IDASA". This organisation was founded in 1987 by
Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert and Alex Boraine, bath of the corporate-funded
Progressive Federal Party - which 'bore the Oppenheimer imprint from the
start'.125This fraction within White politics had long represented essentially two
strands. One was the compassionate face of liberalism, militating against racial
oppression, symbolised in the persons of Alex Boraine and Helen Suzman and
bodies such as the Black Sash.126The other strand however tended to support
the interests of capital (hence the substantial funding from big business) and
can be seen in the persons and institutions of Zac de Beer and Tony Leon of the
Democratic Party and John Kane-Berman of the South African Institute of Race
Relations. This process reflected a playing out of processes at a global level - as
the neo-liberalist counter-revolution began to spread outwards from the core
into the semi-periphery, 'increasingly liberalism came to be identified with
individual rights and the ideology of the free market', a tendency encouraged by
corporate interests.P? Indeed, the Democratic Party underwent a progressively
rightward shift and 'became infused with Thatcherite ideas'.128
123 Ben Molapo, 1991, p. 14.
124 William Robinson, 1996, p. 43.
125David Pallister, Sarah Stewart and Ian Lepper South Africa Inc. - The Oppenheimer
Empire London: Corgi Books, 1988, p. 89.
126 Though of course Alex Boraine was a former labour consultant to Anglo-American,
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Oppenheimer.
127Allister Sparks 'DP Chose Wrong Option, Paid Bitter Price', The Star (Johannesburg),
June IS, 1994.
128 Ibid.
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This process was mirrored in IDASA's own history as the organisation
grew from a liberal body facilitating constructive dialogue between opposing
poles within South Africa (and without, as in the 1987 Dakar meeting between
the ANC and Afrikaner intellectuals) to that of an institution increasingly
pushing essentially a neo-liberalist agenda. For sure, the organisation was
funded by a large coterie of agents that can be viewed as part of a wider
episternic community, in the terms already discussed. By 1998 IDASA was
receiving funds from and collaborating with in the form of conferences and
seminars (among other activities): the American embassy; BP South Africa; the
European Union; the Ford Foundation; the Johannesburg Chamber of
Industries; Kelloggs; the Rockefeller Foundation; Shell South Africa; Unilever;
Lonhro Management; SA Breweries; the Standard Bank Foundation; and the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID).129
By funding IDASA,such elements were following the suggestion of Robert
Charlick, a 'Senior Governance Expert' of the World Bank, that aid agencies
should strengthen 'the advocacy and analytic capabilities of non-govemmental
organisations ...associated with production'iP? Certainly, USAID's own
'description of services' for its interventions in Africa includes technical and
advisory services in areas such as 'macro-economic, fiscal, and monetary
policy...public-sector-private-sector roles; and intemational trade and
finance'.131USAID itself had been extremely active in the former socialist states
'educat[ing] the public about the issues that will shape their well-being, such as
how market-driven economies and democratic govemance function effectively
and efficiently to everyone's benefit' (according to USAID's representative in
Hungary). This was important, the representative went on because 'the average
citizen of the [former socialist] region still believes many myths about the old
system' [emphasis addedj.r-v
IDASA'smost prominent member - Frederick van Zyl Slabbert - had long
been an advocate of "elite consensus" and the desirability of "closed door"
negotiations to solve South Africa's problems. Such tactics explicitly aimed to
129 IDASA Funders http://www.idasa.org.za/funders.htm
130Robert Charlick 'The Concept of Governance and its Implications for AID's
Development Assistance Program in Africa', prepared for the AIDAfrica Research Bureau
under the Africa Bureau Democracy and Governance Program Washington DC:
Associates in Rural Development Inc., 1992., p. 16.
131USAIDmagazine Governance in Africa, vol. 4, no. 1, Spring, 1995.
132'Ideas into Action: Think Tanks and Democracy', keynote address to USAID
conference in Budapest, May 1996 by Thomas Cornell, USAID's representative in
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avoid involving the wider population, who may have questioned Slabbert's and
those he was working with's desire to head off any threats to the ongoing
economic dispensation within the country. Whilst an alternative viewpoint could
posture the view that Slabbert et al. contributed, via their push for elite
compact, to lessening conflict and avoiding an ethnic civil war, such tactics
nonetheless do correspond to the Gramscian notion of the "passive revolution"
and supports .Jean-Francois Bayart's thesis that African states are prone to
such processes.133 This is when in times of crisis the national bourgeoisie are
too weak to (re-)establish hegemony in the sense of an ideological compact
between itself and the popular masses. An "organic crisis" then ensues. The
process of re-organisation is then framed as a "revolution" without a
"revolution", a process of change presided over and directed by established elites
in alliance with aspiring elites but not the masses. Such 'modifications
are ...introduced into the country's economic structure ...to develop the
productive forces under the direction of the traditional ruling classes'<> As
Simon asserts (and this can be applied to the South African transition), 'social
reforms which have been demanded by the opposing forces may be carried out,
but in such a way as to disorganise these forces and damp down any popular
struggles'.135A central feature of this is what Gramsci called transformiso (the
main aim of the "change industry"), whereby 'the actual or potential leaders of
potential group or subordinate classes are incorporated into elite networks, a
practice that can be regarded as a political tool to prevent the formation of
counter-hegemony'.136
As a prominent advocate of polyarchy within South Africa, Slabbert
confirms Robinson's thesis regarding the inextricable linkages between liberal
democracy and neo-liberal economics - one report characterised him as 'above
all the political creature of Big Business. He was helped into politics by Big
Business, sustained in it, supported and sponsored by Big Business+ 'ê"
Slabbert's later incarnation as regional facilitator of George Soros' Open Society
Hungary, http://www.cipe.org/e21/corE21.html
133.Jean-Francois Bayart The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly London: Longman,
1993.
134Antonio Gramsci, 1971, pp. 119-120.
135Roger Simon, 1982, p. 26.
136Rita Abrahamsen The Victory of Popular Forces or Passive Revolution? A Neo-
Gramscian Perspective on Democratisation', Journal of Modem African Studies, vol. 35,
no. 1, March 1997, p. 149.
137Ken Owen cited in Anthony Sampson Black and Gold: Tycoons, Revolutionaries and
Apartheid London: Coronet, 1987, p. 301.
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Foundation and his chairmanship of Adcorp Holdings (market capitalisation of
560 million rand) tends to support this assessment.tê" Slabbert himself later
admitted that 'the "victory" of liberal democracy and capitalism ...was essentially
an ideological victory about the "best" way to be democratic and bring about
economic development'.139 Defending capitalism whilst pushing polyarchy is an
integrated tactic of those favourable to the ongoing hegemonic order and as
Robinson asserts, 'promoting polyarchy and promoting neo-liberal restructuring
[is] a singular process'.140
IDASA was one of the organisations favoured by funding from the
National Endowment for Democracy (NED), an American government-funded
institute which was active in shaping the political and economic debate and in
diverting popular struggles in countries as diverse as Haiti, Nicaragua and the
Philippines. This organisation 'has financed advised and supported in many
ways political parties, election campaigns, union, student groups, book
publishers, newspapers, other media ...and in general organisations and
individuals which are pro-capitalist and anti-socialist'ir+i Its intervention in
South Africa in supporting, among others, IDASAwas a part of American foreign
policy and was 'an integral part of the US government's attempts to
propagandise the benefits of "free enterprise'L'<' Its objectives in South Africa
can be summarised, as Robinson suggests, into promoting three main aims:
l. to identify and support an emergent Black bourgeoisie who could be
incorporated into a post-apartheid hegemonic bloc;
H. to develop a national network of "moderate" Black community leaders
who could compete with "radicals";
lll. to cultivate a Black bourgeoisie among small and mid-level enterprises
that would identify themselves as having a stake in a stable capitalist
dispensation, develop their economic power, and crucially, view the White
transnationalised fraction of South African capital as class allies and
leadera.r+s
Slabbert's initiative in establishing Khula - a pioneering Black empowerment
138 'Slabbert Gets Down to Some Real Business', Business TImes, (Johannesburg) August
11, 1998.
139 Heribert Adam, Frederik van Zyl Slabbert and Kogila Moodley, 1997, p. 188.
140 William Robinson, 1996, p. 55.
141 From William Blum The National Endowment for Democracy',
http:j jmembers.aol.comj bblum6 jned.htm
142 Dale McKinley, 1997, p. 92.
143 William Robinson, 1996, p. 331.
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company IS a vivid example of this process. The company was set up in
partnership with leading elements within the aspiring Black bourgeoisie with
links to the liberation movement. For example Mzi Khumalo, a former political
prisoner who spent thirteen years on Robben Island, was a leading partner.
Khumalo typified the Africanist pro-capitalist wing of the ANC, confessing that
'everyone else on [Robben] Island wanted to be a politician. I wanted to be a
stinking rich bu sinessrnan'i t+' The greatest desire of the fraction that Khumalo
represents is indeed to become part of a re-constructed hegemonic bloc -
Slabbert's initiative served to provide this and give direction and example to
others following in Khula's wake.
Retuming to the NED, recipients of its largesse were almost all moderate
and conservative groups in contention with the ANC and UDF. For example,
funds were disbursed to Inkatha-linked fronts or the reactionary South African
Black Taxi Association. At the same time, NED provided funding to IDASA in
return for it to fulfil its role as an ensemble of organic intellectuals promoting
the hegemonic discourse. In tandem with a wide variety of other funding
agencies IDASAfulfilled this role in a variety of ways - holding a wide variety of
conferences on themes such as the promotion of liberal democracy and
"realistic" economic policies (e.g. in Constance, Germany in 1991), and
establishing a "training centre for democracy" in Johannesburg in 1992.145
According to Kotzé and Greyling, 'IDASA focused less on the main actors in
politics, such as the government, than on support groups and opinion-makers,
in order to force them towards a more democratic approach'. This was because
Slabbert and Boraine viewed the popular aspirations of the majority as having 'a
total misconception about the content and character of the notion of
"democracy"'.146The role of IDASAthen was to "educate" and socialise important
elements of society into an understanding of polyarchy, and at the same time
help construct the economic "limits of the possible".
One can see this graphically for example in the conference that was held
ill 1993 in partnership with the Aspen Institute. According to reports, 'the
conference's common thread was that SA's best objective would be growth and
144 Siyayaf, issue 2, Winter 1998, p. 34.
145 Alex Boraine 'A Democratic Alternative: A Brief History of IDASA' in Ian Liebenberg,
Fiona Lortan, Bobby Nel and Gert van der Westhuizen (eds.) The Long March: The Story of
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employment creation through international trade', that a post-apartheid Pretoria
must 'show SA to be an attractive base for multi-nationals', and that 'instant
gratification is neither possible nor wiseU+?The headquarters of the Aspen
Institute of course was where George Bush delivered his "New World Order"
speech in 1990 and the organisation lists among its 'Great Moments' the
occasion when it awarded Bush a Distinguished Leadership Award and
Margaret Thatcher a Statesman Award.r+ë The Institute itself claims to 'enhance
the quality of leadership through informed dialogue about the timeless ideas
and values of the world's great cultures'i>? and 'aims to define issues', 'propose
agendas' and 'develop policy option s'v'>? As pointed out in the discussion on
common sense, defining issues and dressing them up as "normal" - 'timeless
ideas' - IS an integral part of the construction of hegemony and the
emasculation of alternative viewpoints. The Aspen's ideological agenda was
graphically exposed during its 1997 conference on the world economy, where it
'focused on how to more effectively manage the process of closer economic and
financial integration on a national, regional and global scale' and 'the tasks
necessary for establishing the sound policy regimes on which the global
economy must be based'.151 In short, the Aspen Institute is one of many
socialising agents of the transnational neo-liberal hegemonic project. Working in
tandem with IDASA, the Institute was one such international interventionist
that helped to promote the ongoing order to the emerging elite during the
transition period in South Africa.
This process was to continue post-1994, only now advocacy for social
change (within a particular order) was largely abandoned, confirming James
Petras' observation that 'economic development compatible with the "free
market" rather than social organisation for social change becomes the dominant
item on the funding agenda' once the immediate crisis is over.I-? Indeed, this
strategy can be identified as continuing to construct constituencies and exert
influence within civil society on a long-term basis as part of a project to build up
a hegemonic social order in South Africa. Only by doing so will the historic bloc
147 Business Day (Johannesburg) May 3, 1993.
148'Great Moments at the Aspen Institute', www.aspeninst.org/dir/general/timeline.html
1491'heAspen Institute's Mission Statement', www.aspeninst.org/dir/general/mission.html
150'Aspen Institute's Policy Programmes', www.aspeninst.org/dir/polrpo/index.polpro.html
151 The Aspen Institute: Change and Prosperity: The World Economy',
www.aspeninst.org/dir/polpro/PWEjPWEl.html
152James Petras 'A Marxist Critique of Post-Marxists', Links: International Journal of
Socialist Renewal, no. 9, November 1997-Febraury 1998, p. 47.
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that is currently in formation be consolidated. Thus the dissemination of
ideology in favour of the neo-liberal project has continued unabated in the post-
apartheid era. Indeed, in this period IDASAhas continued to propagate the idea
that keeping the people away from the real levers of power i.e. the economy, is a
"good thing". The opening issue of its glossy magazine Sibaya! (which solicits
corporate advertising whilst claming to be non-partisanl.t= demanded that
'power over the economy [be invested] in non-elected bodies' in order to 'insulate
total public spending and deficit levels from public pressure' and that, following
the classically Gramscian notion regarding the emasculation of altemative
voices, the government should consider 'bringing potential critics and
opponents on board [as this] could lower the probability of policy reversal'.1S4At
this point, Pretoria was firmly committed to neo-liberalism: IDASA's advice on
this is quite explicit and reveals the role the organisation plays and played as an
organic intellectual grouping. The call for a detachment of economic policy-
making from democratic input indeed closely shadows a line of thinking within
the hegemonic discourse - a point highlighted by Jac Laubscher, group
economist at Gensec Asset Management, when he claimed that South Africa was
'too democratic for the economy's good'. ISSThe fact that IDASA'schief executive
- Wilmot James - is a trustee of the Ford Foundation and a non-executive
director of the National Business Initiative may hence come as no surprise.r=
Previously, Slabbert had frequently intervened in the transition period to
define the "limits of the possible" and promote what he termed "the consensus".
For example, in his book The Quest for Democracy: South African in Transition,
Slabbert pushed the ongoing project's political agenda by claiming that a
hegemonic consensus existed at the elite level around two principles namely
"contingent consent" and "bounded uncertainty" i.e. liberal democracy and
constitutionality. The purpose of his book was to establish the "rules of the
game" and then assert that negotiations must be left to the elites of the National
Party and the ANC and its partners. The reasoning behind such an agenda
however was exposed by Slabbert himself when he suggested that 'one of the
153 In classic positivist and polyarchical thinking, Wilmot James (IDASA'schief executive)
says that 'the publication expects to attract corporate advertising [but] is unlikely to
carry party political advertising as it intends to retain a high degree of editorial
independence', quoted in Business Day (Johannesburg) February 18, 1997.
154 Stephen Gelb and Lael Bethlehem 'Macro-Economics for the Masses', Siyaya!, no. 1,
Autumn, 1998, pp. 16and 17.
ISS Cape Times (Cape Town), October 30, 1998.
lS6 The Star (Johannesburg) September 26, 1996.
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most daunting challenges facing [a future interim government] is to protect the
new political space created by negotiations from being used to contest the
historical imbalances that precipitated negotiations in the first placeU>?Now, if
what 'precipitated negotiations' were the social, economic and political
'historical imbalances' that apartheid exacerbated/created, Slabbert is clearly
advocating the defence and isolation of the 'new political space' (occupied by
both the old and new elite) from the influence of the masses. In short, Slabbert
was pushing an extremely elitist agenda that aimed to secure and defend the
hegemonic norms of polyarchy and neo-liberalism.
Thus 'the establishment - with their arms, and their economists - ensures
status quo policies with a little redistribution here and there, but no attack
upon the fundamental contradictions and constraints in the society'.lS8 Such
activity, and Slabbert was but one of hundreds of "change gurus" operating
around the time of the transition, helped stifle ideological debate and steer the
ANCelites into accepting and advancing the particular norms of democracy that
polyarchy promotes. As a result, 'the transition in the 1990s ...witnessed a
fundamental revision in the ANC's conception of democracy' and 'its earlier
commitment to economic egalitarianism receded in the face of pressure from
international and domestic business interests'.lS9 It is to this ideological shift,
'the quietest and most profound revolution of our time',160 and that is
fundamental to our understanding of post-apartheid foreign policy, that this
study now turns to in the next chapter.
157 Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert The Quest for Democracy: South Africa in Transition
London: Penguin, 1992, p. 90.
IS8 Fantu Cheru 'Debt, Development and Democracy - The IMFjWorld Bank in Africa',
Work in Progress, no. 82, June 1992, p. 33.
IS9 Adam Habib, Devan Pillay and Ashwin Desai 'South Africa and the Global: The
Structural Conditioning of a Transition to Democracy', Journal of Contemporary African
Studies, vol. 16, no. 1, January 1998, p. 104.
160 Sunday Independent (Johannesburg), February 2, 1997.
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CHAPTER 3
FROM REDISTRIBUTION TO HEGEMONIC NORMS:
CONSTRAINTS AND CONTRADICTIONS
At the time of the ANC's un-banning in February 1990, the organisation had no
clearly formulated political and economic policies.rv! This was as a consequence
of the fact that 'the ANCin exile never articulated a clear program for economic
change',162 though as a 'movement whose raison d'être before 1990 was
liberation from apartheid, it was perhaps not surprising that formulating [an]
economic strategy was not a prioritytv- Instead, the organisation had relied on
an emotional - almost mystical - attachment to the principles of the 1955
Freedom Charter with its vague but suggestively redistributionist slogans such
as:
The People shall share in the country's wealth!
The national wealth of our country, the heritage of all South Africans
shall be restored to the people;
The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and monopoly industry
shall he transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole;
All other industries and trade shall be controlled to assist the well-being
of the people;
All people shall have equal rights to trade where they choose, to
manufacture and to enter all trades, crafts and professions.
The land shall be shared among those who work it!164
The Charter committed the ANCto what it later (at the Morogoro Conference in
1969) referred to as "national democracy". This was essentially conceptualised
as competitive elections, profound economic restructuring and large-scale
improvements in the situation and the standard of living for South Africa's
working class. The post-apartheid "national democracy" as viewed by large
segments of the national liberation movement was seen as social-democratic
democracy combined with economic egalitarianism. For most of the struggle
period, it was the Freedom Charter that enquirers were referred to when the
question of how a post-apartheid economy was to be structured was asked.
Hence on paper and for many (most?) of the ANC's grassroots membership the
161Fatima Meer, 1987, p. 398.
162Patti Waldmeir, 1997, p. 253.
163Alan Ward 'Changes in the Political Economy of the New South Africa', in Francis
Toase and Edmund Yorke (eds.), 1998, p. 38.
164Cited in The Freedom Charter', Third World Quarterly, vol. 9, no. 2, April 1987, p.
673.
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organisation was apparently committed to a mixture of state intervention and a
socialist (or at least social-democratic) reform of the underpinnings of the
economy via nationalisation. As suggested above, this socialist orientation was
spurred on by the ANC's close linkages with the SACP.
Yet the exact manner by which the ANCwas to pursue this and exactly
what economic policies an ANC government would implement was never
formally enunciated. Instead a 'pleasant abstraction from class antagonisms
[and al sentimental equalisation of contradictory class interests' was
postured.t= The reasons behind this lay in the diverse membership profile of
the movement. Essentially:
Its purposefully vague anti-capitalist rhetoric gave the ANC leadership
considerable ideological leeway successfully to stitch together a loosely
defined coalition of interest groups that included workers an aspirant
entrepreneurs, Christians and communists, and the unemployed and
middle class, around a shared objective of dismantling apartheid.v=
This situation was to lead to considerable difficulty for any coherent socialist-
oriented redistributive project, for its un-banning 'presented the ANCwith a new
national terrain which demanded new strategies and tactical adjustments' but
this was to lead to 'a great deal of confusion' vis-a-vis economic policies.tv? This
in itself sprang from the gap between the ANCas a liberation movement and the
ANCas a government-in-waiting.
The first concerted effort to resolve this gap in ANC policy was found in
the prescriptions of the Harare Conference in April-May 1990, which followed
the uri-banning of the liberation organisations. This document, the product of a
joint ANC/COSATU workshop, reserved for the state a 'leading role in the
reconstruction of the economy lil order to facilitate the realisation
of...developmental objectives. This necessitates some form of overall macro-
economic planning and co-ordination'.168 Indeed, in a post-apartheid state
dirigiste impulses would be manifested by an extension of public ownership, the
restriction on the exportation of capital, the closer regulation of the mining
conglomerates, and an emphasis on domestic savings as the main source of
investment.
165KarlMarx's comments on the slogans of the revolutionaries in France in 1848 - 'The
Class Struggle in France (1848-50)' in A Handbook of Marxism London:VictorGollancz,
1935, p. 107.
166MartinMurray, 1994, p. 18.
167 New Nation (Johannesburg), June 18-24, 1993.
168African National Congress 'Recommendationson Post-Apartheid Economic Policy',
Transformation, 1990, p. 12.
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Such a seemingly strongly pro-state position was followed by a draft ANC
Economic Manifesto (prepared for but not adopted by the 1991 National
Conference), and the ANC's Ready to Govern document of May 1992. According
to Hein Marais, the Harare document 'in its main themes (and several other
respects) ...echoed policy work done by COSATU's Economic Trends group
which, until then, had been responsible for the most substantial efforts to
develop a coherent yet progressive economic strategy'.169 At the core of the
Discussion Document was a basic commitment to the restructuring of the
economy. However, just as previous ANC statements on economics were vague
and imprecise, so too was the Document and different readings could deduct
'anything from extensive state intervention to conventional market-driven
structural adjustmenri"? The document gave a deliberately active part to state
bodies in the planning of future industrial strategy and also emphasised the
necessity to restructure the financial sector.!"! Such a programme 'would
include funnelling foreign investment into targeted areas of the economy [and]
basic needs would not be met through "inflationary financing" but by
marshalling domestic savings and raising corporate tax rates'.172 In a seemingly
direct challenge to big capital, the document also argued for the unbundling of
the massive corporations that dominated (and effectively controlled) the South
Africa economy whilst capital's familiar demands for low labour costs were
rejected. At the same time, and further challenging capital the hegemonic
common sense of neo-liberalism, a pivotal role for labour was envisioned in the
originating and execution of industrial policy.!">
Essentially rejecting the "trickle-down" underpinnings of neo-liberalism,
the document's basic message centred around "growth through redistribution",
'in which redistribution acted as a spur to growth and in which the fruits of
growth are redistributed to satisfy basic needs'<> The premise behind this
position was that growth would be promoted first by meeting 'the basic needs of
the majority through a redistribution of income, which would increase
!69 Hein Marais South Africa: Limits to Change - The Political Economy of Transformation
London: Zed Press, 1998, p. 148.
170Nicoli Nattrass, 'Politics and Economics in ANC Economic Policy, African Affairs, vol.
93, no: 372, July 1994, p. 6
!7! ANC Department of Economic Policy, 1990, 'Discussion Document on Economic
Policy' Johannesburg: ANC, 1990.
172Hein Marais, 1998, p. 148.
173 Ibid.
174ANCDepartment of Economic Policy, 1990.
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employment, demand and production'.175 That such an economic programme,
essentially antithetical to neo-liberalism, could be promoted by the ANC
reflected, 'the influence of the Left (mainly SACP and COSATU-aligned)within
the ANCat the time'.176Furthermore, the document came out very early on in
the transition process and before the ideological onslaught from the neo-
liberalist episternic community was to work its effect on the decision-making
elites within the ANC. This breathing space for ideas outside of the ongoing
common sense was not to last for long, as will be seen below.
Indeed, the prescriptions of the document and in particular its "growth
through redistribution" agenda were immediately attacked by a disparate array
of pro-business elements in the media and "independent" policy think-tanks as
well as by various conservative economists. These attacks 'ranged from
consternation about the "socialist" undertones of the document to a more
sophisticated set of objections to its alleged overtones of macro-economic
populism'i!"? For sure, the more sophisticated critics grounded their analysis on
the supposed negative effects the prescriptions would have on foreign
investment whilst at the same time arguing that the deficit that would be
spurred by such policies would have an inflationary impact.Fë Such an effect
would be very much out of step with the normative programme of neo-
liberalism. Essentially, the thesis put forward by those opposed to the growth
through redistribution approach was that an increase in state expenditure
aimed at redistribution would 'overheat the economy [and] bog it down in a
morass of foreign exchange shortages, currency devaluations, rampant inflation,
severe indebtedness and cuts in real wagea'i!"? At the same time, the pro-
business media ran a string of hysterical articles Waffling about the
"foolishness" of redistributing some wealth from the massively privileged to the
chronically disadvantaged via such policies. For example, the Financial Mail
warned that:
There will be a massive loss of jobs, shops will empty of goods, housing
will fall into ruin, disease and misery will predominate - Comrade Nelson,
like Comrade Nyerere of Tanzania will say: 'Sorry, we made a mistake.
175Matthew Kentridge Turning the Tanker: The Economic Debate in South Africa
Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies, 1993, p. 6.
176 Hein Marais, 1998, p. 148.
177 Ibid.
178 For a collection of influential conservative analyses of the South African economy, see
Merle Lipton and Charles Simkins (eds.) State and Market in Post-Apartheid South Africa
Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1993
179 Hein Marais, 1998, p. 49.
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We've redistributed all we have'.180
Such criticism however was not based on any insightful analysis of what
"growth through redistribution" could mean and instead, in closely following
Gramscian understanding of how common sense is promoted, simply rubbished
alternatives. At the same time, a remarkable project to convince the ANC elite
and the public of the foolishness of such a non-neo-liberal approach to the
economy was embarked upon. As one pro-business paper put it, 'the ANC is
muddled and confused. It needs to be guided and educated - taught to face
harsh economic reality and the need to modify the expectations of its cadres'.181
This process of "education" will be drawn out below, but the mass of anti-
interventionist thought caught the ANC off-guard, precipitating a 'back-
pedalling on its commitment to some form of socialism' from then on.182As early
as 1991 Mandela was anxiously placating Washington that the ANChad ditched
any "radical" notions regarding nationalisation, asserting that 'nationalisation is
like the sword of Damocles hanging over those who want to invest. So long as
nationalisation is our policy, we will not attract investors'.183
Thabo Mbeki was pushing the same accomodatory line, stressing that 'on
face value the positions the NP is elaborating now are not very different really
from the position the movement has been advancing'.184 Certainly, the ANC's
May 1992 policy guidelines made no allusion to the "growth through
redistribution" formula, and 'over the next two years, the party's economic
thinking would increasingly bear the imprints of neo-liberal thinking, as the
need for macro-economic stability became interpreted as demanding fiscal and
monetary stringency and calls for deregulation, privatisation and export-led
growth gained favour among ANCleaders and their economic advisors vw>
Why this occurred sprang from a variety of factors militating against a
viable non-neo-liberal approach. As suggested, the collapse of the Soviet
economies threw socialist intellectuals into a state of disorganisation and
strengthened the hand of those who argued Fukuyama-style that there was "no
alternative" to Western capitalism. As also suggested, the lack of a coherent
180 Financial Mail October 18, 1991.
181Financial Mail cited in Patrick Bond Commanding Weights and Community Control:
New Economics for a New South Africa Johannesburg: RavanPress, 1991, p. 60.
182 Thomas KoelbieThe Global Economy and Democracy in South Africa NewBrunswick,
NewJersey: Rutgers UniversityPress, 1999, p. 104.
183 Financial Times (London)November1991.
184 Interviewwith Thabo Mbekiin 'NotYet Out of the Woods',Mayibuye: Journal of the
ANC March 1991, p. 12.
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macro-economic policy by the ANC (due to historic reasons) as the organisation
went into the transition process, and the susceptibility that this opened up to
the nee-liberalist-inclined episternic community, also had an important effect.
As one analyst remarked:
How big is the ANC Economics Department? Very, very small and very
new in a lot of ways. And yet you've got the captains of industry, with
their think tanks that have got a whole lot of policy studies coming out.
That can be quite seductive.të"
Indeed, the ANC's Economics Department has subsequently been critiqued as
'understaffed, poorly organised, and its leadership appeared to have made little
or no effort to mobilise the sources of relevant experience available at some of
the universities'.187 This situation was not helped by the delay in transferring
the DEP from Lusaka to South Africa after the ANC was uri-banned in February
1990 - a scenario 'that meant that there was a disjuncture between the political
structures and the research departments'.188
At the same time a "charm offensive" was launched on the ANC's elites by
big capital and its class allies, particularly in the business press and various
think-tanks, to "correct" any remaining heresy in the movement's economic
policies. This created a scenario whereby 'the business sector [came] to playa
part in national affairs that is surely without parallel in the world'.189 As one
analysis observed, 'the close-knit circle of associates together with their coterie
of supporters in the media and academia now pride themselves on having
"weaned off' the ANC of its past economic fantasies [and] thwarted
experiments'.190 This process was aimed particularly at Mandela and Mbeki, key
figures in shifting the ANC's policies, and was tactically the construction of
hegemony at both the coercive and consensual levels. Coercively, essentially
scare tactics over the economy were the order of the day. For example, the then
Finance Minster Derek Keys:
[G]ave ANC economics head Trevor Manuel a briefing on the economy,
and Manuel repeated it to Mandela. "And I got frightened", Mandela
recalls. "Before Trevor finished, I said to him, 'Now what does this mean
185Hein Marais, 1998, pp. 149-150.
186Karl von Holdt quoted in 'Strategy and Tactics: Karl von Holdt and Devan Pillay' in
Alex Callinocos, 1992, p. 57.
187 Vishnu Padayachee 'Progressive Academic Economists and the Challenge of
Development in South Africa's Decade of Liberation', Review of African Political Economy,
no. 77, 1998, p. 433.
188 Moses Ngoasheng 'Policy Research Inside the African National Congress',
Transformation, 18, 1992, p. 116.
189 Financial Mail, April 29, 1994.
190Heribert Adam, Frederik van Zyl Slabbert and Kogila Moodley, 1997, p. 171.
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as far as negotiations are concemed? Because it appears to me that if we
allow the situation to continue ...the economy is going to be destroyed'.191
The ANC's Mac Maharaj concurred, describing Keys' lecture as 'truly
devastating'i w? At the same time, the pro-business media ran numerous articles
along the line that 'a mixed economy [would] place the country's economic
interests in much the same sort of jeopardy that apartheid hard] done'.193These
factors convinced many within the ANCleadership that there was no alternative
to the common sense of neo-liberalist policies and that globalisation had
constrained their manoeuvrability. As a result, 'the ANC leaders [were] prepared
to ditch old ideas and embrace new ones in the interests of what they
consider[ed] to be their own power U?+
Such constraints were real, particularly because the National Party
government had increased the country's budget deficit from 0.9 per cent of GDP
in 1989-90 to 10.8 per cent in 1993-94 through a 'reckless spending spree' that
had its roots in the emergencies of the 1980s.195During this period, massive
amounts were expended on defence and other security measures, whilst
corruption became endemic.rw Combined with a profligate policy towards the
end of the National Party tenure to pump extra fmances into civil servant
pension funds, the stock of govemment debt rose roughly from R 100 billion to
R 250 billion. 197
It should be borne in mind that this increase in debt of R 150 billion
could have covered expenditure for essential services in South Africa for nearly
twenty years.198 Criminally, in its last year of power alone, the National Party
govemment increased the national debt by R 60 billion.rs? By doing so, the
regime circumscribed any future ANC govemment's room for manoeuvre, as
further spending in order to redistribute wealth for example, would lead to
inflation and massive debt. This allowed Finance Minister Chris Liebenberg to
argue that the debt 'crowd[ed] out other expenditure items and increas[ed] the
191Patti Waldmeir, 1997, p. 213.
192 Quoted in Dan O'Meara, 1996, p. 412.p. 412.
193 Financial Mail, October 11, 1991.
194 Sunday Independent (Johannesburg) June 6, 1999.
195Interview with Sampie Terreblanche, Professor of Economics, Department of
Economics,University of Stellenbosch, Stellenbosch,July 15, 1999.
196 Ibid.
197 Anglo-American's Gavan Duffy, quoted in 'On Macro-economic Policy',
http://aidc.org.za/ themba/ on_macro_eco_pol.html
198 An estimated R 90 billion was reported necessary to provide essential services over
the next ten years - Business Day (Johannesburg) September 15, 1998.
199 Sunday Times (Johannesburg), May 15, 1994.
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lack of fiscal manoeuvring'.200 Certainly, the ANC concurred with this VIew,
asserting later that 'the spendthrift National party government left us a
structural legacy of debt', having 'ran its finances like there was no tomorrow' in
the last few years of its rule.201It was a clever move by strategists in Pretoria
and further helped the promotion of the ongoing hegemonic discourse.
The consensual aspects of the construction of hegemony vis-a-vis the
ANC leadership was also helped by Mandela's seeming eagerness to mix with
the privileged elite - 'he seemed more at ease with bankers than trade
unionists'.202 This was a reflection perhaps of the petit bourgeois aspirations
that many ANCleaders had long held to. As one analysis puts it:
[Mandela] constantly sought the views of international businessmen and
bankers on South Africa's future. And he cultivated close relationships
with top local businessmen - he spent holidays with the head of one of
the country's leading mining families [and] entertained at the home of one
of Johannesburg's most ostentatious businessmen ...where guests were
met in the driveway with champagne on silver salvers. [He also] dined
regularly with Anglo patriarch Harry Oppenheimer.203
In short, 'the leadership core of the ANCwere wined and dined from morning to
night by the captains of industry'P>' This had results, as a satisfied
Oppenheimer asserted regarding this period: 'when you talked about the future
of the country, particularly on the economic side [to Mandela] he said a great
many things that seemed to me very silly, but he says many of them less
now'.205 This personal one-to-one attention on the ANC leadership was
combined with a plethora of corporate scenario planning exercises released and
aggressively promoted after 1990.206These scenario exercises were derived from
a technique originally pioneered by Pierre Wack and Edward Newland at Shell
International in the early 1970s. As one report asserts, 'it was through Wack
and Newland that Anglo American was exposed to the process of scenario
planning in the early 1980s [and] when Sunter's exercise was launched, they
200 Quoted in 1996 Budget Speech Cape Town: Legi-Link, 1996, p. 22.
201 Finance Minister Trevor Manuel on Face the Nation television programme, SABC 3,
8.30 p.m., May 2, 1999.
202 Anthony Sampson, 1999, p. 434.
203 Patti Waldmeir, 1997, p.256.
204 Interview with Sampie Terreblanche, Professor of Economics, Department of
Economics, University of Stellenbosch, Stellenbosch, July 15, 1999.
205Patti Waldmeir, 1997, p. 256.
206 See Patrick Bond 'The Making of South Africa's Macro-economic Compromise:
Scenario Planning and the Narrowing of Development Strategies' in Ernest Maganya and
R. Houghton (eds.) Transformation in South Africa? Policy Debates in the 1990s
Johannesburg: Institute for African Alternatives, 1996a.
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were both involveci'<?? The objective of shaping common sense by these
scenarios was quite explicit, the aim being to 'significantly alter the mind-sets or
paradigms through which decision makers see the world'.208
The first was Nedcor / Old Mutual's Prospects for a Successful Transition,
launched in 1990. Between January 1991 and June 1992, over 45,000 hand-
picked South Africans, invariably from the decision-making levels of society and
the ANC attended the presentation of the Prospects.ë» This was quickly followed
by the insurance conglomerate Sanlarn's Platform for Investment scenario and
the social-democratic Mont Fleur Scenarios. At the same time, other documents
such as the South African Chamber of Business' Economic Options for South
Africa were brandished about as offering "realistic" scenarios. The process by
which these scenario exercises were introduced to the public was conducted so
as to maximise publicity and impact, as one analysis pointed out:
Beginning in late 1990 successive generations of scenario plans have
typically been brought to the public's attention first by excited rumours of
the planners' arduous, behind-dose-doors bull sessions; then by selected
leakage to the business press (often by hushed reference to the
confidential, highly sensitive nature of the process); next by reference to
the impressive and diverse collection of new South African elites who
enthusiastically received early viewings of the scenario results; then
through more presentations to sundry audiences in the corporate
network; and finally through the ubiquitous video package and in
print.v'v
Perhaps the most high-profile of these at this juncture in the transition was the
"Mont Fleur Scenario" of August 1992, a scenario that claimed to have input
from a wide variety of opinions and was supposedly "social-democratic".
Funded by the Frederich Ebert Stiftung and the Swiss Development
Agency, with a facilitator from Shell International, the Mont Fleur scenario was
'in retrospect ... an important factor in the march of orthodoxy - less for its
content details than for its theme song and the range of progressive (induding
ANC) economists and union figures it drew into the exercise'<" ' Like many other
scenarios of its kind, Mont Fleur revelled in simplistic caricature - in this case
derived from ornithological sketches. In particular was its characterisation of a
'popularly elected government which tries to achieve too much too quickly' and
207 Robin Lee 'Choosing Our Future', Leadership, vol. 12, no. 3, 1993, p. 72
208 Ibid.
209 'Foreword', Nedcor-Old Mutual Scenarios South Africa: Prospects for Successful
Transition Kenwyn: Juta, 1992.
210 Patrick Bond 'Scenario Plundering', Southern African Review of Books, vol. 5, issue 26,
July / August 1993, p. 3.
211 'Foreword', Nedcor-Old Mutual Scenarios, 1992.
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in the familiar language of those pushing the orthodox line, succumbed to
'macro-economic populism'<t? Such an economic programme was termed
"Icarus" and the disastrous course of the Greek figure's own flight was mirrored
in the apocalyptical language of the Mont Fleur team with 'the country
experienc[ing] an unprecedented economic crisis, resulting in social collapse
and political chaos'.213 This characterisation appeared to have made a deep
impression of the ANC elites - as it was intended. Indeed, not long after the
Mont Fleur presentation Tito Mboweni, chief spokesman on economic affairs for
the ANC, stressed that his movement would avoid 'crowding out the private
sector and over time destroy a whole set of macro-economic balances, leading
up to sharp economic decline and collapse - a kind of Icarus now, crash later'.214
In contrast to such disaster was the "Flight of the Flamingoes" which
consciously echoed Clem Sunter's advocacy of the "High Road".2IsThis had been
the central point of an elaborate and well-funded attempt by Anglo-American to
fumish the (White) public with "acceptable" future scenarios by which they
could be reconciled to a non-racial yet capitalist post-apartheid South Africa -
'spinning the future' as it has since been called.216As one analysis pointed out,
it was 'the perception of the nature of the choice faced by South Africa itself
[that] became a significant factor in influencing opinion'. Indeed, because of 'the
free-enterprise populist ideology that underpinned his presentations, Sunter
found a receptive audience in the White community for his sceriariosv!"
Echoing Sunter's own prescriptions, the "Flight of the Flamingoes" entailed
adopting 'sound policies and observ[ing] macro-economic constraints' within a
'market-oriented economic system' whilst promoting 'business confidence'.218As
events have developed, the comment that '''Flamingo'' has subsequently
informed the economics approach of the GNU'appears remarkably accurate.ê-?
212Philip Mohr 'Flight Paths', Leadership, vol. 11, no. 5, 1992, p. 34.
213 Ibid.
214Tito Mboweni interviewed in 'Grand Plan', Leadership, vol. 11, no. 3, 1992, p. 42.
215Clem Sunter The World and South Africa in the 1990s Cape Town: Human and
Rousseau and Tafelberg, 1987. Sunter, an Anglo-American executive, was one of the first
to popularise the scenario approach to shaping the debate in South Africa with a series
of highly popular paperbacks defining the "rules of the game" and the "sensible"
solutions to South Africa's problems. Like the other scenarios, Sunter's work was given
maximum publicity - his first book saw him presenting the main points to over 30,000
people on about 250 different occasions - see profile and interview in 'The Hottest
Gospel', Leadership, vol. 6, no. 3, 1987.
216Joe Flower 'Spinning the Future', http) jwww.well.comjuserjbbearjchange12.html
217Adrian Guelke, 1999, p. 13.
218Philip Mohr, 1992, p. 35.
219James Hamill in Francis Toase and Edmund Yorke (eds.), 1998, p. 66.
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out'.222
What was particularly notable about the Mont Fleur Scenarios was the
participation of ostensibly Left academics which 'tended to boost the credibility
of the whole exercise'<>? Yet such inclusion was purposeful in promoting a
particular agenda ostensibly stemming from consensus by including ideas that
somehow fit within the limits of what may be acceptable. Such tactics had been
first practiced by the Nedcor IOld Mutual scenario which:
[A]ssembled an eminent group of economists and political thinkers
(including several from the ranks of the Democratic Movement) [combined
with] rather stereotypical views expressed by 40 bank executives ... [This]
managed to weld a few progressive positions onto an utterly orthodox
framework. .. [permitting it] to present scenario planning to groups as
diverse as the cabinet, the ANC national executive, Anglo American,
COSATU leadership and its 'Economic Trends' group, the ANC
Department of Economic Planning, and the like'.221
Such efforts continued the rightward drift of the ANC: 'a political retreat, paved
with consensus-formation in cosy seminars sponsored by business-oriented
think-tanks, of which Anglo American, Nedcor/ Old Mutual and Sanlam stand
When discussing the plethora of scenario exercises released onto the
South African public during the transition, it is helpful 'to distinguish between
their form and content'<v- for 'the process was more important than the
product'<> Indeed, 'increasingly the scenario exercises reflected the desire of
the masters and carefully hand-picked participants to come up with a deal -
rather than with good analysis'.225 With regard to the content of the scenarios,
there were some differences for sure on the policies being promoted (although
all worked within the broad remits of liberal capitalism). Yet perhaps most
importantly, there was a consistent call demanding that macro-economic policy
be 'grounded in relationships of "trust", "negotiation" and "consensus-
building"'.226 In short, 'a kind of "coerced harmony", analogous to the central
dynamic applied in the political negotiations' was crafted.ê-" That this harmony
was perhaps coerced is suggested by the very close-knit circle of facilitators who
arranged the "diverse" scenarios. Both Wack and Newland were both part of the
220Philip Mohr, 1992, p. 34.
221 Patrick Bond, 1996a, p. 20.
222 Ibid., p. 16.
223Hein Marais, 1998, p. 150.
224 Patrick Bond, 1996a, p. 29.
225Patrick Bond, 1993, p. 3
226Hein Marais, 1998, p. 150.
227Patrick Bond 'An International Perspective on the "People-driven" Character of the
RDP', African Communist, no. 144, 1996b, p. 2.
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Sunter exercise, while Wack was also a member of the NedcorjOld Mutual team
- and the present scenario planner at Shell, Adam Kahane, was the facilitator of
Mont Fleur'.228Such a limited array of organisers of the scenarios suggests a
vindication of an assertion regarding the concocted "debates" over neo-
liberalism and the way the terms of the debate are carefully - and artificially -
constructed by selected representatives:
There has been a concerted effort, an extremely well-funded ideological
effort, to make [neo-liberalism] and all that goes with it seem beneficent
and necessary. You fund people to create an ideological climate which
becomes the life support system for the doctrine ...You create the
colloquia and the symposia, open to the press that you sponsor.
And they all write [in] journals that you also fund, and from there they
get on the editorial pages and on the air. Pretty soon you have those
three-man ...pseudo debates on television between the raving radical
right, the extreme right and the right of centre [and] [a]nyone who thinks
differently ...must make apologies for his or her beliefs.ê-?
Though it is correct that most of the scenarios were cognisant of the constraints
that globalisation placed on formulating South Africa economic policy, the
activities of the scenarios were also aimed at limiting the terms of the debate
within certain normative remits and in constructing a common sense view of the
options available, dismissing alternatives (such as "growth through
redistribution") as nonsensical "economic populism" and hence dismissible as
non-serious intrusions into the economic debate.
The ideological bombardment from advocates of a neo-liberalist future
was incessant. This in turn was 'amplified by the corporate-owned media which
gleefully attacked any signs of heterodoxy and dissonance in ANC thinking',230
and a stream of interventions from various international financial institutions -
in particular the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It is to this
that this study briefly turns to next.
Interventions by the hegemonic guardians: the WorldBank and the IMF
The involvement in South Africa of the two most powerful international financial
institutions was remarkable for their extensive activity around the transition
and into the first post-apartheid government. Throughout the transition period,
'the ANC leadership came under relentless pressure from the International
Monetary Fund [and] the World Bank. ..to abandon its proposed inward
228 Robin Lee, 1993, p. 73.
229 Susan George The Debt Boomerang: How Third World Debt Harms Us All London: Pluto
Press, 1992, p. 109.
230Hein Marais, 1998, p. 150.
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investment programme in favour of a more "realistic" investment-led, export-
oriented growth strategy'<>! Though Left elements within the ANC warned about
getting too close to such agents of 'surveillance and control',232 significant 'ANC
officials were sent to Washington DC for a familiarisation course at the World
Bank and returned without some of [their] baggage of suspicion'.233
This occurred within a context where the then head of the Johannesburg
Stock Exchange had cynically remarked that the ANC 'must talk to people like
competent economists from the IMF. If they go to Washington, they'll find all of a
sudden that they'll be doing what everyone else is doing, which is privatising
and reducing the state's share of the economy'<> Of course, advice from the
World Bank and the IMF at this stage was offered - and accepted. It was not
imposed upon a pliant liberation movement but was sought out by the
leadership of the ANC. Such an understanding indicates that the World Bank
and IMF were preaching to at best the wavering, and at worst converted - even if
this conversion was not yet out in the open and space was open for alternatives
or moderated versions of the hegemonic discourse. Yet ultimately an intimate
relationship between the ANC elites and the various international financial
institutions was arrived at.
Throughout this period, a plethora of research projects funded by the IMF
and World Bank corresponded with and refined the same hegemonic project.
While the IMF delivered sharp injunctions about what was "reasonable" and
"realistic", early on in the transition process the World Bank began discussions
with the ANC and its liberation partners, creating a scenario where 'big
business, the IMF and the World Bank [were] increasingly influential in the top
ranks of the ANC leadership'.235 According to one analyst, 'even by World Bank
standards', the Bank's presence in South Africa during this period represented
'an unusually large ... effort' by the body, and it is true that the Bank enjoyed
considerable access to the ANC elites.236 Indeed, one World Bank representative
later boasted that 'this is the only country in the world where we speak to the
231 Martin Murray, 1994, p. 21.
232 Louis Pauly Who Elected the Bankers? Surveillance and Control in the World Economy
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997.
233 Patti Waldmeier, 1997, p. 255.
234 Quoted in The World Bank: Beggaring South Africa?', South African Labour Bulletin,
vol. 20, no. 6, December 1996, p. 23.
235 Karl von Holdt 'What is the Future for Labour?', Southern African Labour Bulletin, vol.
16, no. 8, November-December 1992, p. 34.
236 Economic Trends, internal memorandum, 1991 cited in Vishnu Padayachee, in
Jonathan Michie and Vishnu Padayachee (eds.), 1997, p. 30.
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opposition<" This confirms Bank officials' assertions that one of the Bank's
main tactics is to 'win access to the most senior policy-makers, thereby
permitting the Bank staff to accelerate reform and to influence its character [by
securing] a place at the policy table'.238Such aims were realised in early 1996
when two World Bank economists were employed to help draw up the neo-
liberalist GEARprogramme (see below).
Yet it must be said that linkages with the World Bank and the IMFwere
of some considerable controversy within the ANC, reflecting the dynamic
debates that the organisation was undergoing vis-a-vis political and economic
policies throughout the transition. Antagonism towards the international
institutions was perhaps strongest amongst the rank-and-file ANC, COSATU
and a disparate group of non-governmental organisations situated within civil
society, particularly as the 'question whether South Africa [could]
obtain ...financial assistance [from the IFIs] without surrendering control over
key aspects of its development strategy and economic policies' was uppermost in
the minds of many within the progressive movemente.ê-? Indeed, though World
Bank staff had 'been involved in making policy on a broad front since the 1990
uri-banning of the liberation movements', tensions about such a relationship
within the ANCand its partners had meant that it was long-standing policy not
to approach either the Bank or the IMFfor Ioans.v'?
When this policy was reversed in late 1996 under the rubric of GEAR, it
elicited strong reaction from Leftist elements within the liberation movement.
Thus whilst evidence suggest that the relationship with the 'surveillance'
institutions served to help shift the ANCrightwards on economic policy towards
neo-liberalism, this process was non-lineal and infused with controversy -
mirroring the intemal debates that such a relationship provoked and reflective
of the ongoing tensions within the liberation movement over socio-economic
policies. That being said though, the Bank's efforts to influence the ANCwere
overt, frequently working in tandem with the pro-business episternic community
and leading one briefing paper to declare that
237 Isaac Sam, Business Day (Johannesburg), 15 August 1994.
238 Elliot Berg and A. Batchelder Structural Adjustment Lending a Critical View
Washington DC: World Bank Country Policy Department, 1985.
239 Vishnu Padayachee 'Development Implications for South Africa of Using IMF and
World Bank Loans and Resources' in Pauline Baker, Alex Boraine and Warren Krafchik
(eds.) South Africa and the World Economy in the 1990s Cape Town: David Philips, 1993,
p. 185.
240 Weekly Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), October 11, 1996.
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[S]ince the late 1980s, South Africa has been awash 'with the views of
business, academics and international institutions, particularly the IMF
and the World Bank, which have sought to influence politicians in a
debate about the future of the country's economic and society.vt '
This process included an influential report that contributed to the debate over
the eventual adoption of orthodox policies by the organisation. The World
Bank's Reducing Poverty became the constituent of a profound process of
coercion and consent - pressurising and "trust-building" - with the ANC. The
Report combined elaborate probes of Pretoria's economic situation 'with
somewhat restrained neo-liberal directives that were often offset by
incorporating aspects of progressive thinking'<-? Indeed, the Bank ironically
leaned to a more progressive viewpoint than many of the South African
"captains of industry" and their scenarios did, arguing that 'South Africa's
unequal legacy cannot be reversed solely by market reforms because those
disenfranchised by apartheid will be unable to obtain the resources necessary to
exploit market opportunities'.243
Such an ostensibly moderate position, even within the remit of the
broader hegemonic project was too far for some South African elites who urged
on the orthodoxy. For example, the National Manpower Commission's chair
demanded that 'employers and unions negotiate wages in the face of the cold
winds of international competitionPv' This, despite the structural inequalities
that labour had historically faced in South Africa. Such passion for the norms of
neo-liberalism pervaded the business press, with some analysts openly
recommending the swift implementation of IMF-style structural adjustment
programmes on South Africa, appealing to over the heads of the govemment. As
an editorial in the Business Day reminded readers:
The IMF will want measures such as currency liberalisation, reducing
government spending, cutting subsidies to blue chip companies,
privati sing state assets and busting the cartels in labour and other
markets. Some will complain about a loss of sovereignty, but we would
have undertaken these reforms years ago had we not be thwarted by
vested interests ... we've been unable to make the reforms that will give
us 6% growth. Perhaps the IMFwill help.245
Such demands were realised in March 1993 when the National Party
govemment released its last ever economic programme, the Normative Economic
241Overseas DevelopmentInstitute BriefingPaper 4/94, 'EconomicPoliciesin the New
South Africa',http) jwww.oneworld.orgjodijodi_economy.html
242ElliotBergand A.Batchelder, 1985.
243 Business Day (Johannesburg),August 15, 1994.
244Sunday Times (Johannesburg), July 17, 1994.
245Editorial,Business Times (Johannesburg),August 21, 1994.
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Model (NEM).
The Normative Economic Model and the continued shift rightwards of the
ANC
As already indicated, from the late 1980s the National Party had increasingly
tilted towards the neo-liberalist project. The NEM was a culmination of this
process, with its programme for privati sing state assets, embarking on a
concerted liberalisation policy and stringent monetary discipline: changes were
predicated around and were dependent upon growth, with wage competition a
key component.246Such a posture was reflective of the influence that the neo-
liberalist hegemony had worked on the National Party, a topic already covered.
Indeed, 'the NEM bore the hallmark of a January 1992 IMF "occasional paper"
which reversed the "growth through redistribution" formula, and proceeded by
way of elimination to argue for adjustments that were in step with its standard
directives to the South v>'?
For example, the NEM echoed the IMF's prescriptions that economic
growth would be facilitated by policies such as corporate tax cuts with revenue
being recouped uia an increase in indirect taxation; low inflation; the restriction
of trade union power and a requirement that labour restrain its wage demands.
This in turn would be partnered by a cutting of the fiscal deficit; stemming the
outflow of capital and boosting the export sector (reflecting the hand of the
outward-oriented transnational classes) with supply-side economics. Such
policies were seen as stimulating growth from which the benefits would spread
through society by 'redistribut[ingJ a tiny percentage of income to the poorest
40% of South Africans'.248In short, the NEM remained 'firmly in the jargon of
the "growth school"',249was 'clearly in line with the basic interests of the
establishment',25o and was 'a trickle-down model with government providing
some support (through welfare and public works projects) to the "short-term"
victims of adjustments'.251 The fundamental philosophy behind such an
approach was summed up in the document's words that 'market-oriented
246 Kally Forrest 'Government Policy for Economic Growth: Deregulation, Weaker Unions,
Lower Wages', South African Labour Bulletin, vol. 17, no. 2, 1993, p. 13.
247Hein Marais, 1998,.p. 153.
248Hein Marais 'All Geared Up', African Communist, no. 145, Third Quarter, 1996.
249 Stef Coetzee 'Structural Adjustment or Transformation or Both?', Africa Insight, vol.
23, no. 2, 1993, p. 63.
250 Johan van Zyl and Elwil Beukes 'Human-centred Development: The Key to Social
Stability in South Africa', Africa Insight, vol. 23, no. 3, 1993, p. 122.
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econormc systems do better than centrally planned ones, and ...participants in
market systems do better when their freedom of decision is not directly
curtailed, but at most indirectly guided'.252
Whilst elements within the ANC and its partners heavily critiqued the
NEM, even some business journals at this point shied away from such
excessively neo-liberalist prescriptions and the NEM's prominence in the
economic debate declined.s= Yet, the fact that such an agenda should be
confronted indicated that the economic debate was far from over and that space
did exist for progressive elements within the ANC to operate. This of course is
not to say that the prescriptions of the NEM were wholly abandoned. Many
observers remarked on the uncanny similarity between elements of the NEM
and GEAR (much to the later approval of the National Party), 254and for sure,
the promoter of the NEM, Derek Keys was retained by the first post-apartheid
government as Finance Minister.v=
Though met with fierce reaction from its allies on the Left, the ANC elite
had from at least 1992 onwards, successively qualified any progressive
economic policies its diverse membership put forward with strong caveats
punted in the direction of big business - with the explicit aim of pacifying
domestic and international capital. Furthermore, as the negotiations process
wore on, 'consultation by the ANC [elite] with its membership and political allies
was patchy and perfunctory, and the relationship between the negotiations and
economic policy formulation virtually non-existent'.256 As the elite rapidly began
to accede to the hegemonic line, the pronouncements from the ANC even began
putting forward the need for property rights guarantees and privatisation. Such
guarantees were to be grounded in a constitutional law and followed what has
been termed the 'new constitutionalism' of neo-liberalism that 'privileged rights
251HeinMarais, 1998, p. 153.
252Ministryof Finance The Key Issues in the Normative Economic Model Pretoria: Ministry
of Finance, 1993, p. l O,
253See for instance Finance Week, June 17-23, 1993; and a later critique in Finance
Week, February 10-16,1994, pp. 11-12.
254See NP leader, Marthinus van Schalkwyk's comments in this regard - Business Day
(Johannesburg), March 3, 1998.
255Chris Stals, head of the ReserveBank under the National Party administration was
also retained by the GNU. According to one account, Stals 'preside[ed] over...secret
transfers of billions in gold and currency to finance apartheid South Africa's secret arms
and nuclear programmes - a ten-year process that has left a once rich country
desperately in debt', Sunday Independent (Johannesburg), August 1, 1999.
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of citizenship ...to corporate capital and large investor s'<s" Such a foundation for
post-apartheid South Africa had been strongly demanded by capital and was
articulated by the South African Chamber of Business' appeal for a
constitutional bill of rights, what has been referred to as 'a way of protecting the
minority's privileges rather than enlarging the freedom of the majority'<v This
view was echoed by the assertion that one of the outcomes of the transition was:
... [A] commitment on the part of the ANC to manage, and to locate its
programme of economic reconstruction within the framework of, a market
economy. This was captured in a range of clauses in the Bill of Rights
which recognised the right of individuals to own property and accumulate
capital, and to dispense with these as they please [emphasis addedj.ê>?
In short, the settlement thus established the parameters of the GNU's economic
programme and conditioned its evolution in a neo-liberal direction. Such moves
in turn marked 'a shift away from policies which [would have been] morally and
politically correct, but which [would have] cause[dJ strong adverse reaction from
powerful local and international interests<sv Indeed, the ANC's draft policy
guidelines of April 1992 made no reference to higher taxation thresholds for the
massive corporations, suggested privatising elements of the public sector whilst
at the same time ditched any call for a restructuring of the financial sector.
The strengthening of the neo-liberalist position
Though elements from the Left and COSATUin particular attempted to stem the
drift rightwards,261 by the time of the democratic elections of 1994 the macro-
economic debate had been largely won by those within and without the ANC
who favoured - to varying degrees - the hegemonic orthodoxy. It is extremely
difficult to pin-point when this actually occurred as the dynamics surrounding
the intra-ANC debate on economic policy and the rhetoric that emanated from
this was complex and often contradictory. Furthermore, the construction of
hegemony is not an event but a process and in this sense it is futile to attempt
to fix a time when the ANCsupposedly "switched" to neo-liberalism, though the
suggestion that 'the ground for the macro-economic compromise was sewn
during the 1990-93 period' is not unreasonable.262 Certainly, 'by late 1992
257 Stephen Gill 'New Constitutionalism, Democratisation and Global Political Economy',
Pacifica Review, vol. 10, no. 1, February 1998, p. 23.
258 Sammy Adelman 'Capitalising on a New Constitution', Work in Progress, no. 68,
August 1990, p. 34.
259 Adam Habib, 1998, p. 225.
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nationalisation was effectively no longer a senous option on the economic
agenda of the ANC'.263Yet the courting of the ANCelites went back to before the
organisation was un-banned, when business leaders made the pilgrimage to
Lusaka, and Mandela was sounded out in Pollsmoor prison on his various
attitudes. Thus though the overt behaviour of the "change industry" is most
discernible post-1990, this was the visible manifestation of an attempt at
influence-building that had begun a considerable time before.
In any case, pronouncements by elites within the ANC indicated fairly
early on in the transition that they had become reconciled to the broad norms of
the hegemonic discourse. For example, when Mandela spoke at the World
Economic Forum meeting in Davos, Switzerland in February 1992, his rhetoric
was remarkably soothing to the gathered at this 'transnational planning
body'.264For instance, he asserted that the ANCwas 'determined to...establish
the political and social climate which is necessary to ensure business
confidence and create the possibility for all investors to make long-term
commitments' to South Africa, whilst urging business to 'give us time' over the
question of natiorialisation.v=
By doing so, Mandela 'created a good impression among the many leading
international and business figures at the conference'.266 According to one
account, attendance at the WEF had a profound influence upon Mandela's
thinking vis-a-vis economic issues, 'with intense lobbying from the gathered
elites finally convincing him of the common sense of neo-liberalism. Apparently,
"'They changed my views altogether", recalled Mandela. "1 came home to say:
"Chaps, we have to choose. We either keep nationalisation and get no
investment, or we modify our own attitude and get investment"'.267 Hence it is
possible to assert that certainly by 1992, Mandela was acceding to the neo-
liberalist line. To wit, 'the ANC [was] probably the only liberation movement in
history to speak of financial discipline before it assume[d] power'.268That this
caused controversy within the ranks of the ANCis without doubt, indicating the
tensions that such issues provoked.
263Adam Habib and Vishnu Padayachee, 1999, p. 8.
264Kees van der Pijl, 1998, p. 132.
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Nonetheless, such a process eventually ensured that 'the "big issues" that
were for so long the touchstones of socialists in South Africa - nationalisation of
banks, mines and factories; nationalisation and redistribution of the land;
universal health care and universal, equal education - [were] effectively
abandoned'.269 Symbolically, the new ANC government retained Derek Keys (an
ex-chief executive of Gencor, one of South Africa's major mining conglomerates)
as Finance Minster. By doing so, Mandela:
Delighted investors, businessmen and White South Africans ... Nothing
else would have persuaded the outside world - not to mention sceptical
South Africans - of his commitment to free-market economies and
political moderation.ê"?
In our theoretical understanding of how the GNU continued to be socialised
towards the hegemonic norms, Keys' appointment is quite revelatory, for he
played a no small part in imparting neo-liberalism as "common sense" to the
ANC elite. As a report in the corporate mouthpiece Business Day commented
approvingly:
We can look with some hope to the evolution in economic thinking in the
ANC since the occasion nearly three years ago when Nelson Mandela
stepped out prison and promptly reaffirmed his belief in the
nationalisation of the heights of the economy. By contrast ... Mandela [has
gone] out of his way to assure a large group of foreign (and local)
journalists that the ANC was now as business-friendly as any potential
foreign investor could reasonably ask. He indicated further that ANC
economic thinking was now being influenced as much by Finance Minister
Derek Keys and by organised business as anyone else [emphasis
addedj.s"!
When Keys resigned a few months later, Mandela replaced him with another
White conservative banker, Chris Liebenberg, whose budget in 1995 was
described as 'speak[ing] volumes about the new-found conservatism of
the ... government of national unity'.272
Whilst it is true that the ANC had not entirely surrendered before the
incessant demands of capital and some progressive components broadly
remained within the ANC's economic propositions, a definite neo-liberalist slant
emanated from ANC economic policy, leading at least one commentator to
remark that:
[T]he new government 1S bending over backwards to send the right
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signals to the motley crowd of Business SA lobbyists, financiers and
financial economists, Anglo-American executives, Business Day
editorialists and low-grade public relations specialists who regularly
pronounce on the progress ANC leaders have made on embracing neo-
liberalism.v'-'
Thus the new government accepted the compulsions of financial and monetary
"discipline", defended the reorganisation of South African trade policies to foster
an export-led growth plan and envisaged a reduced role in the state - with its
consequent effect on being able to deliver on any redistributive promises the
ANC still held to. Economic regeneration was predicated around sustainable
growth via a surge (which never materialised) of foreign investment - as one
commentary put it, 'the ANC's growth plan [became] primarily one of setting the
stage for a presumed influx of international investment, with all
bets ...placed ... on such initiatives as an ever more welcoming posture towards
the Bretton Woods institutions and an ever more "flexible" labour marketP?"
This was supposed to encourage a concomitant increase in investment by
domestic capital (as opposed to indulging in an investment strike and off-shore
re-location as many subsequently did). Ironically, this in turn had been
facilitated - at the demand of capital - by the effective removal of exchange
controls in March 1995 when the dual exchange rate system was unified.
In explaining why this occurred, it is vital that reductionist explanations
are avoided. The simplistic view is that the ANC came around to the "economic
realities" of neo-liberalism and so quietly ditched their socialist pretensions in
favour of the ongoing orthodoxy. Yet such a supposition grants the ANC far
more ideological coherence than ever existed during its long years in exile, and
certainly during the transition when the organisation was in a state of flux over
a host of issues, economic policy included. Furthermore, such a position ignores
the residual body of aspiring bourgeois Africanists within the ANC who had
always felt uneasy about the organisation's socialist rhetoric during the years of
struggle. As suggested, such fractions within the ANC were boldly strengthened
by the collapse of the socialist state systems and the concomitant ideological
disorganisation that the Left suffered from as a result of this. In addition, whilst
the structural power of capital in an era of globalisation was undoubtedly robust
and was drawn into the debate by those favouring a (continued) tum towards
neo-liberalism by the South African state, such an argument rapidly collapses
273 Patrick Bond 'Economics Diary', Southern African Review of Books, issue 33,
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into structural determinism and allows no space for South African agency.
Whilst it is true that this agency was constrained by the ongoing global order,
certain choices were made by the ANCduring the transition and these need a
more nuanced and satisfactory explanation if our picture is to be complete.
One important factor in shifting ANCmacro-economic policy can be found
in the crucial change - at the behest of capital and its allies - of the terms of the
debate from the ideological, where the ANCwas largely unprepared and in a
state of confusion, to the specifically technical, where the organisation was most
certainly disadvantaged. For sure, as one analysis summarised it:
As the DEP entered the terrain of policy, it soon became clear that this
was a contested terrain. The terrain of struggle had shifted to the arena of
policy. For example, capital and the state tried to pressurise the ANCto
concentrate on technical economic issues. The ANChad to say something
about the budget, deficits, tax policy and so on. The state and big
business were determined to push the ANC into a position where it
[would] begin to concentrate on technical proposals to what [were]
essentially politico-economic problems.275
As already indicated, the ANC efforts in working out responses to such
pressures and crafting a coherent macro-economic framework, were hampered
by the lack of attention put into bodies such as the Economic Department. Such
a scenario had crucial consequences in how the economic debate played out
and how the hegemony of neo-liberalism was established in the upper echelons
of the ANC.Not least was the fact that the ANCand its liberation partners were
severely constrained in their ability to combat the rush of neo-liberalist ideas
that engulfed the movement in the transition period, leading to proposals such
as the Macro-economic Research Group (MERG)report to get 10st',276and where
the ANC 'all too readily conceded ground to neo-liberal conventional wisdom'<?"
This scenario was 'a direct consequence of the democratic movement's historical
neglect of the social and economic spheres. Indeed, there was a patent abuse of
technically rigorous economists at the helm of the ANC's DEP'.278At the same
time, 'there were no formal and structured information transfer mechanisms
from the DEP to the national executive and the other way around. The ad hoc
nature of the relationship tended to produce a disjuncture between research
outputs and politico-economic pronouncements by the IeadershipP"? Thus:
275Moses Ngoasheng, 1992, p. 117.
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In terms of the economic debate, the ANCwas ...clearly on the defensive
at the beginning of the negotiation process. It simply did not have a set of
new progressive ideas and strategies to counter those neo-liberal ideas so
powerfully proposed by the Washington institutions, Western
governments, local business interests, and the De Klerk regime.280
This factor considerably strengthened the hand of the episternic community of
capital and its organic intellectuals who relatively easily embarked on a
concentrated political and ideological struggle to promote the hegemonic norms
which they subscribed to. By doing so, the policies that should not be pursued -
the "Flight of Icarus" of the Mont Fleur Scenario - were comprehensively
rejected, very often at nominally technical levels. As one analysis has put it, the
privileged elite in South Africa were 'quite effective in [their] ideological
propaganda about economic policies that should not be implemented on the
grounds that they may damage the vested economic interests of the rich and the
very rich'.281That this was possible can, in large part, be accounted for by the
failure of progressive elements within the ANC to put forward a coherent
counter-hegemonic strategy that on the technical level could withstand the
withering critique of the episternic community of neo-liberalism.
This actuality not only effectively emasculated the progressive wing of the
liberation movement, it also gave courage to the Africanist conservative fraction
within the ANC who, in tandem with erstwhile ideological partners in the
business community, rapidly moved to direct the ANC's economic policy down
more "realistic" paths.282 Such a playing out of the historical contradictions
within the liberation organisation not only meant that the conservative wing of
the ANC became ascendant, but also that the progressive element was
essentially disempowered by their inability and inaccessibility to the economic
debate. Henceforth, and in classical Gramscian analysis, those fractions who
opposed the neo-liberalist agenda were cast from the terrain of the debate as
lacking any serious and rigorous contribution to be made. This was graphically
seen in the case of the MERG proposals (see below) which was to be the most
coherent Left economic programme to be offered up to the ANCbut which came
too late and withered away in the face of criticism from within and without the
ANCand a palpable reluctance to defend the report from within the movement.
Tito Mboweni later asserted that 'the problem with MERGwas that it was not as
280Jonathan Michie and Vishnu Padayachee The South African Debate Resumes', in
Jonathan Michieand Vishnu Padayachee(eds.), 1997, p. 228.
281SampieTerreblanche in Ursula van Beek, 1995, p. 361.
282 HeinMarais, 1998, p. 158.
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strongly embedded in the organisation as it should have been to make its
recommendation acceptable',283 and such a strategic mistake by the Left was to
have profound implications for how the ANC's economic policies were to proceed
post-1994. In effect, the MERG report died a death before it had even been
properly discussed, and an interesting question within the remit of this work is,
why?
MERG's emasculation
The Macro-economic Research Group was established in November 1991 under
Vella Pillay as a Canadian-funded, university-based endeavour - supported by
the ANC - to essentially develop a new and progressive macro-economic
framework for a post-apartheid South Africa. Its importance lay in the actuality
that it 'was the only place where any real macro-economic capacity was located'
within the liberation movement.v= The fact that this could be done by the ANC
illustrates that early on in the transition the ANC was open to alternatives to
the hegemonic norms. Indeed, as negotiations at the World Trade Centre moved
on, the ANC leadership specifically requested MERG to produce a macro-
economic framework which it could use as settlement approached.v= As a
result, the Group released its main report - Making Democracy Work - in
December 1993, which 'represented a return to the spirit of the economic
thinking prevalent at the ANC's 1990 Harare Workshop'.286
However, almost immediately the proposals put forward m the report
were rubbished by the business community and its media allies where 'a series
of personal attacks were launched against some of the MERG's leading
protagonists' who were denounced, among other things, as 'simply communists
in disguise'.287At the same time, the report was 'swiftly and publicly rapped over
the knuckles' by conservative elements within the ANC who saw it as posing a
challenge to the neo-liberalist consensus they had carefully crafted with
capital.288Mandela had already rescinded on a promise to write a foreword for
283 TitoMbowenicited in John Matisson, 1998.
284 Weekly Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), June 20, 1997.
285Vishnu Padayachee, 1998, p. 438.
286 TomLodge'PolicyProcesses Within the AfricanNational Congress and the Tripartite
Alliance',Politikon, vol. 26, no. 1,May 1999, p. 10.
287Charles Millwardand Vella Pillay 'The Economic Battle for South Africa's Future' in
Ernest Maganyaand R. Houghton (eds.), 1996, p. 35.
288 Business Day (Johannesburg), November17, 1993.
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the document,289 whilst Trevor Manuel pointedly undercut the report at its very
launch by declaring that it was not ANCpolicy. Such spoiling tactics, led to the
assertion that the MERG recommendations were 'killed by conservative ANC
technocrats the very weekend it was launched'.290 Indeed, the notion that the
MERG's report was killed off by the ANCleadership is reinforced by the fact that
Tito Mboweni waited only a few hours to then 'rebuke publicly the MERG
recommendation that the Reserve Bank be taken under the public wing'.291
Such behaviour by top ANC cadres led the Business Day to smugly proclaim
that 'after the ANC rebuttal, we need not ascribe too much significance to
MERG'.292
Furthermore, the ANC's (secret) signing of a Letter of Intent with the IMF
profoundly undermined the MERG proposals by committing an ANCgovemment
to reducing the deficit to six per cent of GOP for 1994-1995, maintaining a high
interest policy and continuing to open up the country to transnational capital.
In retum, a $ 850 million loan was unlocked. Such a move was conclusive proof
that the ANC had acceded to the ongoing hegemony of neo-liberalism and that
they 'had finally bought into the world consensus'.293
The end result was the eventual marginalisation of the MERG's
suggestions. Fundamental to MERG's proposals was that the maintenance of a
sound fiscal balance should be enabling and facilitating to development, and not
a fetishised constraint on initiatives.v?+ Indeed, the MERG proposal's were
amongst the most imaginative policy suggestions to enter the economic debate,
primarily because 'rather than accepting the imported policy fetishes and
superstitions of the herd of South African corporate ideologues as an absolute
binding constraint on policy formulation', MERG proposed a wide range of
policies that could have afforded greater space to a more progressive macro-
economic environment.w- This point is important because proponents of neo-
liberalism deployed fiscal discipline as a trump card to rubbish virtually any
meaningful social policies, despite evidence that there was more space in which
289 Anthony Sampson, 1999, p. 473.
290 Patrick Bond, 1996a, p. 32.
291Patrick Bond 'Economics Diary', Southern African Review of Books, vol. 5, issue 28,
NovemberIDecember, 1993, p. 21.
292 Cited in ibid.
293Patti Waldmeir, 1997, p. 258.
294 Macro-economic Research Group (MERG)Making Democracy Work Bellville: Centre for
Development Studies/Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 47.
295John Sender 'Economic Restructuring in South Africa: Reactionary Rhetoric Prevails',
Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 20. no. 4, December 1994, p. 540.
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to manouevre than that postured by the "voices of reason".296
MERG had also recommended that South Africa's economy 'could best be
restructured through the labour market (improved training and higher wages)
and through interventions aimed at improving the structure and operation of
business'.297 Such a restructured framework rested on a working relationship
between 'a strong private sector interacting with a strong public sector'.298
Indeed, MERG argued for government intervention in the economy 'both to
promote growth and redress the inequalities of apartheid'. Furthermore, it
recommended 'a regimen of deliberately managed interest and exchange rates, a
coherent industrial policy which would target specific sectors of the economy for
support, and a programme of public works centred around a mass housing
programme kick-start the economy'.299 At the same time, govemment would
intervene 'in output and pricing decisions in the minerals sectors, [the]
regulation of the housing and building supplies market, [the] tightening and
extending controls on mergers and acquisitions, [and the] monitoring [of] the
behaviour of participants in oligopolistic markets'.30o
These premises were based on the notion that an increase in state
investment in social and physical infrastructure would promote growth, whilst a
national minimum wage to protect the disadvantaged from immiseration was
urged. Not surprisingly, this last recommendation drew the ire of the business
community, despite the fact that the report had put forward this suggestion on
the grounds that it would actually improve productivity 'by reducing
absenteeism, illness and labour turnover', and stimulate companies 'to
undertake the necessary adjustments [thereby making] human resources more
productive'<oi The suggestion that the state serve a leadership and co-
ordination role in intervening in specific areas of economic policy of course
directly contradicted the neo-liberalist common sense view that envisioned a
massively reduced role for the state in the economic realm, and so was attacked
296See for example Laurence Harris and Jonathan Michie The Effects of Globalizationon
Policy Formulation in South Africa' in Dean Baker, Gerald Epstein and Robert Pollin
(eds.) Globalization and Progressive Economic Policy Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998. "
297HeinMarais, 1998, p. 159.
298Macro-economicResearch Group, 1993, p. 265.
299Charles Millward and Vella Pillay in Ernest Maganya and Houghton (eds.), 1996, p.
35.
300 NicoliNattrass 'South Africa:The Economic Restructuring Agenda: A Critique of the
MERGReport', Third World Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 2, 1994, p. 223.
301 Macro-economicResearch Group, 1993, p. 163.
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for going against the prevailing global wisdom. Indeed, influential interventions
by leading academic economists saw to it that the MERG report was
characterised as 'radical', contradicted 'serious economic policy debates', and
out of line with 'conventional economic arguments'.302 Yet such interventions
essentially argued for a fall in wages, a maintenance of existing corporate power
and for a post-apartheid state that did little to correct market failure: all in the
name of macro-economic "realities" and "pragmatism". As one critic pointed out,
such a policy agenda was 'little different from that of the least progressive
elements of South African capital'.303
However, as Marais suggests, 'the perspectives gathered in the MERG
report [rapidly] fell victim to a dominant discourse and a balance of forces that
had tilted ineluctably rightward'. 304Though elements of MERG were broadly
incorporated into the Base Document of the ROP, it was to prove a temporary
expediency as the hegemonic project increasingly came to hold sway at the elite
levels. This progressive movement towards (and within) the hegemonic discourse
was to continue until just under two years later, the government's GEAR
strategy would confirm Nicholas Oppenheimer's assertion that 'in a remarkably
short time [the ANC] matured into a government which understands and
accepts the disciplines of the marketplace'iw>
Prior to this, a holding action centred around the ROP had temporarily
placated many Leftist critics. Such a scenario indicated that whilst the ANChad
indeed shifted rightwards, the contradictions within the movement and in
particular the tensions that this engendered between the conservative ANCelite
and its partners in government (as well as its own Left-wing) meant that a
wholesale swing to neo-liberalism had to be postponed for an interim period.
This alternative in the shape of the ROP reflected the ambiguities and tensions
in the ANC's economic stance as it struggled to reconcile its drift to the Right
with its more progressive historic credentials. It is to this which is briefly turned
to, before ending with an examination of the ANC's open embrace of neo-
liberalism in the form of GEAR.
302 Nicoli Nattrass 'Economic Restructuring in South Africa: The Debate Continues',
Journal of Southern African Studies, vol.20. no. 4, December 1994, p. 518.
303 Raphael Kaplinksy"Economic Restructuring in South Africa:The Debate Continues':
AResponse', Journal of Southern African Studies, vol.20. no. 4, December1994, p. 536.
304 Hein Marais, 1998, p. 160.
30S Nicholas Oppenheimer, deputy chairman of Anglo-AmericanCorporation and De
Beers, London, December 10, 1996, cited on SA Foundation web page
http://www.safoundation.org.za/psaecon.html
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The Reconstruction and Development Programme
The Reconstruction and Development Programme was the main vehicle chosen
by the new post-apartheid government to further the much-needed socio-
economic reform that the ANC had campaigned upon during the electoral
period. Indeed, for the period until it was effectively ditched for the GEAR
programme, the RDP was to a large degree the icon around which the ANC's
vision for the future was predicated.êw Initially drafted in February 1994 and
the economic document upon which the ANC fought the elections, the RDP was
finally presented as an economic framework for South Africa in the form of the
RDP White Paper in September 1994. Yet the differences between the initial pre-
election Base Document of February and the post-election White Paper of
September were quite profound. This process in itself reflected the ongoing
tensions within the GNU and the pressures of capital, for the Base Document
had been widely seen as a compromise that the ANC elite had agreed upon to
keep on board COSATU and the SACP during the immediate pre-election period,
raising the suspicion that 'the RDP was viewed by the ANC leadership as just a
mobilising tool for election purposes'<v? For sure, the South African labour
movement had 'made its entry into the Tripartite Alliance contingent upon the
ANC and SACP adopting [the RDPj as the basis of all subsequent development
policy'.308
However, even before the ANC acceded to power, its elites were indicating
to big business that they were 'more flexible on its [the RDP's] policy outlook'
and 'clearly [didn't] want the RDP to constitute a writing in stone of its economic
thinking' - raising the question: how genuine was the ANC leadership in its
commitment to the original RDP document?309 Certainly, on the eve of the
elections key ANC players such as Mandela, Mbeki and Erwin met with 250 key
businessmen at the "Sandton Summit" to 'subject the practicalities of the ANC's
RDP to public scrutiny' (or, phrased another way, and in an advertisement for
the meeting, the opportunity to 'have them [the ANC] for breakfast').310 Instead
of promoting the RDP in principle, Mandela emphasised to the assembled
306 Barry Munslow and Patrick FitzGerald 'The Reconstruction and Development
Programme', in Managing Sustainable Development in South Africa Cape Town: Oxford
University Press, 1995, p. 42.
307 Vishnu Padayachee, 1998, p. 440.
308 David Ginsburg, 1996, p. 87.
309 Finance Week April 7- 13, 1994.
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representatives of large-scale capital that ANCpolicy was 'evolving in detail' and
that he 'envisage[d] a partnership with business making an input into policy',
whilst Erwin stressed that 'there [was] not one mention at all of socialism'<!'
This retreat from defending the RDP as a principled cornerstone of any post-
apartheid administration's economic policy reflected not only a continuum in the
confusion surrounding the ANC's overall macro-economic stance (though by this
time its leaders largely accepted the broader precepts of the hegemonic
discourse), but an almost desperate attempt to court large-scale capital and
signal to "the market" the ANCelite's general "tilt".
This in itself was a reflection of the ANC leadership's belief that 'the
confidence of the markets could only be maintained by a commitment to
financial orthodoxy and the belief that such confidence was vital to the
country's ability to attract inward investment'.312 This acceptance of the
"realities" of a globalised world was manifested shortly after acceding to power
when, hampered by a constitutional demand to share office with the National
Party 'there was a ...discernible shift away from state intervention and towards
an RDP driven by private-sector growth'313 Such a scenario reflected the steady,
if non-lineal, trajectory rightwards by the ANC since its un-banning in 1990,
increasingly predicating 'transformation on the pnor servicing of the
prerogatives of capital'A':'
In the context of the RDP this was perhaps possible because of the
essential vagueness, lack of concrete economic proposals and the confusion
sown around the differences between the original Base Document and the
subsequent White Paper meant that the RDP came 'to mean anything anyone
want[ed] it to mean',315 and could be viewed as 'an attempt on the part of the
South African Government of National Unity to be all things to all people'.316
Indeed, 'the politically motivated attempt to keep the Left within the democratic
movement happy ...resulted in a highly incoherent and largely fragmented
310 Finance Week March 10-16, 1994.
311 Finance Week April 7-13,1994.
312 Adrian Guelke, 1999, p. 170.
313Simon Adams What's Left? The South African Communist Party After Apartheid',
Review of African Political Economy, no. 72, June 1997, p. 241.
314Hein Marais in Weekly Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), May 16, 1997.
315Thabo Rapoo Making the Means Justify the Ends? The Theory and Practice of the RDP
Research Report no. 5, Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies, 1996, p. 5.
316P.A. Black The RDP: Is it in Good Company?', South African Joumal of Economics, vol.
63, no. 4, December 1995, p. 544.
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strategy for economic developmentA'" This fragmentation in itself reflected the
deep concessions that the ANC and its liberation partners had granted during
their negotiated path to power and, the structural compromise via the new
constitution that forced onto the first post-apartheid government the National
Party as ostensible partners. In short, the ROP was a compromised document
from a compromised administration.
Hence whilst some argued - perhaps optimistically - that it was a
continuation of the MERG proposals, others saw it as a 'very significant
compromise to the neo-liberal "trickle down" policy preferences of the old
regime'.318The Sunday Times remarked that 'all signs now are that our policy-
makers see that the objectives of the ROP are wholly compatible with the three
words [liberalisation, privatisation and convertibility] which so interest the
money men'.319 For example, eliminating calls for nationalisation - even as a
policy option - whilst pushing for privatisation and "fiscal discipline" indicated
just one way the White Paper had changed from the initial Base Document.
Indeed, whereas the Base Document had, following the MERG report, argued
that fiscal discipline should be a means to achieve development, the White
Paper elevated such a notion to an objective. It is for this reason that even the
most conservative economists supported the ROP, focussing on its 'envisaged
monetary and fiscal discipline' and its usage of 'domestic and foreign
competition as the disciplinary force in the market for the private sector, leaving
it ["the market"] on its own for the rest'.320 As the successor to MERG (the
National Institute for Economic Policy) argued, such a watered down version
was a rightward shift from the original ROP and effectively elevated fiscal
prudence as the be-all and end-all of the developmental VISIOn of the
programme.au By doing so, the hand of conservatives within and without
government was further strengthened.
Furthermore, the White Paper retreated from the Base Document's
moderate dirigiste position that the state should playa leading and enabling role
in guiding the economy. Instead, the White Paper reduced the state's role to
317 AshgarAdelzadehand Vishnu Padayachee 'The RDPWhite Paper: The Reconstruction
of a DevelopmentVision?', Transformation, no. 25, 1994, p. 2.
318 Ibid.
319 Sunday Times (Johannesburg), October 9, 1994.
320 G.L. de Wet 'The RDPand a Structural Problem in the South AfricanEconomy', South
African Journal of Economics, vol.62, no. 4, December 1994, p. 330.
321 New Nation (Johannesburg) November4, 1994.
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simply being the manager in a "neutral" manner á la the neo-liberal orthodoxy.
Certainly, the business community essentially welcomed the programme,
though predictably expressed concern at the cost. As one writer suggested,
perhaps much of the business community's enthusiasm was based on
'expectations of major new business opportunities' to be found in the various
expansion schemes the RDP prornised.w- Certainly, one executive of a major
conglomerate enthused that his company was 'well placed to contribute to and
benefit from the infrastructure-linked projects of the [RDP].323
Capital's support for the programme was based on a cool understanding
that the RDP itself was predicated 'on the balance of evidence [that] will guide
the decision for or against economic policy measures'<e- Indeed, Bobby Godsell
of Anglo-American, perhaps typical of capital's position, privileged this caveat
over all else and hence saw the RDP as a 'positive step' grounded in
'pragmatism'.»> The episternic community quickly went to work to guide the
government over which factors were to be seen to account for the 'balance of
evidence', as will be shown below.
It is true that the RDP's lack of dogmatism (in contrast to the later GEAR)
allowed considerable leeway for interpretation. This allowed a broad array of
elements to rally around it - perhaps preventing an early split in the GNU - and
helped foster a sense of agreement in the early post-election period. Yet, by
putting off hard economic choices in favour of "consensus", the RDP quickly
turned from 'being a strategy to reorganise the social and economic well-being of
the country ... [into] a shopping list'.326This actuality effectively strengthened the
hand of capital. Grounding an economic framework on the ostensibly pragmatic
'balance of evidence' allowed, as had occurred throughout the transition period,
the far more technically organised promoters of neo-liberalism to shape this very
terrain and define the 'balance of evidence'. The release of the South Africa
Foundation report (see below) is a case in point.
Furthermore, the weakness of the RDP was increasingly evidenced by the
322 Jesmond Blumenfeld 'From Icon to Scapegoat: The Experience of South Africa's
Reconstruction and Development Programme', Development Policy Review, vol. 15, no. 1,
March 1997, p. 76.
323 Warren Clewlow, chairman of Barlow Limited, quoted in Building a Nation: Forbes - A
Special Report, Sandton: Forbes Magazine/Director of Marketing Communications,
Department of Foreign Affairs, no date, p. 14.
324 White Paper on Reconstruction and Development: Government's Strategy for
Fundamental Transformation Pretoria: Republic of South Africa, 1994
325 Business Day (Johannesburg), March Il, 1994.
326 New Nation (Johannesburg), February 24, 1995.
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disjunction between the RDP as an economic programme and other aspects of
economic policy, which became more and more conspicuou s.êv? In particular,
the contradictions that the RDP engendered at a time when the new government
was desperately trying to appease domestic and international capital through its
repeated pledges vis-a-vis macro-economic stability and the desire to make
South Africa "investor-friendly", made the RDP's place within the wider
economic framework 'unclear [and] at worst ...potentially antithetical'.328 The fact
that the RDP itself could be seen as arguing for 'creating an "enabling
environment" ... through macro-economic balance and sound fiscal policy'
compounded this 'cocktail of confusion'.329 At the same time, the palpable lack
of delivery on the ground proved a major embarrassment to the government,
with the minister in overall charge of the RDP - Jay Naidoo - being ridiculed in
the business press as the 'Minister of Everything and the Minister of Nothing'A'?
Whilst reasons for this non-delivery were diverse, primarily due to lack of
government capacity, it became a relatively easy exercise for critics to point to
such scenarios as evidence of the inherent "unworkability" of the RDP.331
Indeed, the business community increasingly 'complained about the
absence of a clear macro-economic framework from government',332 perhaps
helping to explain the 3.7 billion rand that left the country in the first six
months of the GNU's tenure. At the same time, representatives of large-scale
capital urged 'the rejection of egalitarianism, which is counter productive',
whilst making a strenuous push for a firm commitment to 'privatisation and
tight curbs on health and education spending ...so that official debt can be
reduced, taxes moderated and interest rates lowered'.333Conservative academics
meanwhile proclaimed (in the face of all contrary evidence that the ANC still
maintained socialistic aspirations) that 'it would be the height of all folly for
South Africa to rush in where ...socialism had failed, and what is needed is to
make the existing system work better, not to replace it with a proven failure'A>
327Jesmond Blumenfeld, 1997, p. 69.
328 Ibid.
329NicoliNattrass 'The RDPWhite Paper: A Cocktail of Confusion', Indicator SA, vol. 12,
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Such calls reflected an intensification of the epistemie community's 'increasingly
successful lobbying of, and impact on, the ANC leadership'.335 This process was
symbolised by the release by the South Africa Foundation (SAF) of a rabidly
orthodox macro-economic strategic plan entitled Growth for All. This was an
influential intervention that is briefly turned to before examining the outright
shift by the ANC to neo-liberal principles in the guise of GEAR.336
The South Africa Foundation's contribution
Representing a consortium of fifty of South Africa's most powerful corporations
(a company has to be valued at more than two billion rands to qualify for
membership and the fee is seventy thousand rand per annum), the South Africa
Foundation was ire-established to propagate a free market approach'.337 Written
by 'mainstream economists and leading business figures',338 the Foundation's
document endorsed capital's call for a wholesale embracing of nee-liberalism by
the GNU. Integral to this was the SAF's call for a "two-tier" labour market which
discriminated between those already employed (who would remain subject to
continuing labour regulations), and new entrants to the market (who would be
subject to more "flexible" regulations). These new entrants would be subject to
termination of employment 'for commercial reasons' whilst having no automatic
right to severance pay and no right to a procedural mechanism before
retrenchment. Employers meanwhile would posses the right to instantly fire
workers involved in unofficial strikes. Furthermore, the employer would have
the obligation only to implement minimum-standards legislation, whilst
minimum wage restrictions would be abolished.ê-? Much of the business
community was highly enthusiastic, the Financial Mail for instance deeming the
two-tiered market 'a novel idea', 340that was 'a genuine attempt to put forward a
strategy in the national interest'i> '
The importance of the Growth for All document is hard to gauge, though
certainly Mandela - and this reflected the access business had to the top
Enirepeneurship and Economic Growth Pretoria: HSRC, 1994, pp. 83-84.
335Vishnu Padayachee, 1998, p. 444.
336See South Africa Foundation Growth for All: An Economic Strategy for South Africa
Johannesburg: South Africa Foundation, 1996.
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340 Financial Mail, March 8, 1996.
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echelons of the GNU - was given a private presentation of the document prior to
its release.>'? Such access undoubtedly lead to the Financial Mail boasting (on
its front cover) that 'Business Show's Mbeki the Way' with the SAF report.ê+ê A
critique of its platform feared that 'the business community, represented by the
South Africa Foundation' had embarked on 'a well financed and well publicised
campaign to cling onto their wealth' by influencing the ANC elite.ê+t
For sure, one analysis has argued that its publication, combined with the
collapse of the rand 'appear[ed] to force the GNU to accelerate the production of
its macro-economic framework document [i.e. GEAR], in part to reassure jittery
international financial and currency markets of its fiscal prudence'i '<' Certainly
the business press valued its importance, regarding it as an opportunity to
effectively blackmail the government into embracing the extremist neo-liberalist
position of the SAF by asserting that 'if government reacts negatively, it will
draw attention to its qualified endorsement of market-oriented economics. That
in turn will discourage investment, undermine the rand and lock this economy
into a low-growth trap'.346 This in itself mirrored the SAF's own self-inflated
position that if the GNU ignored its prescriptions, 'the world will forget about the
political miracle before long, because [South Africa's] economic policy will have
failed'.347Such pronouncements were not made after dialogue with the broader
civil society, as one analysis points out, but rather bypassed any real debate by
restricting discussion to the elites 'primarily in the newspapers with their
limited readership - in a country with nearly fifty percent illiterates and a high
percentage who do not purchase a newspaper.ê+ë
Nevertheless, coercive power of such rhetoric was considerably
strengthened by the fact that the document was released at a time when the
South African economy was in a state of massive flux - a situation which
effectively removed 'any lingering support within the ANC for a strategy based
341 Financial Mail, March 15, 1996.
342 Sunday Times (Johannesburg), June 2, 1996.
343 Financial Mail, March 8, 1996.
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on fiscal expansion'349 The rand was in free-fall (losing 25 per cent between
February and July); interest rates remained high; whilst the trade account of
the balance of payments moved in a highly erratic fashion. At the same time, the
foreign exchange reserves were being depleted until by mid-1996 were equal to
only five weeks import cover.ê-? Such a scenario was deemed to stem from 'the
market [having] judged that the social aspirations of [the] first non-apartheid
government...are beyond the productive capacity of the economy, unless the
tried and tested path to economic growth is embarked upon' [emphasis
added].351Rather fantastically, the decline of the rand was linked to the GNU
having relations with Cuba and Libya which supposedly 'probably helped to fan
suspicion abroad that SA's declared commitment to fiscal discipline, stable
prices, enterprise, growth and job creation lacks real conviction v=?
This notwithstanding, the 'factors and pressures [surrounding the crisis]
all served to focus attention on the appropriateness or otherwise of the
government's macro-economic policy' and further undermined the RDP,353as
'those who wanted a "clear" (that IS, their own) macro-economic policy to be
anointed as official [and not the RDPj used the rand's decline to intensify
pressure'.354 This ensemble of determinants rapidly lead to an abandonment of
the programme in what has been termed 'a panic response to the ...exchange
rate instability and a lame succumbing to the policy dictates and ideological
pressures of the international financial institu tions<s=
Such a scenario was compounded by the urgings of the international
financial institutions, the domestic media and capital. The Financial Mail for
example claimed that the failings in the South African economy were in fact due
to the failure of the RDP, and urged its scrapping.ê= In addition, by maintaining
most of the old civil service, the GNU was continually receiving 'advice given on
349Charles Mather and Ashgar Adelzadeh 'Macro-economic Strategies, Agriculture and
Rural Poverty in Post-Apartheid South Africa', Africa Insight, vol. 28, nos. 1-2, 1998, p.
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350 For a technical discussion of how this crisis affected the GNU's policies, see Janine
Aron and Ibrahim Elbadawi 'Reflections on the South African Rand Crisis of 1996 and
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351 Financial Mail, May 3, 1996.
352 Ibid.
353 Jonathan Michie and Vishnu Padayachee The South African Policy Debate Resumes',
in Jonathan Michie and Vishnu Padayachee (eds.), 1997, p. 224.
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economic matters [which was] almost exactly the same as under the National
Party regime'.357 This inexorably led to a situation where the ANC-led
government relied too heavily on old guard strategic courisel.ê=' This was
combined with ongoing circumstances where there was:
[A]continuing extension of the rise of a "technocratic" policy-making elite,
compnsmg key ministers and senior civil servants in relevant
departments together with a core of academic advisers, most of whom
were politically sympathetic to the government, but almost all of whom
emphasised the need for fiscal discipline to be at the core of South
Africa's macro-economic strategy.ê-?
With this in mind and the trajectory of the transition that has already been
mapped out, it became increasingly apparent that 'the GNU .. .internalised the
conditionalities imposed by the World Bank and IMF'.360 Indeed, a United
Nations report asserted that GEAR 'closely resembled an IMF structural
adjustment programme' and in fact 'had embraced liberalisation beyond the
WTO's requirements'<e! Certainly, with the National Party leaving the GNU in
June 1996 the notion that conservative non-ANC elements were constraining
the organisation's economic direction proved to be false: GEAR was a product of
the ANC elites thinking on economic issues and 'signall[ed] the government's
acceptance of market-imposed criteria for the conduct of macro-economic
policy'.362 This was manifested through the release of the GEAR document, the
concomitant effective scrapping of the RDP (though the document is paid
considerable lip-service by the government) and a situation where 'economists
and the markets accepted that the democratic government had embraced
dominant economic thinking'r=?
Introduction of GEARand the consolidation of neo-liberalism
In February 1996 Thabo Mbeki announced a new strategy for the nation's
economic development. Though the government continued to pay rhetorical lip-
service to the RDP, its office was closed and its nominal head - Jay Naidoo - was
356 Financial Mail, October 6, 1995.
357 Philip Dexter The ROP', South African Labour Bulletin, September 1995, p. 58.
358 Weekly Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), October 2, 1996.
359 Jesmond Blumenfeld 'Assessing South Africa's Growth Strategy', Briefing Paper no.
49, July 1998, Royal Institute of International Affairs - Southern Africa Study Group, p.
2.
360 Ben Fine 'Privatisation and the ROP: A Critical Assessment', Transformation, no. 27,
1995,p.21.
361 Sunday Independent (Johannesburg), May 24, 1998.
362 Jesmond Blumenfeld, 1998, p. 5.
363 Sunday Independent (Johannesburg), March 22, 1998.
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reassigned, and this was rapidly followed in June 1996, by the government
hastily releasing its new macro-economic strategy- under the name of the
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) plan.364 This document
ambitiously claimed it would increase annual growth by an average of 4.2%,
create 1.35 million jobs by 2000, boost exports by an average 8.4% per year and
- perhaps crucially - improve social structure. It has failed to do any of these.365
How this new policy was adopted came about from a coalescing of factors,
summarised as:
[T]he ANC, pressured by advisers from the old regime, economists from
the World Bank and IMF [and] experts from the business
community ... stepped back from the RDP's emphasis on social
spending ... and instead adopted a neo-liberal economic export strategy-
which emphasised free markets, fiscal discipline and building business
confidence, even if that meant "downsizing" to be competitive in the
global economy.ê=
In an attempt at closing off debate, as Gramsci highlights in his discussion of
ideology, the government's finance minister immediately declared that GEAR
was 'non-negotiable' in its broad outline - a move that, as one South African
capitalist said, was 'the language which investors, both local and foreign, greatly
appreciate',367 but which those on the Left saw as 'utter arrogance'.368 Indeed,
GEAR was released 'without any qualification [and] after very limited discussion'
within the ANC national executive committee,369 and with no prior discussion,
particularly with the ANC's partners in government - COSATU and the SACP.
Even senior ANC leaders were not informed of its contents - as Mandela later
adrnitted.wv
'Produced in great secrecy by a small team of technical expertsP"! GEAR
was modelled on a South African Reserve Bank econometric model that was the
same used by the bank during the late apartheid years and was ostensibly
364 Growth, Employment and Redistribution: A Macro-economic Strategy, unpublished,
1996.
365For a trenchant critique of GEAR, see South African Comrades for the Encounter
'Resistance to Neo-liberalism: A View from South Africa', paper presented at the Second
International Encounter for Humanity and Against Neo-liberalism, Madrid, July 26-
August 2, 1997.
366Nancy Murray 'Somewhere Over The Rainbow: A Journey to the New South Africa',
Race and Class, vol. 38, no. 3, 1997, p. 5.
367Brian McCarthy, chairman of McCarthy Retail Group, Durban August 26, 1996
quoted on SA Foundation web page - http://www.safoundation.org.za/psaecon.html
368First vice-president of COSATU,Connie September, cited in Umsebenzi, July 1998, p.
2.
369 Business Day (Johannesburg) September 4, 1996.
370 SouthScan, vol. 12, no. 34, September 19, 1997.
371 Jeremy Cronin 'Why the SACP Rejects GEAR', Weekly Mail and Guardian
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'consistent with the results obtained using models of the Development Bank of
Southern Africa, the Bureau for Economic Research and the World Bank'.372
This was characterised as 'one of the most conservative models that anybody
could chose to use'.373 Furthermore, 'the main model used ... [w]as never. ..made
public and thus [wJas never. ..the subject of an independent and rigorous debate
by professional economists'<?s This invited criticism from Jeremy Cronin that
the policy was 'decided on only by "some macro economists playing on their
computers"'.375 Whilst this is perhaps unfair, the credentials of GEAR's authors
certainly exhibited a profound conservative bent, one which has serious
implications for any developmental impulse for the country:
Most of the sixteen economists who devised the strategy are from
institutions such as the Finance Ministry, Development Bank of
Southern Africa, World Bank and Stellenbosch University's Bureau of
Economic Research. Their free-market ideologies have proven ineffectual
or downright oppressive here and across the Third World.376
Yet the ideology contained in the GEAR document was consistent 'with the
strong international consensus on the efficiency of the market system'<'?"
exhibited a 'commitment to conservative fiscal policies, trade liberalisation and a
shift from consumption to investment spending'j-'" and was made up of 'litanies
of policy measures that could have been taken from the IMF manual'<"? Indeed,
such a fit between GEAR and the ongoing hegemonic demands exhibited, in the
words of Conrad Strauss of Standard Bank, 'a strong measure of agreement
between government and business on [economic] policy'.380 Whilst the new
framework stunned many on the Left within the ANC alliance, it did finally
illustrate, 'quite clearly that the "common sense" orthodoxy of neo-liberal
development [was] entrenched' in government thinking,381 and 'underscored
(Johannesburg), July 10-16, 1998.
372 Growth, Employment and Redistribution: A Macro-economic Strategy, 1996,
appendix, p. 10.
373 The Citizen (Johannesburg), July 23, 1996.
374Asghar Adelzadeh, 1996, p. 68.
375 Pretoria News (Pretoria), July 22, 1996.
376Patrick Bond 'Little to Cheer in New Plan', New Nation (Johannesburg), June 21,
1996.
377 Cape Times (Cape Town) May 7, 1997.
378 Business Day (Johannesburg), October 30, 1998.
379Edward Osborne 'Fiscal and Monetary Policy and the GEAR', paper presented at
University of Durban-Westville/ Natal Mercury international conference, April 24, 1997
cited in Vishnu Padayachee, 1998, p. 442.
380 Conrad Strauss, chairman of Standard Bank, London, December 10, 1996, cited on
SAFoundation web page - http://www.safoundation.org.za/psaecon.html
381 Anthony Leysens and Lisa Thompson 'A Paper Tiger? Political Implications of an
Export-Led Growth Strategy for South Africa', South African Journal of International
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the ... shift among policy makers away from redistribution and towards macro-
economic growth'.382 In short, it was a culmination of impulses that had playing
out throughout the transition, and ultimately 'reflect[ed] a remarkable shift lil
the ANC's ideological orientation in the period from 1990 to 1996'.383
Whilst the government has been touchy on accusations that its policies
are essentially neo-liberal monetarism, a 1996 document sent out by the
government openly admitted that 'certain measures in GEAR are similar to
many neo-liberal packages'<e- One analysis has summed this up by saying that
'to all intents and purposes, the policy that almost replaced the sacred Freedom
Charter [i.e. the RDP] in its vision of a more equal and progressive order has
now been shelved [and a] Thatcherite discourse of fiscal discipline and market
forces has taken over'.385 Mandela himself later admitted that people 'can say
[our policy] is Thatcherite, but for this country, privatisation is the fundamental
policy of our government',386 whilst Mbeki invited analysts to 'call [him] a
Thatcheri te '.387
This has subsequently meant that the business press in South Africa is
lil general highly supportive of Mbeki's succession post-Mandela, with the
Business Day typically expressing the assertion that 'Mbeki [has] the hand on
the GEAR economic policy, [it is] a hand which everyone wants to be strong' as
capital hopes that 'Mbeki will prove a decisive, Machiavellian figure, who will
use his mandate to break the power of the unions to impede privatisation and
block needed liberalisation of the labour market, and thus make it easier for
employers to hire and fire [workers]'.388 Such support for Mbeki from capital has
been long-standing and goes back to the transition period when he was 'the
darling of the business sector' and 'the corporate sector's ... Man in Shell House',
temporary spats with (White) capital notwithstanding.389 Indeed, as a recent
Affairs, vol. 1, no. 2, 1994, p. 56.
382 'RDP: Growth the Only Answer', African Business, no. 210, May 1996, p. 10.
383 Sampie Terreblanche 'The Ideological Journey of South Africa From the RDP to the
GEAR Macroeconomic Plan', paper presented at the Multi-Event 1999 on Transforming
Public Life: Religion in the Making of Cultural Values and Public Policy, Cape Town,
February 16, 1999, p. 7.
384 Quoted in Rob Davies Engaging with Gear (draft), 1997, p. 3 cited in Hein Marais,
1998, p. 161.
385 Heribert Adam, Frederik van Zyl Slabbert and Kogila Moodley, 1997, p. 161.
386 Nelson Mandela, quoted in John Pilger Hidden Agendas London: Vintage, 1998, p.
606
387 Business Times (Johannesburg), June 16, 1996.
388 Business Day (Johannesburg), June 9, 1999.
389 Sunday Times (Johannesburg), June 20, 1999.
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biography of him points out, Mbeki has long been recognised as someone who
'possessed the qualities to lead the ANCinto the new South Africa and strike an
historic compromise with White South Africa and the forces of capitalism'.390
This in itself ties in with the aspirations of the emergent Black elite who
are also strongly supportive of Mbeki and who are increasingly joining the ranks
of a nascent historic bloc, sharing the 'liberal capitalistic ideology' of White-
dominated capital, whilst reinforcing their increasing foothold m the
economy.>"' As one newspaper put it, 'the buppies are right behind Mbeki'.392
Such an ongoing development is a playing out of tendencies that have been
residual within the ANC's O'INTI historical experience through the long years of
struggle and which are manifesting themselves more openly in the post-
liberation era:
[T]heAfrican National Congress has since its inception sought to promote
the interest of [the Black bourgeoisie] class ...During the liberation
struggle, particularly before the ANC's banning in 1960, it articulated an
ideology favourable to the development of the Black capitalist class.
Upon its return from exile it continued doing so, and on assuming the
reins of government it has enthusiastically supported the development of
the Black bourgeoisie through legislative and administrative actions.w'
Thus 'although the ANC still enjoys overwhelming support of the Black working
class, its policies are aimed at advancing the interests of the Black bourgeoisie
and petit-bourgeoisie whose interests are integrally tied to that of [externally-
oriented] money capital'P?" Such a profound dislocation engenders
contradictions that are manifested in a variety of ways - the foreign policy of
South Africa being but one example.
Although GEAR was proclaimed as a continuation of the RDP by other
means, the RDP is in fact only referred to in the GEAR policy document four
times.395 Furthermore, in contrast to the RDP, GEAR explicitly posits
'redistribution as a by-product of growth instead of an integral part of its
economic strategy'.396 It was not surprising that after reflection upon the
390Adrian Hadland and Jovial Rantao The Life and Times of Thabo Mbeki Rivonia: Zebra
Press, 1999, p. 88.
391 Cape Argus (Cape Times), March 8, 1999.
392"Buppies" is a contraction of "Black yuppies" - Sunday Independent (Johannesburg),
July 4, 1999.
393 Weekly Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), May 21 - 27, 1999.
394Labour Left Collective COSATU, the SACP and the ANC: The Parting of the Ways?
Athlone: Labour Left Collective, 1998, p. 13.
395For an alternative viewpoint on GEAR as a potentially workable programme consistent
with the goals of the RDP, see Pieter le Roux 'The Growth, Employment and
Redistribution Strategy (GEAR):A Critical Discussion', Africanus, vol. 27, no. 2, 1997.
396James Heintz, National Labour and Economic Development Institute 'GEAR: A Labour
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contents of the new economic model critics should denounce it as representing
'a recourse to the policy goals and instruments of the past apartheid regime'<"?
and occupying 'the right wing of the [politico-economic] spectrum' whilst sharing
much of the ideological assumptions of the SAF document.ê'" This criticism
stemmed from the economic methods chosen to deliver GEAR's elaborate
prorruses.
Essentially, GEAR privileged the position of capital within South Africa
and relied on them - in typical neo-liberalist "trickle down" theory - to uplift the
disempowered through increased private investment. This would be achieved by
cutting back state spending in an attempt to lower the budget deficit down to 3
per cent by 2000; maintaining a low inflation rate; a reduction in corporate
taxes; the gradual phasing out of remaining exchange controls; the promotion of
wage demand restraints by labour; the creation of a more "flexible" labour
market; and an increased push for the privatisation of state assets. The model
was essentially based on 'a set of orthodox, outward-oriented, investor-friendly
stabilisation and adjustment policies',399 which reflected the concerns and
aspirations of the globally-oriented transnationalised elites within South Africa.
Mbeki confirmed this assertion when he declared soon after the GEAR
programme was launched that the GNU was 'determined to ensure that we
further open up our economy'r'v" By doing so, GEAR privileged 'market reaction
(for example, in the foreign exchange market) and notions of business
confidence' as a yardstick 'to assess government's performance', further
strengthening the hand of the outwardly-linked classes in the ccuntry.w!
This fraction of capital and its allies fell over itself in praising GEAR as
'investor friendly' and 'responding to many of the concerns expressed by
business',402 whilst the Economist celebrated the 'conservative macro-economic
policy' that had been adopted.v'ê For sure, one Financial Times writer asserted
that with GEAR, 'the ANC emerged with as powerful a commitment to budgetary
Perspective' http:j jwww.und.ac.zajundjindicjarchivesjindicatorjspring97jHEINZS.htm
397 National Institute for Economic Policy From the RDP to GEAR: The Gradual Embracing
of Nee-liberalism. in Economic Policy Johannesburg: NIEP, 1996, p. 2.
398 Nicoli Nattrass 'Gambling on Investment: Competing Economic Strategies in South
Africa', Transformation, no. 31, 1996, p, 1996, p. 26.
399 Ibid., p. 29.
400 The Sowetan (Johannesburg), March 27,1996.
401 Simon Roberts 'Monetary Policy Within Macro-economic Policy: An Appraisal in the
Context of Reconstruction and Development', Transformation, no. 32, 1997, p. 68.
402 Business Times (Johannesburg) June 16, 1996.
403 Economist, March 8,1997, p. 98.
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discipline and fiscal conservatism as White South Africa could have \vished',404
whilst GEAR's first budget received a 'thumbs up from big business' according
to the Sunday Independent.tv>
Few analysts would disagree with such opimoris. Indeed, commentaries
agreed that 'the [ANC] government...met most of [business"] macro-economic
demands'r=> and that GEAR's 'very character and logic [was] overwritten by the
macro-economic context which ... adheres to the contours of neo-liberal
orthodoxy'r'v? As a result, it was 'difficult to identify social equity as an explicit
feature of the [GEAR] strategy'r'vs This further undermined any real attempt to
restructure the social organisation of South Africa's political economy.w? Such
circumstances were in part a result of the dominant ongoing discourse which
created a scenario where 'if they [the ANC] come out and say: "Our first
obligation is to our people" there [would] be some very heavy choking' by capital,
freed - as neo-liberalism demands - from any link from political or social
responsibility. 410
In a critique of the ANC's economic policies, John Saul pointed out that
the government's policies pretended that 'everyone, capitalist and shanty-town
dweller alike, has more or less the same interests and can be served by more or
less the same policiesr'<n By separating the economic from the political, as neo-
liberalism attempts to do and as was implicit in the GEAR document, this tactic
served the interests of the emergent Black elite as they became increasingly
incorporated into the nascent historic bloc. Indeed, GEAR has been described as
'reflect[ing] and reinforc[ing] the dominance of the Black middle class' which has
'less and less quarrel with the old social structure and a greater and greater
appetite to become part of it'.412 This integration into a nascent historic bloc is of
profound importance as 'pressure from this ultra-free market elite [the emergent
Black bourgeoisie] could limit attempts by the government to restore the kind of
developmental policies on which an improvement in the lot of the poor would
404Patti Waldmeir, 1997, pp. 257-258.
405 Sunday Independent (Johannesburg), March 15, 1997.
406 'Growing Pains?' Democracy inAction, vol. 10, no. 51, August 1996, p. 27.
407Hein Marais in Weekly Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg) May 16, 1997.
408 'Growing Pains?' Democracy inAction, vol. 10, no. 51, August 1996, p. 27.
409 See André Kraak 'Transforming South Africa's Economy: From Racial Fordism to Neo-
Fordism', Economic and Industrial Democracy, vol. 17, no. 1, February 1996.
410Nico Czypionka, economic consultant, cited in Cape Times (Cape Town), October 30,
1998.
411John Saul '...Or Half Empty?', Southern African Report, vol. 9, no. 5, July 1994, p. 38.
412 Financial Mail, November 29, 1996.
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depend'i+':'
In short, the more powerful an emerging Black elite becomes, the more
the pressure will increase on the ANCfrom within its own constituency to move
further away from substantial progressive impulses - bar the rhetoric - and
more towards a greater accommodation with capital - to continue in its
'ideological quantum leap to a position considerably to the right of centre on the
ideological spectrurri'r'!" Indeed, already the business press is asserting that
'there is no reason to believe that ... the ANCwill depart much, if at all, from the
policy orthodoxy to which It has already glued itself.41s Certainly, one of the first
things Thabo Mbeki did after being elected to the office of President in June
1999 was to 'present an overtly business-friendly image' in his first speech as
president to Parliament, in an attempt to 'woo business leadersv+I"
Yet, recognition by the ANC of the contradictions of neo-liberalism -
whose adoption by the leading elites within the Party in itself reflects the
historical contradictions of the organisation - and resistance from the Left
within the GNU, mean that a tentative tempering effort must be conducted - at
least publicly, for whilst 'as a political party, the alliance (the ANC,COSATUand
the South African Communist Party) is still Left-wing...the ANC government is
right of centre'.417 Such a situation has had a profound effect and influence on
the foreign policy of post-apartheid South Africa - a point that is turned to in the
rest of this work.
413 Cape Argus (Cape Town), March 8, 1999.
414 Sampie Terreblanche, 1999, p. 10.
415 Financial Mail June Il, 1999.
416 Sunday Times (Johannesburg), June 27, 1999.
417 Cape Argus (Cape Town), March 8,1999.
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PART THREE
MULTILATERALISM, MIDDLEPOWERMANSHIP AND NEO-
LIBERALISM
Having examined why the ANC acceded to the dominant hegemonic discourse of
neo-liberalism and how this must be contextualised within the structural
constraints that are brought to bear upon the GNU by an increasingly globalised
world, an examination of South Africa's multilateral behaviour is now embarked
upon. Just as the historic compromise has engendered contradictions within the
domestic polity between competing class fractions and within the GNU's own
ranks, so too has acceding to neo-liberalist principles caused a fundamental
tension in Pretoria's overall foreign policy.
For sure, the GNU elite are at one with the wider project as propagated by
the transnational elite (indeed, the elite within the GNU's leadership are part of this
global class). This has meant a forceful promotion of the liberalisation of markets,
free trade, polyarchical institutions and the rest of the wider neo-liberalist project.
Yet, at the same time, the leadership of the new administration is acutely
conscious of the need to reconcile its embrace of the global normative project, with
that of the demands of an important and sizeable fraction of its domestic
constituency. This element is far more wary of liberalisation, privatisation and
other "common sense" prescriptions than are the GNU elite. Indeed, disputes
between the ANC leadership and the SACP and COSATUare symptomatic of this
contradiction in the tripartite alliance and mark out a fault-line between the
outwardly-oriented components of the nascent historic bloc (which includes large-
scale capital), and the more inwardly-oriented fractions of productive capital,
labour and Leftist elements opposed to the neo-liberalist counter-revolution.
Attempts to reconcile these two positions, of promoting "free" trade whilst at
the same time demanding "fair" trade for instance, reflect the wider contradictions
in South African foreign policy post-1994 and are a playing out of the historic
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compromise emanating from the negotiated transition that saw the ANC accede to
administrative power. In the foreign policy realm, this has meant an ostensible
reformist, middlepowermanship role being pursued by Pretoria, whilst staying
within the broader framework of the normative principles that mark out the
contemporary world order.
Brief overview of Pretoria's foreign policy
By embracing nee-liberalism, the ANChas adopted an overall foreign policy agenda
that has, as has already been established, provoked consternation and
disappointment from many of its erstwhile supporters and those who expected a
rigorous change in the direction of Pretoria's foreign affairs. This disappointment is
captured by Peter Vale when he writes that:
South Africa has quite comfortably settled into the ideological-biased "New
World Order" framing of the late-20th Century associated with America's
determination to assert its hegemony on the post-Cold War period.!
As the next three chapters work will demonstrate, this is (in part) evidenced by
South Africa's role in various multilateral organisations such as the WTO; the
Cairns Group; UNCTAD;the Non-Aligned Movement; the Commonwealth; and the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension process. All these bodies
are where the GNU leadership frequently postures a self-proclaimed "bridge-
building" middlepowermanship role, but also where Pretoria is regularly the state
attempting to nudge and cajole the rest of the South into accepting the "realities" of
the ongoing order, albeit tempered by an ostensible reformist posture.
Having said this, Pretoria's foreign policy cannot be reduced to a simplistic
equation: that as an adherent of nee-liberalism, Pretoria is a "lackey" of the West.
South Africa's foreign policy is far more nuanced and contradictory than that, as
will be demonstrated. For sure at a fundamental level the ANC elite has accepted
the tenets of neo-liberalism and thus seeks to promote these principles elsewhere.
As the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs asserted, 'we have our own understanding
of human rights, democracy and good governance, and wil1..use our influence to
help achieve that in other countries', a clear endorsement of Pretoria's almost
1 Peter Vale in Hennie Kotzé (ed.), 1997, p. 22.
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crusade-like mission in propagating liberalised markets and other elements of the
neo-liberalist "package" to the South (and in particular Africal.? whilst another
member of his department has asserted that 'foreign policy must be based on local
policy [sic] and that policy is creating wealt.hê
However, whilst accepting such basic tenets, the ANC elite is well aware of
the negative downside and constraints that are concomitant with the increasingly
globalising world in which they have found themselves. Neo-liberalism has
generated massive disparities on a global scale - as one observer remarked:
These contradictions are social, political and economic, and they are both
"local" and "global" in character. Perhaps the central social contradiction of
global politics today resolves around what used to be called "uneven
development": the polarising and wrenching consequences of the huge
growth in global inequality within and between nations.«
At the same time, the GNU is caught in a web of contradictions that are derivative
of the historic compromise that saw it accede to power. Not least of these is the fact
that its main partners in government (as well as substantial elements within the
ANC's own ranks) have a highly ambivalent if not hostile posture towards the
process of globalisation, and in particular the negative manifestations of this.
Though as has been seen, the ANC elite has largely cast aside its former dirigiste
pretensions, there are substantial fractions within the ruling party who have
opposing positions on which macro-economic policies would suit South Africa's
peoples best.
Yet at the same time, leading elements of the GNU - encouraged by local and
international capital - accept the basic tenets of the hegemonic order, arguing that
there is "no alternative" to neo-liberalist prescriptions. In part this springs from a
particular conception of the international political economy which is seen as
exerting powerful pressures on any alternative postures. As a result, the GNUhas
acted 'with a high degree of sensitivity to the constraints imposed by the global
system' and reforms 'have been shaped to fit with many of the orthodoxies set by
2 Aziz Pahad quoted in 'Bearing the Burden of Success', Enterprise, vol. 96, March 1996, p.
90.
3 Dumisani Kumalo, Director of United States Bilateral Relations, Department of Foreign
Affairs, in response to question at IDASA's headquarter's, Cape Town, March 25, 1999.
4 Stephen Gill 'Structural Changes in Multilateralism: The G-7 Nexus and the Global Crisis'
in Michael Schechter (ed.) Innovation in Multilateralistri London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 116.
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the external environment, often when these are at odds with the proposals put
forward during the ANC's long period of liberation st.ruggle"> This has created
fundamental tensions within the ranks of the South African government and
essentially has meant that in its foreign policy 'the GNU has to play to two
audiences at the same time, with different sets of expectationsv
It is in realisation of this actuality that as a country that aims to promote its
South identity, whilst at the same time acceding to the dominant discourse, South
Africa has pursued an essentially contradictory policy of embracing neo-liberalism
whilst at the same time striking a public pose of trying to alleviate the worst
aspects of globalisation - in part aiming to placate the vocal criticism from the Left
vis-a-vis its overall policy posture. This policy is inherently inconsistent: as one
analysis put it, 'there is [a] quite obvious tension between on the one hand
supporting global free trade, and on the other committing oneself to changing the
rules of the system to ensure greater equity'." Indeed, such attempts at soothing
powerful elements of its domestic constituency must be combined with 'appropriate
responses to the awesome challenges posed by an increasingly globalised economy,
in which the rest of sub-Saharan Africa participates on ever more unfavourable
terms. This requires an extremely difficult balancing act.»
This is, as has been suggested, particularly apparent in Pretoria's
multilateralist activity where South Africa promotes a tactical and reformist agenda
that aims at an amelioration of the global politico-economic system and promotes a
rules-based trading regime. This is, it is offered, in part a result of the effect that
neo-liberalism has had/is having on the South. Whilst the ANC elite shares with
the capitalist transnational class the belief that no-orie can "buck the market" and
that there is currently "no alternative" for a state like South Africa to pursue neo-
liberalist macro-economic strictures, it can be argued that the ANC postures an
agenda that strives to ultimately ease the most harmful effects of this ongoing
5 AndrewCooper, 1998,p. 705.
6 Philip Nel 'Conceptionsof GlobalisationAmongthe South African Elite', Global Dialogue,
vol.4, no. 1,April 1999,p. 23.
7 LisaThompsonand AnthonyLeysens 'Comments:South AfricanForeignPolicyDiscussion
Document',unpublished paper, August 1996, p. 8.
S Paul-HenriBischoffand RogerSouthall 'The Early ForeignPolicyof the DemocraticSouth
Africa' in Stephen Wright (ed.)African Foreign Policies Boulder: WestviewPress, 1999, p.
154.
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order. As one leading South African policy-maker put it, 'globalisation is a reality
we can't stop. Certain areas of globalisation creates difficulties for the South, so
how do we make sure the negative effects do not visit South Africa?"?
Such a broad policy serves the important function of exhibiting to its
constituency on the Left that the ANCis actively striving for the benefit of the less
advantaged, both within and without the country's borders, whilst at the same time
signalling to the power-holders at the intemationallevel (and domestically) that the
GNU can be trusted to play by the common sense rules of the game. As one
analysis frames it:
South African policy-makers cannot escape the demands for increasing
economic liberalisation emanating from transnational capitalist forces and
international financial institutions in the world political economy. On the
other hand, the feasibility of implementing such policies ...unilaterally are
severely curtailed by the high expectations and demands with which a future
democratic government will have to deal [with].10
In short, whilst as a government in power the ANC adheres to the essential tenets
of neo-liberalism; as a party in alliance with the SACP and COSATUand having a
residual and fairly strong Leftist element within its ranks, the GNUmust perform a
balancing act. Adopting a reformist element to its foreign policy regarding the
global political economy is one way in which this can be achieved. Indeed, 'such
reformist commitments are a way of deflecting the perceived negative effects of
globalisation on the South African state, and of displaying a commitment to change
for the sake of domestic coalition partners to the Left'.!' This is reflected in its
foreign policy, hence a reformist agenda at multilateral fora is one particular way in
which the contradictory effect of acceding to neo-liberalism whilst having to play to
a less-than-convinced gallery of supporters is manifested by the ANC-led
government.
This is also symbolically typified by Pretoria's "independent" stance ins-a-cis
Washington and the capitalist heartland over such issues as oil from Iran or
relations with Fidel Castro. As Patrick Bond writes, Pretoria is 'willing to snub New
World Order opinion by embracing Castro, Gaddaffi, and Arafat while playing front-
9 Jackie Selebi, in response to questions during presentation to Department of Political
Science, University of Stellenbosch, February 26, 1999.
10 Anthony Leysens and Lisa Thompson, 1997, p. 65.
Il Philip Nel, 1999, p. 35.
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man for the United States where it really counts: control of African geopolitics [and]
endorsement of neo-liberal economics'i P In short, relations with such "renegades"
is a useful tool by which the ANCgovernment can deflect criticism of its essentially
pro-capitalist post-apartheid foreign policy. By being seen to maintain contact with
its former allies in the liberation struggle, the ANC government sends out a
message to important constituencies within and without the country that, contrary
to appearance, the movement has not "sold out".
Yet, the relations with such states are really of little substance at the final
analysis and despite the criticism from the Right within South Africa, amount to
very little and certainly are not a indication of any general "tilt" towards the more
confrontationist elements within the South. Indeed, such relations are quite
contradictory for reformist rhetoric aside Pretoria is one of the more accomodatory
nations in the South vis-a-vis the North and actively postures itself as a "bridge"
between the developed and developing world. In our theoretical understanding,
such a policy is identified as Pretoria's playing of a middlepowermanship role which
ultimately serves to further the ongoing hegemonic order whilst ostensibly
posturing a mediating role in times of crisis. Indeed, within the context of South
African foreign policy, relations with such "renegades" and periodic spats with
Washington serve a highly useful purpose, for they suggest independence of mind
in Pretoria whilst never seriously confronting the real issues behind the ongoing
relationship between North and South, indeed between Washington and Pretoria.
As one analysis puts it, such ostensible confrontations 'provides a way of critically
engaging (at times de-legitimising) the US and the dominant norms in the global
political economy, without confronting the dominant power on fundamental
issues'.13
Indeed, relations with Washington are complex and contradictory. Within the
theoretical understanding of this work, the United States is not seen as being
hegemonic. It is true that in the past hegemonic blocs were situated in the main
within a particular spatial territory. However, in the epoch of globalisation a shift
from state-centric notions of power must be accommodated. In our conception, it is
the historic bloc comprised of a transnational class elite that is the agent of
12 Patrick Bond 'ANC's Chief Operator Moves Centre Stage', Red Pepper, February 1998.
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hegemony - organised around the principles of neo-liberalism - and not an
individual state as such. This dominant transnational historic bloc of social forces
constitutes the elite class fractions that are outwardly-linked in a complex web of
social networks that have at their core a material interest in the promotion of the
neo-liberalist project. Hegemonic power is no longer simply located in one state -
making talk of the supposed decline of Washington and elaborate theories
regarding hegemonic stability theory redundant, if not eccentric. 14
Clearly, the hegemony of a transnational elite remains based on the
preponderance of American political and economic power, in the main because the
Washington elite are the main political (and at times, military) affirmers of neo-
liberalism, but this hegemonic order is not an exclusively American project and the
United States is not "the hegemon". As one analysis puts it, 'power based on
territory co-exists with power inherent in de-territorialised spheres of finance and
production'. IS An intricate process of change in economic forces and the
restructuring of global production (and the concomitant rise of an elite
transnational class) has resulted in 'the transformation of both US hegemony and
the global political economy. US hegemony has changed from an outward
projection of US "national" hegemony. What is emerging is a necessarily incomplete
form of transnational, neo-liberal dominance, one which is nevertheless anchored
in US political and military centrality', but which cannot be simply reduced to a
simple reduction to American "interests" .16
In essence, this means that whilst the United States remains central to the
ongoing hegemonic project, this is only due to the preponderant structural power
that American fractions of the transnational historic bloc possess. As a result, the
questioning of a particular position held by Washington does not necessarily mean
that Pretoria rejects the normative global order. It is the fundamentals of the global
order that remain central: normative principles that are shared and propagated by
the ongoing transnational historic bloc, of which the leadership of the GNU and
globally-oriented elite fractions within South Africa are elements of. Such an
13 Philip Nel, 1999, p. 35.
14 For a critique of hegemonic stability theory, see Susan Strange 'The Persistent Myth of
Lost Hegemony', International Organization, vol. 41, no. 4, Autumn 1987.
15 Robert Cox 'Introduction' in Robert Cox (ed.), 1997, p. xix.
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understanding suggests why Pretoria has to date restricted itself to policies that are
well within the ambit of the neo-liberalist discourse, but which aim to smooth out
difficulties in the ongoing order.
To deploy Cox's phrase, South Africa indulges in "problem-solving"
behaviour in its multilateral relations. Pretoria at times de-legitimises the dominant
powers - in particular their behaviour on global trading matters and the hypocrisy
that demands the "opening up" of markets in the South whilst surreptitiously
keeping out exports from the developing world. This reflects the tensions between
the notions regarding "free trade" in theory, and the actual practical situation
where a "level playing field" is frequently absent, or skewed in favour of the
powerful - characterised as the contradictions between the ideology of neo-
liberalism and "really existing free market doctrine" .17
The use of tariff and non-tariff barriers; the demand for special treatment for
politically sensitive industries - such as textiles and agriculture - by developed,
states during the Uruguay Round; and "voluntary export quotas" "suggested" by
Northern administrations on Southern exporters are examples where the rhetoric of
free trade is not actually implemented by the powerful.ts The appeal to a rules-
based regime under the WTO is one example where Pretoria attempts to fit rhetoric
with practice, as is South Africa's membership of the agricultural lobbying
organisation, the Cairns Group. Its stance at forums such as the NAM and
UNCTAD also calIon the North to take its responsibilities seriously and act in
"partnership" with the South to alleviate and be more sensitive towards the more
negative aspects of the globalisation thrust.
Yet within a broader analysis, such posturing not only fails to address the
deeper structural underpinnings of the global order - the framework which keeps
the South (and South Africa) marginalised; it actually acts to legitimise that order,
for by indulging in problem-solving activity, Pretoria further reifies the common
sense notions surrounding the hegemony of neo-liberalism. By doing so, and by
pursing a foreign policy that remains essentially problem-solving, the GNU
16 Stephen Gill in Henk Overbeek (ed.), 1993, p. 246.
17 Noam Chomsky Profit Over People: Neo-Liberalism and Global Order New York: Seven
Stories Press, 1999, p. 34.
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leadership appears to take as a given that 'multilateralism in form is non-
hierarchical' (hence the rhetoric from South African policy makers regarding the
supposed equality of all within a multilateral setting); yet, 'in reality [this] cloaks
and obscures the reality of dominant-subordinate relatiorishipa'."?
Indeed, by raising essentially technical questions (however important these
issues may be to the day-to-day life of the country), the South African leadership
serves to contribute to making neo-liberalism accepted as the "only" macro-
economic framework and development strategy within which they (and by
implication, other Southern elites) can work within - and the best option which one
can pursue in such a scenario is to work via a "tactical" engagement policy to
maximise benefits. This essentially self-reinforcing policy has occurred within the
context of a globalised international political economy and the concomitant rise to
hegemony amongst the transnational elite of the precepts of neo-liberalism.
Not only is this linked to the material benefits that this transnational elite
and its class allies can expect to benefit from an acceptance and pursuance of neo-
liberalism, it also reflects the development where the elite in all international
financial institutions and most multilateral bodies and national administrations
earnestly believe that neo-liberalism is the best and only way to promote growth
and development (importantly, in that order). As one analyst remarked:
[C]ore interests have supported neo-liberalism not only for material gain but
also because there has been a genuine belief that it will lead to development.
For peripheral interests (LDCsas well as the "emerging market economies" of
central and eastern Europe), consent has been given with conviction that
participation in the global marketplace will benefit them.w
This helps account for the acceptance of the broad principles of neo-liberalism
within whose framework South Africa proffers up support within the global order.
This was seen explicitly in Pretoria's involvement in the second Tokyo International
Conference on African Development (TICAD II) which met in Japan in October
1998. Here, elites from African states, multilateral aid agencies, donor countries
and corporate representatives met to discuss ways in which African states could
18 Dot Keet Globalisatiori and Reqionalisation: Contradictory Tendencies, Counteractive Tactics,
or Strategie Possibilities? Braamfontein: Foundation for Global Dialogue, 1999, p. 10.
19 Robert Cox 'Introduction" in Robert Cox (ed.) The New Realism: Perspectives on
Multilateralism and World Order London: Macmillan, 1997, p. xvi.
20 Kelley Lee in Andrew Linklater and J. Macmillan (eds.), 1995, p. 156.
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reduce poverty and integrate their markets more successfully into the global
economy. At the conference there was an 'expectation that South Africa [would]
playa crucial role in shaping the next phase of the Conference that is, deepening of
the process and the translation of its broader aims into viable projecta'<! These
'broader aims' were stressed by Thabo Mbeki, whose attendance at the Conference
underscored the importance Pretoria regarded the agenda to be set by TICAD II.
This agenda, supported by Mbeki, included:
The establishment of sound, open macro-economic policies, including
liberalised exchange and trade systems and investment regimes; the
implementation of economic and structural reform programmes supported
by the World Bank and IMF to establish the necessary track records for
receiving debt relief, and generally promoting good governance, democracy
and respect for human rights and the rule of law.22
Such prescriptions, agreed to by Mbeki and other leading Southern elites, fits with
the dominant orthodoxy. Indeed, this 'fits the project of the World Bank and other
donors who would like to see South Africa take the leading role to facilitate
collective economic liberalisation across the region by improving conditions for a
more active role by private agents'.23 It is this project that the South African
government accepts and endeavours to promote uis-a-uis development in Africa and
in its broader foreign policy stance.
As has been suggested, much of the GNU's posturing otherwise (largely
constricted to essentially positivist-like technical questions on smoothing out
problems in the ongoing order) is cast as an attempt to placate critics on the Left
who reject this position. This in itself springs from the fact that the post-apartheid
government's foreign policy reflects the contradictions of the historic compromise
that attempts to reconcile labour with business; outwardly-oriented capital with
productive domestically-oriented capital; the SACP with the nascent Black
bourgeoisie etc. All this and more is conducted within the wider framework where
neo-liberalism is the hegemonic project. In short, as will be demonstrated in the
proceeding chapter, South Africa abides by and promotes the ongoing discourse of
neo-liberalist economics and polyarchical politics in its foreign policy.
21 Sunday Independent (Johannesburg) March 16, 1998.
22 The Star (Johannesburg) October 23, 1998.
23 Fantu Cheru in Stephen Gill (ed.), 1997, p. 239.
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At the same time, conscious of the (particularly economic) contradictions
that this has for a nation of the South, Pretoria postures a reformist platform by
which it aims to ultimately ameliorate the more negative outcomes that neo-
liberalism has on developing economies. The ANC elite apparently sees no option
but to promote the broader remits of the ongoing project, yet is also spurred on to
attempt to promote a less harsher environment for the South to operate in. That
this foreign policy is contradictory is self-evident, yet as Schlemmer writes 'if the
government had proved anything, it was that it could hold contradictory policies in
balance'i>' The rest of this work aims to demonstrate how this is so within the
broader conduct of post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy, by examining
South Africa's involvement in a variety of multilateral fora.
24 Lawrence Schlemmer cited by South African Press Agency (Johannesburg) August 6, 1998.
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CHAPTER 4
SOUTH AFRICA'S "BRIDGE-BUILDING" ROLE WITHIN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER: ENGAGEMENT WITH MULTILATERAL
TRADE BODIES
SECTION I: SOUTH AFRICA AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION
The creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO)was the most serious attempt
yet to re-structure the international political economy and established what may be
viewed as the premier disciplinary agent of global capitalism as it is currently
organised viz. neo-liberalism. lts founding will have serious implications for all
actors in the intemational political economy. The flexibility and practicality that
had marked much of the GATT's regime - and which was cognisant of the
difficulties faced by administrations in liberalising their markets - has been
removed by the strict institutionalisation of normative principles regarding the
functioning of the global economy.v> This enshrining in international law of the
hegemonic discourse of neo-liberalism can be viewed as the ultimate playing out
par excellence of the globalisation thrusts that have animated the world in the last
two or more decades and the triumph (for now) of intemational capital and its
transnational agents.
Such institutionalisation of these forces and their interests as international
law has profound implications for South Africa's elites, grappling as they are with
reinserting the state into the world community. How the GNU has reacted to this
neo-liberalist watchdog informs the observer a great deal of what are the
fundamental contours of post-apartheid South Africa's engagement with the
international political economy.
25 See Prudence Gordon 'TheWorldTrade Organisation - Throwing the Baby Out with the
Bathwater? How Institutionalisation and Increased Regulation Might Undermine Trade
Liberalisation',Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 50, no. 3, 1996.
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Origins of the WTO
The formation of the WTO on January 1, 1995 flagged the most comprehensive
attempt at reforming international trade in the post-Second World War era. At the
same time, it was a reformulation (albeit in an updated form) of what had
ultimately been a failed project i.e. the International Trade Organisation (ITO)of
1948. Until the WTO's founding, global capitalism had been regulated more or less
under the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),a "provisional" body
that in itself had been a put together compromise extricated from the failed
negotiations surrounding the ITO. GATThad supplied the trading regulations and
rules for most of the capitalist world in the period 1948-1994, governing a regime
that was witness to prolonged growth rates in global commerce. Yet though
seemingly a well-established body, it was originally a provisional agreement and a
"temporary" organisation.
This provisionality in GATT'sstatus sprang from the events surrounding the
attempts in the 1940s to regulate global trade. As the Second World War was
coming to an end, the (capitalist) Allies met at Bretton Woods for discussions on
how to fashion the architecture of the post-war economic system. Perhaps at the
top of the negotiators' list was the question of international commerce, primarily
because tariffs imposed by Washington in 1930 were regarded as being the catalyst
to the various trade wars and then recession of the 1930s. In the minds of the
negotiators at Bretton Woods, these tariffs were causally linked to the social
conditions out of which sprang fascism and which were to eventually lead to world
war. The unanimity over this reading of history led to an essential unity in the West
grounded in a strategic and structural synthesis. The triumphant position of the
military-industrial complex in the United States and the New Deal
consensus/ compromise formed the foundations for an at first trans-Atlantic and
then progressively global deployment of a corporate-liberal "concept of control" - a
strategic synthesis of locally-based inwardly-looking capital's stress on planning
and state intervention at the national level á la Keynesianism, and the more
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
outwardly-oriented, global-in-outlook capital's emphasis on
intemationalism. 26
laissez-faire
American elites saw the GAIT then as a means by which to synthesise the
aspirations of two divergent elite fractions, aligning 'elements of the domestic New
Deal with a world-wide "Open Door" for US exports and investment'27 The power
and concomitant interests of this last fraction - outwardly-oriented capital (what
van der Pijl refers to as "money capital") - has progressively achieved dominance in
the post-war years, reconfiguring the global landscape and pushing forward the
drive to liberalisation. Indeed, it can be said that the rise of money capital has been
the defining moment of the current era, and it is this actuality that has provided
the stimulus to the reformulation of the GAIT as the WTO (see below).
The GATT'sprinciples and features
Originally, the aims of the Bretton Woods system was to be tripartite m nature.
Firstly, to ensure currency stability a fixed exchange rate mechanism (administered
by the International Monetary Fund) was to operate. This was a rejection of the
laissez faire approach to capital flows and reflected the "ButskeUite" class
compromises that had been achieved in much of the West between 'industrialists,
labour leaders, and Keynesian-minded state officials', who preferred a 'more
interventionist approach that would make domestic and international finance serve
broader political and economic goals'.28 This in itself reflected the 'double
movement' aimed at 'the conservation of man and nature as well as productive
organisationw
Secondly, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the
"WorldBank") was to promote economic recovery and renewal from the ruins of the
world war. Thirdly, a body was to be set up as a specialised agency of the UN that
26 William Carroll 'Restructuring Capital, Organising Consent: Gramsci, Political Economy,
and Canada', Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, vol. 27, no. 3, August, 1990,
p.396.
27Kees van der Pijl, 1984, p. 26.
28Eric Helleiner States and the Re-emergence of Global Finance: from Bretton Woods to the
1990s Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1994, pp. 27-28.
29 Karl Polanyi The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time
Boston: Beacon Press, 1957, p. 132.
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was to oversee global trade - the International Trade Organization. Originally, the
mandate of the ITO extended beyond the surveillance of global commerce, to
include regulations on employment, commodity contracts, prohibitive business
customs, international investment, and services - in short, 'to carry out the welfare
states' new orthodoxy of regulating national regulations of trade'i '? However,
because of problems with the ITO's supposed compatibility with the American
constitution - an objection raised by protectionist-inclined elements amongst
Washington's elite - the proposed body failed to be ratified by the capitalist
hegemon and so the GATT - which had started as a temporary organisation in 1947
as a preparatory body for a future ITO, survived for nearly fifty years - until being
superseded by the WTO.
The most important features of GATT (which now also apply to the World
Trade Organization) were probably Article I, which asserted the non-discriminatory
principle that a GATT member country must offer the same treatment to exports
from any other GATT member as the most favourable terms that it offers to any
specific member under the customary status of "Most Favoured Nation"; and Article
III which granted GATT members the same form of market access and other rights
as the domestic (national) producers of any other member state. Other significant
measures known as "plurilateral" agreements, that is with voluntary membership,
and efforts to reduce tariffs were also an important part of the GATT's ambitions in
an attempt at crafting a regime of 'embedded liberalism'<! Most of this was
accomplished through a series of multilateral trade rounds. Indeed, until the
formation of the WTO global trade liberalisation was driven by this process.
At first, GATT's energies were directed at reducing tariffs and addressing the
various protectionist measures left over from the 1930s. Progress was slow and it
was not until 1961 that the capitalist trading system was as open as it had been in
1924.32 Only from the 1973 Tokyo Round onwards were non-tariff barriers
increasingly important in the negotiations. Tokyo also marked a tentative move
towards the liberalisation of agricultural products - though agriculture was to
remain divorced from industrial goods.
30 Craig Murphy, 1994, p. 197.
31 John Ruggie, 1982.
32 Craig Murphy, 1994, p. 167.
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trade.>' Indeed, the action by many Western administrations selective
Proponents of the neo-liberalist structures advocated by the WTO have
argued that the increasingly liberalised trading regime under GATTfacilitated an
exponential growth in global commerce - and that the WTO is but are-negotiated
successor to GATT in the era of globalisation. Indeed, the success of GATT is
postured as 'incontestable'33 However, this interpretation is open to question. It is
true that GATTsucceeded in implementing successive rounds of tariff cuts which
resulted in a reduction in this type of protectionism. However, the major capitalist
powers adopted policies of 'selective intervention and subsidy in support of
particular sectors, enterprises or regions within their own domestic economy', thus
undermining the notion that liberalisation was responsible for the growth in global
liberalisation - allowed the state elites to lessen the impact of tariff cuts and
permitted them to protect politically sensitive parts of their national economies. Not
only would this protect the specific elites situated at the head of such "sensitive"
(and usually strategically important) industries; it also allowed the national
leadership to posture a protective stance towards those labour constituencies it
was shielding.
Such policies worked within the Keynesian and mercantilist frameworks of
the post-war consensus that saw "the market" as a discredited form by which to
steer macro-economic policy.ê> Such a line of thought viewed government
interference not as problematic, but as strategically necessary:
[TJhis form of protectionism had the advantage that it was not only more
flexible but also less conspicuous and thus less likely to attract the attention
of foreign competitors or the GATT. In some cases, such as textiles, it was
clearly too costly, or politically untenable, to use such means to prevent the
decline of major industries in the industrialised West. Yet even then it was
possible to devise mechanisms - in the shape of the Multi-Fibre Agreement
introduced in the 1960s - which made it possible to slow down the process
of decline.
It is thus implausible to suggest that the lowering of tariffs under the GATT
acted as a significant stimulus to the rapid growth that occurred.ê=
33 World Trade Organisation, 'Roots: From Havana to Marrakesh',
http://www.wto.org/about/facts4.htm
34 HarryShutt The Trouble with Capitalism: An Enquiry into the Causes of Global Economic
Failure London: Zed Books, 1998, p. 28.
3S Stephen Gill, 1991, p. 96.
36 Harry Shutt, 1998, p. 28.
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This and similar assertions undermine the neo-liberalist mantra-like assertion that
liberalisation is the panacea to international trade and will lead inexorably to
growth. For sure, GATTmade favourable the post-war development in global trade,
and hence in a roundabout way the substantial rate of expansion, but this was
done within the framework of interventionist policies and macro-economic dirigisme
that were supportive of this growth - and with recognisable attempts at equity - that
are wholly absent in the current hegemonic discourse centred around liberalisation
and appeals to "the market". Yet it is such assumptions that largely drive the
trajectory of the WTO's normative agenda - an agenda that is 'the expression of the
hegemony of a transnational ruling class united behind a concept of control
reflecting the particular configuration of capitalist forces'_37
GATT'sweakening
The late 1960s saw not only an emerging crisis lil Fordism and a decline in the
competitiveness of American-based productive capital (which spurred the
government to devise other forms of protection for sectors facing increased foreign
competition), but also the strengthening of the fractional position of money capital.
Contradictions within the capitalist polity began to emerge as the consensus
surrounding the post-war compromise began to unravel. Whilst mushrooming rates
of unemployment and a continual inability to resolve the crisis within the status
quo framework sparked widespread labour unrest, governments in the capitalist
heartland felt compelled to pursue bilateral market-sharing settlements with
competitors (thus undermining the multilateralist principles upon which the GATT
was ostensibly predicated), and to launch what became a subsidies race in their
attempt to retain a grip on their share of agricultural trade. Such a playing out
from the structural crisis weakened GATT'sproficiency and credibility.
At the same time, with the discarding of one of the three pillars of Bretton
Woods - namely capital controls - money capital was released from its regulation by
national central banks and large amounts of (particularly American) capital were
transferred to the periphery. The seeds of this went back to 1958 when the
convertibility of currencies was restored in Europe with the founding of the EEC.
37 Kees van der Pijl, 1998, p. 5.
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This fostered 'capital mobility and growing payments imbalances between the major
economies [and] undermined the sustainability of the system of fixed exchange
rates', leading to Nixon's unilateral decision.ê'' By doing so, the New International
Division of Labour was formed, undermining the compromise which underpinned
the very structure of post-war Atlantic integration.ê? Indeed, 'the dramatic
expansion in the capacity of capital to move rapidly across national and regional
markets [was] intimately linked to the disruption of the Bretton Woods
conseneu s '."? At the same time, the retreat to unilateral behaviour by Washington
spurred other parties to pursue their own bilateral or regionalist agreements whilst
at the same time increasingly retreating behind protectionist postures of varying
degree. This struck at the heart of the GAIT - the principle of non-discrimination -
and was seen as threatening the very existence of a multilateral regime governing
world trade.
This process coincided with a gradual turn in the complexity of the global
economy which further undermined the GAIT's relevancy, particularly by the early
1980s. Global trade had become far more complex over the previous forty years and
the GAIT was unable to cope with this development. In particular, the GAIT's rules
and regulations found itself unable to adjust to the new agenda of global trade
centred around trade in services - transport, travel, banking, insurance,
telecommunications, transport, consultancy etc. This new form of trade went hand-
in-hand with the "third wave" of scientific innovation, the trade in ideas and
knowledge-intensification, ever-changing technology and innovative goods and
services. These processes accelerated structural changes in the global economy.
Not that this was teleological. As one analysis puts it:
The words chosen by...standard-bearers of the new globalism would make
one think that it is all a natural outcome of inexorable scientific and
technological progress. But that is nonsense. Global economic integration is
by no means a natural process; it is consciously driven by a single-minded
policy. In every agreement and in every piece of new legislation, it has always
been the decisions of governments and parliaments which have removed the
barriers to cross-border movement of capital and goods.v'
38 Stephen Gill in Yoshikazu Sakamoto (ed.), 1994, p. 175.
39 Kees van der Pijl, 1984, p. xviii.
40 Louis Pauly, 1997, p. 32.
41 Hans-Peter Martin and Harald Schumann, 1997, p. 8.
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Nonetheless, the organisational changes that followed the new "intellectual
property" of the post-Fordist era meant that the trade in services - not included by
the regulations of the GATT- were of considerable interest to more and more state
elites. Those particularly in the North 'resented the fact that [these] newly emerging
sectors such as services were left out of GATTand that the latter had little to offer
in terms of intellectual property protectiorr'<? At the same time, much of the South
saw the failure to include agriculture within the GATT'sremit as an indication that
the regime was essentially unfavourable to their developmental aspirations,
particularly when loopholes in the multilateral system were heavily exploited by the
North and efforts at liberalising agricultural trade were strongly resisted by the
developed world.
Such factors and others saw a weakening of GATT and persuaded its
members that the very survival of a rules-based multilateral trading regime was at
stake. Furthermore, this movement towards a reformulation of the GATToccurred
within the context of the neo-liberal counter-revolution - a theme that has already
been remarked upon. In short, the agenda behind the Uruguay Round was clearly
linked to the scenario where 'monetarism and supply-side economics [had]
claim[ed] succession to [Keynesianism's] hegemonic aura'r'" Energy was thus
channelled into addressing the issues that had undermined the GATT and
constructing a revitalised and extended multilateral system which was within the
remit and bolstered the neo-liberalist project. These activities led to the Uruguay
Round, the Marrakesh Declaration and ultimately, the formation of the WTO.
The Uruguay Round and Marrakesh Declaration
In November 1982 in Geneva a ministerial meeting of GATTmembers attempted to
launch an important new round of negotiations. Though the conference ultimately
failed - brought down by the agriculture issue - the work programme that the
Geneva meeting had agreed to came to provide the basis of the negotiating agenda
for what was to become known as the "Uruguay Round". Despite this, it took
42 'Introduction' in Riccardo Faini and Enzo Grilli (eds.) Multilateralism and Regionalism After
the Uruguay Round Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997, p. xiii.
43 Robert Cox The Global Political Economy and Social Choice' in Robert Cox with Timothy
Sinclair, 1997, p. 206.
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another four years before the varIOUSadministrations agreed to launch the new
round of negotiations, doing so in September 1986, in Punta del Este, Uruguay.
The gathered ministers eventually accepted a negotiating agenda which:
[CJoveredvirtually every outstanding trade policy issue. The talks were going
to extend the trading system into several new areas, notably trade in
services and intellectual property, and to reform trade in the sensitive
sectors of agriculture and textiles. All the original GATTarticles were up for
review.s-
Space precludes an examination of the intricate negotiations that led to the
formation of the WTO.45 What shall be briefly commented upon are the
fundamental principles that the Marrakesh Declaration outlined, and in particular
how these will affect the South. Only then can Pretoria's behaviour within and
towards the disciplinary body in the context of its post-1994 foreign policy be
discussed.
On April IS, 1994 the Marrakesh Declaration was signed, paving the way for
the formation of the WTO. From the beginning the Declaration was a compromise
that protected the North's agricultural sector - a theme that shall be returned to in
our discussion of the Cairns Group. Lobbyists for the European agricultural
industry had strongly resisted any deal which posed a threat to their protected
position, whilst agricultural producers outside of Europe were very reluctant to
sign a deal which did not tackle the reform of the European market and a halt to its
non-competitive behaviour. In short, the Declaration was a compromise and in
'instances where the choice was between risking serious conflict and attempting to
enforce the letter of GATT disciplines - for example on regional integration or
subsidies - the contracting parties generally "blinked'".« This being said, the WTO
put forward a radical and far-reaching agenda for the future regulation of world
trade:
Services Previously GATThad primarily focused on the trade in goods. As has been
commented upon, this was rapidly superseded in the 1980s by a massive growth in
44 World Trade Organisation The Uruguay Round', http://www.wto.org/about/facts5.htm
45 For details and background, see Bernard Hoekman and Michael Kostecki The Political
Economy of the World Trading System: From GATT to WTO Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1995; Anne Krueger (ed.) The WTO as an International Organization Chicago: Chicago
University Press, 1998; and Alan Oxley The Challenge of Free Trade New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1990.
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the proportion of world output and trade being situated in services - such as
finance, telecommunications, tourism and the media. The Uruguay Round sought
to apply the same principles to services trade as applied to goods (such as most
favoured nation and non-discrimination). At the heart of the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS)was the effective commodification of financial services and
the extension of legal obligations to free capital movement, which essentially
overrode national economic sovereignty. At the same time, 'the definition of exports
[was] extended in the case of services to include production by foreign-owned
subsidiaries in the host country. Trade regulation [was] thus ...extended for the first
time to the internal market regimes of member statesr'"
Agriculture Terms of the agreement encompassed market access, internal
supports and subsidised exports. New regulations on sanitary standards were to be
introduced in the North over a six-year period whilst food-importing states were
granted ten years. Least developed countries were exempt. This deal, known as the
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures was designed to reduce the
ability of states - often heavily influenced by a disproportionately powerful
agricultural lobby - to use sanitary standards as a barrier to imports.
As an industry notorious for its amount of non-tariff barriers, these were to
undergo a process of "tariffication" i.e. to be converted to tariffs. Developed
countries were committed to reducing tariffs by 36% over six years, whilst
developing countries must reduce them by 24% over ten years (primary staples
being exempted). Exceptions remained, but the deal was the first concerted success
in liberalising trade in agricultural products.
Yet, the effect of these measure will be uneven throughout the South. The
reduction of export subsidies by Europe and the United States will make those
countries that also export similar agricultural products (e.g. South Africa) more
competitive as their costs are cheaper - their market share is expected to rise. A
study by the OECD-World Bank has estimated that prices for many foodstuffs
(wheat, maize, barley, meat and dairy products etc.) will rise by up to seven per
46 Bernard Hoekman and Michael Kostecki, 1995, p. 8.
47 Alan Freeman 'Fixing Up the World? GATI' and the World Trade Organisation', Links, no.
10, March-July, 1998, p. 82
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cent.w Whilst food-exporting countries (such as South Africa) will benefit from this
development, net importers - very often the least developed states - will suffer.
Certainly, any rise in the cost of food imports will compound the difficulties of the
debt-burdened states - those that can least afford such an outcome.
Textiles Under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement of 1961, limitations on the amount of
textiles imported into developed countries from the South had acted as effective
taxes on the developing world's exports. Under the rubric of the WTO these quotas
will be phased out over a period of ten years. This will have a mixed effect on the
developing world, for whilst relatively efficient textile producers will be freed from
the effective taxes imposed on them by the MFA when exporting to the North
(industries in states such as China, Thailand, India and South Africa stand to
gain), less efficient textile producers - largely concentrated in Central America and
the Caribbean - will lose out unless their productivity is raised."? Of course, how
this "competitiveness" is achieved is highly controversial, though usually one of the
first casualties is labour as "flexibility" and a lowering of "costs" is high on the
agenda. This invariably results in increased job insecurity, the repression of labour
rights and the intensification of the exploitation of fernales.>?
Furthermore, the phasing out of the quotas on imports from the developing
world is slow (ten years) and in that period the scramble in the South to position
themselves as the most "competitive" in order to place their exports in the markets
of the North is likely to become a "race to the bottom" for the average textile worker
in developing countries. This is particularly so in an era where the ability to
compete at all costs undermines any residual sympathy the elites in the South may
have had for its working class. After all, often 'the [only] competitive advantage
which poorer countries have is their poverty' and the ability to produce with
minimal labour costs, whilst the elites see investment as the solution to all their
problems (as well as a possible source of enrichment via "deals").51 Any labour
48 Martin Khor Kok Peng 'The End of the Uruguay Round and Third World Interests', paper
published by Third World Network, February 1994.
49 Shalendra Sharma 'The World Trade Organisation and Implications for Developing
Countries', SAISReview, vol. 17, no. 2, Summer-Fall 1997, p. 66.
50 Myriam van der Stichele Globalisation, Marginalisation and the WTO Brussels:
Transnational Institute, WTOBooklet Series vol. 2, 1997, p. 5.
51 Oxfam World Trade Organisation', Oxfam Briefing Paper for the WTO Ministerial
Conference, September 1996.
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unrest which threatens this is likely to provoke repression - textile-producing
Bangladesh is a classic example of all of these points.
Tariffs Once the Uruguay Round is fully implemented, tariffs on imports of
industrial products by the developed world will fall from an average of 6.4% to just
4.0%. Non-tariff barriers - quotas and subsidies - will be converted to tariffs and
then progressively eliminated through scheduled reductions.
Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)Though intellectual property
rights had been covered by the 132 member World Intellectual Property
Organisation since 1967, the TRIPs proviso went much further and covered
patents, copyright and trademarks. Supporters of the provisions were all states
located in the developed world and based their argument on the grounds that
protection stimulated research and development i.e. there is little incentive to
engage in research if the new inventions which spring from this process cannot be
protected from rival competitors. Hence states that established an effective
protection for intellectual property rights were more likely to be recipients of
investment from companies anxious about the illicit duplication of their intellectual
property.
Opposition to this position was found in the South who saw it as a scheme
to perpetuate the advantage the North had over the developing world. The
provisions surrounding TRIPs made illegal the trade in products containing any
technology less than twenty years old, unless it was in line with the specifications
of the current holder of the patent. Virtually all holders of intellectual property
rights are situated in the North - only 0.16% of world patents are held by residents
of the South.w This fact essentially means that most (patented) technological
innovations come from OECD countries, and their ability to withhold this
technology - or to set their own price for it - will hamper the efforts of developing
economies to grow. As one analyst put it, the WTO's regulations conceming TRIPs
transformed
[T]he owner of a technical process a separate legal entity distinct not only
from the labourer but also the factory or farm-owner and the original
inventor. They transform the ownership and control of technology into a
marketable instrument of domination ... set[ting] in concrete the principal
S2 John Mihevc The Market Tells Them So London: Zed Books, 1995.
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market mechanism that impoverishes the Third World, namely the transfer
of technological super-profit through trade.s-'
In an appeal against what was perceived as the hypocrisy of the North over "free
trade" (a position that South Africa has also pursued), opponents of the TRIPs
provisions also argued that the WTO's agenda was based on the reduction of trade
barriers and that the rules surrounding intellectual property rights was actually a
reversal of this, designed to protect the North from competition from the South.
Indeed resistance from the South meant that there could be no agreement on a
world-wide limit on the expiry of some intellectual property rights - patents for
instance - although the essentially Northern-based pharmaceutical industry was
conferred a five year marketing monopoly on new products. Furthermore, states in
the South have the ability to delay the complete compliance of the TRIPs agreement
for up to ten years.
Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) This agreement lays down the rule
that local content and trade-balancing requirements are against GATTnational
treatment regulations. Six types of TRIMs are prohibited which are seen as
attempts to direct or control foreign investment. For the South perhaps one of the
most worrisome of these new rulings is that on local content requirements and
trade balancing requirements that compel investors to export as much as they
import. This will be abolished. 54Such new rules profoundly undermines the ability
of developing countries to impose conditions on foreign investors. For sure, this
prescription is in the interests of transnational corporations who will benefit from
the "liberalisation" of the investment procedure, but it is likely to see many small-
scale domestic businesses in the South collapse in the face of the arrival of
Northern mega-corporations.
In essence, the WTOwas founded as one of the main structures of global
governance in an increasingly globalised international political economy, forming
the third arm of what the G-77 chairman has termed 'a New Institutional Trinity
[whose] specific function [is] to control and dominate the economic relations that
commit the developing world'.55 This body was granted far-ranging disciplinary
53 Alan Freeman, 1998, p. 82.
54 Shalendra Sharma, 1997, p. 67.
55 Luis Fernando Jaramillo 'Q-77 Chairman Criticise Uruguay Round Outcome as Against
the South', speech presented in NewYork, January 1994.
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powers that saw its surveillance mission widened beyond that of GAIT to
encompass sectors previously governed by' protectionist policies, such as textiles
and agriculture, as well as what has already been referred to as "new" issues -
regulation of investment measures, services, intellectual property rights etc.
The South and the WT056
During the era when the GAIT regime was at its height, developing countries were
in a position where they could neutralise the application of the liberalising thrust of
the agreements by banding together via multilateral bodies such as UNCTADor the
Non-Aligned Movement. The first in particular was set up to promote the South's
interests on the international trade front and thus aid development. Northern
dominance of GAIT was seen as problematic, though at the height of the NIEO era
a number of developing countries engaged with the body during the Tokyo Round
and in fact succeeded in obtaining the legalisation of preferential tariff and non-
tariff treatment for the South in the form of the Generalised System of Preferences
of 1971. Essentially, a two-tiered global system developed where the developing
world, after hard and consistent lobbying, was exempted from the requirement to
reciprocate in its trade with the North - a tacit recognition of the structural
inequalities that the developing world suffered from and a reflection of the broadly
dependenista-tinged ethos then current amongst those multilateral bodies
ostensibly dealing with the South's problems.
This engagement with GAIT was based upon the knowledge that an
alternative economic system in the East provided the developing world with a
measure of autonomy and political space, and took a fair degree of pressure off of
many Southern elites that would otherwise have been applied by the developed
world. However, the Uruguay Round occurred at a time of momentous structural
change throughout the world and when the Round ended with the Marrakesh
Declaration the global landscape had fundamentally altered, drastically
undermining if not destroying the (relative) positions of negotiating strength the
56 For a comprehensive overview of how the organisation will affect the developing world, see
Emma Jones and Paul Whittingham Understanding the World Trade Organisation:
Implications and Possibilities for the South Braamfontein: Foundation for Global Dialogue,
1998.
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South had enjoyed vis-a-ins the developed West. The demise of the actually existing
socialist states not only removed an alternative market and supplier, it also
undermined any dirigiste certainties that much of the developing world had clung
to.
Thus the reassertion ofAmerican-based domination over the Third World (an
ongoing project of Reagan); combined with the "lost decade" of chronic debt
accumulation, in part worsened by the application of structural adjustment
programmes; and all within the overarching context of a global movement
rightwards on economic policy at the expense of any redistributionist VISIOn,
profoundly altered the global balance of power. This was compounded by the
switch in attention (what little there was) away from the South towards the East
and the reconstruction of eastern Europe according to liberal precepts, whilst the
seemingly exponential growth of east Asia held out the temptation to Southern
elites that export-based economies and international trade was the panacea to all
their problems.
South solidarity (understandably) largely evaporated in the face of such an
onslaught and much of the developing world's behaviour throughout the Uruguay
Rounds (after being inextricably drawn into the process) were essentially rearguard
attempts at warding off the more intolerable demands of the North. In essence,
much of the South went along with the provisions of the Uruguay Round out of fear
of something worse. American willingness to tackle those administrations deemed
out of step with prevailing "realities" and "common sense" was a major spur in this
direction, particularly as American trade legislation - e.g. the 301 Trade Policy -
provided for open and highly damaging discrimination against those states who
supposedly had a weak intellectual property protection regime - an 'aggressive
unilateralism' as such behaviour has been termed.57
In short, like all other Rounds under GATTthe Uruguay Round was marked
by compromise, concessions and horse-trading. This was largely (though not
exclusively) done amongst the major players - "the Quad" of the United States,
Canada, the European Union and Japan - and the South, negotiating from a
57 Jagdish Bhagwati and Hugh Patrick (eds.) Aggressive Unilateralism: America's 301 Trade
Policy and the World Trading System Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990.
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position of weakness and concerned at their continued marginalisation, saw little
option but to go along with the decisions of the predominant powers such as
Europe and the United States. It is true that agricultural producers formed the
Caims Group to push for improved access to the protected markets of the OECD,
but it is probably correct in suggesting that for many elites of the South,
endorsement for the formation of the WTOcentred around fear that failure to do so
would stimulate a move by the North to concentrate on regional trading groups i.e.
NAFTAand the EU - a process which would only contribute to their further
marginalisation.
At the same time, many of the elites in the South had accepted much of the
precepts of the hegemonic neo-liberalist project and perhaps saw hope in the WTO
as a vehicle by which the markets of the North could be truly opened up to
competition from the developing world - a process which stood to benefit important
fractions of the Southern-based elites (even if the reverse action threatened to
impact negatively on the majority). This reflected the change in attitude towards
GATTamongst much of the Southem elites. Formerly regarding the body as a "rich
man's club", many had slowly accepted the "common sense" of neo-liberalism and
these elements from 'the developing countries had become active and constructive
participants in the ongoing GATTnegotiations', seeking out the best deals they
could for their local elites.v' This being so, it is the policy of attempting to get the
developed world to fulfil its obligations regarding WTO prescriptions that Pretoria
has seemingly adopted regarding its interaction with the body - a subject that shall
now be turned to.
South Africa and the WTO
Pretoria's posture towards the WTOis predicated on the position that 'capitalism is
the only game in town and integration into the world economy via an open liberal
economy the only path to progressw As was detailed in the previous chapter, the
GNUhas accepted the hegemony of neo-liberalism and the essential tenets and
58 Michael Hart 'The WTO and the Political Economy of Globalisation', Journal of World
Trade, vol. 31, no. 5, October 1997, p. 76.
59 Meghnad Desai 'Organising the Only Game in Town', World Today, vol. 52, no. 12,
December 1996, p. 310.
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constraints of the ongoing order. In particular, the post-apartheid government
accepts that "investor-friendly" policies are an ostensible precursor to investment
capital flows and hence growth of the economy. At the same time however,
Pretoria's foreign policy must balance the desire to appear as attractive as possible
to money capital with its commitment to redistributive goals and soothe the
concerns of its Leftist partners and constituency. One way it attempts to strike this
balance - however contradictory this may actually be - is to adopt a reformist
position at various multilateral bodies. This can be seen in evidence when looking
at Pretoria's role in organisations such as UNCTADand the NAM.Within the WTO
South Africa has adopted a tactic that is well within the remit of neo-liberalism.
Indeed, it has actually the potential to cause considerable embarrassment to the
elites situated in the North. Essentially, South Africa has "turned the table" on the
dominant powers in the global economy and highlighted their hypocrisy uis-a-uis
"free trade" and "liberalisation".
This policy is based around the rhetoric of the "rules-based" system that the
WTO puts forward. Indeed, the Director-General of the Department of Foreign
Affairs has suggested that the promotion of such a global regime is a major plank
to South Africa's foreign policy and is integral to the GNU's pro-growth policies:
[T]he creation of a rules-based international system of interaction between
states contributes to our domestic agenda. The setting of international
standards and rules, the creation of transparent trading and other systems
and ensuring that no single country or group of countries can dominate world
affairs...creates an environment within which growth and development can
take ·place.60
Within such an international system there are "obligations" that members states
must abide by. At the same time, there are "rights" which a member state can
expect and it is this flip-side of the rules that Pretoria has attempted to push in its
engagement with the organisation. For sure, the GNU accepts that it has
obligations stemming from its membership of the WTOand broadly accedes to such
prescriptions - Dumisani Kumalo of the Department of Foreign Affairs phrased this
60 Jackie Selebi 'Address by Mr JS Selebi, Director-General of the Department of Foreign
Affairs, to the South African Institute of International Affairs', issued by Media Section,
Department of Foreign Affairs, Johannesburg, May 18, 1999.
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as South Africa 'assuming the responsibility of taking control of governrnerrt'A' Yet
at the same time, it is conscious that the obligations to be undertaken by the
developing world are 'all specific, onerous, and couched in mandatory language of
"shall"', whilst those that reflect the rights that can be expected from accession to
the body 'are couched in the language "should", "could" or "take into account"'.62
Attempting to turn such commitments into concrete actualities and promote equal
treatment for all is one way the GNU has decided to interact with the WTO - as
Mandela remarked:
We are firmly of the belief that the existence of the GATT,and now the World
Trade Organisation, as a rules-based system provides a solid foundation on
which our deliberations can build in order to improve ...
Rules must be applied without fear or favour.v-
By putting forward such a position, Pretoria has opened up space for
manoeuvrability and has pursued a set of policies that it believes will benefit its
local industry - at least that sector which is in a competitive-worthy enough state
to export. This is not necessarily in the wider interests of the broader South African
population (for such a policy is predicated on the basis of quid pro quo by which
non-competitive South African industries - essentially productive capital-based and
inwardly-looking, face collapse); nor indeed may it be in the interests of the region
which is replete with non-competitive industrial sectors.v+
Nonetheless, the nascent historic bloc has seized on the declamatory
statements of the WTO and the aspiration to craft a rules-based multilateral
trading system and taken them at their word. This space is possible because unlike
the IMF or the World Bank there is no built-in asymmetry of power between the
various member states and a country like South Africa has the (theoretical) ability
to challenge major global players on their policies - something which could never
61Dumisani Kumalo, Director of United States Bilateral Relations, Department of Foreign
Affairs,at IDASAcentre, CapeTown,March 25, 1999.
62Chakravarthi Raghavan 'The South and the WTOTrade Order: An Overview',Singapore,
December 6-8, 1996,
gopher:j j gopher.chasque.apc.orgjOO...zzzj singapur.zzzjeve.zzzjeve6.zzz
63NelsonMandela 'Addressby President Mandela on the Occasion of the Seth Anniversaryof
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)',Geneva, issued by the Officeof the
President,May 19,1998.
64 Indeed, President Moi of Kenya has complained that such policies act to only benefit
South Africa at the expense of the rest of the wider region - Cape Times (CapeTown),May
25, 1999.
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happen in the North-dominated Bretton Woods bodies. This can be seen as an
advance on the former pre-WTO regime where decision-making was heavily in
favour of the major players through their overbearing "trade weight" .65
As a result of the more rules-based regulations, it has become possible for a
state to force another to comply with the global trade rules as laid out by the WTO.
This has been particularly directed against Washington which has had to answer to
the disciplinary body over its trading policies towards Argentina and Brazil as well
as Massachusetts' unilateral ban on trade with Burma.së The appeal to the WTO
over the Helms-Burton Act is another example where the obligations of the North
can be turned against them.
At the same time, South Africa's engagement with the WTOand its attempts
to "de-legitimise" certain actions by the major economic powers over their
hypocritical selectivity in adhering to WTO regulations in various issue areas
actually serves to legitimise the normative order that acts as a framework within
which the WTO is situated and regulates. In this, Pretoria is following what has
already been referred to as a middlepowermanship role in international affairs: its
actions regarding the WTOseemingly demonstrate that the organisation is a rules-
based regime from which all can benefit and where even middle-ranking powers
from the South can confront and challenge the dominant developed powers.
By doing so, South Africa usefully (for those who subscribe to the neo-
liberalist order) undermines the argument that the WTO is serving the agenda
purely of the privileged North for it is seen as critically engaging with and on
occasion de-legitimising the dominant norms governing the international political
economy. Yet, it does so without calling into question the fundamental structure
that underpins these norms, nor does it interrogate the global order which keeps
most of the South impoverished and dis-empowered. Indeed, cynics might suggest
that Pretoria's engagement with the WTO and its ostensible de-legitimisation of
specific practices by individual Northern nations actually obfuscates the broader
65 Chakravarthi Raghavan Recolonization: GAIT, the Uruguay Round and the Third World
London: Zed Books, 1990, p. 64.
66 'US Trade: WTO May be Hitting Too Close to Home', Inter Press Service, February 28,
1997.
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and more central issues surrounding global inequality that have retreated into the
background as the neo-liberal consensus has achieved dominance.
This being so, there are other reasons why the GNU has opted to join and
engage with the WTO. Firstly, by doing so it is giving a powerful signal to overseas
capital that the new South Africa accepts and plays by the hegemonic "rules of the
game" when it comes to macro-economic policy. This is of course directly connected
to the move rightwards that the ANCelite performed during and after the transition
period - GEAR is complementary to the WTO prescriptions (indeed South African
economic policy goes beyond the disciplinary body on some issues).
Secondly, by engaging with the WTOand advocating that its regulations are
held applicable to all members including the North, the GNU holds up to the world
the hypocrisy of much of the rhetoric emanating from the developed world, thus
opening up space from which it can operate and exploit. From this South Africa not
only gains kudos amongst elements in the South for tackling the North, but also
furthers its own money capital's interests as well as its more broader export sector.
At the same time, negative aspects of globalisation and unpopular decisions that
the GNU imposes on its domestic constituency (particularly organised labour and
the Left in general) can be cast as "inevitable" results of South Africa engaging with
"the world" i.e. the WTO.This last point should not be under-estimated, for as one
analyst wrote of the WTO:
[C]ontracting parties ...externalis[e] the onus for reform ...The imposition of
GATTjWTO injunctions ...can be a useful way for governments to sell
politically unpopular measures to domestic constituencies'_67
Sprung from a historical compromise and caught amongst a web of contradictions,
this ability to back-pedal on its more progressive posturing prior to GEAR (indeed,
prior to taking office) and shifting the culpability onto the constraints of
"globalisation" in the form of WTO rules and regulations, is a highly useful device
for the GNU in justifying its stance on such issues to its Left-leaning constituency
and partners within the GNU.As has been suggested, this lies at the heart of much
of its foreign policy. This being so, it is important to look at South Africa's position
vis-a-vis the WTO.
67 Richard Higgott in Andrew Cooper (ed.), 1997, p. 32.
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Pretoria's posture regarding the WTO
'South Africa's accession to the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement [was] in some respects
a milestone in the country's move away from relatively autonomous industrial
policies' and reflected a continuation of a trajectory of deeper integration with the
global economy that had begun in the 1980s.68 Prior to the elections, a senior
representative of the ANC - Kader Asmal - had attended the signing of the
Declaration - chaperoned by the then Minister of Trade and Industry Derek Keys
(subsequently to be retained by the GNU as Trade Minister). As an ironic aside,
under GATTthe international sanctions that had operated against apartheid South
Africa (and which Asmal had been a prominent campaigner for) had actually been
illegal under the GATT rules and this "apolitical" regulation had been further
institutionalised and made compulsory with the new Declaration.
Like the rest of the South, Pretoria was largely on the defensive at the actual
negotiations. This posture was compounded by the fact that the process was taking
place at a time of flux in the domestic polity in South Africa and negotiators who
did attend from Pretoria had no mandate to negotiate from. This not only prevented
South Africa from joining international alliances such as the Cairns Group to
promote the interests of South African producers, it also caused a great deal of
tension and anger amongst the liberation forces who 'voiced their own criticisms of
the fact that the apartheid government was committing a future democratic
government to a major long-term trade reform, without any process of
consultation'<v As a result of this controversy the National Economic Forum took
over the responsibility for negotiating South Africa's offer to GATT.
Whilst representatives of the ANCwere informally represented, the body was
dominated by the National Party, its bureaucrats and sectors of big business and
monopoly capital. Indeed the Forum did not have the ability to develop a coherent
offer to GATT and so the "technical" details were left to the various government
68 Jonathan Katzenellenbogen 'The Search for Competitive Advantage', South African
Yearbook of International Affairs, 1996, p. 198.
69 AlanHirsch 'From the GAITto the WTO:TheGlobalTrade Regimeand Its Implicationsfor
South Africa', South Africa in the Global Economy Johannesburg: South AfricaInstitute of
InternationalAffairs,1995, p. 50.
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departments to deal with and formulate policies. During the transition the ANCwas
hamstrung by its weakness in not having a well developed technical team that
could argue the case for more progressive macro-economic policies. It is not hard to
see the drive to accede to the Uruguay Round by the South African government -
literally in its last days in office - to bind the new administration post-elections to
the neo-liberalist restrictions that membership of the WTOwould bring into force
on South Africa. Involving the NEF then was an astute move by the incumbent
party in power to cast legitimacy over the process of "locking in" the government-to-
be to the neo-liberalist agenda. Indeed, one analysis asserted that 'Minister Derek
Keys enthusiastically supported the role of the NEF in the process [of negotiating
Pretoria's membership of the WTO] as he understood that it would bind a future
government to the GATT reforms',"? whilst a business press source gratifyingly
remarked that:
The importance of [the NEF] reaching agreement on the GATTproposals ...is
that the post-general election government [will be] effectively tied into
following policies that focus on macro-economic stability for the next few
years - or face the threat of international isolation."!
This of course is not to say that the ANC was totally hostile to the events
surrounding Pretoria's accession to the WTO.Asmal's attendance at the Marrakesh
Declaration and Mandela's lending of support on Pretoria's position on clothing and
textile tariff liberalisation indicates that the elites within the liberation organisation
were not wholly antipathetic to the Uruguay Round and were by this point resigned
to the open manifestation of the globalisation process but at the same time seeking
out what they thought was the best deal for their future administration.
As one of the last acts of the National Party regime, Derek Keys committed
South Africa to bring its highest tariff down to a maximum 30% over five years,
excepting the politically sensitive i.e. heavily unionised and labour-intensive
industries (accounting for nearly 20% of the total manufacturing employment in
1993) such as clothing, textiles and the motor industry. These have been granted
between eight to twelve-years phasing in periods. Tariff lines were to raise from the
then figure of about 55% to around 98% to be covered by GATT- restricting heavily
Pretoria's ability to raise tariffs as a mechanism to defend industries under threat.
70 Ibid., p. 51.
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At the same time, Pretoria committed itself to removing the General Export
Incentive Scheme (which it did so in July 1997) by which South African exporters
were given quite considerable rebates on the total export value. Furthermore,
Pretoria agree to the SPS Measures; reduce its subsidies to agriculture by 21% in
quantity terms and 36% in outlay terms per product; and reduce its domestic
support for agriculture by R 0.4 billion.
The agreed reforms uis-a-uis South African agriculture were, as one analyst
put it 'not consciously structured with developmental objectives in mind',72 and
indeed reflected the concerns and agendas of a highly developed White-dominated
economic sector that had enjoyed years of protective subsidies and support (and
cheap labour) until it had become one of the leading - and most "competitive" -
exporters of agricultural products (though hindered by the anti-apartheid boycotts
and sanctions). As a result of this and other features of the South African economy,
Pretoria acceded to the Uruguay Round negotiations as a developed nation and
agreed to reduce the highest tariffs by 60%, eliminate all tariffs that were under 5%
and cut all subsidies by the stipulated amount for developed states.
South Africa's position regarding the WTOhas been in support of its broad
prescriptions - essentially an endorsement of the neo-liberalist themes that
underpin the body - whilst pressing for full adherence to the idea of a rules-based
regime. As the Deputy Director of multilateral trade relations for the South African
government asserted, 'the WTO needs to address the Issue of
implementation ...Agreements should facilitate rather than penalise developing
countries for bringing down trade barriers'Yê Indeed, the reluctance of the North to
fulfil their obligations undermines the credibility of the organisation and Pretoria
has sought to avoid this by highlighting wherever relevant the double standards
practised by the developed world. But as has been pointed out, this is not to de-
legitimise the neo-liberalist WTO,but rather to reinforce its prescriptions by calling
for an adherence to its rules-based principles and to balance "free trade" with "fair
trade". This policy and the general posture towards the WTO was particularly
71 Finance Week March 10-16, 1994.
72 Alan Hirsch, 1995, p. 52.
73 Xavier Carim, Deputy Director of Multilateral Trade Relations, Department of Trade and
Industry quoted in Financial Mail May 15, 1998.
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highlighted at the summit in May 1998 to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the
GAIT.
Significantly, amongst African nations only South Africa and the French
client state of Cote d1voire sent delegates to the summit in Geneva - all the other
states on the continent boycotted the event. From the start, President Mandela
predicated Pretoria's policies towards the WTOwith the largely uncritical position
that 'all had to acknowledge that integration of the global economy was inevitable
and had to be accepted' for 'what happens in Switzerland affects South Africa the
same day - it's a process we have to accept and adjust to'_?4Such comments were
very much in line with the messages emanating from the leaders of the North -
Clinton stating that 'globalisation is not a policy choice - it is a fact', whilst Blair
asserted that the 'irreversible and irresistible trend' towards free trade was
unstoppable.t-
This seeming accession to the discourse of globalisation was however
balanced by the desire to playa mediating role between North and South, but one
which was essentially tilted in favour of the transnational elites. As a state
classified by the WTOas developed but chairing UNCTAD,this mediating position
was perhaps to be expected. For example, 'SA trade diplomats in Pretoria and
Geneva [said] that SA occupie[d] the "middle ground'" on the question of starting a
so-called "millennium round" of trade discussions (as demanded by the EU) that
aimed to abolish all remaining tariffs and trade barriers in an instance.t> South
Africa's position on this was that it was 'sympathetic to the view that there are
built-in obligations to continue negotiations' regarding further liberalisation, but
that 'the process should be slowed down.'."?
Whilst this position recognised the difficulties faced by many in the South to
further liberalisation, Mandela's comments that the developing world must
'precisely define those areas that are obstacles to their progress in the world
trading system' and that 'there can be no refusal to discuss matters such as labour
standards, social issues and the environment' indicated that as far as the GNUwas
74 Cape Times (Cape Town) May 20, 1998.
75 Business Day (Johannesburg) May 19, 1998.
76 Financial Mail May 15, 1998.
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concerned, there were no areas in the domestic polity that could/ should rely on
protection from national government - a line way in advance of most Southern
states.t'' Whilst Mandela did qualify this statement with an appeal to the WTO to
recognise the South's difficulties, Pretoria's strategic position as a "bridge-builder"
and leader of the African group of WTOmembers held out huge repercussions for
the continent as 'if SA agrees to the millennium round, it's difficult to see how
other African countries could oppose the move'.??
That the GNU accepted the hegemonic discourse of neo-liberalism was
thrown into sharp relief at the Geneva summit - indeed, discussion of liberalisation
was off South Africa's agenda, with Mandela saying that free market access 'should
no longer be the issue debated. It is the practical effects of implementing this that
need to be incorporated into the multilateral system'. Indeed, South Africa's
essentially technical intervention on how to improve the WTO's functioning fitted
very much into the middlepowermanship role that it plays within multilateral
organisations, with Mandela arguing that improvements in the rule-based system
was desirable as it was 'imperative that we build confidence in the system'iw The
South African business press has been supportive of this policy, arguing that 'the
WTOsystem is a marked improvement' on GATT,and that 'under the new system,
resolutions are binding' - a development that is in the interests of local externally-
oriented capital.s!
This positive engagement with the WTO and appealing to its rules-based
regime and attempting to bind the major powers to their commitments, 'engaging
globalisation and extracting benefits' as Mbeki has called it, can be graphically
seen in Pretoria's enthusiastic referral to the organisation on matters relating to
anti-dumping, which has become the most common trade defence remedy available
to state administrations.es Since South Africa began to partake in beginning anti-
77 Xavier Carim, Deputy Director of Multilateral Trade Relations, Department of Trade and
Industry quoted in ibid.
78 Inter-Press Service 'Mandela Tells WTO to Bridge North-South Gap',
http) joneworld.orgjips2jmay98j 16_46_063
79 Financial Mail May 15, 1998.
80 Nelson Mandela 'Address by President Mandela on the Occasion of the Soth Anniversary of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)', Geneva, issued by the Office of the
President, May 19, 1998.
8! Business Day (Johannesburg) May 19, 1998.
82 The Sowetan (Johannesburg) May 19, 1999.
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dumping measures in 1994, Pretoria has been consistently amongst the most
regular initiators of dumping cases at the WTO:
Figure 3: Main initiators of anti-dumping cases83
State Cases State Cases State Cases State Cases State Cases
us 48 EU 33 SA 33 Austral 42 SA 41
EU 43 Arg. 27 EU 25 EU 41 US 34
Mexico 22 SA 16 Arg./ 22 SA 23 India 30
US (each)
Turkey 21 US 14 India 21 USA 16 EU 22
Arg. 17 Canada Il Brazil 18 ROK 15 Brazil 16
SA 16 NZ 10 Austral 17 Arg. 14 Austral 13
Austral 15 India 6 ROK 13 Canada 14 Mexico 10
Brazil 9 Austral 5 Indon. 9 India 13 Canada 8
Such figures illustrate that South Africa (and other Southern states) are
enthusiastically engaging the WTO's precepts to confront trade dumpers. The
ability to do so under the rules-based WTO shows that there has been a re-
appraisal of the usefulness of anti-dumping measures by countries in the South.
Traditionally, anti-dumping measures were viewed by developing nations as a form
of disguised protectionism, arguing that it permitted developed economies to
discriminate against their cheaper imports.ë+ However, the regulations of the WTO
have allowed those elites based in the South - who are willing to engage with and
use the WTO'smechanisms - to apply them to their rich trading partners.
83 Figures 1994-97 adapted from: WTO Secretariat, Rules Division Antidumping Measures
Database, cited in Jorge Miranda, Raul Torres and Mario Ruiz "The International Use of
Antidumping: 1987-1997', Journal of World Trade, vol. 32, no. 5, October 1998; figures for
1998 cited in Financial Times (London) May 6, 1999.
84 Financial Times (London) May 6, 1999.
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This in itself reflects the changes that have occurred within the global
economy and in particular mirrors the dominant ideology that is an integral part of
the ongoing order. As one analyst wrote•.'the history of the developing countries in
the world trading system reveals initial hostility to a regime that was controlled by
advanced and industrialised countries. However it is obvious that the developing
countries' attitudes [have changedl'w This attitudinal change has coincided with
the rise to hegemony amongst the transnationalised elites of the neo-liberalist
discourse, and the discrediting of dirigiste projects.
At the same time, it provides these self-same elites with a "safety-valve" by
which they can protect (or attempt to) domestic industries against unfair foreign
competition.se With tariffs largely being taken away, anti-dumping measures can
provide a degree of protection. Even if initiated cases are unsuccessful, by
launching them an administration that is in the process of opening up its markets
can posture itself as having the welfare of domestic interests at heart and be seen
to act in its interests - even if the reality is somewhat different and policy is being
driven by more externally-oriented elite fractions. This, and the policy of advancing
a rules-based global regime, may account for Pretoria's enthusiastic engagement of
anti-dumping regulations.
This being so, Mandela's speech at the WTO anniversary summit was
indicative of a posture that sought to promote the WTOregime (a regime built upon
firm neo-liberalist foundations) whilst also putting forward propositions that would
aid developing countries to cope with the liberalising agenda of the organisation. By
doing so, South Africa pursues a bridge-building role aimed at developing
"confidence" in the system, a tactic designed at ultimately strengthening the WTO
but along lines that would benefit those elites in the South who stand to gain from
a more reciprocal rules-based trading regime that outlawed unilateral behaviour
from the North - a scenario where only the developing world would suffer. This role
has been criticised by analysts for 'supporting free trade while at the same time
insisting that [South Africa] must attempt to change the rules of the system in a
non-confrontational manner [and within the neo-liberalist discourse] amounts to a
85 Kofi Oteng Kufour 'The Developing Countries and the Shaping of GAIT/WTO Antidumping
Law', Journal of World Trade, vol. 32, no. 6, December 1998, p. 194.
86 Sunday Times (Johannesburg) November 8, 1998.
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one-way traffic bridge. It accepts that the end of history, or for that matter ideology,
has indeed been reached'<?
At the same time, the GNU also attempts to balance the diverse pressures
being exerted on it - on the one hand being seen to concur with the neo-liberalist
agenda demanded by powerful externally-oriented capital; and on the other
posturing an ostensibly Southern-oriented position that sought to ameliorate the
more negative effects of globalisation and the demands put on the domestic polity
by the rules and regulations of the WTO.By doing so, criticism from labour and the
Left could be deflected (though most analysts agree that the newly regularised
trading regime 'could create exciting possibilities for the big SA clients').88 It is this
contradictory behaviour - stemming from the historic compromise - that has
marked South African foreign policy and which can be witnessed in Pretoria's role
in other multilateral bodies, such as the Cairns Group of agricultural nations - a
group closely linked to the ongoing process of liberalisation motored in part by the
WTO.
87 Lisa Thompson and Anthony Leysens, 1996, p. 9.
88 Financial Mail (Johannesburg) December 19, 1997.
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SECTION il: SOUTH AFRICA AND THE CAIRNS GROUP
'The Cairns Group was established in 1986 by a group of medium-sized
agricultural exporting countries to pursue common agricultural trade objectives in
the Uruguay Round'.89 It currently has fifteen member states (Australia, Argentina,
Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, Indonesia, Malaysia, NewZealand, Paraguay,
the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Uruguay), and has developed into a
successful example of a bridge-building coalition between developed and
developing nations. lts formation was as a response to the failure to successfully
include agriculture into the GATT regime and sprang from the desire of food
exporters to open up the markets of the United States and Europe and push for
greater liberalisation in cross-border trade. This in itself was derivative of the
special treatment afforded to agriculture for most of the GATT'stenure, for 'it ha[d]
always been accepted that international rules governing agricultural trade had to
be different from those applied to manufactures'iw
Such exceptional treatment recognised that agriculture was not only subject
to weather conditions but also was politically and socially sensitive. Combined with
strong and well-organised lobbies that served specific interests - the 'sacred cows
and hot potatoes' of agriculture as it was once put - various exceptions were made
to accommodate the agribusiness' demands.v' These included: price supports on
grains and dairy products; subsidies being granted special treatment (even on
exports), whilst tariffs on imports were permitted as part of domestic support
programmes or for the elimination of surpluses in domestic production; preferential
loans; and research and development assistance. Though the intentions were
different, this led to 'countries [being] able to justify all sorts of protectionist
barriers.w In short, agriculture remained until well into the 1990s one of the (very)
few sectors that had weathered the storm of the neo-liberalist counter-revolution
89 Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada "Trade Topics: The Cairns Group'
http://www.agr.ca/misb/itpd/ttl2.html
90 Diana Tussie 'Holding the Balance: The Cairns Group in the Uruguay Round' in Diana
Tussie and David Glover (eds.) The Developing Countries in World Trade: Policies and
Bargaining Strategies Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993, p. 181.
91 William Browne, Jerry Skees, Louis Swanson, Paul Thompson and Laurian Sacred Cows
and Hot Potatoes: Agrarian Myths in Agricultural Policy Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.
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and remained predicated upon non-liberal principles of domestic intervention - a
left-over from the original GAIT trading regime.
Such provisions of domestic interference cis-a-vis agro-industry (in essence
carry-overs from the protectionist tendencies of the 1930s) had at the time of
introduction largely suited the interests of American agriculture, who were able to
make huge profits exporting food to war-ravaged Europe. But, as the political
economy of agriculture developed and the competitive advantage of American
farmers declined in comparison to the heavily-subsidised European farming
industry (who had become significant exporters of food by the 1970s) demands for
"liberalisation" increasingly became heard. This became particularly acute as a
"farm war" broke out between Washington and Brussels, with as much as two-
thirds of Europe's budget going towards supporting the farming industry via the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP),whilst American agricultural trade went into
deficit.s- 'With its market share eroded and its access to the EC severely restricted,
the United States tumed into a forceful advocate of agricultural Iiberalisation'iv-
Such a scenario of course must be contextualised within the ongoing
process of globalisation and the mounting pressure at a structural level to
relinquish protectionist and interventionist polices in favour of market-oriented
neo-liberal programmes. At this stage, the neo-liberalist counter-revolution was
reaching into even the formerly hallowed and protected agricultural sectors.
Indeed, as one analysis described this movement:
[D]uring the 1980s and 1990s, the premises of embedded liberalism, and the
appropriateness of excluding sectors like agriculture from market-based
rules and disciplines [were] challenged ...A neo-liberal reformulation of
economic policy...gained further momentum from domestic budget deficits,
fuelled in part by the cost of the social adjustment component of embedded
liberalism. In short, whether promoted by international trade agreements
requiring the alignment of domestic and foreign economic policies along neo-
liberal lines, or the structural imperative to reduce government
expenditures, or the ideological preferences for deregulated markets,
92 Diana Tussie in Diana Tussie and David Glover (eds.), 1993, p. 182.
93 See Robert Wolfe Farm Wars: The Political Economy of Agriculture and the Intemational
Trade Regime New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998.
94 Diana Tussie in Diana Tussie and David Glover (eds.), 1993, p. 182.
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governments [took] increasing aim at changing polices that rest[ed] upon
ideas opposed to neo-liberal principles.v>
However, changes in the global market conditions for agriculture and the rise of
neo-liberalism as the hegemonic economic ideology do not explain completely why
the demand for liberalisation of agriculture arose. It was in fact a combination of
the restructuring of the international political economy to reflect the interests of a
particular transnational configuration of social and industrial forces (and the
concomitant push towards neo-liberalism globally), with changes in the domestic
milieu vis-a-vis agricultural production. This scenario then played itself out at the
international level first with protectionist measures to support American farmers
and then with the rise in interest for trade liberalisation - a device aimed primarily
at European competitors (though the call was shared by third party producers
being damaged by the farm wars).
Fundamentally the subsidy programme via CAPresulted in the capture of an
increased and rising share of the agricultural export market by the European
agricultural industry and a concomitant decline in the American industry's share.
Domestic pressures by the powerful American farming lobby then saw the rapid
rise in protectionist policies and a massive rise in farm support policies, even
whilst food prices in general were falling - creating huge pressure on the American
Treasury. At the same time, such policies (both in America and the EU)
increasingly damaged 'third parties elsewhere, and in particular in the developing
world where the proportion of GOP accounted for by agriculture was much higher
than. in the developed world.w Thus a number of countries who felt vulnerable to
such a scenario, as well as other more developed states with important agricultural
industries, joined together in an attempt to change the ongoing negative situation
vis-a.:'vis the global agricultural regime.
In short, middle-ranking powers which possessed strong export-oriented
agricultural industries and shared the normative principles of neo-liberalism were
at the forefront of pushing the liberalisation for the agribusiness, and came to form
the Cairns Group. Essentially, they saw it as of the utmost urgency to push Europe
95 William Coleman and Grace Skogstad 'Neo-Liberalism, Policy Networks, and Policy
Change: Agricultural Policy Reform in Australia and Canada', Australian Journal of Political
Science, vol. 30, no. 2, July 1995, p. 243.
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out of its CAP-based agricultural regime and at the same time persuade
Washington to desist from retaliating with similar measures that damaged not only
European farmers but all other agricultural exporters.
In general, the Cairns Group's 'primary goal in its effort to dismantle
protectionism [was] to overhaul the CAP', as it was export subsidisation that
threatened the ability of Cairns farmers to compete on the global market.?? At the
same time, the formation of the Group was a recognition that the growing
polarisation between Europe and Washington over agriculture not only damaged
third party interests - specifically those agricultural countries caught in the middle
- but also threatened to undermine the multilateral principles behind the GATT
regime, particularly if a subsidies war was to spill over into tit-far-tat unilateral
measures introduced with little regard for their overall consequences to the
international political economy.
As states which had important sectors under threat from such a scenario,
the Cairns members saw themselves as possessing the potential to act as bridge-
builders and 'reduce the degree of polarisation between the two principal
protagonistsve Furthermore, the initiative was aimed at restoring a measure of
multilateralism into an issue area that for years had been the realm of deals cut
between Europe and Washington, often at the expense of other interested - but
excluded - parties. As middle-ranking powers with a stake in the smooth running
of the global economy (predicated as it was on neo-liberalist principles), the Cairns
members postured a role 'of restraining and modifying the behaviour of larger,
more powerful actors through the strengthening of order in the world economy'rw
This then was the agenda behind the Cairns Group and as a lobby group
uniting both developed and developing nations it was essentially successful.
Certainly:' and in contrast to the position of Wolfe,lOo'it was largely as a result of
the Group's efforts that a framework for reform in farm products trade was
96 Robert Wolfe, 1998, p. 76.
97 William Coleman and Grace Skogstad, 1995, p. 184.
98 Rohinton Medhora 'Emerging Issues in International Trade Relations: Some Research
Directions', http://www.idrc.ca/tec/emerging.html
99 Richard Higgott and Andrew Cooper 'Middle Power Leadership and Coalition Building:
Australia, the Cairns Group, and the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations', International
Organization, vol. 44, no. 4, Autumn, 1990, p. 600
_ 100 See comments in Robert Wolfe, 1998, p. 91.
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established in the Uruguay Round and agriculture was for the first time subject to
trade liberalising rules (set out in the WTO Agreement on Agriculturej'uci With
their combined bargaining power the Group simply 'refused to accede to US
demands for the liberalisation of services, in which they had relatively little
interest, unless ... reductions [on protectionist measures in the agricultural sector]
were forthcoming'.102 After initial deadlock, this policy served to lubricate the
movement towards addressing agricultural issues during the Uruguay Round.
This is not to say that there were tensions within the Group - certainly
Canada's posture was somewhat ambiguous, whilst the heterogeneity of the
various members position in the global economy, as well as their diverse ideological
predispositions (though it would be accurate to say that all shared the basic
assumption regarding liberalist economic policies) meant that there was a limited
natural "like-mindedness" beyond that of liberalising agricultural trade.Jv- Yet, as
Cooper points out:
What induced a feeling of solidarity among the Cairns Group was their
common vulnerability in the international political economy. All of the
members had suffered considerable damage from both the CAP and the EC's
export restitution policy on the one side, and the United State's "fight fire
with fire" responses on the other.t?"
Under Australian leadership - a crucial ingredient in stimulating Cairns formation
and direction - the Group acted largely collectively, projecting a combined influence
and hence greater impact on the agriculture negotiations than any individual
member states would have had acting alone. Indeed, together the Group accounted
for around twenty per cent of global agricultural exports. Originally, Australia had
attended an informal summit in Uruguay with Argentina, Brazil, New Zealand and
Uruguay as part of a "Southern Hemisphere Temperate Zone Agricultural
Producers" group in April 1986. At the same time, Canberra was establishing
linkages with Thailand. This preliminary work led to the first meeting at Cairns in
101 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'The Cairns Group: Fact Sheet' -
http:j j orpheus.dfat.gov.auj trade/u ...arions / cairsn_groupj cairsn_fs.html
102John Odell and Barry Eiehengreen 'The United States, the ITO, and the WTO: Agent
Slack and Presidential Leadership' in Anne Krueger (ed.), 1998, p. 188.
103 For a discussion of what is meant by "like-mindedness", see Andrew Cooper 'Like-minded
Nations and Contrasting Diplomatic Styles: Australian and Canadian Approaches to
Agricultural Trade', Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol. 25, no. 2, June 1992.
104 Andrew Cooper In Between Countries - Australia, Canada and the Search for Order in
Agricultural Trade Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997, p. 116.
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Australia in August 1986 where fourteen delegations issued a declaration for the
forthcoming Uruguay Round of GAIT.
This meeting in Australia 'accomplished a great deal, including the
identification of principles uie-a-vis free trade in agriculture and the establishment
of an informal working relationship among the members of the group'. lOS At the
heart of this - and which ties to much of Pretoria's own position (hence explaining
why South Africa was to later join the Group) - was the commitment to a rules-
based global regime, founded around the (sensitive) application of liberalisation to
all. As Australia's Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade was to later assert,
the Group supported the notion that:
The most effective way of breaking down trade barriers is through
multilateral trade negotiations conducted under the auspices of the World
Trade Organisation.
The WTO provides not only a framework for conducting negotiations, but
also contains a broad-based set of rules governing world trade. These rules
set out the rights and obligations of members, which are designed to ensure
a non-discriminatory international trading system.
While the WTOis not perfect, there is increasing recognition that the world
needs a rules-based trading system for the stability and confidence which it
engenders and because it helps smaller countries achieve fairer outcornes.I?"
This platform aims to accompany the neo-liberalist counter-revolution and the
continuing moment of globalisation, whilst providing regulatory safeguards that
aim to soften the impact of libralisation and ease national economies into the
international political economy. At strategic junctures the call for free and fair
trade, based on an established rules-based order serve to de-legitimise and
embarrass the major global players, who may be tempted to encourage such a
process abroad (thus serving the interests of their powerful transnational fractions)
whilst protecting economically vulnerable but politically powerful domestic
constituencies who are unable to compete in a fully liberalised environment. Such
a position turns the rhetoric of liberalisation emanating from the capitalist
heartland against itself and acts to compel Washington and London to follow
through on their neo-liberalist pronouncements or be exposed as hypocrites.
105 tua., p. 120.
106 David Spencer, Deputy Secretary, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
'The Cairns Group and WTO Negotiations'
http://www.agribusiness.asn.au/New ...nts/congress97-98/sessions3DFAT.htm
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Indeed, this should not be under-estimated - as one analysts remarked, the Cairns
Group 'succeeded in embarrassing both the European Community and the United
States into serious negotiations on farm talks'i 'v?
It is this actuality that influences many states - such as South Africa - to
pursue Cairns-like policies vis-a-vis global trade. This is further propelled by the
Cairns Group's willingness to put forward a position that recognised the "special
and different" treatment for developing countries regarding their agricultural
economies. Indeed, the concession by Australia in 1987 to support the principle
that the special interests of the developing nations would be upheld 'cemented the
support of the developing countries for the Cairns Group'.108 This position by
Cairns members of "sensitivity" to Southern difficulties and the amelioration of the
negative effects of globalisation - a particular feature of Pretoria's foreign policy - is
a conscious attempt by developing states' elites to balance such interests with the
demands of important constituencies to the Left which must be taken into account
for politically pragmatic reasons.
Yet ultimately, engagement in Cairns is in the interests of large exporters
capable of competing on the international market (and those consumers who can
afford to buy imported products). This may not necessarily coincide with the
concerns of lesser farming communities who have to bear the brunt of open
markets and competition with agro-industry, Free market competition is seen as a
way to 'force them [subsistence farmersloutand make them realise that they have
to have knowledge of the market in order to operate'. After all, 'if you don't force
people into productive enterprises, they'll just keep producing normal, even non-
profitable, products. To whose advantage is it to support subsistence farmers? It's
anti-consumer'. 109
The liberalisation project advanced by the Cairns Group may well serve the
interests of exporters - and the South African industry is particularly well-placed in
this regard. However, those who cannot compete (for a variety of reasons) may well
likely suffer. Though the South African government has expressed a desire to
107 Journal of Commerce, May 27, 1987, p. 10.
108Andrew Cooper, 1997, p. 123.
109Interview with Ezra Steenkamp, Assistant Director of Trade Policy, National Department
ofAgriculture, Pretoria, July 8, 1999.
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protect the interests of smaller farmers and has committed itself to the upliftment
of the rural poor, the Cairns Group agenda is more in line with the externally-
oriented fractions of South African society, rather than the smaller farmers -
"uncompetitive" though they may be through a variety of historical reasons.U?
This being so, with the finalisation of the Uruguay Round and as a result of
the pressure subjected by the Cairns Group, agriculture was included within the
liberalising project of the GATT.III The Group's role was of great import for as one
analyst noted, 'the United States opened the road; Cairns provided the fuel for the
journey'.112 Agricultural subsidies were agreed to be capped whilst a number of
quantitative restrictions were converted through tariffication; other non-tariff
measures such as lengthy quarantines rules were regularised under the Agreement
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. At the same time, the Uruguay Round
admitted that the reform of agriculture still needed to go further and so ordered a
further set of multilateral negotiations to begin at the end of 1999, all within the
ambit of new 'rules of the game [to include] agriculture under market conditions'i u>
This will bring further benefits to fractions within the Cairns Group.I!" Such
negotiations will push for extra reductions to agricultural support and move to
shut off any perceived loopholes in the 1994 agreements that act to undermine
freer trade in agriculture .
-'.Post-Uruguay Round, the Cairns Group has continued its drive for the "full
and fair" implementation of the WTO agreements on agriculture and fulfils a
"watchdog role", looking at generic issues and not specific country issues. lIS For
example, the Group has strongly backed the working of the Committee on
110 For a brief overview of such reasons, and a positioning of agriculture within the wider
South African society, see Jan Groenewald 'Agriculture: Its Role in the Economic and Social
Life of South Africa' in Johan van Rooyen, Jan Groenewald, Simphiwe Ngqangweni and
Tamas Fenyes (eds.) Agricultural Policy Reform in South Africa Cape Town: Africa Institute
for Policy Analysis and Economic Integration, 1999.
III Rod Tyers 'The Cairns Group and the Uruguay Round of International Trade
Negotiations', Australian Economic Review, no. 101, January-March 1993.
112 Diana Tussie in Diana Tussie and David Glover (eds.), 1993, p. 201.
113 Nestor Stancanelli, the Argentinean Ambassador to Australia, quoted in 'The Millennium
Round, Agricultural Reform and the Cairns Group'
http://www.mecon.ar/cabinet/update/number7/mileing.htm
114 See Kym Anderson 'Agricultural Competitiveness After the Uruguay Round', Review of
Marketing and Agricultural Economics, vol. 63, no. 3, December 1995.
liS Interview with Ezra Steenkamp, Assistant Director of Trade Policy, National Department
of Agriculture, Pretoria, July 8, 1999.
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Agriculture and the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, and
reacted to the 'lack of political will by the developed countries to implement the
provisions of the ...agriculture treaties', as evidenced at the WTO's Singapore
summit in 1996.116 Indeed, one of its members - Ambassador Danai from Thailand
- was actually appointed the first Chair of the Committee on Agriculture and his
successor in early 1997 was another Cairns member - Ambassador Osorio of
Colombia. Increasingly the Group has adopted an activist role, co-ordinating
positions on GATTaccession negotiations; European agricultural reform; and the
deployment by Brussels and Washington of agricultural export subsidies. It was to
this activist grouping of middle powers bent on enforcing the neo-liberalist rules
implicit in the rhetoric emanating from the North - the 'commitment to achieving
a...market-oriented agricultural trading system' - that Pretoria joined in February
1998.117
Pretoria's membership of the Cairns Group
As a major agricultural exporter and a middle-ranking power with a favourable
global profile, South Africa was invited to join the Cairns Group, being sponsored
by NewZealand.1l8 Pretoria's willingness to join was perhaps a natural progression
of its membership of the WTO. With a foreign policy that shared the basic
presumptions of the Group's acceptance of neo-liberalism as the organising
framework upon which macro-economic policy should be based, whilst at the same
time pushing for a more rules-based global trading regime and posturing a policy of
attempting to mitigate the most negative aspects of globalisation, the Cairns Group
afforded Pretoria with the platform to affirm all of these complex positions at once.
As one senior South African official put it, 'South Africa aligned itself with the
Cairns Group because its broad policy direction in agriculture leads it to
supporting further liberalisation [whilst] the fact that there are now multilaterally
116 Martin Khor 'After Singapore, the Battle of Interpretations Begin: Labour Standards' -
http:j jwww.southbound.com.my.southsjtwnjtitlejbat-cn.htm
117 Cairns Group "Vision" for the WTO Agriculture Negotiations - "Completing the Task" -
http:j j orpheus.dfat.gov.auj tradej n...ationsj cairsn_group j cairsn_vision.html
liB South Africa had already attended as an observer at the Cairns Group Ministerial
Meetings in Manila (1995), Cartagena (1996), and Rio de Janeiro (1997).
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agreed rules relating to [agricultural] trade must on balance be a positive from our
perepective ';'!?
The Cairns Group also formally allowed South Africa to attach itself to a
group of middle powers who were attempting to smooth out the disputes in the
ongoing world order. Indeed, membership of the Cairns Group is a powerful
example of the South African leadership's acceptance of the hegemonic discourse
whilst at the same time affording credibility to the wider global order. Furthermore,
involvement in a multilateralist initiative uis-á-uis agriculture was seen as the 'only
way we [South Africa] can make a difference in world trade. That is, by forming an
alliance with experienced countries, we can help South African agriculture at the
WTO'.120An internal government document made this tactical strategy of allying
with similar states on particular issues explicit:
[T]he capacity to influence outcomes rests on the ability to participate
effectively in bargaining coalitions built around specific interests among like-
minded countries. As South Africa begins to elaborate its national priorities
in new WTOnegotiations, it will need to begin a series of consultations with
key countries with which it may share common interests and views. Such an
approach should aim to establish appropriate alliances around specific
issues. In this regard, the Cairns Group is the exemplar.r>'
Indeed, 'an individual effort might not make any substantial impact on the
multilateral trade system'.122 Yet such essentially problem-solving engagement,
whilst attempting to maximise benefits for (certain fractions of) South African
agriculture, serves to legitimise the overall global trading regime. Acceptance of this
and the neo-liberalist norms that underpin this has been quite explicit, with a
senior South African official accepting that 'we can't go against the stream'i '<'
That Pretoria fitted the membership profile was beyond doubt - indeed on
matters of adherence to trade liberalisation, South Africa in fact 'far exceed[ed]
119 Correspondence with Attie Swart, Agricultural Counsellor, South African Permanent
Mission to the United Nations and International Organisations, Geneva, Switzerland, June
7, 1999.
120 Interview with Ezra Steenkamp, Assistant Director of Trade Policy, National Department
of Agriculture, Pretoria, July 8, 1999.
121Preparing for WTO Multilateral Trade Negotiations in 2000: Towards a South African
Framework, internal document, Department of Foreign Affairs, no date, p.9.
122 Information Document on the Cairns Group internal document, Department of Agriculture,
South Africa, no date, p. 2.
123 Interview with Ezra Steenkamp, Assistant Director of Trade Policy, Department of
Agriculture, Pretoria, July 8, 1999.
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World Trade Organisation commitments' on export subsidies.r>' Joining the Group
was attractive to South Africa for the reasons that have been outlined above.
Furthermore, Pretoria's qualified accession to the Lomé Convention i.e. without
trade preferences, spurred on the agricultural industry in the country to push for
greater access to a broader range of markets within Europe and address European
subsidies on exports that then gained access to South African markets. On a
bilateral basis - as trade negotiations with Europe showed - this was a long and
drawn out process.
Membership of the Cairns Group was one way in which the GNU could link
up on a multilateral basis with like-minded states to press for such liberalisation -
thus demonstrating its commitment to an important segment of South Africa's
industry, who openly supported such measures.125 The big players of this industry
were very well-placed to take advantage of any freeing up of market access by
Europe as 'most South African farmers [had] already been through the pain of a
subsidy phase out' and those that had survived were highly market competitive.Ps
Indeed, South African agriculture had already undergone fundamental change in
the three main areas in which WTO rules for agricultural trade exist, namely
domestic support, export subsidies and market access. Firstly, the new Marketing
and Agricultural Products Act of 1996 eliminated all marketing boards and the
removal of price regulations. Secondly, the termination of the General Export
Incentive Scheme in 1997 eliminated export subsidies. Finally, the replacement of
import permits with import duties and the reduction of their bound levels, as well
as Pretoria's market access quota commitments improved access to the domestic
South African market.P?
In addition, the opening up of external markets and the increase in exports
from South Africa was an important element of GEAR's overall target, which aimed
for a 10% export growth per annum, with agricultural exports a critical element to
achieving such aims. Indeed, by 1996 agricultural exports were contributing 10%
124 Business Day (Johannesburg) October 6, 1997.
125 See comments by South African Agricultural Union Trade Director Hans van der Merwe
in Business Day (Johannesburg) August 6, 1998.
126 Farmer's Weekly (Johannesburg) February 25, 1994.
127 Information Document on the Cairns Group internal document, Department of Agriculture,
South Africa, no date, p. 4.
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of foreign exchange earnings (despite the declining share of the sector in the
GDP).128Thus liberalisation abroad (as at home) was a major plank of the GNU's
growth and development strategy. This being so, with its scrapping of subsidies for
agriculture and the abolition of agriculture control boards, Pretoria was in line with
the objectives of the Group and having changed from self-sufficiency policies to
export-oriented policies, the South African agri-business had a great deal to gain
from a liberalised international agricultural regime.P? Having said that, this was
balanced to a degree with the recognition that trade liberalisation may have a
negative effect on net food importing countries through increased prices in the
global market as well as the role of subsistence farmers in the rural areas of
developing countries, as well as issues of food security for those states who faced
foreign exchange constraints.Pv
When invited to join, South Africa received strong support from its mam
sponsor New Zealand which argued that 'as major agricultural exporters we both
have a common interests in breaking down barriers to free trade in farm products',
and that 'having SAaboard would strengthen the Cairns Group ahead of important
WTO negotiations on the liberalisation of agricultural trade in 1999'.131Thus,
South Africa was welcomed aboard on February 2, 1998. As with many other
aspects of its foreign policy role, Pretoria was portrayed as 'providing a model for
other nations' and Australia explicitly asserted that 'the leadership role that South
Africa plays in southern Africa will strengthen the capacity of the Cairns Group to
explain and advance its objectives [of liberalisation] in international agricultural
trade'.132As with its promotion of polyarchy, "good governance" and security in the
South, membership of the Cairns Group was in line with the broad hegemonic
order, though it challenges the hypocrisy and tensions between theoretical neo-
liberalism and "really existing free trade".
128 Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs Agricultural Policy in South Africa: A Discussion
Document - http) jwww.nda.agric.zajdocsjpolcy98.htm
129 Interview with Ezra Steenkamp, Assistant Director of Trade Policy, Department of
Agriculture, Pretoria, July 8, 1999.
130 Preparing for WTO Multilateral Trade Negotiations in 2000: Towards a South African
Framework, internal document, Department of Foreign Affairs, no date, p.4.
131 New Zealand's International Trade Minister Lockwood Smith, quoted in Sunday Times
(Johannesburg) August 17, 1997.
132 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade South Africa Joins the Cairns Group of
Agricultural Countries - http://www.dfat.gov.aujpmb/releasesjdepartmentjdOlO_98.html
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In the context of economic policy, Pretoria believes that 'protectionism is not
a good thing' and that there is 'world trend' and a 'growing movement towards the
liberalisation of developed countries markets'.133 Pretoria hopes to make use of this
trend and its competitive advantage in various agricultural sectors by pushing both
"free"and "fair" trade.t>'
Since joining the Cairns Group, South Africa has taken an activist role,
being integral at the eighteenth ministerial meeting of the Group in April 1998 to
crafting the "Vision Statement" which laid out the Group's chief aims for the
forthcoming agriculture negotiations in 1999. The Statement outlined the Group's
liberalising objectives in three main reform areas within the GATT framework:
substantive cuts to all remaining tariffs, tariff peaks and the rectification of tariff
escalation; the abolition of all trade-distorting local subsidies; and the scrapping of
export subsidies and definite regulations to thwart attempts at circumventing
export subsidy pledges. In short, a firm commitment by the Group to push on with
liberalisation.
This though was tempered with the reaffirmation of the Caims Group's
endorsement of "special and different" treatment for developing countries
(including least developed countries and small states), and the pledge to keep this
platform an undiminished part of any forthcoming negotiations on agriculture
within the WTO framework. Indeed, echoing Pretoria's position on liberalisation
being linked to sensitivity towards developing nations needs, the Group resolved
that the ongoing process of liberalisation had to continue to be supportive of the
developmental requirements of WTO members from the South. Yet a more critical
perspective may view such concerns for the South as an attempt to legitimise the
WTOas the normative regulative body on global trade. As one analysis put it:
The principle of special and differential treatment for developing countries
including least developed countries and states, must also remain an integral
part of the next WTOagriculture negotiations. If the multilateral system fails
to benefit all members or at least the majority it will [stimulate a loss of] faith
133Interview with Ezra Steenkamp, Assistant Director of Trade Policy, Department of
Agriculture,Pretoria, July 8, 1999. See also 'Agricultural Trade Diplomacy'in Ministry for
Agriculture and Land Affairs Agricultural Policy in South Africa: A Discussion Document
Pretoria:Ministry forAgricultureand LandAffairs,1998.
134Interview with Ezra Steenkamp, Assistant Director of Trade Policy, Department of
Agriculture,Pretoria, July 8, 1999.
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in the WTO as the major multilateral negotiating forum and countries will
focus on other regional and bilateral agreements.I3S
Hence "keeping on board" national elites by accepting the principles of differential
treatment for the South on agricultural issues can be seen as one way of
legitimising the broader order and pushing forward the neo-liberalist project, whilst
cushioning elites located in the South from populist pressures that may well build
up if such differential accounting is not taken into consideration and advanced by
Cairns.
This position of supporting the ongoing liberalisation of agriculture saw the
Group endorsing the declaration at the second WTO Ministerial Conference in
Switzerland in May 1998 regarding groundwork for the next round of agriculture
negotiations. The Declaration springing from this meeting bound members to a
process which started in September 1998 and aimed to finish with a ministerial-
level agreement about the extent, structure and time-frame for future agriculture-
related negotiations at the third WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle in late
1999. In the words of the Cairns Group this aimed to "complete the task" on
liberalising agricultural trade.136 This has become a matter of priority for the Cairns
members as depressed prices in the North for products has tempted many
administrations to fall back from their commitments to abolishing subsidies and
other price-distortion mechanisms.tê? The Group has called on Washington and
Brussels to 'exercise restraint' on satisfying pressures by their own agricultural
lobbies for falling short on their obligations under the WTO.I38
As part of this, the Cairns Group agreed to convene lil Mar del Plata,
Argentina, in late 1999 at a preparatory meeting aimed at giving Group countries
an opportunity to meet, discuss and (hopefully) agree on the Group's input into the
content of the WTOmeeting in Seattle. This was predicated on a continuation of
the Group's commitment to neo-liberalist principles regarding global agricultural
trade and sought to reaffirm:
135 Ezra Steenkamp 'The Next Millennium Round of World Trade Negotiations: Agricultural
Issues at Stake and Strategies', Agrekon, vol. 37, no. 4, December 1998, p. 415.
136 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'Cairns Group "Vision" - "Completing
the Task" - http://orpheus.dfat.gov.au/trade/n ...ations/cairsn_group/cairsn_vision.html
137 Business Day (Johannesburg) January 12, 1999.
138 Business Day (Johannesburg) September 28, 1998.
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Its commitment to achieving a fair and market oriented agricultural trading
system as sought by the Agreement on Agriculture. To this end, the Cairns
Group is united in its resolve to ensure that the next WTO agriculture
negotiations achieve fundamental reform which will place trade in
agricultural goods on the same basis as trade in other goods.t-?
It is this liberalisation project, well within the framework of neo-liberalism, that
Pretoria has committed itself to. As the business press has enthusiastically
remarked, South Africa is 'at the forefront of a fight for international free trade in
agricultural products'.140 Whether this will only help its export-orientated
agricultural fractions remains an open-ended question.
139 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'The Cairns Group: Fact Sheet' -
http://orpheus.dfat.gov.au/trade/n ... ations / cairsn_group / cairsn_fs.html
140 Business Day (Johannesburg) April 7, 1998.
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CHAPTER 5
SOUTH AFRICA AND DEVELOPMENTAL-ORIENTED
MULTILATERAL ORGANISATIONS
SECTION I: SOUTH AFRICA AND UNCTAD IX
South Africa's hosting of the ninth United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTADIX)was an important milestone in Pretoria's return to the
world community after decades of international isolation. At the same time, it was
one of the first multilateral platforms where South Africa postured itself both as a
reformer and as an accomodatory bridge between North and South. As Aziz Pahad,
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs remarked:
The very fact that South Africa, despite its late entry into the world
community of nations, was asked to host UNCTADIX is a clear indication
from both developed and developing nations that they see South Africa as
playing a role in bridging the gap between the two worlds.t+!
UNCTADIXwas also where Pretoria attempted to influence Southern colleagues of
the benefits of accepting the globalising thrust whilst seeking an amelioration of its
more negative effects. How this position differed from previous positions of
UNCTADis important, and thus a contextualisation of UNCTADin global politics is
required before this work proceeds to discussing South Africa's role in the
organisation.
Background to UNCTAD IX
UNCTADwas formed in 1964 to 'create a forum in which the more prosperous
member countries [of the United Nations] would come under pressure to agree to
measures benefiting the less-developed countries'. More specifically, its formation
was 'a deliberate effort to use international bureaucracy and conference diplomacy
141 Quoted in Marlene Kromberg, 1996, p. 6
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to alter current norms affecting trade and development'.142 UNCTAD's founding
reflected the growth in membership of the UNof newly-independent states from the
former European colonial empires. A large number of the elites of these new
entities keenly felt the iniquity of the world order upon which they had been
launched, an order 'informed by the dominant ideology of the powerful nations',
and in which the new states had had no hand in crafting.t-ê UNCTADand the later
call for a "New International Economic Order" therefore was a 'response to real
problems experienced by Third World states as a result of the Bretton Woods
system's creation and operation+t+'
Its aim - particularly during the years during and immediately after the
organisation's energetic first head, Raul Prebisch's tenure - was to address the
various issues surrounding the ongoing trade and investment regimes (dominated
by the capitalist West) that were felt to hinder development. Indeed, during the
heydays of the South's activism against global inequality (the mid-1970s), UNCTAD
led the way as one of the key institutional actors voicing the concerns of the
developing world. Promoting an ideological mix of global Keynesianism heavily
influenced by dependency theory, the organisation urged market intervention to
promote development whilst calling attention to the external and structural
constraints on development.t-s
As an organisation, UNCTADwas mandated to perform a variety of purposes.
Perhaps most importantly, was the policy formulating aspect of the body, designed
. to create general and explicit prescriptions associated with trade and development.
Such a process was guided by the research work conducted by the staff of the
UNCTADSecretariat in consultation with experts engaged by the organisation. This
process was then followed by at times painstaking negotiations with the UNCTAD
membership. This was dependent upon consensus and invariably strengthened the
hand of the developed world. If and when a decision was reached, UNCTADtook on
an observational role to monitor compliance whilst technical co-operation and
142 Joseph Nye 'UNCTAD: Poor Man's Pressure Group' in Robert Cox and Howard Jacobson
(eds.) The Anatomy of Influence: Decision-making in International Organizations New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1973, p. 334.
143 Craig Murphy, 1984, p. 2.
144 Ibid.
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assistance sought to enable member countries to follow the prescriptions agreed
upon by the body. That much of this process resulted in a skewed scenario in
favour of the ongoing order reflected the organisational bias inherent in UNCTAD's
constitutional principles, as well as the negative perceptions the developed world
possessed towards the organisation. Historically, UNCTADwas:
The first real confrontation of North and South, symbolic of the new,
fundamental structure of international politics, in which the problems of
relations of industrialised rich and agricultural poor had replaced the
problem of relations between western capitalist and eastern Communist. It
was an occasion to redress the injustices perpetrated under colonial
regimes ...
...UNCTADwould begin to apply in practice what Western political theory
had taught since the time of Plato, that no political community could be
stable if it contained extremes of rich and poor.tw
For its part, the West was highly ambivalent towards UNCTAD's establishment,
preferring to rely upon the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)to
regulate global trading relations. Such a preference suited their own interests, and
the developed world's reluctance to discuss substantial issues vis-a-vis
development (which threatened to open up all manner of questions regarding the
global trading architecture, unequal terms of trade etc.) manifested itself in the
demand to allow decisions made by UNCTADto be reached by consensus, as has
been already mentioned.t-? Such a 'procedure of conciliation' meant that the terms
of the debate and the manoeuvrability of UNCTADwere constrained from the
beginning, with the developed world granted effective influence in line with their
material power (thus perpetuating their global dominance over the South), but out
of all proportion to their numerical strength. Such structural power enabled the
North to 'generally confine their role [in UNCTAD]to opposing any proposals for
change' whilst ostensible "positive proposals" of their own were invariably 'of a
cosmetic nature designed to conceal their underlying resistance to change'.148
145 Hans Singer 'Ideas and Policy: The Sources of UNCTAD', IDS Bulletin, July 1984, pp. 14-
17.
146 Charles Robertson 'The Creation of UNCTAD' in Robert Cox (ed.) International
Organisation: World Politics London: Macmillan, 1969, p. 258.
147 Robert Mortimer The Third World Coalition in International Politics Boulder: Westview
Press, 1984,p. 17.
148 Robert Ramsay 'UNCTAD's Failure: The Rich Get Richer', International Organisation, vol.
38, no. 2, 1984, pp. 388-389.
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[AJnopportunity to lecture Third World leaders on Reaganomics and offer
American technical assistance to Third World governments that wanted to
emulate his domestic policies ...Afterwards, the US simply refused to engage
in global negotiations, forcing the North-South dialogue to a stall.IS2
Others have argued that UNCTAD's'functioning was blocked by continuous efforts
by the North to deny it any negotiating or binding authorityt-?
This is not to say that UNCTADwas a doomed body from the start. Indeed,
during the epoch surrounding the demand for a New International Economic
Order, UNCTAD had some limited success, notably the formulation of the
Generalised System of Preferences and the Integrated Programme for
Commodities. ISO Yet much of the success of such formulations were sabotaged by
the North's unwillingness to fully implement the agreements and 'it had become
obvious by the late 1970s that the high expectations held in some quarters for
progress towards a new order were being frustrated', symbolised by the breakdown
of the Paris Conference on International Economic Co-operation in June 1977 and
the failures of UNCTADIV, V, and VI (May 1976, June 1979, and June 1983
respectively) .1Sl Furthermore, the inflexibility of the North uis-a-uis the developing
world began to harden as the neo-liberalist counter revolution gained momentum
under Reagan and Thatcher. This was perhaps most graphically illustrated by
Reagan's response to the Brandt Commission's proposals for a meeting to overcome
the deadlock in global negotiations over question concerning trade and
development. Reagan only agreed to attend provided that Cuba was excluded, the
meeting was to avoid substantive issues, and was not to issue any form of final
communiqué (I).
This arrogant attitude towards the South was compounded by Washington's
behaviour at the actual summit in Cancun when Reagan used the meeting as:
149 Myriam van der Stichele World Trade: Free for Whom, Fair for Whom?' in Erskine
Childers (ed.) Challenges to the United Nations: Building a Safer World New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1995 , p. 69.
150 See Michael Barratt-Brown Africa's Choices: After Thirty Years of the World Bank
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1995, pp. 157-159.
lSI S.K.B. Asante 'The Role of the Organisation of African Unity in Promoting Peace,
Development and Regional Security in Africa' in Emmanuel Hansen (ed.) Africa: Perspectives
on Peace and Development London: Zed Books, 1987, p. 132.
IS2 Enrico Augelli and Craig Murphy, 1988, p. 189.
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Such actions were applauded by Margaret Thatcher, who suggested that one of the
'valuable' outcomes of Cancun was that it 'was the last of such gatherings'.
Henceforth, 'the intractable problems of Third World poverty, hunger and debt
would not be solved by misdirected international intervention, but rather by
liberating enterprise, promoting trade - and defeating socialism in all its forms'.153
As Augelli and Murphy demonstrated, throughout the 1980s Washington
(and London) actively pressurised the South into accepting the neo-liberalist
macro-economic policies favoured by the historic bloc located in the North.J>' This
saw the focal point of power in terms of global economic governance drastically
transfer to those international financial institutions where the North possessed
preponderance (and hence Washington and London had fiercely rejected any notion
at Cancun of putting the IMFand World Bank under United Nations control). Such
a scenario had been compounded by the decision in late 1979 by the US Federal
Reserve Bank to raise interest rates to avoid a catastrophic decline in the dollar's
value. This caused a draconian deflation in the global economy and plunged much
of the South into unmanageable debt, resulting in an increased ability by the North
to promote and enforce neo-liberal policies onto states in grave need of financial
assistance.
Those organisations struggling on behalf of the South and who dared to step
out of line incurred the wrath of the London-Washington axis - examples such as
UNESCO, the threats against the WHO and FAO and the (enforced) inertia of the
General Assembly being prime examples of an unrelenting offensive from the North
against bodies that in any way seemed to challenge the prescriptions of those who
controlled the global economy.
The ability to withstand the liberalising thrust promoted by the North was
further weakened by the Uruguay Round of GATT,which sought to not only lock-in
the developing world to the increasingly globalised world economy, but also
effectively made UNCTAD's role as a discussion forum, attempting to arrive at
consensus on trade issues, somewhat redundant. This was particularly so as the
WTOtook on the substantive role where binding trade agreements were resolved.
153 Margaret Thatcher The Downing Street Years London: Harper and Collins, 1993, p. 170.
154 On this, see also Walden Bello Dark Victory: The United States, Structural Adjustment and
Global Poverty London: Pluto Press, 1994.
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Ironically, it had been 'global Keynesians' within UNCTADwho had 'argued that the
Uruguay Round ...be capped by the transformation of GATTinto a full-fledged world
trade organisation'. ISS This action, which effectively undercut much of UNCTAD's
relevance, must be contextualised within an epoch of an ever-increasing hegemonic
consensus amongst transnationalised elites over the liberalisation of economic
policies and the belief in a central role for the market in development - concomitant
with the collapse of alternative economic projects located in the East. In short, the
previous ideological tendency of UNCTAD to base its assumptions around
regulation of the global economy as a means to promote development was
dramatically undercut, if not discredited. So too were any confrontationist
expressions, for in a world where there was "no alternative" to neo-liberalism, what
was there to confront?
It was in this context that the state elites (and the bureaucratic staff) within
UNCTAD, sought to re-package the organisation, for whilst the logic of neo-
liberalism was broadly accepted by many, the negative effects of a liberalised world
was equally felt. This process was exhibited at UNCTAD VIII in Cartagena,
Colombia in 1992 where the "Spirit of Cartagena" recognised the central roles of
private enterprise and the market for growth, wrapped up in the rhetoric of 'shared
responsibility and partnership for developmerrt'i t-s Whilst UNCTAD's Commission
remained true to its original commitment to see to the needs of the developing
world, a recognition of the globalised, neo-liberalist normative order was implicit
(and explicit) throughout the summit:
The texts agreed upon in Cartagena included references to a host of
principles that earlier had only been championed by the OECD: an
unambiguous preference for free markets; disregard of any notion of
withdrawal from the world economy; an equation of democratisation and the
protection of human rights with development; and all the rhetoric regarding
the need to decrease corruption and increase efficiency of governments in
the South.t-?
155 Craig Murphy, 1994, p. 270.
156 The Spirit of Cartagena', declaration adopted by UNCTADat its eighth session held at the
Convention Centre, Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, from 8 to 25 February, 1992,
http://www.inro.com.my/inro/caratgena.htm
157 Craig Murphy The United Nations' Capacity to Promote Sustainable Development: The
Lessons of a Year That "Eludes All Facile Judgement"' in The State of the United Nations,
1992Providence: Academic Council of the United Nations System, 1992, pp. 63-64.
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Indeed, this essential acceptance of the normative order was exemplified by the
abandonment of any confrontational posturing in the final communiqué. Instead,
the rhetoric talked of the need to 'overcome confrontation and to foster a climate of
genuine co-operation and solidarity'.158Yet behind this placatory rhetoric was' an
implicit recognition by the South that the globalising impulses that shaped the
contemporary world order had reduced the options, if not space, for the South to
construct any viable alternative ei la the NIEO.As Kees van der Pijl asserts:
By 1980, the internationalisation of capital itself began to undermine the
position of the Third World state classes. Their aspiration to insert their
national economies as integral industrial locations in the emerging world
economy was overtaken by the rise of Asian island- and city-states as
export-industrial locations .
...Thus, even disregarding political developments, the intemationalisation of
capital itself worked to undermine the posture of the Third World state
classes and their regulation project which had caused the greatest concern
[via the call for a NIEO]in 1973-76.159
This had profound effects on the positions of those international organisations that
were ostensibly representative of the developing world, where a retreat from
demands for any structural change in the global economy and a gradual and at
times partial move towards the rising consensus at the elite level concerning the
common sense precepts of neo-liberalism was experienced. As one analysis put it
post -UNCTADVIII:.
Whereas up until that time [i.e. Cartagena] UNCTADhad been a platform
where developing countries demanded adjustment of the
international ...system to their developmental needs, it now expressed the
belief that adoption of [neo-liberalist] laws and related efforts in ...GATT
would facilitate technology transfers to developing countries.
The structural power of transnational capital has not just formed the policy
agenda of deregulation, it is also responsible for the drive to privatisation of
the state sector in all countries of the world. 160
Acceptance of the hegemonic discourse whilst (at best) attempting to ameliorate the
worst aspects of the established order hence became the tactic for much of the
developing world. This was a remarkable sea-change in UNCTAD's normative
158'The Spirit of Cartagena'.
159Kees van der Pijl 'The Sovereignty of Capital Impaired: Social Forces and Codes of
Conduct for Multinational Corporations' in Henk Overbeek (ed.), 1993, pp. 48-49.
160Ankie Hoogvelt Globalisation and the Post-colonial World: The New Political Economy of
Development Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997, p. 137
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posture, for 'until [Cartagena] UNCTAD could be viewed as a counter-hegemonic
organisation resisting the dominance of the Bretton Woods institutions. The
restructuring of the organisation [at UNCTAD VIII gave] it a less confrontational
role in the North-South dialogue'.161 Indeed, much of the South's elites had by this
point bought into the hegemonic order and actively pursued neo-liberalist policies
as a means by which their states could attempt to escape poverty. This was
reflected in UNCTAD's Trade and Development Report of 1992 which aimed to
encourage private consumption and investment demand.tv- Yet a certain unease in
some quarters over the globalisation juggernaut and the neo-liberalist agenda was
exhibited, most notably by the proposals for the application of policies with a
Keynesian tinge to them to facilitate the Report's calls. Such hesitancy was
reflective of the uneven adoption of nee-liberalism as the path to development by
some Southern elites - a scenario that was to change somewhat by the time of
UNCTAD IX.
It was in this context, where 'with the exception of Cuba and North Korea,
no state ... objected to the ideology of a market economy' that South Africa re-
entered the global cornmunity.ie-' For our analysis this is of importance for the
project that the GNU elites accepted at the domestic level was promoted with some
considerable enthusiasm in various multilateral fora. One of the first instances of
this was Pretoria's offer to host UNCTAD IX under the theme of 'Promoting Growth
and Sustainable Development in a Liberalising and Globalising World Economy'.164
UNCTAD IX
The meeting in South Africa continued the broad trajectory of UNCTAD VIII. At the
same time, concern was expressed from the South that the "Spirit of Cartagena"
had been a largely one-sided affair, with the developing world accepting the remit of
the hegemonic order, abandoning confrontational postures and calling for
161Marc Williams International Organisations and the Third World Hemel Hempstead:
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994, p. 179.
162See UNCTADTrade and Development Report, 1992 NewYork: United Nations, 1992 .•
163Marie-Claude Smouts 'International Organizations and Inequality Among States',
International Social Science Journal, no. 144, June 1995, p. 239.
164See South Africa Offers to Host UNCTAD IX, UNCTADpress release TAD/INF/2565, July
13,1995.
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partnership, whilst the developed world did very little to reciprocate. Yet, in an era
of the WTO the ability of UNCTADto promote changes in the global economic
environment was rigorously critiqued by the developed world, particularly as many
Northern-based elites strongly wished to avoid taking clear positions on matters
that the WTO handled. Indeed, questions regarding how UNCTADrelated to the
WTOemerged as paramount concerns of the North at the summit, as the developed
world sought to further limit the role UNCTAD had to play in any economic
ordering of the global economic architecture.
Thus as UNCTADIXprogressed, it became clear that the North opposed any
reference to the implementation of 'specific WTO agreements, especially if
developing countries suggested that their developed counterparts were not
honouring their obligations', whilst vigorously manoeuvring against 'granting
UNCTAD a specific mandate in [various] areas, particularly the notion that
UNCTADshould take up and examine issues before they are taken up in the
WTO'.165The North also opposed references to intellectual property rights already
agreed upon by the WTO, apparently fearing that the South was trying to re-
negotiate already concluded articles, even if such agreements were not in their
interests. Importantly, many 'developed countries were reluctant both to allow
UNCTADto examine their macro-economic policies and its impact on the global
economy, and to continue its work on behalf of developing countries with regard to
debt management'.166
Emboldened by the hegemonic status of neo-liberalism as the normative
economic model and the perennial weakness of a South which had abandoned
demands for a NIEO in favour of "partnership", the capitalist North was essentially
in no mood for compromise, rejecting any terms that hinted at new financial
responsibilities, such as propositions to erect financing devices and trust funds for
the South. Even condemnation of unilateralism and extraterritorial measures were
stalled, as Washington saw this as an attack on their policies towards Havana and
Baghdad. Essentially, the North - as a British government briefing paper put it -
wanted at the very least UNCTAD"reformed" and relegated to undertaking 'policy
165 Xavier Carim South Africa and UNCTAD IX: New Beginnings? Pretoria: Institute of
StrategicStudies, Occasionalpaper no. 7, August 1996, p. 3.
166 Ibid.
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in ternationally ... from
competitiveness'.168
broad social concerns to narrow economic
analysis and research into trade and developmental issues', and to abstain from
'very general concerns such as interdependence, in favour of specific, targeted
types of work in key areas'.167 At the same time, heads of disciplinary institutions
such as the WTO (its Director-General), the IMF (its Managing Director), and the
World Bank (its Managing Director) played a prominent role in the proceedings - a
manifestation of what some' critics saw as 'a shift of policy focus
Reflecting the changed times and new agenda of what had formerly been the
developing world's voice against such Northern-dominated organisations,
UNCTAD's Secretary-General thanked the WTO's head for attending and asserted
that 'his presence had been a concrete expression of the evolving co-operation
between the two organisations'.169 This co-operative attitude between UNCTADand
its former ostensible protagonists was reflected in the final Midrand Declaration - a
document that Pretoria had substantial input into and which is revealing vis-a-vis
South Africa's broad foreign policy position.
South Africa's role in UNCTADIX
The Midrand Declaration was formulated and drafted by the Conference's
president, South Africa's Minister of Trade and Industry, Alec Erwin, in
consultation with delegations at UNCTAD IX.170A number of notable elements of
the Declaration are worthy of discussion. Firstly, the document was grounded very
much within the ongoing discourse and world order. The WTO was referred to as
having 'strengthened the rules-based trading system and furthered the process of
liberalisation', whilst such a scenario was claimed as 'opening new opportunities
for sustainable development and growth'. The Declaration also asserted that
167Foreign and Commonwealth OfficeBackground Brief United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development - UNCTAD IX, April 1996 http) jwww.fco.gov.ukjreferencejbriefsjunctad9.html
168 Globalisation Must Not be at the Expense of People, joint international NGO statement
from parallel NGO conference to UNCTAD IX, April 24-28, 1996, Johannesburg,
http:j j aidc.org.zajarchivesjunctad-9_2.html
169 WTO and UNCTAD Chiefs Meet to Discuss Further Co-operation, WTOPress Briefing/50,
June 21, 1996.
170 For details and final resolutions at the Conference, see Midrand Declaration
http:j j sunsite.scu.eun.egjuntpdc/libraryjte/unctadixju9midra.htm
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UNCTADIXhad 'responded to these changes and challenges' by attempting to 'give
new and real meaning to the partnership for development'. Market forces were said
to 'playa pivotal role', whilst the WTO was claimed to 'facilitate [the] positive
integration of countries into the global trading system'i!"!
Such an analysis of the global order mirrored that of the South African
government, which had largely abandoned any dirigiste pretensions, instead
privileging the role of "private enterprise" in fostering development. Aziz Pahad's
assertion that 'we...want to involve people throughout the country, especially the
private sector' in formulating foreign policy and that an aim of Pretoria's
international relations was to 'make it possible for the private sector to have better
opportunities in [foreign] countries' reflected this impulse. Indeed, Pahad linked
this aim of Pretoria's foreign policy to the hosting of UNCTAD, suggesting that
'changes in Africa, especially the multi-party democratisation process ...and
economic liberalisation will create the possibility of us moving a little faster in
dealing with economic decline. This is where UNCTAD, with South Africa as
President, can playa vital role'.172
Yet, with acceptance of the hegemonic norms of trade liberalisation went a
recognition of the uneven process of globalisation. This translated in a call for an
attempt at lessening the worst aspects of this process - reflecting in part South
Africa's preferred posture. Indeed, the position of UNCTADand Pretoria dovetailed
to a considerable degree, so that the organisation and South Africa 'has largely
taken on board the "realities" of the liberalising globalised world order, although
[they] adopt a more holistic and questioning approach [raising] issues of particular
concern to the developing world'.173Thus the principles of the "Spirit of Cartagena"
were reinforced with a renewed call for 'partnership for development'. Reflecting the
South's unease at the North's somewhat tardy response to their willingness to
construct a modus vivendi, the Midrand Declaration pointedly remarked that such
partnership had to be grounded on a clear definition of roles, common objectives
and joint action.
171 Ibid.
172 Aziz Pahad quoted in Marlene Kromberg, 1996, p. 7.
173 African NOO Declaration to UNCTAD IX, Parallel NGO conference to UNCTAD IX, April 24-
28,1996, Johannesburg, http://aidc.org.za/archives/unctad-9_l.html
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
247
This was envisaged as involving the intensification of inter-governmental co-
operation between North and South; South-South co-operation; a more effective co-
ordination and complementarily of multilateral institutions; an increased dialogue
between governments and civil society aimed at facilitating development; and a
renewed "partnership" between public and private sectors in order to achieve
increased economic growth rates and ergo (according to the Declaration) greater
development. Following on from this, South Africa (as president of UNCTAD)agreed
to host a workshop on this expected partnership between public and private
sectors, in particular on how to encourage the private sector in more advanced
developing countries to assist those least developing naticns.U+ This was changed,
at the behest of the UNCTADSecretariat, to re-focus the workshop to concentrate
on the 'definition, development and consolidation of a positive agenda for LDCs
(and low income countries in preparation for WTO negotiations' [emphasis
addedl.t"> Held in late June, 1999 the meeting sought to 'enhance the least
developing countries participation in making global trade rules at the WTO'.176
Again, problem-solving activism and attempting to encourage the participation of
the South in the international political economy within the ongoing normative
framework marked Pretoria's multilateralist activity.
Returning to UNCTADIX, Pretoria's delegation ostensibly negotiated on a
common platform agreed upon with the Africa Group and, more broadly as part of
the G77. Yet, as South Africa's Deputy Director of Foreign Trade Relations later
asserted, 'it sought to build bridges amongst all member countries in an attempt to
achieve overall consensua'?" This classic middlepowermanship role was later
celebrated by a senior DFA official who saw South Africa as 'in the middle' and
having 'breathed new life into UNCTADat UNCTADIX' by indicating that it was
seriously interested in a meaningful debate and engagement with the North'.178
This was possible as South Africa was a 'new player on the multilateral field and
174 Midrand Declaration.
175 Preparing for WTO Multilateral Trade Negotiations in 2000: Towards a South African
Framework, internal Department ofForeignAffairsdocument, no date, p. 8.
176 Cape Times (CapeTown)June 28, 1999.
177 XavierCarim, 1996, p. 5.
178Interviewwith John Davies, Director, International Developmentand EconomicAffairs,
Departmentof ForeignAffairs,Pretoria,July 8, 1999.
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Indeed, Pretoria's position was somewhat in advance of other Southern
states regarding liberalisation and the opportunities offered by a deepening global
economy. At the Conference, South Africa was prominent in promoting the notion
not ring-fenced into either [North or South] camp'i!"? Its "bridge-buildng" role then
helped convince many Southern elites at the Conference of the desirability to avoid
confrontational rhetoric and agree to the notion of "partnership" with the North. In
some regards, in the words of one South African official, this sought to change the
culture of UNCTADaway from "begging" and towards taking more responsibility for
economic malperformance.iw For sure many delegations already shared South
Africa's acceptance of the tenets of neo-liberalism, but Pretoria's tactical activities
were of profound importance and 'at the closing plenary, much mention was made
of the constructive way in which the South African team ... transposed the country's
experience and "spirit" of negotiated compromise during sessions dealing with
controversial aspects of the pre-conference text'.181
This consensus-building by Pretoria accounted for much of the rhetoric of
"success" which greeted the closing of UNCTAD IX, with South Africa boasting that
'every member state felt that its views were reflected in the Conference's final text
and the Midrand Declaration' and that 'a win-win outcome' had resulted.182 Much
of this was cast as UNCTAD gaining new-found "credibility" with the developed
world.183 Yet even observers sympathetic to the neo-liberalist project noted the
agenda behind the Declaration, namely that 'the only way [South] countries will
gain from globalisation is if they make major adjustments in policies, resource
allocation and production structures '.184 Furthermore, Pretoria's celebratory
rhetoric contradicted an earlier position of UNCTAD's Secretary-General, who had
cautioned an overly enthusiastic embrace of neo-Iiberalism, saymg that
globalisation was 'not, as the Americans would say, a "win-win situation'''.185
179Interview (by telephone) with Henry Raubenheimer, Deputy Director, Development and
Finance, Department of ForeignAffairs,July 21, 1999.
180 Ibid.
181 The New Face ofUNCTAD, http://www.sn.apc.org/fgd/unctad.htm
182XavierCarim, 1996, p. 5.
183Interview (by telephone) with Henry Raubenheimer, Deputy Director, Development and
Finance, Department of Foreign Affairs,July 21, 1999.
184 Finance Week, April25 - May 1, 1996.
185Rubens Ricupero 'UNCTAD:Enfant Terrible Hopes for Rebirth', World Today, vol. 52, no.
4, April 1996, p. 107.
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of "Trade Points" as a means by which the private sector could be involved in the
development of the South. Alec Erwin also repeatedly stressed that 'South Africa
had already taken visible and significant measures to align its trade practices and
policies with those required by the WTO',whilst urging his South colleagues to do
the same.186Such advice however was rejected by other delegates wary at such
open embracing of neo-liberal prescriptions. For example, the Indian representative
called for a complete embargo on new issues to be added to the WTOtrade agenda,
whilst Bangladesh, Mauritius and China critiqued the way in which developing
countries were expected to integrate themselves into a global economy with very
little assistance from the North - thereby placing states from the South at a
disadvantageous position from the start.P'? Such comments reflected a divergence
of opinion amongst the South at UNCTADIX with certain states - South Africa
being one - largely enthusiastic about the neo-liberalist agenda underwriting the
ongoing order, whilst others urged far greater caution.
This advanced position by Pretoria and its evident enthusiasm for the
essential prescriptions of the normative global order was also reflected in the
contemporaneous hosting of "Africa Connect" - an international business
conference attended by about five hundred capitalists and jointly organised by
UNCTADand the South African Council of the International Chamber of Business.
The aim of this meeting was 'to create an interactive business environment that
can facilitate networking and result in the initiation of real commercial deals in the
world's last great business frontier'.188
Such corporate involvement was inconceivable in an earlier era of UNCTAD
and demonstrated not only how far the organisation had changed towards
accommodating the market-oriented logic of the dominant discourse, but also how
much the South African government subscribed to the broad tenets of this project.
It must be remembered that by this point the GNUhad for all intents and purposes
abandoned the RDP programme and opted for the neo-liberalist GEAR with its
heavy emphasis on the private sector as a vehicle through which development
186 Marlene Kromberg 'UNCTAD - A New Lease on Life', SA Now, vol. 1, no. 4, May 1996, p.
28. .
187 Chakravarthi Raghavan 'No New Issues at WTO Without Prior UNCTAD Examination',
Third World Network, http://www.southbound.com.my/souths/twn/title/prior-ch.htm
188 Africa Connect http://www2.asianconnect.com/untpdc/library/te/unctadix/prconn.htm
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could be achieved. Indeed, Pretoria's Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry made
South Africa's position on the matter quite clear when she asserted 'that only
through attracting investment can a start be made with addressing reconstruction
and industrial development in Africa'.189In short, Pretoria's position at UNCTADIX
was a reflection of its domestic policies - policies which fitted more within the remit
of the ongoing order and the "Spirit of Cartagena" than within what UNCTADhad
traditionally pursued. Parallels between UNCTADand the ANC's shift in the means
by which economic empowerment for the disadvantaged could be achieved were an
interesting reflection on the strength that neo-liberalism had achieved as the
hegemonic orthodoxy.
At the same time, a deeper malaise for the South was evidence at the
Conference as state elites scrambled to attract investment from the North.
Certainly, UNCTADIXwas marked by a great deal of bilateral negotiations behind
closed doors between individual countries of the South and the developed world. In
what may be viewed as a rush for the best deal in a situation where Southern
solidarity against the negative effects of globalisation and transnational capital was
manifestly absent, individual state elites (including South African) attempted to
fashion agreements on an individual basis. Indeed South Africa was reported to
have arranged a large number of trade pacts with various European and Asian
states at the Conference.tw As one report put it, 'such buying and selling of
agreements, especially on trade issues, [spoke] volumes about the absence of
cohesion among African states in their dealings with each other and with the
international community'i'?' In a situation where, as the special adviser to South
Africa's Minister of Trade and Industry argued, UNCTADIX was sending 'out a
message that developing countries are going to take full responsibility for their
development',192the reasoning of competing for investment with little regard for an
overarching normative framework on how to best co-ordinate this process seemed
logical, if not overly desirable.
189 Marlene Kromberg, 1996, p. 29.
190 The Sowetan (Johannesburg) April 17, 1996.
191 'Delegates Agree to Revive the Spirit', New Nation (Johannesburg) April 12, 1996.
192 'Giving UNCTADa New Focus', New Nation (Johannesburg) April 12, 1996.
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Criticism ofUNCTAD IX and South Africa
This position, though celebrated in some quarters as marking a "consensus" and a
new "reality" in North-South relations along with a concomitant congratulation to
Pretoria on its "positive" contribution to UNCTADIX as a "bridge-builder",193was
however critiqued in other quarters. Indeed one analysis suggested that post-
Midrand it was evident that:
UNCTADwas losing its direction and spirit as guardian and defender of the
development principle and perspective, and was trying to "mature" into an
agency seeking "consensus".
Since the prevailing consensus is the free-market liberalisation model that is
promoted by the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO, UNCTADseems
to be seeking a role to be relevant to this model and to be accepted, for
instance, by the WTO and the Intemational Chamber of Commerce, rather
than to challenge or provide alternatives to the model.t?"
The Midrand Declaration's emphasis on partnership with the private sector as a
tool for development - a position that had been enthusiastically embraced by South
Africa during the Conference - was also criticised as promoting the idea that foreign
investment was 'the panacea to solve every problem'. Furthermore, the "consensus"
that Pretoria had so carefully crafted at UNCTADIX was cast as 'the ideology of
pragmatism' yet 'in the present international context, this meant supporting the
intense intemational competition for markets in which states have little control
over their own economies'.195 Such a "consensus" on economic policy served to
fetishise the market and elevate growth as an end in itself.
Certainly, post-UNCTADIX development ran the danger of being measured
by macro-economic indicators and levels of investment, rather than the overall
condition of society. Such a scenario suited the interests of the North for 'good
government and sound economic management, rather than international action'
were now seen as essential for trade and development.196 In short, UNCTADIX
under South Africa's chairmanship continued and extended the move away from
questioning the overall global situation and how this structurally affects
193 See for example Madeleine Wackernagel 'New Focus for UNCTAD', Mail and Guardian May
16, 1996.
194 Tetteh Hormeku 'NGOs Critical of UNCTAD's Investment and Pro-business Approach',
Third World Economics, no. 187/188, June 16-July 15, 1998, p. 1.
195 Ibid.
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development, and towards the more "pragmatic" position of making economies in
the South as attractive as possible to foreign investors. As one senior official
remarked, 'South Africa encourages developing countries to get their act together'
regarding global trade. By doing so, Pretoria attempts to 'lead by example' in
restructuring its economy along neo-liberalist lines.t?" Such all actuality is not
unique to South Africa, but reflects 'the spirit of the times'.198
For our own analysis, the hegemony of the ongoing normative order within
the ruling elite of the ANCwas graphically revealed at UNCTADIX - one of the first
major multilateral initiatives Pretoria took up in the post-apartheid era. So too was
the middlepowermanship role performed by South Africa in 'acting as a bridge
between North and South U??That the Declaration also contained some appeals to
lessening the worst aspects of globalisation indicated that the GNUwas responsive
to its Left constituency and was aware that liberalisation was an uneven process
which affected most directly the vulnerable. Yet socialised into a normative order
where there was no alternative but to accept the remits of neo-liberalism, space
that was available to posture a reformist position - however limited - was taken by
the government eagerly. Still, it is hard to disagree with the assertion that 'the
reason for [UNCTAD's]establishment and existence was to champion and advocate
the perspective of development and of the South, and not be a consensus-seeking
agency with a niche of being "relevant" to the agenda of donor agencies or to be an
appendant to the WTO'.200By promoting consensus at UNCTAD IX, South Africa
stood accused by many of promoting an essentially Northern formula for
development that left the privileged untouched whilst pinning all one's hopes on
the private sector to empower the disadvantaged - a parallel (cynics would suggest)
with GEAR's own prescriptions.
196 Chakravarthi Raghavan 'Broad Support for a Revitalised UNCTAD',Third World Network,
http:j jwww.twnside.org.sgjsouthsjtwnjtitlejbroad-ch.htm
197 Interview with John Davies, Director, International Development and Economic Affairs,
Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, July 8, 1999.
198 Interview (by telephone) with Henry Raubenheimer, Deputy Director, Development and
Finance, Department of Foreign Affairs, July 21, 1999.
199 Interview with John Davies, Director, International Development and Economic Affairs,
Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, July 8, 1999.
200 Tetteh Hormeku, 1998, p. 6.
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SECTION 11: SOUTH AFRICA AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT
In the post-Cold War era, the relevancy of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)has
been raised by a variety of commentators, as has the future of the concept of non-
alignment as a feasible foreign policy orientation. Though there was a continual
critique of the NAMfrom (predominately Western) analysts throughout the bi-polar
era, usually on the grounds that the NAMwas "pro-Soviet" and "anti-Western", this
reached a crescendo as the world entered into the so-called "NewWorld Order". The
relevancy of the NAMwas directly raised for example by the Washington Post which
asked pointedly, 'non-aligned with what?'.201This criticism of the NAMwas echoed
in South Africa when it was announced that Pretoria would join the Movement as
of May 31, 1994. One commentator described the NAM as a 'seemingly
anachronistic organisation',202 whilst another asserted that the NAM was
'substantially redundant'.203
Such criticism largely misses the point, for like UNCTAD, the NAMis one of
the few vehicles through which the South can promote a normative agenda that
attempts to lessen the effects of closer economic integration in the context of a
post-Cold War, liberalising global economy. It is to this agenda that South Africa
attached itself to when it agreed to join the organisation. As will be demonstrated,
the NAM's platform has, again like UNCTAD, substantially changed since the
heydays of the demand for a NIEO, and the organisation in the contemporary
period implicitly recognises the globalising pressures that order the world, whilst
calling for an amelioration of these impulses. This agenda fits with Pretoria's own
foreign policy platform. As such, it can be of no surprise that South Africa not only
joined the organisation (to the dismay of Western-centric analysts), but also hosted
the NAM's Twelfth Summit in late 1998. By examining Pretoria's involvement in
this multilateral body, a valuable perspective and understanding on the foreign
policy posture of post-apartheid South Africa can be gained.
201 Washington Post (WashingtonDC)May26, 1995.
202 James Hamill and Jack Spence 'South Africaand International Organisations', in Walter
Carlsnaes and MarieMuller(eds.) 1997, p. 221.
203 Greg Mills 'South Africa and the Non-AlignedMovement', in South African Yearbook of
International Affairs, 1997 Braamfontein: South African Institute of International Affairs,
1997, p. 162.
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Background
Foundations for the NAMwere initially laid at the Asian African Conference in
Bandung, Indonesia in April 1955.204This conference was attended by twenty-nine
delegations (twenty-three from Asia and six from Africa) at a time when the United
Nations had only fifty-nine member states. Bandung has since been described as
'in essence a celebration of the wave of independence that had swept across Asia
and was then cresting in Africa'.20sThe motives for convening such a conference
were widely varied amongst the elites attending, as were their economic and
political orientations. Nonetheless, Bandung did adopt a number of resolutions
that have been described as 'an augur of a future protest against the subordinating
stays of the developing countries in the international system',206 and which
established a set of normative values which aimed at a more equitable world order.
Bandung was followed by the Belgrade Conference of 1961 where the NAM
was officially launched. At Belgrade a declaration containing the common views of
delegates on international problems was issued that was in line with the general
Bandung position and an agreement on the summits being triennial was reached.
The NAMwas established as a loose multilateralist project with very little formal
organisation and this resulted in 'conference diplomacy [becoming] a specific
characteristic of non-alignmerrt'<?? By confirming the "Spirit of Bandung" in 1961,
the NAM also adopted a posture that rejected the bilateralist impulses that
dominated the world through the system of Cold War alliances. Yet perhaps what
was the most important outcome from Belgrade and which has continued to the
contemporary period is the general establishment of behavioural norms for state
activity. Though this has certainly been compromised as the NAMhas progressed,
it is important to remember that at that particular time such normative expressions
204 For details see R.AbdulganiThe Bandung Connection Jakarta: Gunung Agung,1981.
205 Robert Mortimer The Third World Coalition in International Politics Boulder: Westview,
1984, p. 9.
206 Ibid., p. 9.
207 Graham Evans and Jeffrey NewnhamDictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to
Concepts, Ideas and Institutions HemelHempstead:HarvesterWheatsheaf, 1992, p. 224.
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were 'innovative, even revolutionary' and consciously rejected big power domination
of the global order.208
By doing so, the NAMcommitted itself to a project that privileged the role of
the United Nations as the proper forum for inter-state activity. The "Lusaka
Declaration" of 1970 explicitly promoted the United Nations and aimed to
strengthen the body 'so that it will be a more effective obstacle against all forms of
. aggressive action and the threat to use force against the freedom, independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity of any country'.209 Such calls, whilst rhetorical
to be sure, did express a desire by a large number of states to operate in a world
less beholden to the unilateralist activities of the Superpowers and other great
nations. At the same time, the NAM'sfocus began to shift from issues vis-a-vis the
Superpowers and East-West confrontation, and towards development issues
involving questions regarding North-South relations. Indeed, this focus on
constructing a normative order to resolve the developmental contradictions
produced by global capitalism henceforth began to preoccupy the summits of the
organisation - in itself a reflection of changes in the international system,
stimulated by the heady growth in the South's representation at multilateral fora
such as the United Nations.
Thus like UNCTAD,the NAMbecame in the 1970s an important platform in
the South's efforts to put forward the NIEO, sharing as it did with UNCTADa broad
dependencia world view á la Prebisch and Singer. This symbolically culminated at
the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations in 1974 where, under the NAM's
then leader (Algeria's Honari Boumedienne), the South deployed NAM and G-77
texts in successfully pushing for a comprehensive normative declaration detailing
the .aspirations of the developing world's elites:
[Flor the first time the General Assembly approved a massive resolution
covering all of the economic issues the Third World had raised since the
Second World War. The resolution touched on sovereignty over natural
resources, improving terms of trade through international regulation of trade
based on equitable treatment, reforming the global monetary system to
include an aid component, expanding concessionary multilateral aid,
providing debt relief, controlling TNCs, promoting international support for
208 Philip Nel, 1998, p. 5.
209 Peter Willets, 1978, p. 31.
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industrialisation, and reforming the United Nations system to give Third
World governments greater control over international economic decisions.uv
Yet as Murphy points out, much of this rhetoric was derivative of Southern elites
perceptions of their own domestic interests within the context of the breakdown of
the Bretton Woods system and the manoeuvrings of the OPEC states. With the end
of the regulatory framework of the Bretton Woods arrangements, negotiations
regarding the future architecture to replace such a system seemed logical to many
Southern elites. In short, 'they took the opportunities offered by the evolving
politics of international economic relations to create leadership roles for
themselves', thereby bolstering their own standing at the domestic level.211This
was important as 'their position as the ruling class at the periphery remain[ed]
tenuous, hence, the imperative of external association and support' - and public
posturing on the international stage.212 Space for this posturing however was
largely dependent on the absence of any firm leadership from the North over the
ongoing global economic meltdown, thereby 'Third World [elites emerged] claiming
a role in international crisis management that only the United States was trying
hard to ignore'<"-
This situation in itself occurred during a period of hegemonic breakdown
and prior to the reformulation of hegemony under the neo-liberalist rubric, thus
the seeking of alternative ordering was a manifestation of this. In aGramscian
sense, 'the crisis consist[ed] precisely in the fact that the old [was] dying and the
new [could not] be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms
appear[ed]'.214 Such 'morbid symptoms' as calls for a reconfiguration of the global
order (in essence, a reformulated global historic bloc) however failed to materialise.
Reasons for this are varied, but centred around OPEC's failure to push home any
advantage accrued by the crisis surrounding the oil hike:
OPEC members did not use their resources as part of a complete strategy for
consolidating power throughout the world economy. Rather than selectively
and judiciously investing their wealth in ways that would bind new allies to
210 Craig Murphy, 1984, p. 114.
211 Ibid., p. 115.
212 Timothy Shaw 'The Non-Aligned Movement and the New International Division of Labour'
in Ralph Onwuka and Timothy Shaw, 1989 (eds.) Africa in World Politics: Into the 1990s
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989, p. 6.
213 Robert Mortimer, 1984, p. 52.
214Antonio Gramsci, 1971, p. 276.
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[a counter-hegemonic] bloc, most of the OPEC members relied upon private
institutions that shared the core interests of the old historical bloc,
international banks.v'"
This failure to work out a coherent strategy to construct an alternative order and
the OPEC member's usage of capitalist banking institutions was to result in a fatal
weakening of the South's bargaining position vis-a-vis the North; radically
undermine South solidarity; and with the recycling of petro-dollars and
concomitant reckless adventurist lending practices of the North's bankers in the
late 1970s-early 1980s lead to the catastrophic debt crisis and the "lost decade". As
Fidel Castro remarked, 'OPEC policies, far from pioneering reformed North-South
, relations ...undermined Third World economic solidarity and the NIEO'.216
These factors combined to lay the foundation for an (easier) re-assertion of
Northern hegemony over the developing world as the neo-liberalist counter-
revolution gained ascendancy. This was marked in the developing world by a
gradual acceptance by Southern elites of the overarching principles of the
hegemonic project. As with all other multilateral organisations - such as UNCTAD-
this scenario played itself out within the NAMas the confrontational posturing of
'the 1970s gave way to more accomodatory rhetoric as the 1980s progressed -
accelerating with the demise of the alternative project centred in the East. It is to
this evolution of the NAM's thinking that this work now turns to in order to
contextualise South Africa's own position as it joined the organisation in 1994.
The NAM's platform
Until the Jakarta Summit lil 1992, the NAM's 'position was fairly consistent,
centring around territorial integrity, resistance to "imperialism", and a rejection of
hierarchies of power and privilege in the international system. The essential aims
were crystallised in the Lusaka Declaration of 1970, which stated that the NAM
was committed to:
215 Enrico Augelli and Craig Murphy, 1988, pp. 150-151.
216 Quoted by Fred Halliday 'The Maturing of the Non-Aligned: Perspectives from New Delhi',
Third World Affairs, 1985 London: Third World Foundation for Social and Economic Studies,
1985, p. 48.
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The pursuit of world peace and [the] strengthening the role of non-aligned
countries within the United Nations so that it will be a more effective
obstacle against all forms of aggressive action ...
Opposition to great power military alliances and pacts ...
The universality of and strengthening of the efficacy of the United Nations;
and
The struggle for economic independence and mutual co-operation on a basis
of equality and mutual benefits.v'?
Yet paradoxically, though the Lusaka Declaration came as the push for liberation
in southern Africa was reaching a climax and as the calls for a NIEOwere to focus
the minds of the state elites in both North and South, Lusaka was also a watershed
in the sense that membership of the NAMnot only by this point was predominately
African but also, as membership of the body expanded, the principles upon which
the organisation were founded were compromised as heavily dependent and
poverty-stricken African states (particularly those that were Francophone) joined.
Many of these were by no means non-aligned, being firmly within the French and
hence Western capitalist camp As one analysis noted,
There [was] a decreasing degree of non-alignment from the "veterans"
through the "once before" to the "newcomers". Moreover there [was] a
considerable change of balance between East and West. Formerly those who
were aligned were split between an Eastern and Western alignment. Now the
West predominat[ed] completely.218
Yet the ongoing process of decolonisation and global politics meant that by the
mid-1970s the NAMwas ostensibly more "socialist" in orientation, perhaps by
Colombo summit in 1976, and certainly by the sixth summit which -symbolically -
was held in Havana in 1979. Of course, much of the rhetoric emanating from the
state elites was just that - rhetoric - and as Shaw comments, 'the ideological
complexion of the Movement [was] considerably more "progressive" than members
actual political economies'A'? Nonetheless, on the eve of the election to government
of outright neo-liberalists in the capitalist heartland of Britain and the United
States, the NAMwas at least ostensibly posturing a vision at variance with the
217 Cited in Peter Willets, 1978, p. 31.
218 H. Hveem and P. Willetts The Practice of Non-Alignment: On the Present and the Future
of an International Movement', in Yash Tandon and D. Chandarana (eds.) Horizons of
African Diplomacy Nairobi: EALB, 1974, p. 2.
219 Timothy Shaw, The Non-Aligned Movement and the New International Division of
Labour; in Ralph Onwuka and Timothy Shaw (eds.) Africa in World Politics Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1989, p. 11.
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gathering thrust of global capitalism and its transnational agents. The demise of
this vision played itself out as an integral part of the reassertion ofWestem-centred
hegemony - 'America's quest for supremacy [over] the Third World' as one study
put it, which occurred as the 1980s progressed.220
This reassertion over the South of Northern politico-economic dominance
came, as was suggested in the study of UNCTAD,at a historical juncture when
financial indebtedness was acting to drastically undermine - if not emasculate -
sovereignty and manoeuvrability in the developing world. At the same time,
leadership fractions within the South were increasingly drawn into the ongoing
restructuring process as promoted by the neo-liberalist project, and their specific
class interests tended to be different from their own constituencies suffering from
the liberalisation of the developing economies. Indeed, the call for liberalisation -
dressed up as it was in the rhetoric of economic "realities" and "TINA"- gave space
for conservative elements within the ruling elites of the South who had always been
reluctant to commit themselves to a concrete plan of action vis-a-vis the NIEO.
Their seizure upon the globalisation discourse to help explain away unpopular
policies (which concomitantly reified the positions of certain externally-oriented
class fractions within the domestic polity) reflected not only a minimal commitment
to any major restructuring of the global economy (except where it benefited
Southern elites); but also mirrored the tensions and contradictions inherent within
an organisation such as the NAMwhose membership was so disparate. As one
analysis succinctly put it:
The ambivalence of the NIEOprogramme as expressed by NAMreflect[ed] the
fact that despite rhetorical unity, the alliance that advanced this programme
was an uneasy one, composed of conservative, radical, and liberal states
with divergent objectives. For status quo states like Mexico, world economic
reform along NIEO lines was seen as a means to alleviate pressures for
much-needed internal economic reforms and thus solidify the position of the
ruling elites. Also, waving the NIEO flag was a perfect ideological weapon to
blunt criticism from forces for change within the country.221
Furthermore, abandonment of "confrontational" posturing (such as the NIEO)
served the interests not only of specific class fractions throughout the South, but
also the specific foreign policies of NAMstates. For example, towards the end of the
220 SeeEnrico Augelli and Craig Murphy, 1988.
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1980s the elites within Yugoslavia became aware of the pressing need to tie its
economic future to the ongoing European integrationist project, particularly in the
light of the decline of the rest of the socialist world. Thus at the ninth summit in
Belgrade in 1989, Yugoslavia 'pleaded for the modernisation of the Movement
[thus] discarding the NAM'sattitude of assertiveness uis-a-uis the two power blocs.
Instead, the NAM[adopted] a more tolerant and flexible position with emphasis on
co-operation and dialogue'.222
Such a position was not simply a reflection of the Yugoslavs, but reflected a
playing out of the increasing integration of the world's markets and the desire by
local Southern-based elites to benefit from this process wherever possible.
Combative posturing against the structural inequalities of the capitalist system
were seen to be of little use in facing up to globalisation, particularly when - as has
been pointed out - much of the elites in the South subscribed to the hegemonic
project of neo-liberalism. Even those that did not fully accede to this "NewWorld
Order" were painfully aware of the ongoing marginalisation that much of the South
was enduring and, in the words of the Indonesian ambassador to South Africa,
were 'willing to undertake whatever was necessary to ensure that [they] could
engage the rest of the international community in dialogue'.223
Yet the "international community" clearly set much of the agenda in the new
North-South dialogue and even whilst the NAMadopted what can be seen as a
"trade unionist" approach to the world economy, discussion of the structural
inequalities that underpinned the global capitalist system were quietly shelved
whilst rhetoric concerning "economic realities", appeals to "universal standards"
and claims regarding the "de-ideologisation" of global politics became the norm.
Such a process - the universalisation of a particular normative agenda - within the
NAMmirrored what was occurring in the former socialist countries. As Shubin
writes,
260
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Talk about the supremacy of "universal human values" became a camouflage
for the process of "re-ideologisation" and the uncritical acceptance of
Western values both in internal and external policies ... [Furthermore] "the
interests of the national economy" started to become key words ...However,
more often than not, these words tended to be used to conceal cover-ups for
the narrow interest of groups of officials and emerging businessmen.e>'
Thus whilst the NAMconsiders its dialogue with G-7 over the debt issue as an
example of 'co-operation and constructive dialogue',225 critics might view such
activities as letting the North (particularly the international financial institutions)
off the hook as it were, and further contributing to the scenario where this no
alternative global ordering other than one dictated by an increasingly powerful
transnational elite and following the prescriptions of nee-liberalism. Indeed, the
NAMhas increasingly echoed the dominant discourse and is almost apologetic in
its dealings with the North: consider how an Indonesian ambassador links
accession to neo-liberalism's fixation on "free markets" with the NAM's "hand of
reconciliation" approach:
If the livelihood of peoples of the developing world is to be preserved and
enhanced, then the Movement must wage an effective struggle for the
liberalisation of world trade. ,.
That the NAMcan effectively play such a role today is largely because there
has been a growing recognition on the part of some of the major developed
countries that the NAM has ...adopted a moderate approach and is now
greatly imbued with the spirit of conciliation and co-operation.s>
This process towards a more conciliatory and less conflictual posture began in the
1980s and was flagged in Belgrade, but has been particularly prominent since the
tenth summit in Jakarta in 1992. A brief examination of this summit and the
subsequent meeting in Colombia is necessary before a situationing of Pretoria's
own role in the Movement is possible.
224 Vladimir Shubin, 1999, p. 370.
225 'Speech ofH.E. Mr Nana S. Sutresna'.
226 Ibid., p. 7.
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Jakarta, 1992 and the "Call from Cartagena"
The Jakarta Declaration has been described as 'the first major reaction of the NAM
to the emerging world order', and as such is of fundamental importance.ê"?
Following on from the Belgrade meeting, the summit and its Declaration reflected
the attempt by the elites within the Movement to come to terms with the ongoing
process of global structural change. As has been suggested before, the posture
which the NAMdeveloped reflected the specific class interest of a transnationalised
elite fraction, networked as it was with its partners in the North. Having acceded to
the hegemonic discourse, the new position of this elite was to (re-)negotiate its
relationship with the dominant forces in the global economy, attempting to accrue
benefits wherever possible and fostering an amelioration of the most negative
aspects of the globalisation process. The Jakarta Declaration in part reflected these
impulses, for 'the NAMaltogether changed its approaches and orientation from one
that was often viewed as denunciatory and confrontational to one that is
unmistakably conciliatory and co-operative'.228Situated within a region that was
then enjoying unprecedented (if uneven) growth and outwardly exhibiting brash
(over-Iconfidenee about the success of "Asian-style capitalism" and the future
"Pacific Century", the elites of many of the South were drawn into seeing the "Asian
way" as a panacea of all its ills. Heavily tied to the neo-liberalist impulses that were
pushing forward the liberalising project, structural problems within the global
economy were swiftly forgotten as the NAM sought out "partnership" with the
North.
Hence pursuing its "trade unionist" approach, the NAM extended an
"Invitation to Dialogue" to the G-7 on the eve of their summit meeting in Tokyo.
Though much of this may have had more to do with then-chairman Suharto's
extensive linkages with the Japanese elites and in particular then Japanese Prime
Minister Miyazawa, the G-7 were probably satisfied by the new-found "realism"
exhibited by the Southern leadership. Thus the G-7 now holds regular
227 Amadu Sesay 'Africa, Non-Alignment and the End of the Cold War' in Sola Akinrinade
and Amadu Sesay (eds.) Africa in the Post-Cold War International System London: Pinter,
1998, p. 157
228 H.E. Mr Nana S. Sutresna 'The Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries - An Overview
from an Indonesian Perspective', lecture at the International Training on Poverty Alleviation
in Indonesia, Cipayung Bogar, West Java, October 14, 1996,
http://www.deplu.go.id/english/gnb.htm
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consultations between the NAMand the G-7 (8) before its annual summits. This
was followed by the co-sponsored resolution between the NAM and the United
States (the first ever) in September 1993 calling for "Strengthening International
Co-operation for Development through Partnership". Such dialogue with the
powerful earned the praise of pro-neo-liberalist journals such as the Far Eastern
Economic Review who boldly announced that the Movement was now 'irrelevant no
more'.229
One way in which this was manifested was the NAM'sconciliatory approach
to the debt issue. In the past, the Movement had adopted a common strategy e.g. at
Cartagena, 1984 that held the potential for confronting the leading financial
institutions over this question. However, the NAMhad failed to push this through,
handicapped as it was by the differing agendas of various elites in the South -
notably in Argentina and Mexico. The transnational elites located in both North
and South had long recognised that 'any move on the external debt would
potentially radicalise domestic politics of income distribution and property rights
beyond the precarious control of the present system', and so had engaged the issue
mostly at the rhetorical level - a useful self-legitimising device for Southern
leaders.23oThis was necessary, for whilst the elites in the South benefited from low
labour costs and their (inevitable) foreign capital holdings overseas increased their
wealth at home every time the national currency was devalued, the
impoverishment this caused at the local level was threatening to their positions.
Posturing a confrontationist agenda towards their creditors was a useful way of
deflecting domestic criticism, as was the recourse to explaining away all the
country's ills onto the debt problem. Such a scenario suited their allies in the
North: the transnational corporations benefited from cheap labour and demoralised
trade unions; whilst the international financial institutions were able to extract
high interest rates on servicing the debt.231
Indeed, transnational class solidarity should not be entirely discounted
when examining the NAM's position on debt, particularly in an epoch of an
apparent convergence of interests based on the new "realities" of the global
229J. Macbeth 'Irrelevant No More', Far Eastern Economic Review, November 11, 1993.
230 Rudiger Dornbusch Dollars, Debts and Deficits Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986, p. 149.
231 Susan George, 1992, p. xvii.
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economy. As the former IMF Executive Director for central America put it, 'the
Third World elites who borrowed the money ...come from the same class as those
who lent it and as those who managed it at the IMF. They went to the same
schools, belonged to the same clubs [and] all profited greatly from the debt. They
will not turn on those interests'.232 Indeed, by agreeing to a more conciliatory and
co-operative posture towards the North - particularly vis-a-vis debt - the Southern-
based elites helped turn the question from being an issue regarding the wider
global political economy, into being one of a purely technical matter resolvable
through dialogue and negotiations and within the overarching framework of the
ongoing hegemonic discourse.
The Cartagena summit held in October 1995 continued the broad trajectory
that Jakarta had exemplified. For sure, the "Call from Cartagena", whilst
containing many of the old familiar non-aligned themes such as sovereignty,
disarmament and anti-colonialism, also contained within it a commitment to
"sound macro-economic management" and growth as a precursor to development.
Whilst one cannot argue against "sound" policies, it is what policies are deemed as
such and which are not that is important, and in this regard the NAM's"Call from
Cartagena" was very much within the orthodox project, tempered as it was with
calls for particular Southern-oriented themes such as the demand to not restrict
aid or technology flows to the developing world. Yet, the Summit immediately prior
to South Africa's hosting reflected, in the final analysis, what Mittelman and Pasha
described as the underpinnings of international organisations in the globalisation
era:
Changes in global production and politics are reflected in the ideology of
international organisations. They disseminate values and norms that
contribute toward redesigning the global political economy. From the height
of the Cold War to the more recent concerns of globalisation, international
institutions have absorbed the realities of global political economy and its
contradictions. Imbued with neo-liberal doctrines, the current remedy for all
ills is the market.233
That this was broadly so with the NAMwas shown by Cartagena's call for 'better
co-operation and co-ordination between the Bretton Woods institutions, the WTO
232 Jorge Sol, quoted by Walden Bello, 1990, p. 61.
233 James Mittelman and Mustapha Kamal Pasha, 1997, p. 53
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
265
and the UN'.234This wish to further increase the dialogue between the disciplinary
institutions of neo-liberalism and the Movement was to remain a feature of the
NAM's position under South Africa's chairmanship. Indeed, this was to deepen.
somewhat as Pretoria held the reins of the organisation.
Motivation for South African membership
Whilst the actual behaviour of South Africa within the NAMis the focus of this next
section, it is important to understand why Pretoria initially joined the organisation.
There are essentially two main reasons underpinning South Africa's commitment to
join. These may be summarised and broadly referred to as historic and symbolic.
Firstly, the historical. For much of its existence, the NAMpaid close attention to
the policies of the then South African government, and provided support to the
anti- apartheid campaign.ê= The GNU was readily aware of this fact - after all, a
number of members of the present South African government found sanctuary and
support in NAMnations during the long years of exile.236For a president known to
remember his friends, 'membership of the NAMwas an affirmation of support, a
gesture of solidarity and a repaying of old historical debts' by Mandela.P? This is
perhaps summed up in a foreign policy document issued by the ANC in 1995,
where it was stated that:
South Africa has had a special link with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).
Even before the formal establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961
the South African national liberation movement had forged links with the
founders of the movement at the historic 1955 Bandung Conference of Afro-
Asian Peoples in Indonesia where our members were represented by a two-
member delegation.238
234 Sally Morphet 'The Non-Aligned and their 11th Summit at Cartagena, October 1995',
235 See Anthoni van Nieuwkerk 'Overview of the Evolution of the Non-Aligned Movement and
its Role in the Liberation of South Africa', paper presented at a workshop on the NAM
organised by the South African Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, March
19, 1998.
236 See Scott Thomas The Diplomacy of Liberation: The Foreign Relations of the ANC Since
1960 London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996.
237 Ian Taylor 'The Republic of South Africa and the Non-Aligned Movement', Review of
International Affairs, vol. XLVIII,no. 1060, p. 4.
238ANC, Department of Information Foreign Policy Perspective for a Democratic South Africa
February 3, 1995.
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Secondly, South Africa's membership of the NAMprovided symbolic resonance to
South Africa's return to international respectability. Formerly shunned by the NAM
(and intemational opinion) as a pariah, being granted membership of the
Movement and other multilateral organisations was essentially a welcome stamp of
approval by nations who had repeatedly expressed disquiet at its domestic and
external behaviour. Symbolically, by joining organisations such as the NAM,South
Africa demonstrated the desire by Pretoria to regain international respectability.
Though its economic policies have not changed in the main, membership of the
NAMprovides symbolic evidence of the ANC's commitment to the disempowered
and disadvantaged - perhaps soothing concems by many of its constituents that its
foreign policy is too overtly "pro-Western". This aspect should not be under-
estimated. Posturing a Southern-oriented foreign policy - as Mandela claimed
'South-South co-operation is of direct and central importance to our own national
and international priorities'239 - allows the GNU to deflect criticism of its
intemational relations and dress up its linkages as being driven by a normative
South-South agenda. This being so, how can South Africa's role in the NAMand its
activities during the hosting of the 12th summit in Durban in late 1998 be
understood?
The Durban Summit
The meeting in Durban is important for our analysis of Pretoria's foreign policy as it
exemplified many of the broad themes that have been identified as typifying South
Africa's international posture in the post-apartheid era.240 Perhaps fundamental to
this was the way Pretoria postured a reformist agenda whilst accepting the basic
tenets of the hegemonic order: 'the protection of human rights, the spread of
[polyarchical] democracy ...and the promotion of liberal capitalism'<+' At the same
time, South Africa was evidently keen to act a "bridge-builder" and promoter of
dialogue between North and South. Though how this played itself out during the
239 South African Press Association (St. Lucia) July 6, 19_98.
240 For a collection of South African positions at the Durban Summit, see Durban '98:
Compendium of South African Statements During the XII NAM Summit Pretoria: Department of
Foreign Affairs, 1998.
241 S.K. Singh 'Non-Alignment: Past, Present and Future', South African Journal of
International Affairs, vol. 1, no. 1, 1993, pp. 31-31.
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negotiations regarding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension
Conference will be examined in the next chapter, it is suffice to say at this juncture
that Pretoria's wish to fulfil an essentially middlepowermanship role á la Cox came
to the fore during the Durban Summit, leading one newspaper to comment that
'South Africa [had] taken an important step towards realising its potential role as a
bridge between the industrialised and developing worlds'v=?
This ambition had been remarked upon before by leading South African
elites, including Pretoria's Foreign Minister. Interestingly - and fitting our analysis
of the patterns surrounding South African foreign policy - this wish to be a bridge-
builder was usually contextualised within a framework where Pretoria had
recognised that "confrontation" with the North had given way to "dialogue" (though
invariably within the confines of the ongoing discourse surrounding politico-
economic matters). As Alfred Nzoput it on commenting specifically on the NAMand
Pretoria's ambitions regarding the organisation and its own role within the
Movement:
The previously confrontational and sterile style of the world-wide debate on
North-South issues has made way for a vigorous and healthy debate on core
issues. This too mirrors our own change in which matters previously caused
division and dissension are now open to wide discussion ...
.. .If we can serve as a bridge to bring the interests of the industrialised world
and the Non-Aligned world closer together, we will know that our struggle
has been truly worthwhile.v+'
This bridge-building role, of attempting to bring North and South together - as
typified at the 12th Summit - was a reflection and a playing out of the
circumstances that the GNU found itself in vis-a.-vis the national/international
nexus. The ANC had by the time it took office largely acceded to the ongoing
discourse surrounding which economic framework was acceptable and which was
not. Yet though the ANCelites broadly accepted the hegemonic order in which they
found themselves, and pressed for ways in which advantages could be had from
this, the demand for certain reforms and an amelioration of the more negative
effects of globalisation, coupled with an ostensible pro-South foreign policy
(however rhetorical) was a recognition - tacit or otherwise - that certain important
242 Sunday Independent (Johannesburg) September 6, 1998.
243 Alfred Nzo 'South Africa Will Contribute to the Strengthening of the Activities of the Non-
Aligned Movement', Review of International Affairs, vol. XLVIII, October 1997, p. 3.
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constituencies which made up the ANC's support base were dissatisfied and
needed soothing.
Indeed, it was a realisation that within the apparent era of "TINA»,space was
opened up for various policies to be pushed and manoeuvrability was possible
which could not only benefit the local internationally-oriented elites, but also serve
to deflect criticism from its own Left constituency that the ANConce in power had
abandoned the struggle. This contradiction - acceptance of the hegemonic
discourse whilst posturing a reformation to it - reflected the very contradictions
evident in the nascent historic bloc under construction post-1994. As one analysis
remarked:
The SAgovemment, while fixed on a course of fiscal discipline, is less sure of
itself in other areas. On the one hand it see the "necessity" of pleasing
foreign investors as it seeks to become integrated into the global
economy ...on the other hand however, it understands that it cannot ignore
the demands of its own constituency, in particular that of labour.v+
This contradiction, playing out at various levels came to the fore as South Africa's
foreign policy post-1994 developed and was exemplified at the NAM summit in
1998. As has been suggested, South Africa attempted to playa bridge-building role
promoting a reformist agenda at the summit, whilst accepting the basic thrus~ of
globalisation. This posture was in the main supported by the business-oriented
press within South Africa. For example, one report asserted that it was 'no use
whining about the marginalisation of emerging markets. Now is the time to act
[and] South Africa is uniquely poised to playa bridging role between the First and
Third Worlds';245whilst another argued that 'one of the most strategic interventions
SA could make on the NAMis to chart a bridge-building role between North and
South'.246
This position by South Africa was seen as mediating between 'the empty,
hostile, socialist rhetoric' (as one paper put it) of the NAM's past,247 and a wholly
uncritical abeyance to the demands of international capital. It was also a way by
which the GNU could gain credibility with the North and posture itself as a
244Devan Pillay 'Globalisation: A Terrain of Struggle', presented to Department of Foreign
Affairs workshop on the Non-Aligned Movement, Cape Town, March 19, 1998, pp. 6-7.
245 Sunday Independent (Johannesburg) August 30, 1998.
246 Business Day (Johannesburg) July 28, 1998.
247 Cape Times (Cape Town) September 9,1998.
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"sensible" country in which to invest. As one Department of Foreign Affairs official
put it, 'in order to be successful, South Africa must build a profile as a serious
player on global issues, particularly issues affecting the South'. One way it can
achieve this is by bringing 'maturity to the NAM,especially on economic issues', by
'trying to bring together differences between North and South'. 'South Africa
consciously plays this role'.248
Thus the Declaration which Pretoria helped craft at the end of the summit
'struck the balance South Africa was trying to bring to NAMon the key question of
globalisation, accepting the inevitability of free market economics but insisting that
the market should not be completely unfettered'.249 This was particularly evident in
Pretoria's successful attempt to nudge the NAMinto accepting a less-overtly hostile
attitude to various international financial institutions and dominant global players,
including - as at UNCTADIX - inviting a host of formerly unwanted guests such as
representatives from Washington and elsewhere.v-? Again as it did at UNCTADIX,
South Africa was keen to set up and involve forums where business could be
involved in economic matters. For example, Pretoria organised in Durban a future
meeting involving the private sector and Southern governmerits.w! At the same
time, Pretoria was instrumental in putting the reform of various facets of the world
economy onto the agenda:
South Africa managed to replace a paragraph which said "globalisation and
Iiberalisation .. .impact negatively on developing countries generally" with a
paragraph that accepted in principle the World Trade Organisation (WTO),a
group NAMhas regarded with some hostility.
The new text says NAM "acknowledged that the emergence of the
strengthened rules-based trading system, as institutionalised in the ... [WTO]
may facilitate positive integration of countries into the global trading system
if the commitment to this objective is strengthened".252
Such activity was later replicated at the Organisation of African Unity Summit in
Algiers lil July 1999, where Pretoria succeeded lil changing previously
248 Interview with Graham Maitland, Non-Aligned Movement sub-directorate, Department of
Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, July 8, 1999.
249 Cape Times (Cape Town) September 4, 1998.
250 Pretoria was instrumental in inviting representatives from the United States, Great
Britain, France, the European Union and the G-8 to a NAMsummit for the first time ever.
251 In particular a future planned SADC/Caricom conference - South African Press Agency
(Durban) September 1, 1998.
252 Cape Times (Cape Town) September 9, 1998.
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"confrontational" rhetoric to a statement that was more cognisant of the global
"realities". In short, so that future interventions would be in 'an informed manner
and not as King Canute striving to wish the waves away'.2S3
Yet, just as with UNCTADIX, South Africa was in advance of much of the
rest of the South on a number of issues, particularly uis-á-uis stances regarding
neo-liberalist macro-economic policies. Mandela had signified much of the South
African position on this at the inaugural session, when he has asserted that
'globalisation has imposed on all of us a fashionable orthodox uniformity according
to which we must address all such questions as budget deficits, rates of inflation,
interest and exchange rates, capital movements, the flexibility of labour markets,
the affordability of social welfare systems and so on'.2S4Though Mandela had gone
on to moderate this wide-ranging acceptance of the hegemonic discourse, it is clear
that this posture reflected the broad framework within which Pretoria's foreign
policy saw itself operating within. Indeed, prior to the summit, Alfred Nzo had
flagged South Africa's determination to push 'economic development through
sound, sustainable and viable macro-economic policies' as a pillar of the NAM's
activity under Pretoria's chairmanship.ê=
At the same time however, the government IS conscious of the need to
placate its sizeable Left constituency that it has not simply given m to
"globalisation" (though they recognise that a degree of manoeuvrability if not
sovereignty has been lost). Hence expressing concerns about the negative effects of
the ongoing order whilst pushing for a reform of various international institutions,
is a means by which the GNUcan placate its (critical) domestic allies, whilst at the
same time not putting at risk its "good boy" image with the custodians of global
structural economic power. Thus whilst Thabo Mbeki may admit that globalisation
is here to stay, he was also eager to point out at the NAM summit that it was
imperative for the Movement to explore 'what intervention can the developing
253 Thabo Mbeki, quoted in Sunday Independent (Johannesburg), July 18, 1999.
254 Nelson Mandela 'Address of the President of the Republic of South Africa, Nelson
Mandela, at the Inaugural Session of the Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or
Governments of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries', Durban, September 2, 1998,
speech issued by the Office of the President.
255 Alfred Nzo 'Summary of Speech Made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Alfred Nzo, at
the Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries',
Cartagena, Colombia, May 19, 1998, issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs.
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countries make to ensure that a process which ...favour[s] the rich addresses also
what are clearly the more urgent needs of our peoples'.256This in part explains why
South Africa has adopted its bridge-building middlepowermanship role, pushing
the broader tenets of the hegemonic order (which it basically accepts) yet arguing
for ameliorating the conditions by which the South has to operate in. Yet, this
essentially contradictory policy has within it the potential to cause conflict with the
less enthusiastic elements (both domestically and internationally) over the degree
to which Pretoria should accept and promote the discourse of neo-liberalism.
Certainly, this came to the fore at the Durban summit and was to have a
somewhat negative effect on perceptions by some members of the NAM on
Pretoria's role, with some complaining that Pretoria's "bridge-building" rhetoric
'sounded too "American" [i. e.] that it did not sufficiently clearly define the fault line
between the developed and developing world'.257 Others critiqued the strong
manner in which Pretoria pushed its conciliatory approach towards the North as
'dominating the discussions' at the expense of other' voices,258 even being
'authoritarian'.259 Though South Africa had pushed for a panel of government
experts to "'interrogate" the' economic policy document drafted for the summit to
ensure its relevance',260 its proposals to insert a statement that 'it is the
responsibility of developing countries themselves to begin to create an appropriate
policy climate conducive to their own economic and trade development', was seen
as smacking too heavily of an endorsement of neo-liberalist prescriptions by many
participants (whilst 'earn[ing] praise from Western observera'lw! So too was
Pretoria's demand that the NAMadopt as part of its Declaration the assertion that
'countries must put greater emphasis on growth strategies that attract foreign
investment' within the framework of 'sound economic policies'.262
256Thabo Mbeki 'Speech of the Deputy President of the Republic of South Africa, Thabo
Mbeki, at the Opening of the Ministerial Meeting of the XII Summit Meeting of Heads of
State and Government of the Non-Aligned Movement',
257 Business Day (Johannesburg) August 28, 1998.
258 South African Press Agency (Durban) August 30, 1998.
259 Cape Times (Cape Town) September 2, 1998.
260 Cape Times (Cape Town) August 28, 1998.
261 Cape Times (Cape Town) September 2, 1998.
262 Cape Times (Cape Town) September 9,1998.
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Furthermore, South Africa failed in having the International Labour Office
(ILO)recognised as the 'pre-eminent' as opposed to the 'only' international body
competent to deal with labour standards: a move aimed at introducing the topic of
labour standards into other fora.263Critics saw this as a development that would
have created the opportunity for other organisations (notably the WTO) to apply
labour standards criteria, a move that was seen as potentially prejudicial to the
least developing countries in favour of those developing nations - such as South
Africa - which had the (relative) space to accommodate more stringent labour
standards alongside development. This was something which many elites in the
South saw as a luxury they could ill-afford. Whilst this is a controversial point of
debate, the proposal to allow the WTO to start applying labour standards certainly
held within it the potential for unilateral actions by the disciplinary body against
those territories that did not meet with some fixed standard - though Pretoria
expressed its opposition to such "hidden protectionism".264 Nontheless, whilst
regulated labour standards would have to a degree protected the working class of
the South, it would also have opened up their countries to greater intrusion and
surveillance by what are essentially Northern-based multilateral bodies.265 A
careful balance between sovereignty and the (at times only) competitive advantage
that developing states possessed therefore had to be poised with the goal of
ensuring sufficient protection for the working classes in the South.v=
This clash over labour standards was perhaps symptomatic of the uneven
process of globalisation and the undermining of Southern solidarity that it
engendered, as well as reflecting the varying degrees of enthusiasm that disparate
elites based in the South viewed the ongoing order. Certainly, at the NAMsummit
Pretoria was one of the less overtly hostile participants to the global order,
263 Interview(by telephone) with Henry Raubenheimer, Deputy Director, Developmentand
Finance, Department of ForeignAffairs,July 21, 1999.
264 Ibid.
265 Cynics might also suggest that such a proposal suited the interests of the GNU's
capitalist allies in big business, who would count on WTOrulings being less labour-friendly
than that of the ILO's;whilst the GNUitself could use such surveillance by the WTOto
undermine the powerof its troublesome labour constituency whilst at the same time casting
any perceivedanti-labour legislationit would forced to enact under WTOrules as being out
of its hands, thus shifting the blame upwards to global institutions and the amorphous
"market".
266 Interview(by telephone) with Henry Raubenheimer, Deputy Director, Developmentand
Finance,Department of ForeignAffairs,July 21, 1999.
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attempting to push its conciliatory bridge-building agenda in the face of opposition
from various quarters. Indeed, whilst the pro-capital media based in South Africa
urged Pretoria to 'nudge the organisation's economic policies in the right direction',
clearly there was a substantial element within the Movement which resisted and
resented such moves.267
Hence though South Africa did succeed at the NAMsummit to a degree, as it
did at UNCTADIX, in changing the policy posture of the organisation it was hosting
and leading, it did so in a way that opened itself up to criticism from the Left and
disaffected Southern elites that it was pursuing a contradictory policy of on the one
hand critically engaging and attempting to push a reformist platform vis-a-vis
globalisation and the hegemonic discourse; and on the other in pushing that very
same agenda - very often serving the interests of South Africa (or more correctly, its
outwardly-linked elite fractions) at the expense of Southern solidarity. This tension
lay at the heart of the ongoing strains and contradictions within the GNU, for
within the South African government were disparate attitudes towards globalisation
- some cautiously welcoming its opportunities; some were agnostic; whilst some
were downright hostile.
The contradictions in South African foreign policy reflect this uncertainty
and ambiguity and were exemplified at the NAMsummit. It is as if the GNUfelt the
need to play to two different audience at a variety of levels: those who promote neo-
liberalism (the Northern-based financial and governmental institutions; and
outwardly-linked and important class fractions within South Africa); and those who
are less than enthusiastic about the whole process (elements of the Southern elite
within the NAMand the ANC's labour and Leftist constituency). This last element
in particular spurs on the GNU to posture a commitment to change at the
international level, though as has been suggested regarding the NAM's "trade
unionist" approach, this commitment to what remain largely issue-oriented
"problem-solving" questions, fails to confront the structural power that sees the
continued marginalisation of much of the South.
This failure to engage with the dominant power on fundamental issues has
had an important effect on South Africari foreign policy. As one analyst remarked,
267 Cape Times (Cape Town) August 31, 1998.
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Pretoria 'has sacrificed its potential to take moral leadership of the post-Cold War
world in favour of becoming its chief negotiator' or bridge-builder.268 This
middlepowermanship role of bridging the gap between North and South suits the
GNU, caught as it is between contending domestic and international forces
struggling for its "soul". However, it also suits Northern elites, anxious as they are
to find "responsible" leaders in the South who they can engage in dialogue with,
without having to experience the uncomfortable questioning of their structural
power as occurred during the 1970s with the NIEO. Indeed, this may account for
the willingness of the North to invite the NAMtroika - headed by Pretoria - to meet
with the G-8 on the eve of their summit in Cologne in June 1999. Certainly, with
South Africa as Chair, no serious interrogation of the global order could be
expected - Pretoria in fact 'welcomed the valuable and continued dialogue between
countries of the South and the G-8...to discuss issues of mutual interests'.269 Yet
such an accomodatory role based as it is on a problem-solving approach to
international relations has at times led to deleterious effects on its global activism,
as an investigation of Pretoria's behaviour during the negotiations for the extension
of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty make evident (see below).
268 Sunday Times (Johannesburg) July 12, 1998.
269 'Media Statement on the Non-Aligned Movements Reaction to the G-8 Meeting in
Cologne', issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs on behalf of the Permanent Mission to
the United Nations in New York, NewYork, July 2, 1999.
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SECTION ill: SOUTH AFRICA AND THE COMMONWEALTH
South Africa's decision to re-join the organisation and the subsequent role it has
played within the body is illuminating for our study and again indicates the
essential acceptance of the hegemonic norms of neo-liberalism by the GNU whilst
calling for reformist measures to ameliorate the ongoing negative effects of
deepening globalisation. This has been Pretoria's basic posture within the
movement on issues pertaining to trade and global politics and is reflective of the
elite's desire to promote liberalisation, whilst being mindful that elements of its
constituency demand a rather different tack. Like UNCTAD,the Commonwealth in
recent years has increasingly adopted a pro-neo-liberalist discourse. This being so,
it is helpful to look at this trajectory in order to place South Africa's own role in it
upon re-admission.
275
Background
The Commonwealth has its origins in the British Empire and its membership, with
the exception of Mozambique, is made up of former colonies or trust territories of
Great Britain. Described officially as a 'voluntary association of sovereign states
which have formed the Commonwealth to boost their development and advance
world peace and justice', the organisation has increasingly taken on board a
normative order which is very much within the remit of neo-Iiberalism.ê?" The
Commonwealth Secretary-General himself admits that certain 'fundamental values'
are now at the core of the organisation, and that the Commonwealth concentrates:
[Its] efforts in ...particular areas. First, in macro-economic policy formulation
and restructuring - for example, in assisting in privatisation policies and the
promotion of capital flows. To this end, it has ...help[ed] increase the flow of
private capital to developing countries.s"!
Understanding this, it is evident that there are important underlying norms and
assumptions underpinning the Commonwealth that need exploring. Yet such an
analysis militates against the organisation's own account oLitself. According to the
270 The Commonwealth and its Members, http://www.comsec.co.uk/members.htm
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Chief Executive of the Commonwealth Partnership on Technology Management, the
Commonwealth operates in a milieu where 'the idea of ideology is behind us and we
have entered an era of politics of reasonableness'.272 Tellingly, the Commonwealth
makes no link between capitalism and the inequities of the world economy. Such
positions of course tie in with the orthodox project which seeks to avoid inquiries
regarding the underpinning norms of the discourse by avoiding "ideology" and
arguing that in the face of "no alternatives", talk of rival ideas is nonsensical. As a
result of this thinking:
[T]he Commonwealth world view does not encompass an explicit linkage
between international economic domination and international power
structures ...There is no over-arching view of a marriage between capitalism
and ...imperialism. The Commonwealth world view is not ideological. Because
it fails absolutely to make any linkage between the two, its analysis of the
world is not even radical. Instead its posture is reformist [and] committed to
negotiations.s">
This analysis has increasingly been borne out in recent years and has been
particularly so since the 1991 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in
Harare. Stemming from this meeting was the Harare Declaration, 'a tuming point
for the Commonwealth [as] it was nothing short of a bold programme to convert the
Commonwealth in a post-Cold War world into a force for democracy and good
governance'.274
HarareDeclaration, 1991
The Declaration issued at the end of the Commonwealth Heads of Government
Meeting in 1991 was reflective of the changed circumstances that followed in the
immediate wake of the end of the "official" East-East confrontation. According to
one analyst, the Declaration represented 'the Commonwealth's latest attempt to
stake out a consensus on the troubling relationship between sovereignty and
"fundamental political values", the official shorthand for the member's commitment
271 Emeka Anyaoku 'The Commonwealth and the New World Order', Round Table, no. 324,
1992, p. 414.
272 Mihaela Smith, chief executive of the Commonwealth Partnership on Technology
Management, cited by South African Press Agency (Swakopmund) July 28, 1998.
273 Stephen Chan The Commonwealth in World Politics: A Study in International Action, 1965
to 1985 London: Lester Crook Academic Publishing, 1988, p. 47.
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to uphold 'democracy, human rights and the rule of law'.275 Thus the Harare
Declaration called for 'international peace and order, global economic development
and the rule of international law'; 'the liberty of the individual under the law'; and
'the individual's inalienable right to participate by means of free and democratic
political processes in framing the society in which he or she lives'.276
Whilst such normative concerns are applauded, it is possible to adopt a
critical stand Cl la Robinson, suggesting that such an interest in "democracy" also
reflected a changed agenda by the North in matters pertaining to the South in the
post-Cold War era.277Indeed, such prescriptions can also be seen as reflective of a
new order where the North felt able to act as disciplinary watchdogs on the
domestic affairs of the South - a role they were hitherto unable to perform in part
due to the tensions and rivalry of the bi-polar confrontation. As one observer noted,
Harare 'was a product of the post Cold War period and dealt primarily on
conditions within nations states. Accordingly the emphasis was on democracy,
human rights and the rule of law within countries'.278 This was of course also at a
time when negotiations on a post-apartheid dispensation were underway, and the
Harare Declaration was very much part of a broader scheme whereby the
Commonwealth aimed to help facilitate dialogue towards a non-racial democracy.
Indeed, in order to be consistent the Declaration not only had to call for
democratisation in South Africa, but also within all other members of the
Commonwealth. Coinciding with this though, following Robinson's analysis, was
the desire to promote the discourse of neo-liberalism and "good governance".
Indeed, such a critique is bolstered by later principles included in the Declaration,
which asserted that:
There is increasing recognition that commitment to market principles and
openness to international trade and investment can promote economic
progress and improve living standards ...
274James Mayall 'Democratising the Commonwealth', International Affairs, vol. 74, no. 2,
April 1998, p. 379.
275 Ibid., p. 385.
276 The Commonwealth Code of Principles, http://www.comsec.co.uk/principl.htm
277SeeWilliamRobinson, 1996.
278K. Srinivasan 'AForce for Democracy,Human Rights and the Rule of Law? Do Harare
and MillbrookGoTooFar or NotFar Enough?', Round Table, no. 344,1997, p. 513.
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Only sound and sustainable development can offer...the prospects of
betterment. Achieving this will requrre a flow of public and private
resources'.279
Hence as part of the final Declaration, a call for 'sound economic management
recognising the central role of the market economy' was posited alongside the
demand for 'democracy, democratic processes and institutions'. Later, the British
Minster for Overseas Development spoke of the empowerment offered to individuals
within neo-liberalist dispensations where 'governments should only do what they
need to, and not take on tasks best left to others', whilst asserting that 'a major
new thrust of [British] policy is to promote pluralistic systems which work for and
respond to individuals in society. In political terms this means dernocracy'Pë? This
project was explicitly 'attached to aid in support of economic reform'281 - as
Robinson claimed, 'promoting polyarchy and promoting neo-liberal restructuring
[is]a singular process'.282
It was in this context that Pretoria was invited to re-join the Commonwealth
(Mandela being granted observer status at Harare). The history of the
Commonwealth's involvement in the South African question has been recounted
elsewhere and need not distract US,283but what is important for our analysis is
what were the motivational factors behind Pretoria rejoining the organisation post-
1994. Following this, what has South Africa's track record (i.e. what has its posture
on fundamental issues pertaining to politico-economic issues) been since that
date?
279 Commonwealth Secretariat The Commonwealth Code of Principles.
280 British Minister for Overseas Development, Lynda Chalker in Leadership SA, vol. 10, no.
5,1991, p. 76.,
281 Ibid. Chalker went on to advance (unwittingly?) the Gramscian position when she said
that 'some might call this [linkage] conditionality, I call it common sense'.
282 William Robinson, 1996, p. 55.
283See Kent Durr 'South Africa and the Commonwealth', Round Table, no. 330, 1994;
Michael Makin 'The Prodigal Returns: South Africa's Re-admission to the Commonwealth of
nations, June 1994', South African Journal of International Affairs, vol. 4, no. 1, Summer
1994; Michael Makin 'Britain, South Africa and the Commonwealth in 1960: The "Winds of
Change" Re-assessed', Historia, vol. 41, no. 2, November 1996; Peter Vale and David Black
The Prodigal Returns: The Commonwealth and South Africa, Past and Future, Working Paper
no. 35, Bellville: Centre for Southern African Studies, 1994;
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South Africa's transition and the Commonwealth
By agreeing to re-join the Commonwealth, Mandela was not only reintegrating
South Africa back into the international community via multilateralism, but also
aligning a future ANC-led South Africa to the norms and values exemplified by the
Commonwealth. In short, this was an important statement of intent by the ANC
leader that was to be played out post-1994. Following the Harare meeting, the
Secretary-General visited South Africa three times leading to the proposal that a
team of "experts" from the country 'provide practical assistance to arrest the
ongoing violence, which had emerged as the key impediment to negotiations'<ë-
This formed itself as the Commonwealth Observer Mission (COMSA),being made
up of a selection of police officers, justice, and public service professionals.
According to their own report, COMSApromoted dialogue between various parties
and fostered reform-oriented dialogue with local police forces as well as
investigating the criminal justice system.285This techno-functionalist aspect of the
Commonwealth (such as election observers during the first democratic vote) was to
henceforth assume predominance in the organisation's role in South Africa. Yet the
legitimisation of the Commonwealth's core values centred around the hegemon's
own project was to continue through such involvement after South Africa was
readmitted to the Commonwealth on May 31 1994.286 Even prior to the re-
admission of Pretoria, the Commonwealth's Secretary-General was promoting to
South African audiences the hegemonic view that if 'countries make greater
success of their adjustment programmes, liberalis[e] trade and creat[e] more
favourable environments for foreign investment, the prospects [for the South] will
improve'.287
284 Violence in South Africa. The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Mission to South
Africa. Phase 1: October 1992-January 1993, London. Commonwealth Secretariat, 1993, p. 1.
285 See ibid., and also Violence in South Africa. The Report of the Commonwealth Observer
Mission to South Africa. Phase II: February - May 1993, London. Commonwealth Secretariat,
1993; and Violence in South Africa. The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Mission to
South Africa. Phase Ill:August - October 1993, London. Commonwealth Secretariat, 1993.
286 For an overview of South African reaction to this, see Michael Makin 'The Prodigal
Returns: South Africa's Re-Admission to the Commonwealth of Nations, June 1994 South
African Journal of International Affairs, vol. 4, No.1, Summer 1996.
287'Commonwealth: Interview with Chief Emeka Anyaoku', Leadership SA, vol. 11, February-
March, 1992, p. 30.
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The ending of the question over South Africa 'created the possibility of
moving the Commonwealth in new directions'.288 In particular, the previously
negative stance the British Conservative administration had towards the
Commonwealth over its de-legitimising stance towards London was replaced by a
more amenable policy that recognised that the body held out possible benefits to
British capital's interests. As one British diplomat remarked:
In the wake of the Cold War and its international effects in 1991 and the end
of apartheid in South Africa...Britain became more comfortable with the
Commonwealth's political discourse. The United Kingdom's status as the
"odd man out" over South Africa had ended.
Further, as the 1990s evolved, several Commonwealth countries began to
emerge as potentially rich markets and as opportunities for British sales of
both goods and services.289
The ending of the controversy over South Africa and the space it opened up for a
"new agenda" for the Commonwealth was recognised by Britain's Foreign Minister
when he asserted that the removal of internal disputes over South Africa would
enable the Commonwealth to unite around promoting the particular fixation of the
hegemonic discourse namely 'consolidating democracy' - an indication of how the
Harare Declaration's prescriptions should be viewed.v?? As that same senior British
politician asserted, 'if we cannot impose democracy by imperial powers, we...need
ways of persuading countries to live by democracy, ways of rewarding them for
working democratically, and ways of expressing displeasure'.291
As has been suggested, whilst "democracy" is to be applauded, it is one
particular type that is being proffered here and this needs to be recognised. Indeed,
the ending of the controversy vis-a-vis South Africa coincided with this project. As
one (uncritical) observer remarked:
For most of the 1980s, Britain had tried unsuccessfully to deflect
Commonwealth summits from their obsessions with southern Africa, and on
to discussion of practical schemes of co-operation, mainly in the economic
field. The collapse of Communism, and along with it a faith in central
economic planning, ostensibly made their task easier. So did the linked
. 288 James Mayall'MoreThan Bread and Circuses', World Today, October 1997,p. 252.
289 Ronald Sander 'The CommonwealthAfter Edinburgh', Round Table, no. 346, 1998, pp.
199-200.
290 DouglasHurd quoted by KatherineWest, 1994, p. 414.
291 DouglasHurd 'TheCommonwealthin a ChangingWorld',Round Table, no. 329, 1994, p.
18.
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issues of good governance and democratisation which assumed importance
in international affairs which they had not previously enjoyed.292
For its part, South Africa's re-joining of the Commonwealth was a recognition that
the new leaders wished the country to become a full member of the international
community. In an interview at the time, the British Prime Minister welcomed this
and highlighted the importance attached to South Africa by the core states when
he commented that 'if South Africa succeeds by following democratic and free
market economics, then over time it will be seen to have changed the face of much
of Africa'.293According to reports at the time, 'Mandela's future economic plans
include a concerted attempts to attract investment capital' and the Commonwealth
'will be able to help South Africa as it moves beyond an era of economic sanctions
and reintegrates itself into the world trade and investment system'.294 Another
commentator was quite explicit in this, asserting that:
Rejoining the Commonwealth membership ...will send a signal to the IMF,
World Bank and investors that South Africa once again is keeping
respectable company and can be trusted to play by the rules ...The country
must be up-front.. .relearning the global liturgy and litany.295
These 'rules' and 'global liturgy' belong to a particular project, namely neo-
liberalism. The Commonwealth serves to legitimise and further these particular
norms and behaviour - a process which has intensified whilst South Africa has
renewed its membership. This legitimisation process has been integral to the
organisation's interaction with South Africa, something which can be demonstrated
by briefly examining the role of the Commonwealth in South Africa since 1994.
281
Elements of the Commonwealth's role in post-1994 South Mrica
The techno-functionalist role of the Commonwealth has become evident
particularly post-1994. Indeed, South Africa represented the south and central
African region in the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation (CFTC),
292 James Mayall, 1997, p. 253.
293 Interview with John Major, in Cape Argus (Cape Town), September 19, 1994.
294 Christian Science Monitor (Boston), May 2, 1994.
295 Stanley Uys 'Why South Africa Should Rejoin the Commonwealth', South Africa
Foundation Review, vol. 20, no. 3, February 1994, p. 2.
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which purports to offer advice on development projects.296 Yet as Bangura points
out, 'British aid is [always] likely to be redirected to potential markets for British
exports'.297 The discourse that surrounds this body, as well as others such as the
Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC), and the Commonwealth Private
Investment Initiative is firmly within the ongoing terms of reference. Indeed, the
CDC explicitly avoids such "controversial" issues such as social development,
instead concentrating on purely economic development grounded within liberal
capitalist norms.298 This also serves to propagate British influence. Factors which
lead the CDC to involvement revolve around those countries 'with which [Britain]
have good political and commercial links' and where the government is 'sensible
and well-administered [with] sound general economic policies'.299Of course, only
those countries which subscribe to the liberal capitalism espoused by the hegemon
and who practice 'sensible' economic policies thus receive the CDC's visitations.
Furthermore, the CDC has set itself the task to help develop the emergent Black
bourgeoisie in South Africa, through the formation with Investsec and Fedsure of
the "Enterprise Capital Fund", and with Nedcor and Southern Life the "Franchise
Fund of South Africa", both 'to assist emerging Black business'<w By doing so, the
Commonwealth is aiding in the construction and consolidation of a historic bloc
based around the existing elites and the emergent aspirant Black middle classes.
Such elements see their interests beholden to the preservation of "free market"
principles, the private sector and the existing capital accumulation regime.
In addition, the Commonwealth is also involved in education in South Africa
- particularly at the university level. Thus there is the Commonwealth Higher
Education Support Scheme and various Commonwealth scholarships (including a
"Queen's Scholarship for South Africa").301 Whilst these are welcomed as
programmes to further the education of previously disadvantaged persons, the
296 Department of Foreign Affairs Multilateral Branch - Annual Report, 1995 Pretoria:
Department of ForeignAffairs,1996, p. 24.
297 Yusuf Bangura Britain and Commonwealth Africa: The Politics of Economic Relations,
1951-75 Manchester: Manchester UniversityPress, 1983, p. 217.
298 See C.M. Rogerson 'British Aid to Southern Africa: The Role of the Commonwealth
DevelopmentCorporation',Africa Insight, vol.23, no. 4, 1993.
299 W. Ryrie 'Managingan AidProgramme',Bulletin, Institute of Development Studies, vol. 17,
no. 2, 1986, p. 9.
300 Business Day (Johannesburg), March 26, 1997.
301 Natal Witness (Durban)March21, 1995.
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legitimising function of such schemes are not to be ignored. Numerous
Commonwealth leaders have received their education in British institutions and
the socialising process has invariably influenced their later world outlook.
Empirical evidence on such socialisation is hard to pinpoint, but certainly
the invitation to study in Britain is not mere altruism on the part of London. Van
der Pijl shows that these scholarships goes back to Cecil Rhodes and were designed
to further Rhodes' ideals. It is possible to agree with this view that such
scholarships and educational networks remain 'connected into a wider culture'.
This can be traced in the careers of both George Bush and Bill Clinton, and can
certainly be extrapolated in the careers of a wide number of the Commonwealth's
elites (such as Hastings Banda, Benazir Bhutto, Thabo Mbeki et al.).302 Indeed,
Mbeki's brother recalled that as a student in Britain, his sibling fitted in
comfortably: 'we really weren't that different...we were also middle-class [and]
brought up in an Anglophilic environment'.303This connects well with the effective
legitimisation process. As one writer noted, 'there is a substantial number of
postgraduate students in the UK who will go on to become policy-makers
throughout the Commonwealth'. This can act to instil 'a sense of "Commonwealth
identity" in therri'<v+ Not only are students brought to the metropole to receive a
particular education, but the Commonwealth also sends its army officers, civil
servants, diplomats and other professionals.wë Even though 'one of the features of
the Commonwealth is that most of its technical assistance is from one developing
country to another',306 the whole process serves to legitimise particular ways of
doing things and invariably also de-legitimises alternative projects.
The Commonwealth has also played a technical role in consolidating
polyarchy - what has been referred to as 'a programme of technical assistance and
capacity building for the legal and institutional underpinnings of democracy'<v?
This assistance and the concomitant role played by the Commonwealth
302 Kees van der Pijl in Bjorn Hettne, 1995, p. 107.
303 Sunday Times (Johannesburg) May 30, 1999.
304 Neil Saravanamuttoo 'Are We Building a Commonwealth for Tomorrow?', Round Table,
no. 336, 1995, p. 440.
30S Daily News (Durban) June 1, 1994.
306 John Groom A Commonwealth for the 21st Century Braamfontein: South African Institute
of International Affairs, 1992, p. 6.
307 Peter Vale and David Black, 1994, p. 19.
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Parliamentary Association (CPA) are classic examples of the legitimisation role
played by multilateral organisations in furtherance of the dominant project. The
adoption of a Westminster-style democratic type was never really seriously
questioned nor alternatives put up for inspection. In the absence of such
alternatives, it has been relatively easy to establish the hegemony of a British-style
parliament. This is in despite of the fact that this very same institution governed
South Africa during the apartheid era. As one new parliamentarian put it, 'I had
always hated this institution and then I became a part of it, part of a system I had
been fighting against for my whole life'.308
Demographic composition changes aside, the norms and values of the
Westminster model remain the same - a remarkable continuation. The CPA's
technical role has been to socialise a generation of first-time parliamentarians into
the ethos of the parliamentary system. This system rests upon clear foundations
found in the hegemonic liberal discourse.
The same can be said at the level of civil society. The norms of a liberal,
Western society are successfully propagated within South Africa by bodies such as
the Commonwealth Lawyers' Association. Through a diffuse process of networking
and informal socialisation, the values of a particular societal project are grounded
in post-apartheid South Africa, almost unconsciously and in turn serve to
legitimise the legitimisation of this ethos. The hegemony of such values in world
society is acknowledged by Vale and Black who assert that 'the work of these
Commonwealth organisations is central to South Africa's capacity to take its place
in the wider world of international relationships'.309 Hence the success of post-
apartheid South Africa is predicated and privileged around the ability of Pretoria to
digest the neo-liberalist discourse that is served up by organisations such as the
Commonwealth, among others. Such a playing out of the hegemony of neo-
liberalism as propagated by the Commonwealth was open to inspection most
graphically at the 1998 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in
Edinburgh. Here, the Commonwealth's pronouncements were fully in line with the
discursive practices of the hegemonic project. Yet, at the same time a reformist
308Patricia de Lille quoted in Sunday Independent (Johannesburg) March 14, 1999.
309Peter Vale and David Black, 1994, p. 19.
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posture was adopted by Pretoria in an attempt to ameliorate the process of uneven
development inherent in globalisation. It is to this that this work now tums to.
Edinburgh 1998
The Edinburgh Commonwealth Heads of Govemment Meeting was the first
Commonwealth summit attended by the post-apartheid government and as such is
of profound interest to our study. From the start it was apparent that the agenda
behind the Edinburgh meeting was a continuation of the neo-liberalist trajectory
that had been so apparent at Harare. Yet the 1998 meeting exhibited a greater
confidence on the part of the core power within the organisation vis-a-vis the
hegemonic project. Indeed, Edinburgh concentrated almost exclusively on macro-
economic matters 'in deference to the wishes of the host government'A'v resulting
in 'its first economic communiqué, making a formal commitment to encouraging
free trade'.311Not that this was solely a British agenda - indeed, reflective of the
hegemony neo-liberalism had attained amongst large sections of the global elite,
the 'concentrat[ion] on trade and investment [was] likely to be shared by many
Heads of Government'Ar-
Prior to the meeting, just as with UNCTAD IX and the NAM, fringe
conferences encouraged private involvement and dialogue with the gathered state
representatives. Much of this was aimed at networking and striking deals. Another
aspect was the desire to continue socialising and "educating" elites from the South
into the discursive practices of the hegemonic project. As one commentary put it:
The Commonwealth Business Forum ...and the Conference on Trade and
Investment Opportunities in the Commonwealth and Europe which the
British Council is or-ganising for mid-career- future leaders from the
Commonwealth and European Union countries, will also have an educational
function for high-level networking that may eventually have an economic
pay-off [emphasis added].313
This mix of private and state initiative was exemplified by the call to establish a
Commonwealth Business Council, headed by leading South African Black
310 James Mayall, 1998, p. 391.
311 South African Press Agency (Edinburgh), October 27, 1997.
312 James Mayall, 1997, p. 254.
313Ibid.
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businessman Cyril Ramaphosa and the CDC's chairman to be 'made up of a small
number of major private-sector leaders to advise the Commonwealth secretariat
and consider methods to boost private sector investment'At+ The Commonwealth's
involvement in boosting the position of the emergent Black bourgeoisie in South
Africa is a case in point - the Business Council can be seen as a further example of
this trend.
Throughout the Edinburgh meeting, the discourse of "free markets" and
liberalisation was dominant, although Southern delegates - South Africa amongst
them - did counsel the "ABCcountries" (Australia, Britain and Canada) about the
uneven process of globalisation. Indeed, Mandela cautioned the summit delegates
that 'stable democracies could not be sustained in countries where poverty was
rife',315and that measures should be introduced to ensure that the world trading
system and global economic growth should be more equitable and benefit
development.ëtv This was in a context where 'frenzied last-minute negotiations by
Commonwealth developing countries' headed off a proposal by the ABC states to
promote 'a further round of Uruguay-style trade talks'A!? Instead, leading states
such as South Africa managed to insert the proviso to the Edinburgh
Commonwealth Declaration on Promoting Shared Prosperity declaration that 'not all
countries have benefited equally from the globalisation of the world economy, and a
significant number are threatened with marginalisation'.318
However, reflective of the hegemony of neo-liberalism, the Declaration
committed all countries 'to strengthen the multilateral trading system, within the
framework of the WTO'.319Indeed, though the British Prime Minister 'acknowledged
differences', the Commonwealth as a whole 'were united by their goals'. This was
namely, a commitment to 'market principles and open international trade, whilst
also calling for uneven development to be addressed'. The role of South Africa in
this "consensus" was that such a position 'appeared to echo an earlier statement
by President Nelson Mandela calling for measures to ensure that the world trading
314 Business Day (Johannesburg), October 27, 1997.
315 Weekly Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg) October 31 - November 6, 1997.
316 Business Day (Johannesburg), October 27, 1997.
317'CHOGM Has Become a Free-Trade Talking Shop', One World News Service, October 27,
1997, http://oneworld. otg] news I reports Icomm_economics. html
3iB Ibid.
286
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
system and global economic growth should be translated into development'.32o
Thus Pretoria's position was to endorse the call for liberalisation, whilst urging a
recognition that such a process had an uneven and sometimes damaging effect on
the South - and thus measures needed to be implemented to safeguard against
such negative outcomes stemming from the neo-liberalist thrust.
Yet even with this proviso attached to the final Declaration, the dominant
discourse was overwhelmingly within the remit of the ongoing neo-liberalist project:
the organisation's Deputy Secretary-General (Economic and Social Affairs) asserted
that the Declaration 'expressed the contemporary economic orthodoxy, and in
particular the need for government to go into partnership with the private sector to
generate wealth'.321 As one of the drafters the Commonwealth Secretary-General
underscored the role of the organisation in 'promoting trade and investment, public
service reform and the role of the private sector', and that governments 'should be
responsible for creating a sound and stable macro policy environment ... and for
creating an enabling environment for the private sector'.322 This had earlier been
echoed in the Commonwealth's house journal, The Round Table, which had
explicitly argued that one of the roles of the organisation was to aid member states
to become more amenable and "attractive" to international capital's requirements:
Investors look for assurances of stable conditions. They need to know that
they can earn profits [and] repatriate them without difficulty ...The
Commonwealth, being both a political and an economic institution .. .is well
equipped to help its members make themselves credible to investors .
.. .It can set a good example to the world in economic performance by
successfully opening markets and attracting investment.w>
The British Prime Minister meanwhile announced that he was 'a passionate
believer in free trade and [that] the Commonwealth should be a force for freer trade
in the world', whilst claiming that 'free trade is essential if all our economies are to
groW'.324This was reflective of a position (promoted by the ABC states and the
319 Ibid.
320 Business Day (Johannesburg), October 27, 1997.
321 Humphrey Maud 'The Commonwealth's Edinburgh Economic Declaration', Round Table,
no. 346, 1998, p. 193.
322 South African Press Agency (Edinburgh)October 22, 1997.
323 Nicholas Bayne 'Globalisation and the Commonwealth: International Economic Relations
in the Post-ColdWarWorld',Round Table, no. 344, 1997, p. 480 and p. 475.
324 South African Press Agency (Edinburgh)October 22, 1997.
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Secretary-General) that neo-liberal restructuring was desirable, inevitable - indeed
almost "natural".
In fact, most elites attending the meeting subscribed to this view, though
they were more circumspect about the uneven process and negative effects
liberalisation was having on their own domestic constituencies. Nevertheless,
within the Commonwealth 'values and understandings are relatively stable and
unquestioned. They are apparent to most actors as the natural order of things'.
This equates to hegemony which 'derives from the ways of doing and
thinking ...insofar as these ways of doing and thinking [inspire] emulation'.325Hence
within the organisation it is assumed as entirely "natural" that a polyarchical
Westminster-style parliament is the norm and will work best for South Africa.
Certainly, the 'acceptance of Commonwealth practices and conventions' remain tied
to the hegemon's preferred norms and values.326
As has been seen, the Commonwealth's role has increasingly been to
support and foster neo-liberalist capitalism. This position has come, post-
Edinburgh, to reflect the consensus that underpins the Commonwealth in the
contemporary period. Whilst South Africa was successful (in tandem with other
Southern states) in raising the issue of global inequality and the uneven process of
globalisation, it is this hegemonic consensus that Pretoria has essentially aligned
itself to with in its membership and activities as a member of the Commonwealth in
the post-l994 period, and which in the words of a Commonwealth handbook
asserts that 'AfricaMeans Business'.327
325 Robert Cox, 1992, p. 179.
326 Commonwealth Secretariat Discussion Draft of the Intergovernmental Group on Criteria for
Commonwealth Membership (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1996).
327 Title of second section of book published by the Commonwealth Business Council The
Commonwealth African Investment Almanac, 1998 London: Hanson Cooke and the
Commonwealth Secretariat, 1998.
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CHAPTER6
PRETORIA'S PROBLEM-SOLVING ACTIVITY IN ISSUE-SPECIFIC
MULTILATERAL BODIES
SECTION 1: SOUTH AFRICA AND THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLlFERA TION
TREATY
The issue of nuclear proliferation, that is the dissemination of weapons of mass
destruction, has been one of the key issues in international politics in the post-
1945 era.328 Efforts to control the process stem from the start of the Cold War
through such overtures as the Baruch Plan of 1946, which proposed to set up an
international body to monitor nuclear production. According to this Plan, right of
access to state territories for the purpose of inspection and verification was to be a
key component in controlling atomic energy. However, on the grounds of defending
their national sovereignty, the Soviet Union rejected the Plan - an indication that
verification was to be the main stumbling block to any treaty that sought to control
the distribution of atomic material.
Being the first nuclear power, the United States was keen to make use of an
international institutional approach, primarily through the foundation of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)in the 1950s. At the same time, the US
encouraged horizontal dissemination by collaborating with London's own nuclear
programme. Vertical proliferation increased dramatically with the invention of the
hydrogen bomb, tactical weaponry and advanced testing procedures and the
problem of a nuclear arms race came increasingly to dominate international
politics. Following the detonation of China's first nuclear weapon in 1964, the
world was faced with a build-up of weapons of mass destruction outside the remit
(and control) of the Superpowers and their Cold War allies. A cohesive international
328 See The United Nations and Nuclear Non-Proliferation New York: United Nations
Department of Public Information, 1995.
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management of nuclear weaponry and their proliferation then became a matter of
urgency and concern to stop "irresponsible" parties gaining such weaponry.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Efforts to control the proliferation of nuclear weaponry were initially based around
secrecy (shattered by successful Soviet espionage coups); proposals regarding a
single international monitoring agency; attempts to ban all nuclear weapons tests;
and through trying to limit access to critical materials and technologies.329
However, by 1968 and under pressure from a concerned international community,
the control of the future spread of nuclear weaponry was seen to lay in a treaty
regime (negotiated between 1961 and 1968) that would demand:
• that states in possession of nuclear weapons do not assist others to acquire
same;
• that states not already in possession do not attempt to acquire them; and
• that facilities in non-nuclear weapon holding states capable of producing
fissionable materials that could be converted to weapon usage be subject to
monitoring from the IAEA
• co-operation on nuclear matters be restricted to the peaceful application of
atomic power
• the results of peaceful explosive testing to be shared with non-nuclear weapon
holding states.êê?
Originally opened for signature on July 1, 1968 and coming into force on March 5,
1970 the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) became the
most widely observed arms control covenant in diplomatic history, and is the only
global legal instrument which commits both the non-nuclear weapon states to
refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons and the nuclear weapons states to seek
329 George Rathjens 'Rethinking Nuclear Proliferation', The Washington Quarterly, vol. 18, no.
1 1994, p. 181.
330 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968)' in United Nations Treaty
Series no. 10485, vol. 729 NewYork: United Nations, 1970.
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reduction of their arsenals.s» There are currently 186 signatories to the NPT.That
is, virtually all the nations of the world with the notable exception of Brazil (which
instead signed the Treaty of Tlataloco, the South American nuclear-free zone
treaty), Cuba, and the three de facto but undeclared nuclear states, namely India,
Israel and Pakistan. The NPT aimed to create a prohibition against the further
proliferation of nuclear weaponry and by doing so it transformed the acquirement
of such weapons from a derivation of state pride, to a matter of official denial.
Ultimately, it also motivated a number of states such as Argentina, Brazil, and
Sweden to give up their nuclear programmes.
According to the NPT, five nations are declared "nuclear weapon states" VIZ.
France, the People's Republic of China, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United
States of America. These are the states that had manufactured and exploded
nuclear devices prior to January 1, 1967, and are thus members of the NPT. Every
other state is defined as non-nuclear and this definition includes those states who
are now known to possess nuclear weaponry or the potential to build such
material, namely India, Israel and Pakistan. These three are not NPT members.
This assumption, between nuclear and non-nuclear states (however redundant) is
twinned with a second basic assumption, namely that military and civilian usage of
nuclear technology can be visibly demarcated. The fact that the nuclear powers
take great pains to restrict the export of "delicate" nuclear technologies as well as
the well-known anxiety over the smuggling of uranium out of the former Soviet
Union by criminal networks, show that this assumptive premise of the treaty is not
shared by the key signatories.
The NPT has remained controversial because of its effective monopolisation
of the right of the existing nuclear states to manufacture weaponry and posses
them whilst the non-nuclear states were prohibited not only from manufacturing
such armaments, but possessing them. This in itself in part sprang from the major
powers having a shared interest in halting proliferation, 'since it [made] global
politics more complicated than ever before'.332This reality remained problematic for
the Treaty and provoked heated debate on the matter. India in particular held the
331 John Simpson and Darryl Howlett 'The NPT Renewal Conference: Stumbling Toward
1995', International Security, vol. 19, no. 1, Summer, 1994.
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position that it is hypocritical for the nuclear powers, already happily in possession
of the desired weaponry, to dictate that other nations cannot.
This being so, under Article X of the original NPT, twenty five years after its
entry into force a conference was to be convened to discuss whether the Treaty
would continue or be extended. It was that proviso that set the scene for the NPT
Renewal Conference in NewYork from April 17 to May 12, 1995.
NPTRenewal Conference: the background
The Renewal Conference came at a time of increasing anxiety over nuclear
proliferation and tension with aspirant nuclear powers. In March 1993 Pyongyang
had withdrew from the non-proliferation pact and refused permission for routine
monitoring of its nuclear sites. At the same time, Pakistan announced in November
of that year that it would not roll back its nuclear program in the face of the
perceived threat from another de facto nuclear power, India. Also, following the end
of the Gulf War, deep suspicion was levelled at Iraq's nuclear programme by
Washington and its allies. This international tension over nuclear weaponry was
compounded by the break-up of the Soviet Union which saw thirty per cent of the
former communist power's nuclear arsenal stranded in the newly independent
republics of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.
Thus as the Conference convened, participants were faced with not only
what to do with those states suspected of possessing nuclear weapons or aspiring
to do so, but also with new states in possession of large portions of the former
Soviet Union's stockpile. Furthermore, the question of nuclear weapon testing,
which had failed to be resolved at the last NPTReview and Extension Conference in
1990, was also on the agenda in NewYork. Having established this, it is pertinent
to now look at Pretoria's own nuclear policy and how the state under the new
democratic dispensation acted during the NPTReview process.
332 Paul Kennedy The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers New York:Vintage Books, 1989, p.
505.
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South Africa and Nuclear Weapons
Pretoria began a nuclear weapons programme In 1970 when the South African
Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) embarked on a government-sponsored
construction of a clandestine plant for the enrichment of uranium.êêê This
programme may be seen as a natural outcome of the assumptions that provided a
coherent framework for South Africa's security policies, particularly with regard to
its external security.ê> Although interest in creating a nuclear capability had been
expressed in the early 1970s (a test site being built in the Kalahari in 1974), it was
the geopolitical developments following the post-Lisbon coup and the involvement
of Soviet and Cuban troops in the region that spurred Pretoria to adopt a "total
national strategy" aimed at combating the perceived threat from Moscow.
Caricatured as the rooi gevaar, this underpinning of Pretoria's attitude towards the
Communist world, particularly after the victory of socialist movements in Angola
and Mozambique in the mid-l970s, propelled South Africa to embark on a nuclear
programme of its own in order to alter the power balance within the region.s>
At this juncture it should be pointed out that Pretoria did not hope to
compete with Moscow in the creation of its own nuclear arsenal. The policy
objective was to coerce the West (in particular Washington) into providing a
"nuclear guarantee" to offset Moscow's ostensible threat.336 By posturing the
escalation of nuclear proliferation in a flash-point region, Pretoria "aimed to force
the United States' hand into offering to provide a security umbrella against alleged
Soviet machinations. Later, as pressure on Pretoria increased and incremental
sanctions began to bite, the South African administration began to vaguely hint
that its nuclear capability would enter the equation somehow.ê-" Such apocalyptic
posturing however was more a sign of the times in an embattled South Africa, than
a measured policy vis-a-vis Pretoria's nuclear custody ..
333 J.D.L. Moore South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation: South Africa's Nuclear Capabilities
and Intentions in the Context of International Non-Proliferation Policies Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1987.
334 Darryl Howlett and John Simpson 'Nuclearisation and De-nuclearisation in South Africa',
Survival, vol. 53, no. 3, Autumn 1993, p. 154-155.
335 Jack Spence 'South Africa: The Nuclear Option', African Affairs, no. 80, October 1981.
336 Darryl Howlett and John Simpson, 1993, p. 158.
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With the active assistance of Israel, South Africa constructed first atomic
device in 1977 but this was aborted after it was apparently discovered by a Soviet
spy satellite.Pe Twoyears later and at the behest of the then head of government -
PW Botha - responsibility for the manufacture of nuclear weaponry was passed
over from the AEC to Armscor. That same year, South Africa conducted a secret
nuclear test in the southem Indian Ocean. Between 1981 and 1989 Armscor
constructed six nuclear weapons and was finalising a seventh when Botha
resigned. Such a policy contradicted the aims and aspirations of the NPT regime
and undermined attempts at removing the nuclear equation from potential areas of
conflict.
Under Botha's successor FW de Klerk, the programme was shut down in
November 1989, all seven devices ordered to be destroyed and a reappraisal of
Pretoria's nuclear weapons policy was undertaken. By the time de Klerk took over
office, South Africa's external security status had improved with the movement
towards Namibian independence and the withdrawal of the Cuban presence in
Angola following the December 1988 agreement. The year 1987 had seen South
Africa offer to negotiate ins-a-vis the NPT(though this may have had had more to do
with the threatened suspension of Pretoria from the IAEAand/ or posturing over
Angola and a comprehensive regional settlement). At the same time, Moscow's
preoccupation with its own domestic restructuring meant that its interest in
southern Africa was now minimal: the rooi gevaar was no more and the rationale
behind Pretoria's nuclear policy disappeared. Cost, and the wish to prevent an
ANC-led government taking possession of nuclear weapons have also been
suggested as motivating factors propelling Pretoria to give up its nuclear
weaponry.339
On July 10, 1991, South Africa acceded to the NPTand in September of that
year Pretoria agreed to accept the monitoring of the IAEA. Since that date South
Africa has been fully committed to a non-nuclear policy and has supported the
concept of a nuclear-free Africa (the Treaty of Pelindaba) endorsed by the
Organisation of African Unity and within the framework of the NPT. At an ANC-
337 The Star (Johannesburg) November 14, 1986.
338 Sunday Independent (Johannesburg) May 4, 1997.
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convened conf~rence on the "Nuclear Policy of the Democratic South Africa", three
proposals were advanced as the movement's position on the NPT. Firstly, that it
would not push for a limited extension as this would undermine the non-
proliferation regime; secondly, that it would not support an indefinite/permanent
extension without a serious alteration of the non-proliferation regime - in particular
addressing disarmament by the five nuclear powers; and thirdly, that Pretoria
should adopt a principled position of supporting a fifteen-year fixed extension
period.ê+?This was, initially, to apparently inform Pretoria's position prior to the
Reviewprocess.
Flawed nature of the NPT
The NPTwas opened for signature on July 1, 1968 and came into force on March 5,
1970. It became the most widely observed arms control covenant in diplomatic
history, and the only global legal instrument which committed both the non-
nuclear weapon states to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons and the nuclear
weapons states to ostensibly seek reduction of their arsenals.>! Yet it is not hard
to cast the NPT acts as a legitimising device in favour of the five nations declared
"nuclear weapon states" viz. France, the People's Republic of China, Russia, the
United Kingdom and the United States of America. Legitimisation is based on
possession and dating i.e. "who got there first" as these states are legitimised on
the basis that they manufactured and exploded nuclear devices prior to January 1,
1967. The NPT thus enshrines the possession of nuclear weaponry in the North
with only China in the South being permitted under the regime to possess nuclear
weapons. Thus conceptually one may say that the NPT supports a "balance of
power" heavily in favour of the industrialised world at the expense of the developing
South. As one commentary noted:
On the face of it, the Treaty has a laudable aim: the prevention of a nuclear
holocaust by working towards disarmament and keeping the numbers of
339 Interview with senior official, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Matters Directorate,
Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, July 8, 1999.
340 Denis Goldberg 'A Nuclear Policy for a New Democratic South Africa', paper presented at
the ANC -organised "Nuclear Policy of the Democratic South Africa" conference, February
ll-13, 1994.
341 John Simpson and Darryl Howlett, 1994.
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nations with atomic weapons to a minimum. However, in practice the NPT
has not prevented the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Instead, it has
ratified the right of the major powers to dictate who else can and cannot
acquire the Bomb.342
.. ,[T]he Treaty is a political weapon which reinforces the division of
the world between the haves and have-nots. Nuclear weaponry has, since
the demonstration of US hegemony at Hiroshima in 1945, symbolised the
real relations of power in the world. The NPT enshrines in law the division
between the dominant powers and the rest.
Furthermore, though Article VI of the Treaty supposedly pursued disarmament,
this had manifestly failed and the number of nuclear weapons had increased
dramatically post-1968 - any disarmament that had occurred largely consisted of
the nuclear powers dismantling obsolete weaponry, whilst their nuclear arsenals
were replenished and extended with newer technology. Hence for non-nuclear
weapon possessing states, who saw the NPT as a means to an end viz. a nuclear-
free world, the Review was viewed as an opportunity to press the declared nuclear
powers for greater efforts in moving towards a real commitment on disarmament. It
was this background that set the scenario for the NPT Review and Extension
Conference in NewYork from April 17 to May 12, 1995.343
The NPTReview and Extension Conference
Prior to the NPT Review, the world's leading nuclear power - the United States -
made it clear that it favoured an 'indefinite extension of the NPT without
conditions'ie= Such a position favoured Washington's desire to remain the
hegemonic (in the neo-realist sense) power, whilst also bolstering the position of its
politico-economic allies namely Britain and France: Such a posture was opposed by
the Non-Aligned Movement which saw any indefinite extension as an implicit
recognition of the perpetuation of the existence of nuclear weapon powers.ê+êThis
opposition also sprang from the stance that an indefinite expansion of the NPT
342 David Nolan 'Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty? No Thanks', Living Marxism, issue 73,
November 1994, p. 7.
343 Ben Sanders 'The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference: An Overview',
Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 16, no. 3 December, 1995.
344 State Department A Declaration by the President on Security Assurances for Non-Nuclear
Weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Washington:
State Department, 1995 - http://www.acda.gov/factshee/wmd/nuclear/npt/nonucwp.htm
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would effectively eliminate pressure on those states who already were in possession
of nuclear capability to make any type of meaningful assurances regarding
disarmament. This would then send a powerful signal to threshold states or those
not "officially" recognised by the Treaty as nuclear powers to press on with their
own nuclear weaponry programmes.
The potential for discord between the NAMand the hegemon was thus high
and South Africa was cast in a difficult position. As a member of the NAMit would
be expected to vote with its allies, yet by doing so it would de-legitimise the
hegemon's leading position and perhaps weaken the strong linkages formed
between Pretoria and the leading capitalist nation. This, at a time when the GNU
was embarking on its "gamble on growth" development strategy (albeit under the
aegis of the then RDP)and the profound sense of vulnerability and desire to satisfy
"the market" and not appear to be out of step with the dominant normative order,
made such a policy extremely problematic for Pretoria. That is not to say that
South Africa was from the start aligned with the dominant powers position.
Initially, it seemed that Pretoria offered tentative backing to a fixed extension
duration - a stance close to the official position of the NAM. Indeed, Pretoria's
delegate at the third preparatory meeting before the NPT Review asserted that his
country 'call[ed] on state parties to comply with all the provisions of the treaty,
whether they relate to non-proliferation, disarmament or peaceful uses'.346
However, American pressure was swiftly brought to bear on Pretoria. The
American ambassador to South Africa, Princeton Lyman, moved to warn the South
African leadership what was expected from them in the form of ademarché,
warning Pretoria that a contrary vote by South Africa regarding indefinite
extensions would damage "mutual interests" and change Washington's perceptions
of South Africa's non-proliferation credentials.>'? 'Certainly, "arm-twisting"
occurred: the United States made it clear it wanted countries to vote its way and
345Tom Zamora Collina 'South Africa Bridges the Gap', Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,
July / August, 1995, p. 30.
346Zondi Masiza and Chris'Landsberg 'Fission for Compliments: South Africa and the 1995
Extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty', Policy: Issues and Actors, vol. 9, no. 3,
September 1996, p. 23.
347 Washington Post (Washington DC)April 17, 1995.
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that it would take those votes into account'.348 The American vice-president
personally lobbied Thabo Mbeki for South Africa's backing for a non-time-bound
extension and President Clinton wrote to Mandela demanding support. Indeed,
'South Africa [was] a special target for lobbying because it [was] perceived to have
influence over other Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and especially African
countries'i>? This pressure was so intense that it nearly backfired and threatened
to provoke Pretoria to reverse its position: according to one source, President
Clinton was warned by Mandela to 'back off, or else'.35o
Although the success of this intense pressure was denied by South African
diplomats, commentators remarked that Pretoria was 'submitting to extreme
pressure exerted by the United States to conform to its desires',351 and that the
adoption of a non-time-bound extension 'crowned months of persuasion, pressure
and manoeuvre by [the] US'.352For his part, Alfred Nzo himself admitted that the
realpolitik of the global order helped move Pretoria's position: 'there are certain
realities we cannot ignore. [The West] constitute the undeniable economic power
base of the world today'.353A middlepowermanship role of consensus-building and
legitimisation was thus required by Pretoria in support of the world order favoured
by the dominant powers, once a policy of supporting an indefinite extension was
adopted by South Africa.
Pretoria hence used its "moral suasion" to act as a "bridge-builder" between
the North and the South in defending the hegemonic order's interests. Having been
the first country to roll back its nuclear weapon status and also sign the NPT in
1991,354and having just emerged as a democratic state, the euphoria surrounding
South Africa's re-emergence on the world stage was a useful factor in pushing a
particular stance vis-a-vis nuclear weaponry, particularly as Pretoria's position
348Joseph Cirincione 'Evaluation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and
Extension Conference', presentation to the Arms Control Association Breakfast, May 17,
1995, http://www.stimson.org/campaign/aca.htm
349 Cape Argus (Cape Town) April 19, 1995.
350 Interview with senior official, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Matters Directorate,
Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, July 8, 1999.
351 See Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg) April 21-27, 1995.
352 Washington Post (Washington DC), May 12, 1999.
353Department of Foreign Affairs South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document Pretoria:
Department of Foreign Affairs, 1996, p. 12. .
354 See Darryl Howlett and John Simpson, 1993.
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earned considerable kudos in the West.355As sources have later claimed, 'no one
else had ...the prestige ...to bridge the gap between the nuclear haves and have-
nots',356 and 'South Africa's new morality meant that it could be used to bring on
board other states to the United State's position'<é?
However, as a member of the NAM, most observers expected 'that South
Africa would support some form of long-term but limited extension',358 and indeed
'mindful of Mandela's stature and his potential influence over Third World
countries, the United States had worried that South Africa might not support an
indefinite extension'.359 Yet such a position de-legitimised the leading hegemon's
own agenda for the continuation of the nuclear status quo. South Africa's role in
facilitating an eventual broad base of support for an indefinite extension with feeble
provisos is thus of profound significance when looking at post-apartheid foreign
policy, especially as South Africa's Foreign Minister regards the Review as 'clearly
one of South Africa's successful efforts' in its diplomacy.vv
The value that the United States saw in using South Africa's nuclear policy
as a legitimising agent of the current order was important as 'South Africa could
produce a far wider margin of consensus for an indefinite extension than the
United States could achieve alone'. As one observer asserted, 'the South
Africans ...offered [Washington] a bridge to the non-aligned, one that the United
States should walk over' for 'with their help, [the United States] could get an
overwhelming vote for extension'<éi Indeed, the weight the United States gave to
South Africa's role in the nuclear issue was earlier on seen in Washington's
support for Pretoria's membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group - an organisation
of states who supplied nuclear technology and which is aimed at preventing the
supply of such technology to developing world nations.362 As the only NAMmember
355 Cape Argus (Cape Town) April 19, 1995.
356 Business Day (Johannesburg) May 16, 1995.
357 Interview with senior official, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Matters Directorate,
Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, July 8, 1999.
358 Tom Zamora CoUina, 1995, p. 30.
359 New York Times (NewYork) April 23, 1995.
360 Alfred Nzo quoted in Cape Times (Cape Town), May 21, 1998.
361 New York Times (NewYork) April 23, 1995.
362 See Zondi Masiza Hunting With the Hounds, Or Running With the Hares? South Africa and
Nuclear Export Control Regimes Policy: Issues and Actors, vol. 11, no. 5 Johannesburg:
Centre for Policy Studies, 1998.
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of this Group, South Africa's accession afforded the institution a certain legitimacy.
Certainly, the notion that the Group was an elite body of developed nations (a
notion that had the potential to de-legitimise the group in the eyes of Southern
observers) was blunted by South Africa's membership. Such membership can be
seen as highly useful for those elements that desired/needed legitimisation of the
nuclear order.
At the same time, membership afforded the South African elite with a highly
visible role in a contentious issue, thus raising the profile of the newly-installed
GNU leadership and indicating that the post-apartheid administration held the
confidence of the developed nations - a welcome flagging of the GNU's credibility
with "international opinion" and an important boost for the new government in its
attempt to attract investment. As one source put it:
South Africa's retum to intemational respectability under majority rule and
a leader in the person of President Nelson Mandela ...has been reinforced by
its constructive role in efforts at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review
Conference to make the pact permanent through a consensus of the 178
signatories.w-
This - and the rumour that 'membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group was
offered to South Africa as a reward for its support of a permanent NPT' - should not
be lightly dismissed.v+
As has been suggested, division at the Review endangered the Treaty. Both
the Western and Eastern (ex-Soviet bloc) caucus groups favoured indefinite
extension, yet could not muster more than around fifty-five votes between them,
whilst the NAMwere hampered by a failure to construct a coherent caucus or
policy adoption.w- Such deadlock threatened to weaken if not de-legitimise the NPT
regime, particularly if a vote was simply taken on a majority basis and a number of
NAMstates decided to abstain from voting. This caused alarm in Pretoria which felt
itself in a difficult position, particularly as the NAMhad failed to construct a clear-
cut position on the matter. South Africa consequently 'broke ranks with NAM'and
sought a 'compromise solution'.366 The time-bound issue regarding extension was
363 'South Africa Offers Hope in NPTTalks', Diplomatic World Bulletin, April 24-30, 1995.
364 Cape Argus (Cape Town) April 19, 1995.
365 John Simpson, 1995, p. 249.
366 Interview with Zondi Masiza, policy analyst, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg,
July 9, 1999.
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seen as causing deadlock at the Review, and South Africa viewed with concern the
possibility of the Treaty breaking down.367As a South African delegate to the
Review admitted, Pretoria 'believed that any decision taken by a simple majority
would weaken the treaty'.368Such an outcome had the potential of de-legitimising
the whole NPT regime and unravelling the Treaty, forcing the creation of a new
regime, possibly not as amenable to the dominant powers' favoured order.
This was of the utmost concern for the nuclear power states, who feared that
any re-negotiation of a new NPT would be opened up to all sorts of inputs and
opinions and, as the American ambassador to South Africa put it, 'such a process
[could] take years and the outcome [would not be] certain'.369 Of course, the
certainties of outcome that Washington was pushing tied in with its own agenda,
and that is why the United States and its allies were so active in stalling any
movement towards an indefinite or rolling extension. Its strenuous activities in
influencing Pretoria (despite the denials) to fall in line must be contextualised
within this actuality - a scenario where those countries holding nuclear weapons
were more interested with ensuring the survival of the NPT than in advancing
towards nuclear disarmament.
South Africa's position at the NPTReview then was essentially to facilitate a
compromise that continued to legitimise the position of the nuclear powers whilst
appearing on face value to address the concerns of the South. As one account had
it:
When the conference opened, the United States and its allies, among them
Russia, faced formidable opposition to an indefinite extension of the treaty,
and did not have enough declared votes for a simple majority had there been
a ballot ...Over the weeks however, the opposition, led by larger developing
nations - among them Mexico, Venezuela, Egypt, Nigeria and Indonesia -
began to split. The eventual collapse of the opposition to an indefinite
extension was hastened by the decision of South Africa to back such a plan
and propose a package of confidence-building documents that would meet
some of the concerns of the non-nuclear weapons nations.ê??
367 Interview with senior official, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Matters Directorate,
Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, July 8, 1999.
368 Abdul Minty quoted in Mail and Guardian, (Johannesburg) June 23, 1995.
369 Mail and Guardian, (Johannesburg) April 28-May 4, 1995.
370 New York Times (NewYork) May 12, 1995.
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An official source has supported this analysis, arguing that South Africa sought to
do 'something practical' and engage with the nuclear weapons states whilst
avoiding pushing the time-bound agenda as it was unacceptable to the nuclear
weapons states. In short, a 'policy of bringing the two sides together was the only
realistic policy'<" Thus having initially expressed support for a fixed period
extension, Pretoria moved to support the nuclear powers position 'without any
preconditions or linkage to other nuclear disarmament measures'P?? a remarkable
volte face that deeply angered many Southern participants.V" The position that
Pretoria put forward was to accede to the nuclear powers stance for an indefinite
extension of the NPT whilst at the same time attempting to put pressure on them
by advocating that the NPT process be reinforced via non-binding Principles for
Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (see below). This position was a clear
attempt by Pretoria to bridge the gap between the nuclear powers and those who
favoured a much stronger regime - including palpable moves towards disarmament.
By appearing to minimise polarisation between the haves and have-ncts
whilst actually strengthening the former, Pretoria played a classical
middlepowermanship role by 'seek[ing] to expand the area of common ground
[making] it possible to curtail risk in the management of conflict'<>' One source put
this succinctly when it pointed out that South Africa 'focused on defining areas on
which the maximum number of signatories ...could find common ground'<" By
playing this role, South Africa was 'instrumental .. .in achieving the widest possible
consensus'.376 This activity coincided with the efforts of Canada, which also worked
for an indefinite extension and whose 'back-room deals' facilitated compromise at
the Conference.ê?? Indeed, towards the end of the Conference, it was the Canadian
resolution that demonstrated that there were Ill. co-sponsors for a non-time-
bound extension, more than enough votes to support this option without a specific
371 Interview with senior official, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Matters Directorate,
Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, July 8, 1999.
372 Alfred Nzo quoted in Cape Times (Cape Town), May 21, 1998.
373John Simpson, 1995, p. 247.
374Robert Cox, 1989, p. 826.
375 Business Day (Johannesburg) May 16, 1995.
376Willie Breytenbach, 'South-North Bargaining: What Role for South Africa', Africa Insight,
vol. 25, no. 4, 1995, p. 231.
377 Interview with Zondi Masiza, policy analyst, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg,
July 9,1999.
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roll-call and a major body-blow to those delegations which still held out against the
nuclear powers' position.vs
The final Review conclusion was agreed without a vote (i.e. not through
consensus) on the indefinite extension of the NPT and furthermore, the Review
agreed upon - again without any vote - to two collateral documents on
Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty and Principles and Objectives for
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. These were in line with the positions favoured
by the United States and other nuclear powers. Indeed, 'the developed countries
have to thank South Africa for its role in "delivering" the sceptical non-nuclear
weapon states, particularly the Non-Aligned Movemerrt'J'"? though other
commentators later remarked that 'criticism [of] what is perceived to be the
Government's pro-Western stance on nuclear disarmament issues [leads one to
ask] if the Government is working together with its non-aligned partners'.380 Official
sources however believe that Pretoria's role at the NPT Review 'gave South Africa
credibility with the United States'.381
The documents agreed upon at the NPTReviewwere in line with what Alfred
Nzo had pushed, and South Africa's proposals were seen as the 'key to persuading
the non-nuclear countries' to accept the new review system.382 The proposals
agreed upon included:
• a restated a commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weaponry;
• a strengthening of adherence to the safeguards under the IAEAagreement;
• providing access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes;
• a movement towards reducing nuclear arsenals;
• the endorsement of the establishment of an increased number of nuclear-free
zones;
378Joseph Cirincione 'Evaluation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and
Extension Conference', presentation to the Arms Control Association Breakfast, May 17,
1995, http) /www.stimson.org/campaign/aca.htm
379Tsepe Motumi 'South Africa and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty - Diplomatic Coup
or Pyrrhic Victory?', African Security Review, vol. 4, no. 2, 1995, p. 46.
380 The Sowetan (Johannesburg) August 26, 1997.
381 Interview with senior official, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Matters Directorate,
Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, July 8, 1999.
382 Washington Post (Washington DC), May 12, 1995.
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• enforcing binding security assurances for non-nuclear powers.383
Such an outcome was of satisfaction to the dominant powers for it legitimised their
own position, even though it left the South African leadership open to the charge
that Pretoria had indulged in 'turning its back on the Third World and cosying up
to the United States by supporting the Big Five powers in their bid to hold on to
their nuclear bombs'.384Not least this was because South Africa's position 'removed
the only source of leverage on the nuclear weapons states, because the treaty's
extension [was] no longer. ..linked to dismantling their arsenals', and 'in the
absence of a binding time-frame, the nuclear powers [were] free to adopt their own
notions of the right time to disarm'.385 Such comments undermine the argument
put forward by observers such as Jean-Jacques Cornish that South Africa's
proposals were an advance for they qualified the indefinite extension with a
declaration of principles binding the nuclear powers to quicker disarmament and
that the Treaty would be strengthened with an ongoing review process. Yet with no
date fixed upon this, such supposed principles were from the start emasculated by
the indefinite extension.386
Indeed, it is not hard to assert that South Africa's role at the NPT conference
secured the relationship between South Africa and the "certain realities" of the
extant world order. Within days of Nzo's speech in New York, the announcement
came that South Africa [was] to receive a billion dollar loan from the US-dominated
World Bank'.387Another source has claimed that South Africa wanted to impress
the big powers, with an eye on attracting investment.388 Whilst one must be
circumspect in making any direct causal link between this and the N~. Review, it
is apparent that Pretoria's behaviour in support of the favoured global -order earned
the new administration gratitude in Washington and strengthened the "mutual
interests" between Washington and Pretoria. Indeed, much of the South African
383AlfredNzo'Statement by the ForeignMinister of the Republic of South Africa,MrAlfred
Nzo,at the 1995 Reviewand Extension Conferenceof the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferationof Nuclear weapons (NPT)',NewYork, United States, April 19, 1995 issued by
the Department of ForeignAffairs.
384 Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg) April21-27, 1995.
385Ruchita Beri 'South Africa'sNuclearPolicy'- http://www.idsa-india.org/ an-oct8-2.html
386SeeCornish' argument in Pretoria News (Pretoria)May 11, 1995.
387 Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg) April29-May4, 1995.
388 Interviewwith Zondi Masiza, policy analyst, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg,
July 9, 1999.
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press were highly enthusiastic of Pretoria's role, exclaiming for example that 'it is
achievements such as the one at the NPT conference which will keep us on the
map as a recognised player to be taken seriously, to be consulted and, most
importantly, to be traded with and invested in'.389
Such a scenario was achieved by South Africa pursumg an essentially
middlepowermanship role that legitimised the global order whilst appearing to have
the potential for de-Iegitimisation - 'providing countries with the means to vent
frustration' as one source pointed out.390This exhibited 'a new conception of the
tactics of achieving [the NPT]goal, through incremental short steps which are both
unobjectionable in themselves and which have some value in reinforcing the
nuclear non-proliferation regime'<v- In other words, a continuation of the ongoing
order through both avoidance of controversy and various tactics of inclusivity that,
in the final analysis, serve to propagate the hegemon's position. Such a policy was
pursued by Pretoria at the NPTReview, and 'pulled Washington's fat from the fire
on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty',392 presenting 'a major foreign policy
victory for the Clinton administrationPv>
South Africa's position post-1995
However, in the post-Review period, the legitimacy of the NPT has been under
serious strain, not least because within two days of the Treaty's indefinite
extension China conducted nuclear testing whilst France quickly announced that it
too was going to resume testing. Furthermore, in mid-1997, Washington conducted
a high-explosive underground test involving nuclear materials. Indeed, it quickly
became apparent that for all South Africa's bridge-building efforts, the practicalities
of the compromise pushed by Pretoria did nothing vis-a-vis the nuclear powers'
disarmament obligations. Later, at the first Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) in
April 1997 - to review the Treaty mid-term - the shaky "consensus" around the NPT
had clearly evaporated with states demanding greater commitments to
389 The Star (Johannesburg) May 15, 1995.
390 Business Day (Johannesburg) May 16, 1995.
391 John Simpson 'The Birth of a New Era? The 1995 NPT Conference and the Politics of
Nuclear Disarmament', Security Dialogue, vol. 26, no. 3, 1995, p. 252.
392 Business Day (Johannesburg) May 16, 1995.
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disarmament and security assurances.w- Indeed, the final document again had to
be adopted without a vote and only after concessions were made to non-nuclear
powers, notably Mexico.
Ironically, despite being the state that contributed heavily to the scenano
where the nuclear powers are under very little pressure to disarm, Pretoria has
since 1995 taken a leading role in ostensibly pushing forward the agenda of
disarmament. According to one analyst, 'frustration with the United States' position
(i.e. resumption of testing) has lead to South Africa taking on a more activist
position'.395 For example, Pretoria joined Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New
Zealand, Slovenia and Sweden in signing a joint declaration entitled "Towards a
Nuclear Free World: The Need for a New Agenda", which called on the nuclear
power states and those states who had just then tested weapons - India and
Pakistan - to commit themselves to the elimination of their respective weapons.êw
This new initiative of middle-ranking powers stemmed from the common perception
that the disarmament process had gone "cold".397
Furthermore, Pretoria has signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT)and agreed to base monitoring facilities on its territory - the third
such country to do SO.398By ratifying the Treaty, South Africa became the
seventeenth member, though for the Treaty to come into effect forty-four parties
must do so. South African activity regarding the CTBTwas substantial, with Jackie
Selebi, serving as the first Chair of the PrepCom of the CTBT, whilst the country
was a member of the core group that managed the process of the resolution on the
CTBT that was adopted in September 1996.399
393 Washington Post (Washington DC), May 12, 1995.
394 Savita Pande 'Post-NPT Extension: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Challenges'
http:j jwww.idsa-india.orgjan-dec-2.html
395 Interview with Zondi Masiza, policy analyst, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg,
July 9, 1999.
396 'Nzo Reaffirms Call for Nuclear Disarmament', Pretoria, September 28, 1998, issued by
Department of Foreign Affairs.
397 The Irish Foreign Minister referred to the eight-nation Declaration as a process of
'warming up something that's gone cold' - South African Press Agency (NewYork) September
23, 1998.
398 South Africa Press Agency (Pretoria) May 21, 1999
399 'Media Statement on South Africa's Ratification of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty
(CTBT)', Pretoria, March 30 1999, issued by Department of Foreign Affairs.
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Furthermore, South Africa (alongside Canada) has taken an active role in
PrepCom II ahead of the NPTReview scheduled for 2000. South Africa has argued
that considerable time be afforded to discussing the practicalities regarding
progress towards disarmament as embarked upon by the nuclear weapons states -
a proposal vigorously opposed by the weapons-holding states. This has the
potential to de-legitimise the nuclear states' position as their 'rejection of South
Africa's attempts to launch focussed discussion ...reveal their intransigence, which
the [non-nuclear powers] increasingly find unacceptable'.400
How can such activism vis-a-vis nuclear disarmament be explained in the
light of Pretoria's controversial role during the NPT conference in 1995? Firstly,
stung by criticism that South Africa had betrayed its Southern allies and brought
its much-touted non-aligned credentials into disrepute, South Africa has evidently
opted for a policy that is less obviously in line with the United States and its allies.
Not only does this help repair the damage done to South Africa's standing over the
nuclear issue, it also 'demonstrates South Africa's readiness to contribute towards
efforts to enhance international peace and security', thus projecting Pretoria's
overall posture on the international stage.w! More importantly, such activism
appears to demonstrate Pretoria's "independent" stance with regard to Washington.
Not only can this be usefully deployed domestically by the GNU against its vocal
critics who charge that post-apartheid foreign policy is too close to the capitalist
hegemon (and the NPTdebacle saw this charge being levelled with some vigour); it
can also be projected externally to demonstrate proof of South Africa's apparent
independence. After all, by pursuing the nuclear powers over nuclear disarmament,
South Africa appears to be de-legitimising their position.
Yet, this must be contextualised: South Africa is pushing this ostensible
agenda within a Treaty framework - which it helped deliver - that means that there
is very little pressure on the nuclear powers to consent to a real disarmament
process. As one analysis put it, 'had nuclear powers accepted legally binding time
frames for nuclear disarmament, perhaps the US would desist from...refining its
400Douglas Roche 'An Analysis of the Second Preparatory Committee Meeting for the 2000
Review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty' - http://waterservl.uwaterloo.ca/-plough/98prepcom.htm
401 'Media Statement on South Africa's Signature of Agreement of the Comprehensive Test-
Ban Treaty', Pretoria, May 21 1999, issued by Department of Foreign Affairs on behalf of the
SA Permanent Mission to the CTBT PrepCom, Vienna.
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nuclear arsenal'.402 Indeed, after the 1995 NPT Review Conference the position of
the nuclear powers and Washington in particular has been strengthened, as 'the
NPTis devoid of any sense of urgency to achieve a nuclear-free world. The nuclear
powers feel at liberty to determine their own pace of disarmament'r'vs The calls for
disarmament by Pretoria, though they do fit within South Africa's overall foreign
policy stance regarding disarmament, are compromised by the scenario where the
current NPT has been indefinitely extended. In short, 'an inherent flaw' in the
extended NPT 'is the assumption that [disarmament] measures could be negotiated
without time-bound frameworksr'v+
Furthermore, by appearing to de-legitimise the dominant powers' position
over nuclear disarmament, South Africa contributes to legitimising the wider global
order, particularly when the fundamentals of the nuclear regime have been
safeguarded (to Washington and its allies' satisfaction) by Pretoria's
middlepowermanship activity at the Review. Appearing to de-legitimise and
"confront" the dominant powers, throws up the imagery of space in which a country
from the South can challenge the developed world. Of course, there is agency, but
what our analysis suggests is that this has been largely confined to technical
interventions, emasculated as it has been by the indefinite extension of the NPT
and the reification of the nuclear powers possession of its existing weaponry.
An activist policy over disarmament and the pursuance of a commitment to
real measures .(however illusory they may be in the current order) not only
illustrates and ties in with Pretoria's enthusiasm for a rules-based global order, it
also reflects in part South African resentment at the behaviour of the nuclear
weapons states after the Conference. Indeed, the resumption of testing by France
and China, and Washington's indications that it wanted to renew underground
testing made Pretoria's 'brilliant package' - the president of the conference, Sri
Lanka's Jayantha Dhanapala's words appear rather hollow, if not
embarrassing.we As sources have put it, 'South Africa foolishly trusted the nuclear
402 The Sowetan (Johannesburg) August 26, 1997.
403 The Sowetan (Johannesburg) August 20, 1996.
404 The Sowetan (Johannesburg) August 26, 1997.
405 Dhanapala is said to have 'immediately seized upon the South African position and
heavily promoted it', motivated, according to one analyst, by a desire to advance his
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powers not to start testing',406 and 'South Africa fears it [was] betrayed as one
nuclear power after another announce[d] plans to go ahead with nuclear testing'r'??
By posturing an increased commitment to disarmament, South Africa's elite can
attempt to save some face in the eyes of those who all along questioned the wisdom
of Pretoria's bridge-building behaviour, on behalf of the nuclear powers, in 1995.
Why Pretoria's new-found energies over the disarmament issue is termed
"ironic" is that it was South Africa that helped craft and deliver this very scenario.
Pretoria now usefully uses this situation to posture a supposedly less
accomodatory role towards the dominant powers. But, at the final analysis, this is
devoid of any real substance - South Africa constantly fails to bring up nuclear
disarmament when its leaders pay visits to nuclear powers e.g. Britain, France and
the United States.wë Indeed, Pretoria's nuclear policy lacks any potency to
seriously undermine the existing nuclear order - rhetoric against Northern
intransigence over disarmament notwithstanding.
By abandoning a principled position in pursuit of "bridge-building" and
"consensus", South Africa's nuclear policy is now largely restricted to urging the
nuclear powers to hold themselves accountable to the provisions of the NPT. But,
with no time-bound agreement in place (a result of Pretoria's middlepowermanship
role in New York), it is likely that this will occur only when the nuclear powers
decide for themselves that disarmament is the way to go. Until then South Africa's
multilateral initiatives on nuclear issues only serve to legitimise the ongoing order,
giving an appearance of "dialogue" with the dominant powers, when none
concretely exists.
diplomatic career - interviewwith Zondi Masiza, policy analyst, Centre for Policy Studies,
Johannesburg, July 9, 1999.
406 Ibid.
407 The Star (Johannesburg) June 23, 1995.
408 The Sowetan (Johannesburg) August 20, 1996.
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CONCLUSION
This work has attempted to understand why post-apartheid South Africa's foreign
policy, specifically its behaviour in multilateral organisations, has been marked by
a tactical middlepowermanship role, essentially problem-solving, and seeking to
smooth out the international system so that the ongoing world order may function
as "efficiently" as possible. Such behaviour has been qualitatively different from the
activist role that was expected from an ANC-led administration, and is also at odds
with the 'paradigm shift' as proclaimed by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
back in 1996.1
In contrast to the "explanations" offered by most previous analysts of South
African foreign policy (Evans and Vale excepted), who fit the role of Gramsci's
"organic intellectuals", this study has demonstrated that the behaviour exhibited
by Pretoria is not immutable or subject to natural law, but is derivative of the
specific conjuncture of forces that conglomerated during the transition from
apartheid, and which continue to play out post-1994. This transition is an open-
ended process, and opportunities for alternative choices do exist - in contrast to
what many (most?) observers of Pretoria's foreign policy seem to think. Indeed,
such explanatory accounts are inherently dangerous for the people of South Africa
because:
To regard the immutability thesis as an exercise in the politically neutral
observation of an independent reality is to lend vital ideological support to
the status quo by denying that alternative possibilities are latent within
existing social structures or by obscuring their existence.?
Such accounts that proffer themselves up as explaining "realities", whilst
suggesting that "there is no alternative" fit in with this, and act to stifle debate on
the future direction of South Africa's international relations - indeed serve to de-
legitimise alternative accounts.
Instead of taking the current milieu as a given, this study has attempted to
frame post-apartheid South Africa within its historical context. Only by attempting
to understand how and why the ANC acceded to the dominant hegemonic
discourse of neo-liberalism and how this must be contextualised within the
1 Interview with Aziz Pahad in Marlene Kromberg, 1996, p. 3.
2 Andrew Linklater, 1998, p. 21.
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structural constraints brought to bear upon the GNUby an increasingly globalised
world, can a coherent understanding of South Africa's multilateral behaviour be
arrived at. Though this has been discussed in some detail, a combination of
'propaganda, pressure, vested interests, threats, fear, realism, wanting to play in
the big league and intellectual cowardice' helped convince the ANCelite that neo-
liberalism was the only "realistic" economic framework available.> Such an account
of the transition avoids the over-personalised narratives of Waldmeier and Sparks,
and instead has examined both the activities of agents and the structural
underpinnings of the move away from apartheid: it has sought to be sensitive to the
space and choices that the liberation movement made - and continues to make.
Just as the historic compromise circa 1990-94 has given rise to
contradictions within the South African polity between contending class fractions
and within the ANC's own ranks, so too has conceding to and accepting the
hegemony of nee-liberalism. As has been demonstrated, this has provoked a
fundamental tension in Pretoria's overall foreign policy, where on the one hand
South Africa accepts the fundamental normative world order (despite being a
country ostensibly of the South), and on the other pushes various reformist
initiatives which seek to re-negotiate Pretoria's standing within this framework.
It is suggested that the GNU elite are at one with the broader project as
advanced by the transnational elite (indeed, the elite within the South African
govemment's leadership form part of this global class): its 'polices are pretty much
what the IMFwould prescribe'< This has meant an activist-driven promotion of the
liberalisation of markets, free trade, polyarchical institutions and the rest of the
wider neo-liberal "package". However, this self-same leadership is intensely aware
of the need to reconcile its acceptance of the global hegemonic order, with that of
the appeals of a historically important and currently sizeable fraction of its support
constituency. This element is much more wary of liberalisation, privatisation and
other "common sense" neo-liberal prescriptions than the GNU elite, and have
critiqued the seeming open acceptance of "globalisation" (however formulated) by
the government. Public disputes between the ANC leadership and the SACP and
3 Communication with Ismail Lagardien, former Director of Communications, Department of
Trade and Industry, - now Senior Vice President of Development Economics, World Bank,
June 22, 1999.
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COSATU are symptomatic of this fundamental contradiction in the tripartite
alliance. Indeed, they mark out a fault-line between the outwardly-oriented
components of the developing historic bloc (which includes large-scale capital), and
the more inwardly-oriented fractions of productive capital, labour and Leftist
elements opposed to the neo-liberal counter-revolution.
Attempts to reconcile these two positions, of promoting "free" trade whilst at
the same time demanding "fair" trade for example, mirror the broader
contradictions that have been evident in South African foreign policy. They reflect
the historic compromise that saw the ANCcome to administrative power, and also
the desire by the government to balance its neo-liberal credentials with certain
reformist convictions. The ANCdocument State and Social Transformation captures
this need for equilibrium when it stated that 'the democratic state has to attend to
the genuine concerns of all other social and national groups [but] it also has to
attend to the concerns of private capital ...It has to try to balance different and at
times conflicting interests whilst addressing the needs of the people over a wide
variety of spheresf In its foreign policy, this has meant a tactical
middlepowermanship role being pursued by Pretoria, pushing for reforms in the
global trade architecture, for instance, whilst remaining within - indeed legitimising
- the broader normative principles that mark out the contemporary world order.
This analysis helps in the understanding of Pretoria's international relations.
Within trade-oriented multilateral organisations such as the WTO and the Cairns
Group, the South African leadership has advanced a role where it seeks to position
itself as an expanding and attractive market for international capital. By being seen
to openly accept the norms of global trade, the GNU seems to hope to build up
business confidence in the country (and the wider region) and pull in international
investment. As one commentator has remarked:
[T]he basics of South African economic policy over the past five years have
been designed to telephone to people the world over who have money and
want to make more of it: "You can believe what we say and trust us" ... [T]his
4 Dennis Dykes, chief economist of Nedcor, cited by South African Press Agency
(Johannesburg), May 26, 1999.
5 African National Congress The State and Social Transformation Discussion Document
Johannesburg: African National Congress, 1996.
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confidence-building in the investor community has meant accepting the
"Washington consensus". 6
Such investment should, the narrative seems to accept, fuel growth: 'investment,
and in particular foreign investment, is of critical importance to the kind of growth
we need'.? This will then supposedly contribute towards the re-rebuilding of the
country - grounded as it is on the firmly neo-liberal GEARprogramme. Yet, at the
same time, such "modemising" policies can only stand a chance of success if the
liberalisation and free trade project is embarked upon with equal vigour in the
developed world. Otherwise, liberalised South African industries will be competing
with protected manufacturers in the North - a scenario that can only impact
negatively upon exports from Pretoria.
It is this urgency to expose the hypocrisy of the North in its calculated push
for free trade in the South - whilst keeping various of its own markets closed to
Southern competition - that impels Pretoria to engage with initiatives such as the
Cairns Group. Similarly, South Africa's position at the WTO seems to accept the
call for nee-liberalism restructuring, but turns this rhetoric around and urges the
developed world to engage in supposed real free trade, rather than the "actually
existing free trade" situation currently marking international commerce.
However, such manoeuvrings fail to fundamentally question the unequal
nature of the South's (and Africa in particular) trading relationship with the
developed world." Indeed, by engaging with such bodies, Pretoria affords a high
measure of legitimacy to not only the (fundamentally neo-liberal) organisations, but
also. to the overall intemational political economy. Such "problem-solving"
behaviour seems to accept the immutability of the current world order and seeks to
ameliorate its worse aspects, rather than promote debate regarding the future
organising principles of a more just international political economy.
Whether the ANC has accepted totally the "end of history" thesis as some
commentators argue, is a moot point.? Certainly, the balance of forces within the
6 Howard Barrel 'Mbeki, Manuel Have the Basics Right', Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg),
March 19-25, 1999. -
7 Nelson Mandela 'Speech by President Nelson Mandela at a Business Luncheon Hosted by
Minister Manuel', issued by the Office of the President, Toronto, September 25, 1998.
8 On this, see Michael Barratt Brown and Pauline Tiffen Short Changed: Africa and World
Trade London: Pluto Press, 1992.
9 See Ray Hartley 'Madiba Says Goodbye at the End of History', Sunday Times
(Johannesburg) May 16, 1999.
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tripartite alliance at present seems to be firmly in favour of those fractions who
urge an increased engagement with "globalisation", rather than a more
interrogatory position. Such a position would put forward "progressive" economic
policies - defined as 'policy measures to counter the destructive features of markets
and to promote equality as well as efficiency in ways that markets alone are
unlikely to accomplish'i!" At the moment however, a concerted progressive agenda
in the GNU's macro-economic policy seems unlikely.
As this study has attempted to demonstrate, this scenario spnngs from a
conglomeration of interests that emerged out of the 1994 compromise and the
ongoing formation of a historic bloc involving external capital and those ANCelites
(and their allied constituencies, such as the "patriotic bourgeoisie") who favour free
market principles over dirigiste impulses. These factors in themselves coincide with
the interests of the wider transnational elite and the neo-liberal project currently
being advanced.
Such forces express themselves not only in overtly neo-liberal bodies, such
as the WTO, but are also assertive in Pretoria's activities with organisations
ostensibly promoting social and economic development, such as UNCTAD,the Non-
Aligned Movement, and the Commonwealth. Within such bodies South Africa often
promotes itself as a "bridge-builder" - in effect playing a middlepowermanship role.
At the same time, Pretoria is frequently the state that seeks to nudge and cajole
others in the South to accept the "global realities". Indeed, as has been
demonstrated, South Africa has often been in advance of others in the developing
world in pushing an acceptance of globalisation, albeit tempering such calls with a
recognition that negative effects of the process do exist and need to be guarded
against.
However, the urge for a critical engagement with the North tends to be
subsumed under the rhetoric of "partnership", which Pretoria has been particularly
enthusiastic to promote in its dealings with those organisations devoted to
development. This has formed a major theme of South Africa's role in such bodies,
where Pretoria has led the way and, at times, been instrumental in changing
"confrontationist" rhetoric vis-a-vis the North and globalisation, to more
10 Dean Baker, Gerald Epstein and Robert Pollin 'Introduction' in Dean Baker, Gerald
Epstein and Robert Pollin (eds.), 1998, p. 4.
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accomodatory postures that accept what the South African leadership sees as both
the positive and negative aspects of the ongoing globalising process. Though this
has meant that Pretoria has been in advance of most of the South, the GNU's
foreign policy at multilateral organisations has sought to promote a more receptive
attitude to the world-wide liberalisation thrust - a tactic that not only posits South
Africa as a worthy investment destination, whose administrators understand the
global "realities", but also improves Pretoria's overall position with regard to those
who hold international power. This desire to signal Pretoria's "responsibility"
informed, as has been suggested, South Africa's "bridge-building" role at the NPT
Review, despite the resulting abandonment of any principled position uis-á-uis
nuclear proliferation. As a discussion paper asserted, judicious multilateral
diplomacy will enhance South Africa's international standing'. I I
Such "pragmatic" policies have increasingly been transposed to specifically
continental institutions, such as the Organisation of African Unity. Indeed, at the
last OAU Heads of State meeting in Algiers in July 1999, Thabo Mbeki led the
meeting's discussion on globalisation and made it clear that Pretoria wanted a shift
in the overall approach of the body towards a more engaging and "constructive"
dialogue with the North.P In doing so, past "negative" rhetoric had to be ditched:
The Draft Algiers Declaration contains a paragraph on globalisation which I
believe is, in many respects, fundamentally flawed and should be changed. it
reads:
"...Ushered in with promises of progress and prosperity for all, (globalisation)
has today aroused fears, in that it poses serious threats to our sovereignty,
cultural and historical identities as well as gravely undermining our
development prospects. We believe that globalisation should be placed within
the framework of a democratically conceived dynamics, and implemented
collectively to make it an institution capable of fulfilling the hope for a
concerted developmental of mankind [sic] and prosperity shared by all
people".
I am certain that in our discussions today we will help one another, among
other things, to understand better the objective process of globalisation and
its positive and negative features.is
11 African National Congress Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic South Africa
Johannesburg: African National Congress, 1994.
12 Business Day (Johannesburg), July 14, 1999.
13 Thabo Mbeki 'Statement at the 35th Ordinary Session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of
State and Governments', issued by the Office of the President, Algiers, Algeria, July 13,
1999.
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This assertive offer to "help" other elites 'understand better the objective process of
globalisation' has been an essential part of South Africa's multilateralist behaviour,
and fits the middlepowermanship role of smoothing out difficulties and
misunderstandings, in order to make the ongoing order function more propitiously.
In this, South Africajoins forces with other actors in the developing world, notably
the NAMleadership. Efforts by Pretoria along these lines also serve to legitimise the
current international political economy, particularly as South Africa's "punches
above its weight" and has the moral credibility, as it were, to carry off such
posturing.
This being said, South Africa's foreign policy should not be caricatured as
being some sort of unquestioning "disciple" of the West or international capital.
Though at a basic level the GNU leadership has embraced the convictions of the
hegemonic project, and seeks to advance these, they are cognisant of the negative
downside and pressures that are concurrent with globalisation. By engaging with
the "objective" process of globalisation rather than challenge it, the GNU sees such
a tactical policy as the best way to ameliorate the contrary processes that impact
negatively upon Pretoria. This in part springs from a particular understanding of
the international political economy, which is seen as exerting forceful constraints
on any alternative positions. Hence, this elite has opted for policies that exhibit a
considerable amount of awareness to what it views as the forces that exact upon
the global system, even if this results in an agenda that is at variance with the
long-held positions of the ANC.This has meant that substantial strains have arisen
within the tripartite alliance and that in its foreign policy the government has had
to play to two different constituencies - crudely, business and labour - at the same
time.
Such contradictions have been evident in South Africa's multilateral
behaviour, where it has promoted a reformist agenda aiming to "improve" the global
system whilst promoting a more rules-based international regime. For sure, the
GNU leadership seems to accept that "there is no alternative" for South Africa to
follow neo-liberal prescriptions (indicating the degree of hegemony that this project
has realised). But, the government attempts to promote policies that seek to
alleviate the most negative effects of this order.
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This policy not only serves the interests of important South African
industries (the government believes), it also acts to flag to its constituency on the
Left that the GNU is attempting to promote the interests of the disempowered.
Concurrently, and perhaps more importantly as far as the GNU is concerned, its
policies signal to the global power-holders {both domestically and internationally)
that an ANC-run South Africa is trustworthy enough to invest in. In essence,
whilst as a government in office the party complies with the principles of the
hegemonic order, as a movement in a political alliance with labour and the Left, the
state leadership must effect a careful equilibrium, recognising the divergent social
forces acting upon and within the South African and international polity.
Pursuing tactical reformist policies in its foreign relations vis-a.-vis the global
world order economy is one way in which this can be satisfied. Such reformist
policies are one way by which the GNUcan attempt to ameliorate the discernible
negative outcomes of globalisation whilst also signalling to its Leftist coalition
partners that it retains and advances a commitment to change. This is played out
in Pretoria's foreign policy: a reformist platform within multilateral organisations is
one manner by which the effects of conceding to neo-liberalism may be "justified"
to a sceptical constituency within the coalition.
In short, South Africa pursues a foreign policy that is essentially "problem-
solving". Certainly, on specific issues Pretoria occasionally de-legitimises the
dominant powers e.g. regarding their hypocritical calls for "open markets" whilst
furtively blocking exports from the South.t+ This mirrors the wider tensions
between theoretical "free trade" and the actualities of "really existing free market
doctrine". Hence, according to the Minister of Trade and Industry, Pretoria is a 'very
strong supporter ..in the WTOas a rules-based system ...Correctly administered and
managed it prevents the abuse of "might is right'''.ls Here, and in the Cairns Group,
South Africa strives to match the rhetoric of liberalisation with its universal
application. South Africa's positions within bodies such as the Commonwealth, the
14 As Alfred Nzo said, 'liberalisation cannot be used by the North to merely weaken and take
over economies of the South, whilst new trade barriers are erected in the North' - Alfred Nzo
'Annual Address by Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo to the South African Institute of
International Affairs in Johannesburg', issued by Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria,
October 1, 1998..
IS Alec Erwin 'Trading With Latin America: Defining Policies for the Future - Keynote
Address', Unisa Latin American Report, vol. 14, no. 2, July-December 1998, p. 63.
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NAM and UNCTAD also seem to demand that the North take its obligations
sincerely regarding both "free" and "fair" trade. The call for "partnership" between
North and South is conducted within this free trade framework, and aims to move
towards some form of workable relationship with the developed world in order to
lessen the more negative aspects encountered by developing states as they seek to
engage with the "objective process" of globalisation.
However, within the broader analysis of this study, such policies fail to
interrogate the structural foundations of the international political economy whilst
granting an important degree of legitimacy to this order. By engaging in essentially
problem-solving behaviour, South Africa contributes towards a reification of the
global common sense predicated upon the hegemony of neo-liberalism. Indeed, by
agitating around basically technical issues, the GNU helps promote neo-liberalism
as the only viable framework and developmental agenda (essentially, a fetishisation
of "growth") which can be deployed. Logically, the best choice which can be
pursued in such a closed scenario is to advance a "tactical" engagement policy in
order to maximise benefits - a tautological fix that the GNU has not yet seemed
aware of, nor indeed problematised.
This being so, it is likely that unless the GNUquestions its accession to neo-
liberalism - a process that largely hinges upon the balances of forces within the
tripartite alliance - the foreign policy of South Africa will remain wedded to a
problem-solving approach within multilateral bodies that seek to iron out problems
in the ongoing order. Hence, Pretoria is likely to continue promoting the ongoing
discourse of neo-liberalism and polyarchical politics in its foreign policy, and
continue playing a middlepowermanship role within multilateral bodies which
serves to legitimise the current world order. This is despite the contradictions this
may engender for a country which ostensibly is a leader of the South - a profound
flagging of the hegemony of neo-liberalism in the contemporary international
political economy.
At the same time, acknowledgement will be made of the negative aspects of
globalisation, but this will be largely cast with reference to the difficulties faced by
outwardly-oriented fractions and perhaps, more obvious visitations made upon
organised labour. However, now that the main driving force behind GEARwithin
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the ANC has acceded to presidential power, placating critics on the Left may well
pre-occupy Pretoria's foreign policy less and less.
Having said that, certain factors might arise that could change this scenario.
Foremost of these is the relationship of organised labour and the Communist Party
within the tripartite alliance. How this plays out is dependent upon the strategic
choices made by the leadership of these bodies, particularly those of the trade·
unions. If such leadership their role as primarily that of a "loyal opposition", and
continue to play-down frustrations with the government's macro-economic policy
by "rationalising" such policies to its members, then opposition to such a situation
will have to be sought outside the organised ranks of labour, currently a project
that is - at most - in its embryonic stage.> Indeed, if as seems present, senior
labour movement officials are keen to be co-opted into the ranks of the nascent
elite, with all the material benefits and privileges that this entails, then such
counter-hegemonic impulses will have to be accommodated outside of existing
organised structures or, alternatively, a rank-and-file movement to oust leaders of
such calibre and ambition from union ranks will have to be embarked upon. If
these contradictions developed to such an extent that the ANC elite felt that its
mass base was under threat, a less overtly neo-liberal strategy, perhaps predicated
upon (limited) neo-Keynesian ingredients, might be adopted as a means to pacify
restive elements and head off revolt. The short duration that the ANC has
committed itself to neo-liberalism may come into play during such a scenario, for
after all, the movement's "ideological quantum leap" is relatively recent.
However, for any such action to succeed in the long-term, linkages would
have to be constructed on an international basis and a global counter-hegemonic
coalition developed that would challenge the hegemony of neo-liberalism. The role
of a coherent ideological counter-solution would be crucial in this regard, as would
the ability to mobilise a transnational social movement in support of such
impulses. As Susan George writes, 'the threat [of neo-liberalism] is clearly
transnational so the response must also be transnational Solidarity no longer
16 The emergence of non-recognised unions and attacks upon organised labour officials prior
to the 1999 elections may suggest that such developments are not that fanciful.
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means aid, or not just aid, but finding the hidden synergies in ...other's struggles so
that ...numerical force and the power of ideas become overwhelming'i!?
Whether a government, whose leadership is increasingly being incorporated
into the transnational elite class, would be willing to embark upon such a
progressive project is an open and highly tendentious thesis. Any such movement
would be dependent upon a wholesale shift in the balance of class forces within the
GNU and would have to spring from a base situated within civil society. The
viability of such a scenario opens up rich areas for future research, although
outside the remit of this work. For the time being, and in the absence of such a
comprehensive social movement, South Africa's macro-economic policies remain
wedded to the neo-liberal project, with all the implications and contradictions that
this has for Pretoria's foreign policy behaviour - as this study has attempted to
understand.
17 Susan George 'A Short History of Nee-Liberalism: Twenty Years of Elite Economics and
Emerging Opportunities for Structural Change', paper presented at conference on 'Economic
Sovereignty in a Globalising World', Bangkok, March 24-26, 1999, p. 8.
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